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This dissertation provides the first extended, systematic analysis of De Rerum 
Natura (DRN)’s engagement with the Graeco-Roman satiric traditions and argues that 
DRN plays an important part in the development of the Roman genre of satire.  Chapter 1 
treats key preliminaries to the topic: the prior scholarship on satire in DRN, the typology 
of ancient didactic, the poem’s contexts (literary, philosophical, intellectual), the distinc-
tion between the “mode” of satire and the “genre” of satire, and methodology. 
Chapter 2’s first half develops a portrait of the satirist-figure in Graeco-Roman 
literature, in a synthesis of “satiric” poetry (works that employ the broader “mode” of sat-
ire, as opposed to works of the actual Roman genre of satire) and current scholarship on 
the topic: the satirist employs a personal voice of comic mockery from a self-
contradictory position of moral superiority and social abjection.  Chapter 2’s second half 
evaluates how DRN’s speaker takes on the role of satirist both in familiar “diatribal” or 
“invective” passages (against the Presocratics in book 1, the fear of death in 3, love in 4) 
and in other passages less often connected with satire and comic mockery.  Chapter 3 fo-
cuses on other features of DRN’s engagement with the satiric mode, particularly the for-
mal characteristics of satire and the tensions between satire and didactic in both satiric 
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literature and DRN—which, as both chapters show, deserves inclusion in the category of 
“satiric literature.” 
Chapter 4 turns to the Roman genre of satire.  After examination of ancient defini-
tions of the genre, the term satura, and the programmatic statements by later satirists 
about Lucilius, the chapter considers the thematic, stylistic, generic, and poetic connec-
tions between DRN and earlier Roman satire—not only Lucilius but also Ennius’ 
Saturae.  Chapter 5 argues that DRN takes advantage of generic tropes in Roman satire; 
that Lucretius’ poem influences how the later satirists Horace, Persius, and Juvenal use 
such tropes; and that these satirists allude prominently to DRN.  The chapter also argues 
that the ends of DRN books 2–6 are satires on Roman civic life.  A general conclusion 
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All citations and quotes of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura are from the text of 
Rouse & Smith [1975].  I have modified that text’s spelling conventions to replace low-
ercase V with the more accurate lowercase U, so that the adjective “sweet,” for instance, 
is not suavis but suauis.  For the fragments of the satires of Lucilius, I use the text of 
Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003]. 
All translations are my own.  When quoting modern scholarship in languages 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I use a few instances of shorthand for ease of refer-
ence.  The abbreviation DRN is used to indicate Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura; in citations 
of texts from the satirists, Serm. refers to Horace’s Sermones, and Epist. to his Epistulae.  
Citations to other works are spelled out in full.  Journal abbreviations used in references 
and citations are listed at the beginning of the Works Cited list (pp. 306–307). 
The satires of Lucilius are fragmentary, and have been numbered differently in 
four main editions.  When I cite a fragment of Lucilius, I use C to refer to the numbering 
of the most recent and complete edition (with French translation and commentary), 
Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003], M for the hallmark Teubner text and commentary of 
Marx [1904/1905], W for the Loeb Classical Library text and English translation of 
Warmington [1938], and K for the two-volume text and German translation of Krenkel 
[1970].  For example: “fr. 28.15C = 753M = 820W = 774K.”  In chapter 4, I instead list 
these correspondences in an appendix. 
The term ego refers to the constructed speaker of a literary work that stands as the 
“voice of the author” (see pp. 30–32, below) and is distinct from the poet.  This distinc-
tion is analogous to the widely-adopted distinction in scholarship on Roman erotic elegy 
between poet (e.g., Ovid) and poet-lover (“Ovid”).  Compare Fowler’s use of “the poem” 









“A satirical writer can suffer no worse fate at the hands of posterity 
than to be taken too seriously” 
Powell [1999: 331] 
 
 “ ‘Serious’ is not the opposite of ‘satire.’ 
Satire is especially serious to the satirist” 
Dupuy [2010] 
 
gli autori nascondono di solito il travaglio della loro creazione 
“authors usually hide the working of their creation” 
Pirandello [1999/1921: 50] 
 
 “Clearly, satire is not for the faint-hearted.” 




The aim of this study is to trace the place of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura (hence-
forth DRN) along two paths of satire: first, the broad boulevard of satiric literature from 
the beginning of Greek poetry to the plays and essays of the modern West, and second, 
the narrower lane of Roman verse satire, satura, which begins with the middle Republi-
can authors Ennius and Lucilius and ends in Juvenal’s satire, a product of the Flavian era.  
By examining how Lucretius’ poem employs the tools, techniques, and tactics of satire—
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by evaluating those portions of DRN where the speaker behaves like a satirist—we can 
gain, I argue, a fuller, richer understanding of how the poem works and how its poetry 
and its purported philosophical program interact.  Attention to the role of DRN in the 
more specific tradition of Roman verse satire demonstrates that Lucretius’ poem acts as a 
kind of detour on the highway, a swerve in the trajectory of Roman satire.  DRN’s nu-
merous satiric passages and frequently satiric speaker draw on the earlier Roman satire of 
Ennius and Lucilius, as I will show, and in turn DRN influences the later satiric verse of 
Horace, Persius, and even Juvenal.  While DRN should not in my view be considered sat-
ire in and of itself, it is an important player in the Roman genre’s development. 
This study builds on, extends, and revises the scant and basically outdated corpus 
of scholarship on satire in DRN.  While earlier work, as well as the explicit satiric tone of 
several Lucretian passages (such as the section on love and sex that ends book 4), has 
contributed to the current scholarly consensus that the Lucretian ego is at times a forceful 
and capable satirist,1 nevertheless the record of publications that actually unpack such 
claims is slim.  At the end of the 19th century, Sellar remarked that “the generous scorn of 
Lucretius” shows an “affinity, in some elements of character, to the Roman satirists” 
[1881: 226] and listed a few allusions to Lucilian satire in DRN [249 n. 1], allusions that I 
discuss in chapter 4.  Houghton simply surveys in brief the Lucretian corpus and picks 
out many instances where a passage “rings with satire” [1912: xxxvi] or is “shot through 
with satire” [xxxviii] or where “we hear the voice of the censorious satirist” [xxxv].  
Murley’s short essay argues “that the bulk of satire in Lucretius is very considerable, 
                                                
1 Witness Hardie’s comment that “Lucretius is one of the great Roman satirists, in the 
diatribes against the fear of death and sexual infatuation in Books 3 and 4” [2007: 125]. 
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comparable with the amount we have from Lucilius or Persius; and that he [Lucretius] 
may well for Horace have elevated the definition and tone of Roman satire” [1939: 395]. 
Waltz, who in 1949 compared DRN to the satiric works of literature ranging from 
Ecclesiastes to Voltaire, described DRN’s satire as the flipside of Lucretius’ poetic gen-
ius, and as a spontaneous effect of the impassioned poet’s temperament.2  Lucretian sat-
ire, in other words, is for Waltz part of the Anti-Lucrèce of Patin [1900/1868], part of the 
enthused poetic instincts that fought against the author’s coolly objective Epicurean in-
tents and contributed to the inconsistent mire of philosophy and poetry that scholars used 
to find in DRN.3  For present-day readers of Lucretius’ poem, however, this explanation 
is unsophisticated and insufficient.  A similar position—one that is in my judgment simi-
larly flawed—was staked out by Dudley, according to whom “Lucretius [holds] a posi-
tion of importance in the development of Roman satire though, in a technical sense, he is 
not a satirist at all.  Satire, for him, provided weapons which he was able to use at need” 
[1965: 129].  Dudley’s claim is in essence that the author of DRN should be seen as an 
Epicurean evangelist who delved into satiric tropes and tradition only as a way to further 
his mission of conversion. 
More recent work has dealt with DRN’s satiric aspects only in brief and in micro-
cosm.  Glazewski [1971: 88 n. 2], discussing the re-use in Horace Serm. 1.1 of the Lu-
                                                
2 Waltz compares DRN to Pascal and Dante [1949: 78–80], Molière [93], Ecclesiastes 
[98], Voltaire [100], and Anatole France [103].  Satire as the other half of Lucretius’ gen-
ius: “cette face, secondaire si l’on veut, mais non inférieure, du genie poétique de Lu-
crèce” [1949: 78].  Satire as a product of Lucretius’ temperament: “[c]ette inclination à la 
satire est manifestement un effet spontané de son tempérament, de son tour d’esprit, et 
même de son tour d’imagination” [1949: 79]. 
3 For more modern evaluations of this hypothesis, see Toohey [1996: 103–107], Dalzell 
[1996: 41–44], O’Hara [2007: 64–69].  Bonelli [1979: 89] offers a view similar to Patin; 
see, contra, Konstan [2008/1973: 29 n. 6]. 
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cretian imagery of the “dinner-guest full of life” (DRN 3.938: plenus uitae conuiua, cf. 
my discussion at p. 269–271, below), echoes Houghton and Murley in his claims: 
Lucretius’ effect on the Roman satiric genre in general is greater 
than that with which he is credited.  Writing between Lucilius and 
Horace, he used the hexameter, which was to become the recog-
nized metre of satire; he had a didactic purpose as did Horace; he 
treated as closely akin to his subject (which was primarily ethical) 
many of the contemporary themes of Roman satire on private life. 
 
Kleve [1978] identifies a basis in the Epicurean tradition for the polemical refutation of 
opposing philosophers in DRN book 1 and elsewhere, while Brown cautions that much of 
DRN’s “satiric streak” [1983: 150 n. 26] is new, original to the poem.  Sosin, in a consid-
eration of Lucretian echoes in Persius 1.1–2, in passing describes the opening to DRN 
book 2 as a “satiric proem” and “a dense compilation from his [Lucretius’] own notebook 
on satire” [1999: 285], but the scope of Sosin’s study does not stretch to a wider view of 
the poem’s overall use of satire.  Smith includes DRN under the rubric of “Latin satiric 
literature” [2005a: vii] and reads the satiric attack on love and sex at the end of book 4 
into other passages throughout the whole poem [2005c].  And Schrijvers, who describes 
DRN as “framed by the theme of pietas” [2007: 57], links Lucretius’ poem with the satire 
of Lucilius, which “brought together Stoic virtue and pietas” [64]. 
Each of these prior studies of Lucretian satiric activity, so to speak, is useful but 
incomplete.  They tend to leave the term “satire” undefined, or else identify it almost 
completely with the problematic category “diatribe” (on which see pp. 27–29, below).  
Similarly, they meander through the text of DRN in its order, not in a synoptic or analytic 
way, and often do so with more summary than critical assessment or interpretation.  And 
the connections they make to earlier and later authors of Roman verse satire are rarely 
explicit.  My work, then, offers a corrective in method and in content—beginning with a 
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conscious consideration of two types of satire, “mode” and “genre” (pp. 23–27, below).  
Previous scholarship has in combination mentioned many of the passages I will consider 
here and all of the obvious ones (e.g., the attack on the Presocratics in book 1, the refuta-
tion of the fear of death in book 3, the passage on love and sex in book 4, and the “an-
thropology” or account of human social development in book 5)—but I also offer satiric 
readings and satiric intertexts of lines previously undiscussed in this respect, most nota-
bly the “troubles at sea” opening to DRN book 2.4 
 
 
The literary and cultural context of DRN 
 
To begin, I address and dispense with certain questions regarding the background 
to and intellectual milieu of Lucretius’ poem.  First among these is the matter of the date 
of DRN.  An important distinction is that between “publication” date, or the time when a 
poem was first circulated among at least a small number of outsider readers, and compo-
sition date.  While there is some agreement on the date of publication, with many schol-
ars placing it in the mid-50s BCE, the date of composition is potentially much earlier, as 
Schrijvers cautions: “the cultural background of Lucretius’ poem is not the decade of the 
                                                
4 My project may be compared in some ways to the evaluations of satiric content in other 
works of Latin literature from genres that are not satire, as for instance Greene’s assess-
ment of Roman satire’s influence on and presence in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses [2008]. 
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fifties, when the work was nearly finished, but the eighties and seventies, when the poem 
was conceived, planned, and in full progress.”5 
As for the publication or initial circulation itself, the conventional wisdom has 
been 55 BCE, at the traditional date of Lucretius’ death, from the (unreliable) testimony of 
Donatus.6  Giancotti, based on the Lucretian ego’s call for peace in the poem’s opening 
invocation (1.29–43), recommended an earlier date for the work, 62 BCE, a year of rela-
tive domestic peace after the defeat of Catiline and his co-conspirators [1959: 145–148].  
Hutchinson [2001], however, argues that the speaker’s reference to an “unsteady time in 
our fatherland” (patriai tempore iniquo, 1.41) suggests dating the poem to 49/48 BCE, at 
the outbreak of Roman civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey the Great.  Capasso 
[2003: 100] sees a much more limited circulation among a small circle of those interested 
in Hellenistic philosophy, in 54 BCE, the year of Cicero’s letter mentioning Lucreti poe-
mata, “Lucretius’ poetic work” (Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem 2.9.3, cf. p. 23 n. 32, be-
low), while Schrijvers claims (without substantiation) that DRN was published by Cicero 
circa 50–45 BCE [2007: 51], in an echo of Jerome’s comment (at Chronicle 171.3) that 
Cicero edited or published Lucretius’ poetry after Lucretius’ death in (as Jerome dates it) 
51/50 BCE.  Volk rejects Hutchinson’s claims and, in an argument from DRN’s proem,7 
                                                
5 Schrijvers [2007: 50].  The composition of the poem’s frame (for DRN, its opening in-
vocation of Venus) may provide some indication of when the poem is “set”: the speaker 
describes the circumstances of his composition, and by the process of what Volk calls 
“poetic simultaneity” [2002a: 6–24], the speaker “present[s] the illusion that the poem is 
being composed only as it evolves” [2010: 127]. 
6 This is the date accepted by, e.g., Sandbach [1940: 77] and Gillespie & Hardie [2007a: 
325]. 
7 Volk [2010: 130]: 
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returns to conventional calls for a date of “the mid 50s, a time of great political uncer-
tainty when internal peace at Rome was certainly endangered, but open civil war had not 
yet broken out” [2010: 131]. 
At any rate, the general consensus places DRN as a (final) product of roughly the 
50s BCE, and thus, as Fowler points out, a work appearing during a troubled political cli-
mate: “the Catilinarian ‘conspiracy’ was less than a decade in the past when the poem 
was published, and…memories of it must inevitably have conditioned the poem’s recep-
tion” [1989: 140].  DRN, Fowler argues, is embedded in a political context and the reader 
may therefore justifiably find a political dimension to the work.  As we will see in chap-
ter 5, this backdrop of politics—and the Lucretian ego’s particular take on civic dis-
course—holds much in common with Roman satire from Lucilius onward. 
The period in which DRN began to be circulated was a time not only of political 
turmoil but also of intense intellectual activity.  Despite the Lucretian speaker’s claims to 
be the first to present Epicurus’ teachings in Latin,8 there is ample evidence for Epicurean 
                                                
The logic of the proem’s argument…runs as follows.  The inception and 
progress of the poem are contingent on Venus’ keeping Mars at bay; as 
Lucretius clearly says, his work could not proceed patriai tempore iniquo.  
However, De rerum natura clearly does exist and evolves without a hitch 
from the proem to the end of Book 6.  What we therefore have to conclude 
is that its composition does not take place at a time of war—if at a time 
when the threat of war is clearly felt, since otherwise the invocation to 
Venus would be unnecessary. 
8 As at, e.g., 5.335–337: 
denique natura haec rerum ratioque repertast 
nuper, et hanc primus cum primis ipse repertus 
nunc ego sum in patrias qui possim uertere uoces. 
Furthermore, this nature of things and this system of reasoning has only 
recently been discovered, and I myself have been discovered first 
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authors and philosophers at Rome and in Italy—who were writing and teaching in both 
Greek and Latin—during the 50s BCE and significantly earlier.  There evidently was 
enough Epicureanism at Rome by the 2nd century BCE for it to have gained widespread 
favor (either among the whole citizenry in popularized form or among certain elements of 
the intellectual or aristocratic elite), penetrated the Roman social consciousness, and 
made the ruling class anxious about the philosophy’s civic implications—for in either 
173 or 154 BCE, and again (according to Suetonius De Grammaticis 25.1) in 161 BCE, the 
philosopher-teachers of Epicureanism were expelled from Rome.9  The figure who looms 
large in contemporary testimonia for Roman Epicureanism is Amafinius, a man of uncer-
tain date who (according to Cicero Tusculan Disputations 4.5–7) was the first philoso-
pher to teach in Latin at Rome, and the first to produce written philosophical treatises in 
Latin, works that were immediately popular.10  In other words: there was indeed Epicu-
                                                
among/alongside the first [or “been discovered to be definitely the best”] 
to be able to translate this system into the speech of our fatherland. 
For the meaning of primus cum primis at 5.336, see Howe [1951: 59]: “the primis cum 
primis of Lucretius could mean ‘the first (in excellence) among the first (in times),’ as 
well as ‘definitely the best,’ the usual reading.” 
According to the suggestions of Rouse & Smith [1975: 404–405 n. c ad loc.], the 
speaker of DRN does not refer here to Latin-language Epicurean predecessors because 
such authors’ “works were brief and dealt mainly with ethical doctrine,” while DRN “was 
the first…to give a detailed account of Epicurean physics.” 
9 On the matter of the expulsion, see Ferrary [1988: 354] and Lévy [2003: 54–55].  On 
the testimony of Suetonius, see Garbarino [1973: 370–371].  According to Griffin, public 
teaching of philosophy may have been banned at Rome after 155 BCE [1989: 3]. 
10 Cf. Howe [1951: 57], and further: “[i]n the absence…of definite evidence to the con-
trary, it seems reasonable to regard Amafinius as a contemporary of Lucretius, and to as-
sume that his followers were drawn from the municipia of Italy” [62].  Howe’s argument 
is “not entirely convincing” in the estimation of Rouse & Smith [1975: 405 n. c].  Re-
gardless of the dating of Amafinius, Glazewski’s statement that DRN “was the first Epi-
curean philosophical work among the Romans” [1971: 85] is incorrect, since the Epicu-
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rean philosophy in Latin before DRN, counter to the poem’s own assertions.  In fact, Sed-
ley [1998: 140–141] points to a possible reference at DRN 4.181–182 to Catius and other 
authors who committed Epicurean principles to Latin prose prior to Lucretius’ poem.11 
And Cicero, a contemporary of Lucretius and an author who himself provides a 
great deal of information about Epicurean philosophy, does not identify the author of 
DRN as the leading Roman Epicurean of his day, but rather a certain Velleius.12  Among 
the corpus of texts that survive from antiquity, however, the most prominent Epicurean 
author of this period (besides the author of DRN) is Philodemus, whose philosophical 
texts in Greek make up a major portion of the library found at Herculaneum’s Villa of the 
Papyri, while evidence that the man himself was particularly influential on some ele-
                                                
rean prose authors were themselves the first to produce philosophical works among the 
Romans. 
See additionally Griffin [1989: 9]: “the Epicureans were the first school to present 
their doctrines in Latin in works which…were read all over Italy,” with citations [p. 9 n. 
15] of Cicero De Finibus 2.44; Tusculan Disputations 4.6–7; Epistulae ad Familiares 
15.6.1, 15.19.3; and multiple passages in Epistulae ad Atticum. 
11 “As the small song of the swan is better than that cacophony of cranes scattered in the 
celestial clouds of the southerly wind,” paruus ut est cycni melior, ille gruum quam | 
clamor in aetheriis dispersus nubibus austri, cf. p. 94, below.  Note also Lévy’s assertion 
that it was in the interests of DRN’s author to suppress mention of Amafinius and his ilk: 
“[l]’auteur du De rerum natura, en revance, avait tout intérêt à ne pas mentionner cet en-
combrant prédécesseur [Amafinius], et cela peut contribuer à expliquer les passages dans 
lesquels il se présente comme le premier à exposer en latin la doctrine épicurienne” 
[2003: 52–53]. 
12 Cicero De Natura Deorum 1.15, with Crawley [1963: 12]; note that Cicero’s recogni-
tion of Velleius as the leading Epicurean may simply be for the purposes of Cicero’s own 
dialogue.  The relationship between DRN and Cicero’s own works is complicated, since 
the Ciceronian corpus both predates and postdates Lucretius’ poem.  Fellini [1951] finds 
traces of Cicero’s De Consulatu Suo in DRN; citing Pucci [1966: 72–75], Maslowski 
points out that Cicero’s “De republica is the first dialogue in which traces of the poem 
can be detected” [1974: 74]; Andreoni [1979] defines De Re Publica as anti-Lucretius; 
and Lévy [2003: 53] finds Cicero complicit in an intentional and ill-willed suppression of 
DRN (“une occultation volontaire et malveillante du De rerum natura”). 
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ments of the Roman governing elite can be derived from his presence in Cicero’s In Pi-
sonem, where he appears as a ridiculous “house philosopher” to the degenerate Piso, 
whose property the Villa of the Papyri may have been.13 
Fundamental to the issue of DRN’s intellectual and literary context is the basic 
question of how much in contact with it DRN is.  Does the poem engage with contempo-
rary poetic and philosophical trends, or is it completely ignorant or uninterested in them, 
focused instead solely on the original doctrines of Epicurus and on its poetic place not 
among the stylistic fads of the day but rather within the more ancient and enduring epic-
didactic tradition?  Both sides of this twofold question have been the subject of hot de-
bate, and I am inclined to side with those scholars who argue that DRN is more involved 
in contemporary poetics and philosophy than a first reading of the poem might otherwise 
suggest to a modern reader.  I will briefly survey each matter—first poetry, then philoso-
phy—before moving on to the thornier question of DRN’s readership. 
Besides Cicero and Philodemus, another important extant contemporary of DRN 
is Catullus, whose poetry constitutes a primary source of information on the poetae noui 
of this period, who pioneered a new style of Latin poetry based on Hellenistic Greek 
verse, particularly that of Callimachus.  While most scholars do not go so far as Hahn, 
who links Catullus and Lucretius by their supposed “common Epicureanism” [1966: 
                                                
13 On the importance of In Pisonem for reconstructing the status of Epicurean philosophy 
at Rome, see, e.g., Griffin [1989: 36].  On Philodemus’ philosophy see, among many oth-
ers in a growing body of scholarship, De Lacy [1941: 56–57], Asmis [1991b, 1995], Gi-
gante [1992], Obbink [1995], and Fitzgerald et al. [2004].  For the possibility that a text 
of DRN itself was part of the Villa of the Papyri collection by the time of Vesuvius’ erup-
tion in 79 CE, see Kleve [1989, 1991], whose proposals to this effect have not however 
been universally accepted, cf. Capasso [2003: 85–101].  Regarding the influence of 
Philodemus on Horace’s Sermones and Epistulae, see Armstrong [1993] and Kemp 
[2010]. 
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138], it is possible to find certain noteworthy resemblances between the two poets, as 
Kenney points out [1970: 380], and perhaps even to see mockery of the Catullan poet-
lover in the exclusus amator, the shut-out lover, of the Lucretian assault on sexual pas-
sion and foibles (DRN 4.1177).14  But more important is whether DRN draws, like Catul-
lus’ poetry does, on Hellenistic or Callimachean poetics.  Epicurus was a Hellenistic phi-
losopher, after all, and, as Kenney rhetorically asks, “[c]ould some one so steeped in Hel-
lenistic philosophy have been oblivious of Hellenistic literature?” [1970: 369].  For Ken-
ney, this answer was “no,” and many scholars agree with Kenney’s contention that DRN 
does engage in a significant way with Hellenistic poetics.15  Knox [1999], however, offers 
a minority dissent, suggesting that what Kenney takes to be Callimachean programmatic 
statements (such as the untouched fountains of the Muses at 1.927 = 4.2) are in fact 
merely poetic commonplaces available to a poet familiar only with Greek poetry from 
Homer to the end of the classical period. 
Yet I would maintain that Kenney is correct to tie together the matter of poetry 
and the matter of philosophy.  I see DRN as the product of an author who was familiar 
with poetic and philosophical traditions and trends alike.  Although direct reference to 
Callimachus or another particular Hellenistic poet does not appear in the extant body of 
                                                
14 Brown points out that the word exclusus “in amatory contexts is almost a technical term 
for the lover’s rejection,” not only in Roman elegy postdating DRN but also in the earlier 
Roman comedy of Plautus, Terence, and Afranius [1983: 298 ad loc.].  Brown addition-
ally makes a number of connections in theme, sources, and content between DRN’s pas-
sage on love and sex and the poetry of Catullus [1983: 74, 132, 250, and especially 139–
143], without taking a definitive stance on a direct relation [1983: 140–144].  Gale argues 
for direct influence in both directions, Catullus’ poetry on DRN and vice versa [2007: 69–
70]; for an example of where Catullus arguably alludes to Lucretius, see Skinner [1976]. 
15 Gale, for instance, finds that the purple passage on the Lucretian ego’s poetic produc-
tion (DRN 1.926–950 = 4.1–25) is “rich in Callimachean imagery” [1991: 421]. 
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Epicurus’ own writings, Epicurus and his followers did discuss poetry and its role in the 
idealized Epicurean society, and so we may judge that a poet preparing to write about the 
teachings of Epicurus—and claiming to derive his knowledge directly from that philoso-
pher, not from any intermediary source—would consider it appropriate to be familiar as 
well with at least some of the poetic literature produced in the same language and in the 
same period.  Ferrero [1949] furthermore draws extensive connections between DRN and 
the “new poetry,” the Neotericism contemporary with Lucretius, a literary movement that 
pulls from Hellenistic poetic sources and of which Catullus’ own poetry was an important 
part.  Finally, DRN can be shown to refer intertextually to a number of literary predeces-
sors, from Ennius to Euripides: Gale [2007] is now the strongest statement of this posi-
tion, and forcefully (and in my opinion persuasively) argues that DRN is as much in 
command of the poetic tradition that it inherits as are Vergil and Ovid. 
Thus, in my view, DRN is in contact with Hellenistic poetics as well as Hellenistic 
philosophy, and likewise with contemporary Roman poetics as well as earlier Hellenistic 
poetry and philosophy.  I also believe that DRN is in contact as well with contemporary 
philosophy—namely with the rivalry at Rome (and in Athens) between Epicureanism and 
Stoicism, another vexatious consideration in Lucretian scholarship.  Although the phi-
losophical fight was not merely between Stoics and Epicureans, but in fact between sev-
eral competing schools of thought including Academics and Skeptics and Cynics, most 
scholarly attention has been directed specifically towards Epicureans and Stoics.  The 
question is twofold: is the intellectual viewpoint of DRN isolated from contemporary 
Epicurean philosophy and based exclusively on the work of the master Epicurus himself?  
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And does DRN engage with Stoic philosophy even though there is no explicit reference in 
the poem to Stoicism or to named Stoic philosophers? 
The long-held scholarly communis opinio was that the philosophical subject posi-
tion given voice in DRN was that of a “lone wolf” secluded from contemporary Epicure-
ans, but there has been a great number of dissenting perspectives, especially since the 
1980s.16  On the one hand, as Sedley [1998: chh. 3–5] argues, DRN may be based primar-
ily (or, in Sedley’s estimation, solely) on a single tract of Epicurus, namely On Nature 
(Περὶ φύσεως), to the exclusion of more recent developments by Epicurean philosophy 
postdating the school’s founder himself.17  On the other hand, it is possible to identify 
meaningful connections between DRN and the Epicurean philosophical activity in con-
temporary Campania—so Dorandi [1997]—and even the texts of Philodemus himself, as 
Kleve [1997] claims.  I would posit simply that reliance principally on a seminal text of 
Epicurus does not prevent DRN’s making reference to more recent developments in Epi-
curean philosophy.  At the same time, the present state of knowledge of Roman-era Ital-
ian Epicureanism may be too limited in scope for a conclusive answer to the question. 
Where we do, I believe, find more certain evidence that DRN should not be con-
sidered a “lone wolf” text is in the issue of its treatment (or non-treatment) of the Stoics.  
                                                
16 The term “lone wolf” is from Kenney [1971: 14].  Clay also has supported this perspec-
tive [1983: 196–197], as has Schrijvers [2007: 52], though it has been rejected to varying 
degrees by De Lacy [1948: 19, 23], Asmis [1982], Kleve [1989, 1991, 1997], Dorandi 
[1997], and Lévy [2003: 52–53], among others. 
17 Though see Gottschalk [1996] for one example of where DRN itself appears to proffer 
an innovation to add to the philosophy of Epicurus, an example that Sedley attempts to 
refute [1998: 71 n. 47], in my view unpersuasively.  Likewise see Clay [1983: 35, 169–
191] on DRN’s philosophical originality and Konstan [2006: 599–600] on its limits; 
Rider offers persuasive evidence that the portrayal of animal sacrifice in DRN constitutes 
a rejection of Epicurean orthodoxy that views such sacrifice as a socially constructive 
good [2011: ch. 1]. 
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Sedley rejects the persistent notion that DRN subtly or backhandedly addresses its Stoic 
opposition and finds unconvincing all prior proposals for Lucretian allusion to Stoicism 
[1998: ch. 3].  So, in Sedley’s formulation, Lucretius is an Epicurean “fundamentalist,” 
and since Epicurus himself did not respond to Stoics in DRN’s sole source-text Περὶ 
φύσεως, DRN therefore does not respond to Stoics either.  Yet many other scholars writ-
ing both before and after Sedley have found allusions to elements of Stoic ideology in, 
for instance, the refutation of Heraclitus, the terms inanis, stulti, and stolidi (the latter two 
are possibly punning pointers to the name “Stoic”) in reference to the philosophically or 
scientifically misguided, and finally the gentle mockery of Heracles at DRN 5.23.18 
Responding to Sedley, Campbell [1999] suggests, in my view profitably, that 
DRN’s “failure to become involved in detailed arguments with the Skeptics and Stoics 
over their attacks on Epicurean theory…may only indicate that there is little place for 
them in a cosmological didactic poem.”  In other words, explicit squabbles with rival 
                                                
18 Heraclitus: Bailey remarks that the Lucretian speaker “seems to have had in mind the 
Stoics more than Heraclitus himself” [1947: 711 ad 1.635–704].  The misguided inanes 
and so forth: cf. Piazzi [2005: 28–30, 90–91].  Heracles: the proposition is made by 
Rouse & Smith [1975: 381 n. d ad 5.23].  Warren, speaking more generally, splits the 
Gordian knot by stating that “if our interests are primarily philosophical then Lucretius’ 
intent in writing a particular passage matters little.…[W]e are at liberty to put Lucretius 
in discussion with Stoic philosophy ourselves” [2007: 24].  I am inclined to agree.  I do 
not see DRN as the product of a “lone wolf” poet or a “lone wolf” philosopher, hence I 
consider it more productive to evaluate DRN embedded in its cultural (and literary and 
intellectual) context than to consider it in isolation. 
So also would DRN’s readership have been at liberty to find Stoicism in the un-
derbrush of Lucretius’ poem.  As Warren continues, “[s]ome readers [of DRN] may miss 
the heated tone of inter-school debate of this period…But the DRN is not that kind of 
work” [2007: 24–25].  Warren additionally proposes that DRN’s attacks on three 
Presocratic philosophers serve as general refutations of three categories of philosophical 
approach, not merely particular invective against a specific Presocratic or a specific con-
temporary rival school such as the Stoics [2007: 26–28].  See further arguments for read-
ing Stoics into the text by Packman [1975–1976], Asmis [1982], Brown [1983: 147 n. 9], 
Harrison [1990], Schmidt [1990], Lévy [1999], and Fowler [2000c]. 
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schools may not fit well with the epic scope and high tone that DRN’s speaker adopts and 
affects, and so their absence from the poem can be taken as a sign not of ignorance of the 
Stoics or other rivals but rather of disdain or casual disregard for their intricacies.19  I 
would tentatively add that we may find some value in the notion that DRN in fact is de-
liberately ambiguous on the matter of engaging the Stoics—that this question is actually 
directed at the reader, and potentially complicates the reception of the Lucretian 
speaker’s message. 
Even more complicated and contentious is the last element of DRN’s intellectual 
context that I will take up: its readership, its intended audience.  Here the issue divides 
into three sub-questions: is DRN a literarily learned or unlearned poem?  What is the so-
cial status of the intended audience?  And does DRN target someone completely unfamil-
iar with philosophy, or rather a reader with some degree of familiarity with Epicureanism 
specifically, or with the various philosophical traditions more generally?  The first in-
quiry, concerning whether DRN is unlearned, I pass over, since I have already sided with 
scholars (such as O’Hara [1998: 70], Minyard [1985: 28 n. 14; 37; 78], or Gale [2007], 
for example) who find DRN to be very much in touch with contemporary literary trends 
against those like, e.g., Knox [1999: 276] who reject the idea that DRN is learned in the 
same respect as Catullus and other contemporary Neoterics.20  To some extent, a more 
poetically learned DRN implies a more restrictive audience, since learned poetry calls for 
learned readers, but the content of DRN is not so obscured by stylistic refinement as to 
                                                
19 Cf. also Griffin [1989: 13]: “[t]here is also ample evidence for Romans maintaining 
that philosophical problems and controversies should not be taken too seriously.” 
20 Cf. also Kenney’s statement that “D.R.N. is a poem in the fullest sense: a literary pro-
duction belonging in a literary tradition and written in a complete awareness of the laws 
and conventions shaping that tradition” [1971: 14]. 
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prevent its comprehension and appreciation by readers unaware of the multiple poetic 
traditions with which the poem engages. 
When it comes to the class or social status of the Romans who form the notional 
audience of DRN, two basic opinions have been expressed.  First is the idea that, in Min-
yard’s formulation, “the De Rerum Natura is nothing if not an oligarchic poem” [1985: 
45]—that is, directed to the attention and concerns of the Roman aristocracy, the no-
biles.21  The opposing opinion, expressed by, e.g., Howe [1948], is that DRN was de-
signed to be inclusive of and appealing to a less-well educated group of nouveau riche—
like Roman citizens who had made their fortunes as part of the Roman army or through 
trade, and who were not familiar already with Greek philosophies or with the Greek liter-
ary tradition more generally.22  Sedley, as well, posits a readership that knows some 
Greek but is not a part of the philhellenic literati of elite Rome [1999: 244], while Wise-
man posited a Lucretius who was a wage-earner writing for a divided audience.23 
Now, at the most basic level, we can I believe say with certainty that DRN’s in-
tended audience would have been restricted to a relatively small subsection of Roman 
society—namely, those who either could read (and afford access to a written copy of 
                                                
21 So also Momigliano [1941: 151], Taylor [1949: 96], Maslowski [1974: 76], Cabisius 
[1979: 247], Dalzell [1982: 36; 1996: 46–51], Gale [1994a: 89], Schrijvers [2007: 62–
63], and Crawley [1963: 5–6]: 
The field of Epicureanism was universal.  Lucretius’ horizon was nar-
rower.  He restricted the field of his evangelistic mission to his own coun-
trymen, and among his own countrymen mainly to the aristocracy.  He had 
less need, and felt less obligation, to appeal to the masses. 
22 Howe [1957] also proposes that DRN was written for readers in Roman municipia, 
towns outside Rome. 
23 Wiseman [1974], in a biographical essay received rather dismissively, cf., e.g., Beten-
sky [1980]. 
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DRN) or who would have been able to gain entry to a recitatio of the poem, if indeed 
such performances of Lucretius’ work ever took place.  But within this subset, I see nei-
ther a resolution to the question of whether the intended audience was broad or narrow, 
nor a conclusive way to identify a narrower stratum of audience—rich or otherwise, well-
educated or fresh from the field of battle, philhellenic or novice to Greek culture.  While 
certain bits of Lucretian imagery may seem targeted to an upper echelon of the Roman 
ruling class, as with the speaker’s mention in book 2 of “looking out at your legions” 
(tuas legiones…cum uideas, 40–41), these are far fewer than the examples drawn from 
everyday life, like those involving puddles (1.305–310), flocks (2.317–322), and laundry 
(6.470–475), examples accessible to essentially all Roman readers.  And at any rate the 
average (literate) soldier would have no difficulty imagining himself surveying a legion 
even if he himself were not a commander. 
More important is whether DRN addresses philosophical novices, or those well-
trained in philosophy already.24  Kenney notes an apparent contradiction in the basic 
status of DRN as a literary poem that claims to teach the fundamental precepts of Epicu-
rean philosophy: “Lucretius wrote for cultivated readers, who must be prepared to take a 
                                                
24 The nominal or explicit addressee/dedicatee of DRN, Memmius, seems to have pos-
sessed the land in Athens where Epicurus’ own house had stood, fallen into disrepair by 
Memmius’ own time—and Memmius evidently was planning to demolish the structural 
remains, either out of dislike for Epicurus’ more lasting philosophical legacy or merely 
from a less sinister disinclination to allow potentially profitable real estate lie fallow as a 
historical relic, cf. Griffin [1989: 16–17 and n. 27]. 
If Memmius was in fact hostile to the concerns of the adherents of Epicurus, then 
his place in DRN is as a resisting reader (see Fetterley [1979] for the term) whom the nar-
rator must sway or (as Mitsis [1993] and Volk [2002a: 81] argue) browbeat into an ac-
ceptance of Epicurean principles.  I discuss Memmius as addressee of DRN in more detail 
in chapter 2 (pp. 123–127, below), and see also an additional note on Memmius in this 
chapter (p. 31 n. 49, below). 
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good deal of trouble if they are to follow him, yet his approach…is the same as that of 
more popular philosophers” [1971: 17].  For some scholars, the intended audience of 
DRN was to be familiar already with at least some aspects of Epicurus’ core scientific 
beliefs—as Crawley puts it, “Lucretius is difficult.  His argument makes considerable 
demands on the reader” [1963: 17].  For many others, DRN targets a less well-educated 
audience, one aided by the poem’s didactic pose and framework.25  Warren posits a 
reader who is philosophically undeclared, as yet uninitiated into the teachings of one par-
ticular school [2007: 31], while Reinhardt [2002: 292], building on Kleve [1979], states 
that “DRN presupposes a reader who is a complete novice in Epicurean philosophy.” 
In O’Hara’s estimation, DRN does not suggest a learned Epicurean audience, one 
thoroughly knowledgeable in philosophy: “the more learned modern scholars become in 
respect to Epicureanism, the more removed their experience of the poem becomes from 
that of the ordinary Roman reader of the poem.”26  This point emblematizes the issue at 
hand: who in fact was the “ordinary Roman reader” of DRN?  I believe that the matter is 
too complex for easy resolution based on the poem’s didactic stance or explanations of 
Epicurean fundamentals.  From these observations we can gather that DRN is not primar-
ily designed as a treatise such as those of Philodemus, expanding or rethinking the Epicu-
rean body of philosophy—but we can arrive at the same conclusion by observing that it is 
a poem, not a straightforward prose essay or a Platonic-style dialogue, the two predomi-
nant media for hardcore philosophy after the time of the Presocratics.  Without better 
                                                
25 E.g., Howe [1948], Wallach [1976: 6], and Roggen [2008: 548]. 
26 O’Hara [2007: 61]—and further, “[n]othing about the De Rerum Natura suggests that 
Lucretius is preaching to the choir” [ibidem].  Compare also the “ordinary reader” to 
which Dalzell on occasion appeals [1996: 61, e.g.]. 
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evidence, we are left, in my estimation, with aporia, and I suggest we embrace it, and 
conceive of DRN’s intended readership broadly.  There is value in Lucretius’ poem for 
the learned and unlearned alike, both for the Epicurean expert and for the philosophical 
novice.  The latter can learn about Epicurus and his philosophy, can be initiated into new 
poetic ground, can learn the path to the good life.  The former can derive pleasure in an 
Epicurean epic, can trace the literary heritage of the poem’s images and style, can enjoy 
watching the fictive internal audience of the didactic as it struggles towards Epicurean 
ἀταραξία, freedom from anxiety—just as the Epicurean enjoys seeing trouble at sea 
from the shore in DRN book 2. 
What is at stake here is how we ought to respond to certain problems in the inter-
pretation of the poem, specifically the distortions of rival philosophies (as in the refuta-
tion of the Presocratics in DRN book 1—see my discussion of DRN’s “straw man” argu-
ments in ch. 3, pp. 177–180, below) and the occasional conflict between DRN’s account 
of Epicurean thought and other evidence for the contemporary state of Epicurean scholar-
ship, conflicts that in Sedley’s view prove that DRN is a product of Epicurean “funda-
mentalism” [again 1998: ch. 3].  If we take the poem’s intended audience to be narrowly 
those new to Epicurean philosophy—those who have encountered neither the tough 
Greek of Philodemus nor the introductory Latin prose tracts of Amafinius, Catius, or oth-
ers—then these distortions are unfair polemical tactics from an unreliable didact, and the 
discrepancies with contemporary Epicureanism are the work indeed of a fundamentalist, 
a lone wolf, or else an unserious philosopher.  But if we include a wider range of phi-
losophical backgrounds in the poem’s desired readership, then the inconsistencies be-
tween what the poem says and what external testimonia show may be seen instead as  
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thought-provoking quirks, as an interpretive gap that draws the attentive and informed 
reader into active engagement with the poem’s didactic plot, and calls attention as well to 
its very literariness, its purpose beyond being a mere primer on Epicureanism.27 
In other words, I suggest that DRN functions as more than one kind of didactic 
simultaneously.  Effe schematized a typology of ancient didactic [1977: passim, esp. pp. 
26–39] based on a poem’s “Stoff,” or nominal/express subject matter, and its “Thema,” 
its true subject or theme.28  Where Stoff and Thema are identical, the didactic is “ideal” or 
“sachbezogen,” as in a standard modern Latin grammar textbook (or, in Effe’s estima-
tion, Manilius’ Astronomica).  Where a poem’s Stoff is subordinated to a different or 
broader Thema—as in Vergil’s Georgics, where scholarly consensus holds that the sup-
posed poetic handbook on farming in fact carries an allegorical or metapoetic or other-
wise metaphorical message greater in scale than agriculture alone—the term is “transpar-
ent.”  And when both Stoff and Thema are subordinate to concerns of style, aesthetics, or 
poetic art (as in Nicander’s Alexipharmaca, a kind of poetic showpiece on the topic of 
snake venoms), the didactic is “formal.”29 
Effe categorizes DRN as “sachbezogen,” and Dalzell agrees: “the poem must be 
included in the class of didactic works which take their message seriously” [1996: 70].  
                                                
27 Cf. Dalzell’s point that “[a] didactic poem always implies two kinds of reader: the im-
mediate pupil to whom the poem is addressed and the true reader to whom this sophisti-
cated kind of poetry will appeal” [1996: 50].  For the term “didactic plot,” which refers to 
the development of the teaching scenario implied by a didactic poem’s progression, see 
Fowler [2000a]. 
28 As Volk [2002a: 4] points out, a major problem with this typology is its reliance, at 
least as originally formulated, on an assertion of the author’s intention—and intentional-
ity is a difficult thing to access from the text alone. 
29 Heath combines “sachbezogen” and “transparent” didactic into the category “final” di-
dactic and renames “formal” didactic “purely formal” [1985: 254 n. 31]. 
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Volk prefers to avoid questions of intention and adopts instead the “empirical” model 
[2002a: 41] of the 10th-century Peripatetic/pseudo-Aristotelian epitome called Tractatus 
Coislianus, which distinguishes between didactic (or παιδευτική) poetry that is “instruc-
tional” or “practical” (ὑφηγητική) and didactic that is “theoretical” (θεωρητική).  Ver-
gil’s Georgics would thus be “instructional,” as the subject of its didaxis is a “how-to” of 
farming, and DRN’s laying out of the Epicurean cosmological system would be “theoreti-
cal.”  Whereas Dalzell, Effe, and many others focus on Lucretius’ poem as sachbezogen 
or ideal or theoretical or final didaxis—in other words, they take DRN as primarily a 
teaching text intended to persuade or convert its readers—I believe that the poem is just 
as much an instance of formal didactic, one whose purpose is artistic and poetic rather 
than simply to teach a praxis or a principle.  Indeed, Lucretius’ Epicurean contemporary 
Philodemus himself viewed the didactic role of poetry as a formal one, too: “[t]hat poetry 
is only an imitation of didactic speech—not really didactic, but needing to appear to con-
vey information of some kind—is a point on which Philodemus is prepared to insist in 
some detail.”30 
The all-inclusive target audience I advocate for DRN is similar to an audience that 
Cicero’s ego claims for his own literary and philosophical work, in contradistinction to 
the intended audience of the satirist Lucilius.  According to Cicero’s De Oratore, “Gaius 
Lucilius, a learned and thoroughly sophisticated man, used to say that he wanted the 
things he’d written to be read neither by the very unlearned nor by the very learned, be-
                                                
30 Armstrong [1993: 224; emphasis preserved].  Cf. Volk [2002a: 63], referring to DRN, 
Vergil’s Georgics, Ovid’s Ars Amatoria and Remedia Amoris, and Manilius’ Astro-
nomica: “[o]n the whole, the Latin works in question, for all their poetic self-
consciousness, do not show themselves to be particularly aware of being specifically di-
dactic poetry,” and Toohey [1996: 2–5]. 
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cause the one group would understand nothing, and the other group would perhaps under-
stand more than he himself did” (2.25: C. Lucilius, homo doctus et perurbanus, dicere 
solebat ea quae scriberet neque se ab indoctissimis neque a doctissimis legi uelle, quod 
alteri nihil intellegerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse).  This middle road is what DRN’s 
intended readership looks like if the audience is made up of novices, of those unfamiliar 
with Epicurean philosophy.  The very unlearned cannot follow the sometimes difficult 
argumentation and concepts of the philosophy, and the very learned could find fault with 
the distortions and discrepancies I mentioned above. 
By contrast, the Ciceronian speaker elsewhere describes to his interlocutor Brutus 
an intended audience wider than the kind that he described for Lucilius: 
nec uero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea le-
gant.  utinam essent ille Persius, Scipio uero et Rutilius multo 
etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et 
Consentinis et Siculis scribere.  facete is quidem, sicut alia; sed 
neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret…ego 
autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem ceden-
tem in philosophia audeam scribere? 
       (De Finibus 1.7–8) 
  
And indeed I will not, like our dear Lucilius, shrink back from hav-
ing everyone read my writings.  If only that Persius were around, 
and much more indeed Scipio and Rutilius, whose judgment he 
[Lucilius] feared and said instead he was writing for people in Tar-
entum and Consentia and Sicily.  Of course he was speaking hu-
morously, as elsewhere—but also people for whose judgment he 
was toiling were not so learned.…Yet I, whom should I fear as a 
reader, when I dare to write to you, a person second not even to the 
Greeks in philosophy? 
 
For the late Republican author of philosophy and poetry, in this passage, the age is liter-
ate and sophisticated—sophisticated enough, by the way, to perceive that the Lucilian 
ego who claims to fear the judgment of learned men is not necessarily speaking in ear-
nest—and a portion of Roman readers of the day can compete with Greeks in philosophi-
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cal erudition.31  Cicero’s speaker embraces the audience Lucilius picked for himself, but 
adds on the doctissimi as well.  This broadly defined aspirational readership is what I be-
lieve is most profitable for the readership of DRN, the construction most productive for 
the interpretation of the poem on both literary and philosophical levels.  And if indeed, as 
seems likely, the tantalizing reference to a certain Lucretius in one of Cicero’s letters is in 
fact a valid testimonium for our poem,32 then we have evidence that one of the Romans 
most learned of all time in philosophy, Cicero himself, no novice to Epicurean doctrine, 
formed part of DRN’s original audience. 
 
 
Satire: genre and mode 
 
This study approaches Lucretian connections to satire from two angles: genre and 
mode.  By “genre” I mean that I will pay careful attention to the interaction between DRN 
and the specific texts of the Roman genre of verse satire, Ennius and Lucilius through 
Juvenal.  In Culler’s formulation, “genres are not special varieties of language but sets of 
expectations which allow sentences of a language to become signs…in a second-order 
literary system.  The same sentence can have a different meaning depending on the genre 
                                                
31 I thank Caroline B. Bishop for drawing these two passages, and their connection to 
Cicero’s own foray into didactic (Aratea), to my attention. 
32 Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem 2.9.3: Lucreti poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt multis lu-
minibus ingenii, multae etiam artis, “Lucretius’ poetic work, just as you write, has many 
flashes of talent/genius/character, and also of great skill,” with, among others, Sandbach 
[1940], Pizzani [1959: 38–40], and Clay [1969: 31–32]. 
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in which it appears.”33  Roman satire possesses a set of expectations of this kind, and 
Roman satire’s constituents are linked particularly by common and recurrent generic 
tropes, as we will see throughout chapter 5.  Ancient boundaries of genre furthermore 
tended to be more firmly defined, with the satura of Juvenal and his predecessors stand-
ing distinct from, for instance, the epic of Vergil’s Aeneid or the bucolic of his Eclogues, 
even though all three use the same dactylic hexameter verse form.  Whereas modern con-
ceptions of genre, like that of Culler, can allow for a wide range of texts and characteris-
tics to fall under a single rubric, for our purposes the “genre” of satire will remain fixed 
and closed.34 
By “satiric mode,” on the other hand, I refer to the less formally delimited set of 
satiric tools and techniques that characterizes satirists and satiric figures from Archilo-
chus and Aristophanes to Jonathan Swift.  Rosen, who discusses satiric figures in Homer, 
Callimachus, and a variety of other Greek and Roman poets, describes satire as “a fun-
damentally comic mode,” one based on humorous mockery and comedic attack [2007: 
246–247].  The “mode” of satire consists both of the complex and often ambiguous sub-
jectivity with which the satiric ego is constructed and also of the techniques and strategies 
exploited by poets of mockery.  In this sense, the satiric mode is a set of tools that an 
                                                
33 Culler [1980: 116].  We might think, for instance, of how the epic Vergilian phrase 
“this is the task, this the toil” (Aeneid 6.129: hoc opus, hic labor est) is transfigured in 
meaning when placed in the elegiac/amatory pseudo-didactic context of Ovid’s Ars Ama-
toria (1.453). 
34 Rosen distinguishes between “inductive” and “deductive” conceptions of genre: induc-
tive methods draw their definitions of a genre from specific texts, whereas a deductive 
approach searches for an abstraction that is “conceptually prior” to particular aspects of 
specific works [2007: 13].  Roman satura, therefore, is an inductively delineated genre, 
while my own project of investigating the connections between DRN and satura is, in 
these terms, deductive.  Rosen discusses these issues further [2007: 13–14 and n. 17], 
with citations to relevant theoretical work on genre. 
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author uses to accomplish certain objectives within the larger work as a whole.  Catullus, 
for example, is not a satirist per se, but his use of comic mockery—his occasional func-
tion as a satiric poet—plays part of his wider poetic program.  Works that are not to be 
classified generically as satire can thus nevertheless use the mode of satire, and likewise 
the genre of satire frequently—but not always—employs the mode of satire. 
I note that this distinction, which is what I will use for my inquiries in the follow-
ing chapters, is not clear-cut or undisputed.  In fact, the bibliography on whether satire 
generally (not only in Greek and Roman literature) should be considered a mode, a genre, 
or some other phenomenon is extensive and disunified.35  Simpson posits a cross-
temporal analysis of satire neither as a mode or as a genre but instead as a “discourse” or 
“discursive practice”—that is, “as a level of language organization that supersedes that of 
the sentence and…as a type of meaning potential that arises out of the interaction be-
tween text and context” [2003: 1].  This view of satire, in contradistinction to more con-
ventional mechanisms of evaluation based on text types (genres) or stylistic registers 
(modes), encompasses a literary phenomenon wherein some aspect of the text’s cultural 
setting engenders “disapprobation” in the text’s “producer,” the satirist [8].  A variety of 
satiric events can fall under this conception of satire, even nonstandard texts or “everyday 
                                                
35 I offer a few representative examples.  Satire as mode: Paulson [1967], Bloom & 
Bloom [1979], Griffin [1994], and Connery & Combe [1995b: 9]: “in general usage, ‘sat-
ire’ remains less an identifiable genre than a mode.”  As genre: Frye [1957: 223–239, 
309–314], Kernan [1959], and Guilhamet [1987].  Others reject the mode-or-genre debate 
in favor of a thematic approach—e.g., Carretta [1983] and Nokes [1987]. 
For an extensive annotated bibliography, see Lynch [1995], in addition to Nilsen 
[1987].  See also the overview provided by Simpson [2003: 51–53]. 
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humour practices” [5], and a text’s engaging in the discourse of satire is not exclusive of 
engagement in other discourses [7].36 
When limited to ancient Greek and Roman works, satire is, in my estimation, 
somewhat easier to conceptualize, especially given the possibility of division between the 
broader category of mode and the more restrictive subset of Roman satire.  The latter, the 
genre of satura, is not without complications—Freudenburg has called Roman satire an 
“anti-genre” [2001: 1, cf. pp. 26–27] and Habinek notes that “Roman satire describes it-
self as play more often than it describes itself as satire” [2005: 177], a fact that may indi-
cate a functional rather than a generic view of satura among the satirists themselves.  But 
we can see a qualitative distinction between what I am identifying as generic works of 
satire and other works that employ the mocking invective characteristic to the mode of 
satire but are not themselves part of the genre, as when for instance Horace makes a firm 
division between his Epodes and his satire (his Sermones): 
denique non omnes eadem mirantur amantque; 
carmine tu gaudes, hic delectatur iambis, 
ille Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro. 
tres mihi conuiuae prope dissentire uidetur, 
poscentes uario multum diuersa palato. 
       (Epist. 2.2.58–62) 
 
Furthermore, not everyone admires and loves the same things.  You 
might enjoy (my) odes, this guy may take pleasure in (my) iam-
bics, that guy perhaps in (my) conversation/satire and in (my) dark 
wit.  It seems to me almost like three dinner companions having an 
argument, as they’re asking for quite different things because of 
their dissimilar tastes.37 
 
                                                
36 For further discussion, see Simpson [2003: 69–110, 211–220]. 
37 Cf. Brink [1982: ad loc.], Mankin [1987], and Epist. 1.19.23–34. 
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His Epodes, “iambics,” are separated from his Sermones, “conversations” or “satires,” 
not only in meter (epodic iambs as opposed to satire’s dactylic hexameters) but in taste, 
in nutritive or poetic content.  Whereas some scholars writing previously on DRN and 
satire have looked at satire as a functional or modal phenomenon,38 I will combine both 
approaches, and examine not only how DRN is “satiric” in its use of the satiric mode but 
also how it is affected by and itself affects the tradition of the Roman genre of satura. 
Of what, then, does the genre of satire consist?  The scholarly consensus includes 
the fragmentary corpus of Lucilius (2nd century BCE), the two books of Sermones by 
Horace (35–30 BCE), the six satires with preface of the Neronian author Persius (mid/late-
1st century CE), and the hefty collection of Juvenal’s satires (early 2nd century CE).39  Addi-
tionally, I side with those scholars who include before Lucilius the fragments of Saturae 
by Ennius.  Although the poetry is very poorly understood on account of the paucity of 
lines surviving, it contains enough in common with Lucilius—and the generic rules of 
satura were in Ennius’ time non-existent—so that I believe it merits inclusion.40  I remain 
agnostic on the suggestions by Flintoff that Naevius [1988] and Pacuvius [1990] may 
have written satire too, since at any rate there are not sufficient fragments of their poten-
tially satiric works to enable serious consideration in this study. 
A final note is in order here, on the matter of “diatribe.”  This term has been ap-
plied by modern scholars to a purported Greek genre of popular philosophy—the rants 
                                                
38 Waltz, for example, states that for DRN satire is a medium, not an object: “[l]a satire 
pour Lucrèce n’est pas un but, un objet propre: c’est un moyen, mais c’est un moyen de 
choix, pour lequel il possède un don irrécusable” [1949: 102]. 
39 I pass over for the purposes of this study the prosimetric satire of Varro (Saturae 
Menippeae, cf. p. 199 n. 2, below). And the satiric novel Satyrica of Petronius.  
40 I defend this decision more fully in chapter 4 (pp. 207–208 and n. 19, below). 
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and raves of so-called “street philosophers”—and is epitomized by Bion of Borysthe-
nes.41  The concept of Greek philosophical diatribe has occasioned a sizable amount of 
comment by interpreters of DRN, particularly Vallette [1940], Lavagnini [1947], Ferrero 
[1949: 31–33, 136, 142], Conte [1965, 1966], and Kenney [1971: 17–20, 212].  Wallach 
explains the refutation of the fear of death, at DRN 3.830–1094, as “a diatribe in poetic 
form” [1976: 106] and argues at length for “diatribal” source for almost every aspect of 
this passage [1976: passim], and indeed the passage is now commonly invoked as a “dia-
tribe on the fear of death.”42  But as the debate between Jocelyn and Gottschalk has indi-
cated, the “genre” of diatribe is arguably illusory, the Greek term διατριβή means “way 
to spend time” or “discourse,” and so claims for a “diatribal” origin of DRN’s attack on 
fears of mortality are unfounded.43  So also, more recently, has the connection between 
Roman satire and “diatribe” been reconsidered.  Whereas the philosophical elements of 
Horace’s Sermones and Persius’ satire have previously been seen as signs of (or allusions 
to) street-philosopher’s diatribe, the picture is now more complicated, as is evident in 
Freudenburg’s point that both authors’ seeming links to diatribe are problematic: 
“[d]iatribe’s trappings, for Persius (much as they were for Horace), are a holdover and a 
                                                
41 For the notion of diatribe as a Roman literary form, see Oltramare [1926]. 
42 E.g., Toohey [1996: 102], Armstrong [2004: 21], Hopkins [2007: 239], or Hardie 
[2007: 125], quoted at p. 2, above; cf. similarly the appellation “diatribe against love” for 
the end of DRN book 4 used by, e.g., Hamilton [1993: 249], or Fowler’s term for DRN 
2.34–36, “the diatribe against luxury” [2002: 108 ad loc.]. 
43 Jocelyn [1982, 1983]; Gottschalk [1982, 1983].  For a more nuanced take on DRN and 
allegedly “diatribal” elements than that of Wallach, see Piazzi [2005: 16–19]. 
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tease, for it is exactly when those trappings are most prominent…that this poet shows 
himself the least diatribal of all satirists.”44 
Perhaps we might consider diatribe (like one meaning of διατριβή) a discourse 
instead of a genre, in line with Simpson’s discourse model of satire.  Diatribe as we may 
perceive it in Bion or in Horace’s Sermones is not a genre in and of itself, nor a register 
or mode, but rather a discursive response of the speaker (or producer) to a certain stimu-
lus in the speaker’s cultural context.  This position, I add, accounts for the practical defi-
nition of the term “diatribe” in modern usage—a speech-act, a discursive event, that can 
arise in almost any text or context and can co-exist with other literary discourses.  Re-
gardless, what I believe we should take from the de-emphasis of diatribe’s influence on 
Lucretius’ poem and on the Roman satirists is an invitation to consider more closely 
aligned the “diatribal” or satiric elements of DRN and those of the Roman genre of satire.  
If they cannot be drawing from a non-existent genre as a common source, then perhaps 
they are, as I will argue in chapters 4 and 5, interacting with each other more significantly 





Two of the specific methodologies that most significantly inform my approach in 
this study are intertextuality and reader-response theory, and I cite relevant methodologi-
                                                
44 Freudenburg [2001: 188, cf. p. 7].  I treat in detail the attack on the fear of death of 
DRN book 3 in chapter 2 (pp. 103–104 and 133–139, below). 
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cal scholarship when using theoretical terminology or techniques throughout the chapters 
that follow.  Important publications on DRN and these methods include Clay on “Lu-
cretius and His Reader” [1983: 212–266] and Rumpf on Lucretian intertexts and allusion 
[2003: ch. 2].  Of note is the question of first and second readings of the poem.  On the 
one hand, DRN’s surprising conclusion with the destructive plague of Athens can seem to 
invite the reader to revisit or reread the poem in part or in its entirety, as Segal has ar-
gued.45  But on the other hand, the extent to which second readings of texts such as Lu-
cretius’ were common, desired, or even possible in the ancient world is unclear, and the 
poem’s speaker presents it as one that is to educate the newcomer to Epicurean philoso-
phy in an appealing literary format, not to reward the literati who take the time to read 
and reread and rehash the work.  At different points, I believe, it is useful to view the 
work through the differing lenses of the first reader and the second reader:46 just as there 
is value in considering how the poem may have operated for the philosophically ad-
vanced and the philosophically naïve historical reader, so also it is worthwhile to examine 
aspects of Lucretius’ verse both from the viewpoint of a fresh reader and from our own 
perspective, conditioned by multiple interactions with DRN and the other components of 
its intellectual constellation. 
Throughout this study I refer not to what “Lucretius” does or says but to what the 
“Lucretian ego” or “DRN’s narrator” or “Lucretius’ speaker” does and says.  In doing so, 
I embrace the interpretive framework currently in use for scholarship on Roman elegy, 
                                                
45 Segal [1990: ch. 10].  See my discussion of the end of DRN book 6 in chapter 3 (pp. 
189–192, below). 
46 On the first- and second-reader subject positions, see Solomon [2004], cf. Winkler 
[1985: 10]. 
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Roman satire, and Greek lyric, namely a distinct separation between author and speaker, 
such as between Propertius the elegist and “Propertius” the poet-lover who narrates Prop-
ertius’ elegies.47  And I reject the traditional manner of conflating Lucretius the author of 
DRN with the unnamed speaker who advocates adoption of Epicurean philosophy, a con-
flation exemplified by the long-held and now-vitiated conception of a poetic “Anti-
Lucretius” disrupting the philosophy of the Epicurean “Lucretius.”48  My position is simi-
lar to Clay’s argument that “the distinction between [the historical] Gaius Memmius L. f. 
and the reader implied in the poem is crucial”49—in both cases, the historical figure is 
kept separate from the fictional identity that plays an important role within the poem.  
Rosen discusses the difficulty of separating poet from persona in literary genres outside 
of drama (where the fact of the theater usually, but not always, makes clear that the 
speaker is not to be identified with the playwright), because the speaker’s eponymity with 
                                                
47 In elegy scholarship, take for instance the formulation “the Propertian poet-lover” used 
by, among others, Ross [2010/1975: 49], James [2003: 285 n. 56], and Debrohun [1994; 
2003: 179].  In satire, consider the term “the Horatian ego” of, e.g., Smith [2006: 433].  
And for the phrase “the lyric ‘I,’ ” see Calame [2001/1977: 255–258]. 
48 The concept of an “Anti-Lucrèce chez Lucrèce” derives from Patin [1900/1868].  
Compare also the conceptual slippage inherent in Waltz’ description of Lucretius himself 
as a passionate logician who idolizes his master Epicurus: “Lucrèce est un logicien pas-
sionné.  Il est si ardemment convaincu de posséder grâce à son maître—et à son idole—
Épicure la vérité sur la Nature des choses…” [1949: 79]. 
49 Clay [1983: 213], continuing: “for it allows us, as readers of the poem, to abandon the 
enchantments of Clio for the instruction of Calliope…[and] to see Lucretius’ poem as 
part of an ancient poetic tradition” [ibidem], cf. also Rumpf [2003: 19] and, arguing 
against Clay’s firm separation, Mitsis [1993: 124 n. 21]: “[i]t is surely too simplistic 
merely to identify ‘Memmius’ with C. Memmius—but it would be equally odd for Lu-
cretius to choose ‘Memmius’ as his addressee if he wished to avoid any slippage between 
his literary creation and historical reality.”  Contrast Dalzell [1996: 51]: “[t]he character 
of Memmius in the De rerum natura is part of the fiction of the poem.”  I return to Mit-
sis’ broader argument on the Memmius character in chapter 2 (pp. 123–127, below).  
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the author encourages identification of the one with the other.50  Yet as careful and criti-
cal readers of Graeco-Roman poetry, as readers broadly aware of the poetic connections 
of antiquity—conventions that, as Rosen himself demonstrates [2007: ch. 7], dictated an 
awareness that a poet’s speaker should not be read onto the poet himself—we can and 




Overview of this study 
 
The next four chapters fall into two groups: chapters 2 and 3 consider DRN’s use 
of the mode of satire, while chapters 4 and 5 address its relationship to the Roman verse 
genre.  Chapter 2 focuses on the stance of the satirist, and the manifold ways in which 
DRN’s speaker adopts this stance.  Satirists combine a claim of moral high ground with 
statements and implications that may undercut their supposed superiority—and so too, at 
times, does the Lucretian ego.  Chapter 3 turns to the broader features of satire, especially 
the issue of didactic tension in satire.  Most satire claims to offer instructions or advice, 
but in doing so well, satire (like other, more serious instantiations of didaxis) may sow 
the seeds of its own irrelevancy, as the satiric audience, once properly educated, will no 
longer need the teachings that satire advertises.  At the same time, while engaging in sup-
posedly straightforward moral didaxis, satire creates straw-man arguments to further its 
                                                
50 Rosen [2007: 220–223, 246], and also Rudd [1976: 175–181], Clay [1983: 212–225], 
and Volk [2002a: 10–13; 2010: 130]. 
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goals, and thus can call into question the validity of what it advocates and what it dispar-
ages; this issue of satiric straw-man arguments can help explain why the Lucretian refuta-
tion of Presocratic philosophy, particularly that of Anaxagoras, distorts or even appears to 
“get wrong” the basic principles and arguments of the philosophies it targets (cf. pp. 19–
20, above). 
In chapter 4, I look back from Lucretius’ poem to its satiric predecessors, at the 
allusions in DRN to earlier Roman satire—not only Lucilius’ extensive fragments but 
also the few remains of Ennius’ Saturae.  These allusions are relatively numerous and 
significant, and one of their primary functions is to enable the Lucretian ego to co-opt the 
poetic authority of both earlier authors as well as the high social status possessed by the 
Lucilian satirist-figure, a status required for unfettered satiric production at Rome.  Chap-
ter 5 by contrast primarily looks forward to the major surviving works of Roman satura, 
the verses of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal.  DRN participates in the employment of many 
of the same generic tropes and topoi that are present in Roman satire and in some cases, I 
argue, affects Horace’s, Persius’, and Juvenal’s receptions of these commonplace topics.  
There is a generic interchange between philosophy and satire in Roman literature, and 
DRN’s philosophical takes on satire have substantial influence on later satire’s takes on 
philosophy. 
A general conclusion wraps up my overall discussion and offers speculative sug-
gestions about different kinds of potential audiences for the satiric element in Lucretius’ 
poem.  Underpinning this study is an impression that DRN is more complicated, and thus 
less straightforwardly designed to convert the reader to Epicureanism or to stand unques-
tioned in the generic tradition of Greek and Roman epic, than it has seemed to be to ear-
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lier scholars.  In uncovering what I argue are systematic links between DRN and the 
mode and genre of satire, I do not make the simple claim that DRN is itself a work of sat-
ire, but neither do I accept wholesale the notion that the text of the poem gives voice di-
rectly to an author intending to advocate the philosophy of Epicurus to an audience both 








facit indignatio uersum 
“Indignation makes the poetry…” 
(Juvenal 1.79) 
 
quod tamen a uera longe ratione repulsumst 





DRN engages more extensively with the mode and the genre of satire than has 
previously been recognized.1  Although scholars have identified “satiric” elements of the 
poem, passages that sound “Lucilian” or that seem like “satire,”2 there has not yet been a 
systematic survey of satire in the poem as a whole, rather than only in particular segments 
of the poem, like the attack on love and sex at the end of book 4.  Moreover, studies of 
DRN and satire to date take for granted what “satiric” means, what satiric works do, and 
                                                
1 For the basic distinction between satire as mode and genre, see pp. 23–29, above. 
2 E.g., respectively, Murley [1939: 382–384, 386–390] and Dudley [1965], both dis-
cussed at pp. 2–5, above. 
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what characteristics the speakers of such works display.  Scholars, in other words, have 
failed to set out explicitly how they define satire and satiric speech.  In this chapter and 
the next, I pursue one building block of a more complete definition of satire and investi-
gate the use, in Graeco-Roman poetry and in DRN specifically, of “satire” broadly con-
strued, of satire in its capacity as a mode.  In chapters 4 and 5, I investigate connections 
between DRN and the Roman genre of satire. 
In each investigation, of satire as mode and as genre, we will consider two basic 
components: the satirist-figure and the shared textual and thematic characteristics that 
make up “satire.”  It is possible to expand, refine, and complicate our understanding of 
the position of the speaker of DRN by comparing it to the position, as elucidated and ana-
lyzed in scholarship of the past decade or so, of the various egos of satiric works.  As we 
will see, the Lucretian ego has much in common with the figure of the satirist, and this 
relationship should affect our reception of the text and our understanding of DRN’s read-
erships.  The characteristics shared between DRN’s ego and the speaker-position of the 
Roman satirists will serve also as a starting point for investigation of the wider generic 
linkages between DRN and Roman satire in chapters 4 and 5.  There are strong, pervasive 
connections between DRN and satiric works of Graeco-Roman literature, from poetics 
and matters of style to content and rhetorical approach.  My study endeavors to situate the 
poem of Lucretius within the two satiric traditions, particularly in the satiric genealogy 
that can be traced from Ennius and Lucilius to Persius and Juvenal. 
I begin with the broader notion of “satire” and move to the narrower: first the 
mode, then the Roman genre.  Both paths entail synthesis of modern perspectives on the 
poetics and cultural work of ancient satiric literature, in order to paint a more unified pic-
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ture of the satirist, and a clearer understanding of the dynamics of what we call “satire.”  
In this chapter, my inquiry will address three principal questions about the satiric speaker.  
First, how is the satirist characterized, and how does he (always he, almost without ex-
ception) characterize himself?  Second, what does he do and say?  Third, in what ways 
does he interact with others, and how does he position himself in relation to them?  The 
results of these questions provide us with a synopsis of the ancient satirist that we can try 
to map onto DRN’s persona, in order to remark upon the overlaps and interrogate the dis-
crepancies. 
The scholarship on satiric elements in DRN, discussed in the introduction, regu-
larly speaks about “satire” in unspecific ways, and sometimes without reference to the 
ego or “Lucretius the poet” in general.  Such material thus often fits less with Roman sat-
ire than it does with the individual critics’ own notions of satire, and calls for reassess-
ment of DRN’s broader use of the satiric mode.  This reassessment forms the avenue of 
inquiry in chapter 3.  Beyond the characteristics of the satirist, what constitutes satire?  
How can we more formally define the function of the satiric mode?  In what passages 
does DRN employ such a mode, and can those satiric passages be seen to hold thematic 
weight in regard to the poem as a whole? 
 
 
The position of the speaker in Graeco-Roman satiric poetry 
 
Without restriction to particular authors or texts—without the limits of a genre, 
even a genre as slippery and self-problematizing as satire—the ways we conceive of the 
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satiric speaker can be unbounded and, consequently, vague.  Some theorizing of the char-
acteristics and techniques of the “satirist,” whomever we define the satirist to be, thus 
constitutes a necessary preliminary to this chapter’s undertaking.  Satire, broadly con-
strued, is productive of satirists: do we limit ourselves to those who explicitly call them-
selves satirists, like Juvenal or Jerry Seinfeld or Samuel Johnson, who defined satire ex-
pansively, as “a poem in which wickedness or folly is censured” [1768: s.v. “satire”], and 
who also himself wrote formal satire modeled on the works of Juvenal?  Or do we instead 
take as a satirist the active initiator of any kind of “satiric” interaction, wherever one ap-
pears, be it Homer’s Odysseus or (at times3) Homer Simpson? 
This wider sense of “satire” does not have a corresponding Greek or Roman term, 
since the Latin term satura is restricted to works of the specific genre that begins with 
Ennius and Lucilius.  So we are left with the second option, the “satirist” as anyone who 
engages in satiric behavior.  A defining quality of satiric behavior is mockery, especially 
comic mockery, and satiric poetry is thus poetry of aggression and personal attack.  So 
any poetic work featuring such attacks presented in a comedic context can be considered 
satire, and the speaker of such a work can be considered a satirist. 
 
The satiric speaker and poetic mockery 
What unites satire across history is “aggressive criticism and ridicule of a victim 
or a target.”  The speaker of satire is “a personalized comic voice, a poetic ego girded for 
                                                
3 Cf. Janssen [2003]. 
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verbal battle against a target.”4  This personal ego frequently adopts the identity of the 
author (e.g., Hipponax or Persius) and “employ[s] a subjective, putatively autobiographi-
cal, voice” that can lead a receptive reader to believe that the ego is not fictitious but 
real.5  An important effect of satire’s personal voice is the creation of a closeness between 
the speaker and the reader that the text constructs, and from such closeness there devel-
ops between speaker and reader a sense of collaboration against the target of the satiric 
mockery.  A brief example: when the clever ancilla Pardalisca of Plautus’ Casina mocks 
the play’s other women characters in a private monologue delivered directly to the audi-
ence (775–779), she fosters an allegiance between herself and the play’s audience or 
readership.  “[T]he satirist wants to establish himself in an intimate/collusive relationship 
with the audience, enlisting their sympathies for his cause and his stance of self-
                                                
4 Aggressive criticism and ridicule: Muecke [1985: 113].  Personalized comic voice: 
Rosen [2007: 3]. 
5 Rosen [2007: 246]; the book’s final chapter studies the often negative reception of Ar-
chilochus’ iambics and the pitfalls of autobiographical readings of satiric poetry.  Auto-
biographical elements are in some works or passages de-emphasized; for instance, as 
Keane shows, Juvenal is “[t]he least autobiographical of the [Roman] satirists” [2002: 
229–230].  Compare Barchiesi & Cucchiarelli: “Juvenal eliminates from his Satires all 
detailed references to his body and to his personal biography” [2005: 220], and Mayer 
[1989: 19]: “Like Persius, Juvenal does not use satire as a form of personal poetry.” 
Rosen, however, maintains (in my view rightly) that “[s]atire always implies a 
personal voice, even when the form of presentation is oblique and appears distanced from 
an authorial ego” [2007: 68].  Cf. Eco [1992: 64] on “the intention of the text,” with 
Conte [1994], Hinds [1998: 47–51] on the idea that texts imply authorial subjectivity de-
spite problems with the concept of authorial intent, and further Hinds [1998: 144]: “the 
self-fashioning, intention-bearing poet is a figure whom we ourselves read out from the 
text to test our readings in an interpretative move which is necessarily circular: yet the 
energy generated by this interpretative circulation is very real.”  The problem of “inten-
tion” and classical texts is also discussed by Batstone [2005: 93–97], Farrell [2005], Por-
ter [2005], and Kennedy [2005]. 
 40 
righteousness, and entertaining them with his humorous tropes.”6  The fictive reader takes 
part in the mockery by observing it,7 finds such mockery to be a source of comic enter-
tainment, and thus becomes aligned with the satirist. 
But in order for readers to appreciate and therefore go along with the mockery 
that they observe, the satirist must appear to be delivering his critical attacks from a posi-
tion of some kind of moral superiority.  A moral element is integral to satire and is a con-
ventional part of what satire does.8  In Horace, for instance, the ego expresses his satiric 
objective as “telling the truth with a laugh” (ridentem dicere uerum, Serm. 1.1.24), a sen-
timent refigured in Persius as “grating on tender ears with biting truth” (teneras mordaci 
radere uero | auriculas, 1.107–108).9  “Truth,” in both cases, is a vague shorthand for un-
covering the ills, flaws, hypocrisies that pervade the speaker’s poetic world.  By finding 
                                                
6 Rosen [2007: 71].  On the collusive aspect of the satirist-audience relationship through-
out the history of satire, both ancient and modern, see Griffin [1994: 181–184], Bogel 
[2001: 13 and passim], Rosen [2007: 117 n. 1], and Simpson [2003: 85–90 and esp. 8]: 
the target of satire is “ex-colluded…not normally an ‘invited participant’ in the [satiric] 
discourse exchange, even though the target is what provides the initial impetus for sat-
ire.”  Cf. also Griffin [1994: 167]: “We take pleasure in the witty re-creation of the satiric 
victim.” 
7 Bogel describes this interaction between satirist, audience, and target of mockery in 
terms of a “triangle” [2002: 2]; so also Simpson [2003: 86]. 
8 Cf., e.g., Cloud [1989: 64]: “[t]he satirist purports to be a teacher of morality.”  Moral 
improvement was a concern more broadly for Roman conceptions of poetry’s purpose, as 
Williams shows [1968: ch. 9].  
9 For an analysis of how the programmatic statement in Persius poem 1 reconfigures 
those of Horace’s Sermones, see Keane [2006: 123].  Compare this programmatic state-
ment to Persius 5.14–16: “[you, Persius, are] skilled at grating on failing character and 
skewering fault through clever play” (pallentis radere mores | doctus et ingenio culpam 
defigere ludo). 
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and telling “the truth,” it is claimed, the speaker can improve the moral situation of his 
world.  In other words, this “truth”-telling is an essential function of satire.10 
The moral stance alone, however, is not enough.  Satirists must perform their 
moral stance in relation to—that is, in a status higher than—their targets.  But often the 
satirist’s situation is presented in such a way that this superiority is uncertain or at risk.  
Bogel’s formulation of “the difference satire makes” is instructive here: “satirists identify 
in the world something or someone that is both unattractive and curiously or dangerously 
like them, or like the culture or subculture that they identify with…something, then, that 
is not alien enough” [2001: 41; emphasis preserved].  The act of satirizing is thus the 
making and reinforcing of difference or distance between satirist/society and not-alien-
enough satiric object.  This difference is otherness, and the target is to be scorned and 
spurned by the audience as repulsive, reprehensible, or (morally) base.11  So for example 
the Horatian ego repeatedly works to differentiate the friendship to be had in Maecenas’ 
circle from, among others, grotesque buffoons (Serm. 1.5.51–69), class-conscious elites 
(1.6.49–55), and social ladder-climbing wannabes (1.9.42–53).12  Aristophanes in Birds 
likewise uses a series of satiric caricatures to demarcate and exclude from his ideal πόλις 
the citizens whom he considers a threat to peace and tranquility.  And Lucilius delegiti-
                                                
10 And not only of ancient satire.  European authors of the late 19th century, for example, 
used satire in their moralizing critiques of their world, cf. Matz [2010: xiv]: “[s]atirical 
realism is a fundamentally moral kind of literature.” 
11 Mayer argues that Roman satire, in order to validate its own moral legitimacy, depends 
on the aristocracy: “[s]ociety is…the object of satire, but…a high-ranking portion of it 
sets the standard of behaviour and guarantees the satirist’s moral outlook as sound.  The 
outlook is validated not because it is intellectually grounded…but because it is shared by 
the best people” [1989: 5]. 
12 For a cautionary evaluation of continuity and contradiction within the poems of Ser-
mones book 1, see Zetzel [1980: passim, esp. 69]. 
 42 
mizes his targets by placing them in the company of disgraceful and notoriously corrupt 
individuals.13 
Righteousness indeed is integral to being a satirist, even if it is only self-
righteousness.  Because mockery without basis can fall flat with its audience—a blind 
man mocking a one-eyed woman because of her visual impairment is absurd, and Ameri-
can politicians who criticize “earmarks” that send funds to particular districts while they 
secure pork-barrel projects for their own constituencies descend into self-parody—the 
mocker must be deserving of the audience’s allegiance.14  As Plaza argues, “the satirist is 
not simply interested in deriding a particular object, but also has a separate interest in 
painting himself as a knight of justice” [2006: 56 n. 9].  The satirist needs to do so, I add, 
in order to command the allegiance with his readers that undergirds his moralistic, mock-
ing critique.  Hence the ego in Lucilius delivers his satire from the subject position of an 
independent Roman citizen whose poetic/satiric output is simply a product of his educa-
tion and freedom of speech; hence the satiric “voice of the poet” in both Terence and 
                                                
13 So Goldberg [2005: 160]. 
14 This is the premise of the joke at Juvenal 2.23–28: 
loripedem rectus derideat, Aethiopem albus. 
quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes? 
quis caelum terris non misceat et mare caelo 
si fur displiceat Verri, homicida Miloni, 
Clodius accuset moechos, Catilina Cethegum, 
in tabulam Sullae si dicant discipuli tres? 
It’s a straight-legged man who should be mocking a limping one, a white 
man who should be mocking an Ethiopian.  Who could endure the Gracchi 
complaining about coups d’état?  Who wouldn’t get the sky mixed up with 
the land, the sea with the sky, if Verres got bothered by a thief, Milo by a 
murderer, if Clodius took adulterers to court, or if Catiline hauled in 
Cethegus, or if Sulla’s three/triumviral students spoke against his proscrip-
tion list?  
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Aristophanes presumes greater literary talent and quality than the literary critics and po-
litical opponents who comprise the targets of the satire.  At its core, then, the self-
righteousness of the satirist is a matter of poetic or literary authority.15  The figure that the 
reader is to favor should have claim to greater authority than the opposing entity does, 
and in situations of moral antagonism, such poetic authority arises out of the moral high 
ground.16 
Indignation, specifically indignation at the target (as the satiric ego tends to 
claim), is the generative source of satire.  Juvenal’s phrasing, in the epigraph to this chap-
ter, is archetypal: “indignation makes the poetry” (facit indignatio uersum, 1.79).17  Matz, 
arguing that the late 19th century fiction of Ibsen, Conrad, and others should be under-
stood as a synthesis of realism and satire, identifies the basic traits of satire to be 
“[i]rreverent condemnation, scornful and profoundly angry censure” [2010: x].  Dessen 
points out Persius’ adoption of “the pose of the angry young poet” in his first satire 
[1968: 18]—a pose that includes fiercely mocking his poetic contemporaries (1.1–7), 
their audiences (13–23), their poetic sensibilities (76–106), their literary critics (119–
123), and people who themselves mock the Roman intelligentsia (123–134).  Satirists’ 
                                                
15 Bogel, as well, finds the question of authority to “pass distancing—and necessary—
judgments” a fundamental question for the identification and definition of the satirist 
[2001: 82]. 
16 Cf. Bakhtin [1984/1968: 12]: “The satirist whose laughter is negative places himself 
above the object of his mockery, he is opposed to it.”  Graf rejects this characterization as 
“too uniform” [2005: 204] because it does not work well for the ego of Horace’s Ser-
mones. 
17 Rosen adds: “satirists generally do not present themselves as gratuitously rancorous or 
prone to excessive anger” [2007: 179; emphasis preserved], a modification of the conven-
tional wisdom about satiric anger as represented by Anderson [1964], Bertman [1968], 
Bellandi [1973], Coffey [1976: 124], Wilson & Makowski [1990: 34], and Braund [1988, 
1995, 1997], among others. 
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anger—whether genuine or artificially adopted—is, like their mockery itself, legitimate 
and justified. 
Yet, often at the same time as they assert that their anger is justified and their 
moral authority is superior, satirists tend to claim a low social status or a degraded posi-
tion in life, an autobiographical “fact” that serves to enhance their indignation and to at-
tract increased audience sympathy.  As Keane writes of Serm. 1.10.76–77, “temporary 
humiliation ironically gave Laberius the power to criticize; this ambiguous status is not 
unlike the posture that Horace takes when he styles himself a mima” [2006: 20].18  So the 
primary markers of a satirist’s position are “his stance of physical and emotional abjec-
tion and oppression, [and] the indignation against an antagonist that inspires comic 
mockery”19—what Plaza calls “mockery from below” [2006: 53–57], and what Henss 
identifies as a satiric trope, a “Topos der Satire” [1954: 161].  Such abjection and oppres-
sion may conflict with the self-righteousness integral to the satirist’s success—and on 
account of this conflict, Rosen suggests, the satirist becomes a humorous figure.  Perhaps 
the best example of this point is the literary persona of Socrates, who is figured as ugly, 
destitute, and beleaguered by powerful enemies—in a word, abject—but who nonetheless 
is consistently portrayed (with notable exceptions, such as in Aristophanes’ Clouds) as 
ethically, morally, and intellectually sound and superior.  The potential for humor in this 
oxymoronic juxtaposition of Socrates’ abjection and his righteousness is exploited in, for 
                                                
18 Compare the account by Lee [2006] of the physical and social “humiliations” that rein-
force the comic, satiric abjection of figures like Mark Twain, Richard Pryor, and Marga-
ret Cho.  As Griffin, writing on satire of all periods, puts it, “[g]reat satire…appears 
ironically to depend on some resistance to itself” [1994: 138]. 
19 Rosen [2007: 162].  Rosen does not explicitly discuss the abject as theorized in Doug-
las [1966], Kristeva [1982], or Creed [1993]; Rosen views his work as “not a book of 
high theory itself” [2007: 16]. 
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instance, Persius poem 4.20  We can also see this dynamic in action with the self-assured 
yet socially defenseless Horace-ego in Serm. 1.9 (where the satirist may himself be a ver-
sion of the pest he has such difficulties escaping), and with the satirist-figure of Pope’s 
Epilogue to the Satires.21  By this picture of satire, the reader derives entertainment both 
from the satirist’s initial speech-act of mocking the target and from the discrepancy be-
tween the satirist’s righteous self-aggrandizement and his abject indignation. 
 
Juvenal and the disenfranchisement of the satirist 
One possible trait of a satirist that calls for closer attention and modification is 
disenfranchisement.  In his discussion of Naevolus in Juvenal poem 9—Virro’s well-
endowed but down-on-his-luck client, who serves as gigolo for both Virro and his wife 
and who critiques the patron-client system—Rosen takes the notion of the satirist’s op-
pression further still.  After arguing that Naevolus is not an “allegory…of the archetypal 
satirist” (as Braund suggests), but rather “a kind of ironized poetic alter-ego” for the Ju-
venalian satirist, Rosen states that “[t]he satirist, like Naevolus, is by definition always 
disenfranchised.”22  This assessment rings true for Juvenal in particular, who presents in 
his work, I suggest, a satiric poetics of disenfranchisement.  Crystallized in the maxim “if 
                                                
20 On this satire, which is modeled on the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Alcibiades 1, see, 
e.g., Henderson [1991], Hooley [1997: ch. 3], and Littlewood [2002]. 
21 Cf. Griffin [1994: 100]: “The two dialogues of Pope’s Epilogue to the Satires…build 
the satirist into a hero or prophet, but they do not conclude without implicitly questioning 
the effectiveness of their own moral stance.”  On Serm. 1.9, see Zetzel [1980: 71] and 
Henderson [1993], among others. 
22 Allegory: Braund [1988: 170].  Juvenalian alter-ego: Rosen [2007: 225].  Naevolus dis-
enfranchised: Rosen [2007: 230 n. 29], with Richlin [1992/1983]: 202.  Cf. also Bellandi 
[1974], Winkler [1983: 125] (“self-satirization”), and Braund [1988: ch. 4]. 
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you can take it, you deserve it” (omnia ferre | si potes, et debes, 5.1.170–171), disenfran-
chisement is the theme and emblem of the imperial age.  At Rome, the citizens on the 
street (like the satirist himself23) are thoroughly disenfranchised, subjected to those more 
powerful, whether they are patrons (as with Naevolus in poem 9) or thugs (3.288–301) or 
soldiers (3.247–248; poem 16) or the emperor (poem 4).  The disenfranchisement consti-
tutes a systemic failure, in all levels of society, from poetry (as in the opening literary-
critical rant at 1.1–14) to the judiciary (Keane [2006: 94] points out that Juvenal’s works 
“bear witness to frequent failures of the legal system”). 
The notion of a Juvenalian satiric poetics of disenfranchisement can fit well with 
Freudenburg’s assessment of the relationship between Juvenal’s satire and its historical 
context.  Freudenburg posits that the text presents a failed attempt at Lucilian satire, de-
livered in the voice of an ego transfixed by an obsession with the Domitianic and Nero-
nian past [2001: 242].  In the authoritarian Rome of the imperial period, there is no room 
for Lucilius’ libertas—his wanton, privileged, and aggressive freedom of speech—and so 
in Juvenal’s satire instead we see the disenfranchised satirist mocking the literary elite’s 
preoccupation, displayed particularly in the works of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger, with 
the traumas of bygone years.24  At a time when self-righteous mockery with a moralizing 
                                                
23 Juvenal’s satirist portrays himself, as we might expect, in an abject, degraded position, 
with attention to nitty-gritty life in the City: he empathizes with the urban poor (uestibulis 
abeunt ueteres lassique clientes, “old, worn-out clients leave [their patrons’] doorways” 
bereft of the hope of some food from their patrons’ dole, 1.132), has his pal Umbricius 
take the reader on a vile and violent tour of Rome (poem 3), and frenetically notes the 
impending presence of “a Clytemnestra on every street” (Clytemestram nullus non uicus 
habebit, 6.656).  Cf. Freudenburg [2001: 246], “the poor-man’s eye view…at street-
level.” 
24 Yet Rosen [2007: 241 n. 41] argues against Freudenburg’s reading of Juvenal’s satires 
(especially poem 5) as concerning the failure of Lucilian satire in Juvenal’s own age.  In 
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tone can get a person executed, or ordered to commit suicide, the Juvenalian ego, like 
those of Pliny and Tacitus, looks backwards, dispossessed of his civic entitlement to un-
fettered, unguarded speech. 
Thematic disenfranchisement, however, does not well match other satirists that 
we may consider, both in and out of the genre of Roman satire.  Both the Horatian and 
the Lucilian egos do frequently depict themselves as underdogs, particularly in Horace’s 
Sermones, but we should not, as I see it, say that either is (again, in Rosen’s terms) “by 
definition always disenfranchised.”  The satires of Lucilius—at least as they are por-
trayed in their reception by the later satirists—present a free-speaking citizen par excel-
lence, an aristocratic male who not only enjoys the friendship of certain powerful politi-
cal figures (as does the Horatian ego) but also has on his own the power and standing to 
say whatever he wishes to whomever he pleases. 
Yes, the ego of Horace’s Sermones often represents himself abjectly (as, for in-
stance, in the pink-eye and wet dream of Serm. 1.5), and must contend with allegations 
that his poetic mockery is too harsh (e.g., sunt quibus in satura uidear nimis acer, “there 
are some people who think I’m too harsh in my satura,” Serm. 2.1.1).  Furthermore, in 
the second book of Sermones, the satirist hands the microphone over to a variety of inter-
locutors, many of whom mock or chastise him directly, and he even at times recedes deep 
into the background.  But in the first book, particularly in the programmatic poems 
(Serm. 1.4, 1.6, 1.10) and in the other poems that touch upon the circle of Maecenas 
(Serm. 1.5, 1.9), we do not see a disenfranchised satirist.  Instead, we find a speaker con-
                                                
doing so, Rosen also argues implicitly against Henderson—who suggests that we view 
Juvenal’s “Satire as ‘the portrayal of indignation’ ” [1989: 115] and who cites, in turn, 
Anderson [1982]. 
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fident in his upbringing and friendships (i.e., social status) as well as satisfied with his 
poetic prowess and satiric potential.25 
Disenfranchisement also does not fit cleanly with what can be reconstructed of 
Ennius’ satires.  Ennius’ ego was not the acerbic attack-dog of Lucilian satire, but rather 
seems to have avoided both obscenity (Petersmann [1999: 289]) and personal attacks on 
others—in Witke’s formulation, the Ennian satirist (unlike Lucilius’ satirist) did not “em-
brace contemporary politics” [1970: 53].  In fact, Muecke links this difference in tone to 
the different social statuses of Ennius and Lucilius [2005: 42, cf. 40], since Lucilius is 
reported to have been an upper-class Roman citizen while Ennius identifies himself as a 
non-Roman immigrant who only gained citizenship thanks to influential friends in the 
City.  It is in this identification, though, where I again see problems for the notion of per-
sistent disenfranchisement in the figure of the satirist: the satirist does (eventually) gain 
citizenship, and he bases (what fragments survive of) his mockery not on moralizing in-
dignation against others in a superior social or physical condition, but rather on his self-
deprecating construction of his own ego.26 
A final point on the satirist’s disenfranchisement: this supposition does not seem 
to hold constant even for one of Rosen’s own prototypical satirist figures, the Homeric 
                                                
25 If not confident in his physical well-being (Serm. 1.5) or satisfied with chances for an 
uninterrupted stroll (Serm. 1.9).  The lack of any mention in Serm. 1.5 of the political mo-
tivations for the journey to Brundisium may be a sign to the reader that the Horatian sati-
rist is muzzled when it comes to Octavian and Antony.  Cf., among others, Reckford 
[1999], as well as Frank [1920], Rudd [1974], Classen [1981], Ehlers [1985], Fedeli 
[1992], and Gowers [1993b].  The Horace-ego does stress that his father was a freedman 
(Serm. 1.6.6, 45, 46)—perhaps even, as Williams [1995] argues, stretching Horace’s his-
torical heritage to do so; cf. also Christes & Fülle [1996]. 
26 Cf. Flintoff [1990: 586], “self-depiction—and self-denigration—have long been recog-
nized as an important feature of early satire.” 
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Odysseus.  In the cave of Polyphemus, Odysseus does find himself in an abject state, 
subordinate to the physical might of the Cyclops [2007: 123–141] and also back home on 
Ithaca while in disguise as a beggar, but in his altercation with Thersites in Iliad 2 [2007: 
69–91], Odysseus holds social, satiric, and poetic authority far greater than does Ther-
sites.  Social authority: Odysseus is a leader of the Greeks, whereas Thersites at best is a 
kind of court jester (thus Thersites is the character whom readers might consider disen-
franchised).  Satiric authority: “Odysseus’s response [to Thersites’ heckling] is motivated 
by genuine anger” [2007: 90], and the poem presents this anger as justified.27  Hence, 
Odysseus is like a true satirist, but Thersites falls short.  Poetic authority: within the 
poem’s narrative, Odysseus comes out on top, by demonstrating his physical (and, in this 
epic, mythic, bellicose shame culture setting, his social) prowess.  Odysseus may be a 
satirist, but he is, unlike the ego of Juvenal’s satires, not a disenfranchised one. 
Disenfranchisement therefore can, but need not, be a part of the satirist’s claim of 
abjection.  Compare, for instance, the satiric subject positions of the stand-up comedians 
George Carlin and Richard Pryor.  Whereas Pryor stirred up scandal, controversy, and 
immense comic and commercial success by frankly but satirically discussing the racial 
inequities, discrimination, and disenfranchisement that he faced as a black man in Amer-
ica in the 1960s and 1970s, Carlin (who was white) based much of his satire instead on 
criticism of the entertainment industry in which he himself played an important part—and 
                                                
27 More broadly, Dobson [2003] explores the presence in the Iliad and Odyssey of fea-
tures of iambic poetry—including invective and mocking humor.  
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was perhaps the more able to do so because of the privilege and entitlement afforded 
white males in the western world.28 
 
Satirists and seriousness 
It is worth answering another question about the satirist’s characterization: is he 
serious?  Does he mean what he says?  Because of the realism of satire’s fictitiousness—
because of the personal self-presentation of the satiric ego—the reader may understand 
the satirist’s words as spoken in earnest, may take him to be the moral didact he purports 
to be.  The satirist’s audience, that is, could be tempted to take his seriousness seriously.  
But we should be careful, because the satirist’s moral, didactic pose may not be genuine, 
for the satirist is further characterized by recurrent “satiric ponêria” that generates com-
edy from scurrilous self-portrayal and language.29  And this trait, this comic πονηρία, 
                                                
28 On Carlin’s criticism of the media, see Zoglin [2008: 36–37, 126] and Sullivan [2010: 
143–166], among others.  On Pryor and racial inequality, see Vaidhyanathan [1998], 
Haggins [2007: ch. 1], Zoglin [2008: 41–42], Harris [2008], Bingham & Hernandez 
[2009: 337 and elsewhere], and especially Carpio [2008: ch. 2]. 
29 Rosen [2007: 218].  Rosen defines πονηρία as “forays into scandalous diction, com-
promised self-representation, and other similarly comedic gestures” [2007: 218], and later 
[2007: 244 n. 1] refers to Whitman [1964] and Rosenbloom [2002] for semantic studies 
of πονηρία.  On πονηρία as self-undercutting, see again Rosen [2007: 218]: “the poetry 
of mockery is a ‘closed’ fictional world that is rarely, if ever, what it purports to be.  One 
moment it makes claims about its didactic purposes that seem serious enough; the next, it 
undermines them with its own stances of ponêria.” 
For πονηρία in Aristophanic comedy, see Whitman [again 1964, especially ch. 
2], Reckford [1987: 205], and O’Regan [1992: 158 n. 59]; compare the comic “badness” 
(malitia) of Plautus’ clever protagonists, discussed by Petrone [1977], Chiarini [1979], 
Anderson [1993a: 92 and passim], and Polt [2010: ch. 3]. 
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serves to undercut any credence in the satirist’s seriousness and moral superiority.30  En-
tertainment overtakes critique. 
This tension between self-righteousness and πονηρία is, I believe, a pivotal con-
flict in the identity of the satiric ego.  Notionally, satiric mockery has a positive goal be-
yond (mere?) entertainment or exposé, namely a goal of making the world a better place.  
Yet the satiric speaker’s comic wickedness gets in the way, prevents the satirist from ef-
fecting the change he wishes to see. “The satirist represents himself as essentially 
doomed to be constantly on the attack, martyring himself, as it were, to the pursuit of 
some putative ‘better world’ in order to benefit all those who deserve it.”31  The reason 
that lurks behind the satirist’s baleful fate is, simply, the need to sustain his poetic mate-
rial—for a utopia has no need of satire.32 
But this disingenuousness is not necessarily an ever-present feature of satire.  In 
the idea of a satirist’s self-avowed doom of perpetually mocking the corrupt, I see little 
                                                
30 Cf. Smith [2005d], on “self-defeating” sex advice in Serm. 1.2 and Juvenal poem 6, and 
both Freudenburg [1993: ch. 1] and Turpin [1998] on the Horace-ego’s failed philoso-
phizing in Sermones book 1. 
31 Rosen [2007: 180].  Cf. De Caro [2007: 62 n. 21], who argues that the poet-lover of 
Ovid’s Amores is a satiric speaker, but that “all’innamorato non interessa affatto risanare 
la società.”  Compare also Smith’s inquiry into the seriousness of Latin satiric commen-
tary on gender from Plautus to Walter Map [2005b]. 
32 As Rosen asks, “what satirist qua satirist…would really want a world in which the 
things he once complained about are corrected?” [2007: 239]. 
There is a similar conflict in the world of Roman erotic elegy.  The poet-lover 
needs obstacles between him and his beloved in order to generate material for his poetry.  
There can be no paraclausithyron without being an exclusus amator, Ovid’s praeceptor 
amoris encourages puellae to mistreat their lovers in order to keep them coming back for 
more—Ars Amatoria 3.577–610, with Gibson [2003: 324 ad loc.]—and the genre is 
moreover predicated on an unbridgeable divide between the poet-lover’s desire for free 
sex and his beloved’s material needs, as James demonstrates [2003: 14, 42, 91, 98, 106, 
200, 247 n. 53, and passim].  Cf. also, on Horace’s versions of the exclusus amator, 
Cummings [2002]. 
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room for the Horace-ego of certain parts of Sermones, for instance.  The ego at the end of 
Serm. 1.4 looks ahead to a relaxed old age focused on self-improvement, not on attack: 
   mediocribus et quis 
ignoscas uitiis teneor.  fortassis et istinc 
largiter abstulerit longa aetas, liber amicus, 
consilium proprium. 
         (Serm. 1.4.130–133) 
 
I’m held captive by middling faults, the kind you could overlook.  
Maybe I’ll be pushed away from this position, for the most part, by 
long life, a free-speaking friend, and my own advice. 
 
In fact, the Horatian speaker here internalizes his moral observations and keeps silent,33 
while looking to the free speech of a friend, to (Lucilian?) libertas, for self-help advice.  
Far from issuing noisy, self-righteous criticisms of others’ vices, the satirist in these lines 
takes a more cerebral, self-reflective stance.  Moreover, in the programmatic opening to 
the second book of Sermones, the speaker renounces his intent to attack: 
  sed hic stilus haud petet ultro 
quemquam animantem et me ueluti custodiet ensis 
uagina tectus: quem cur destringere coner 
tutus ab infestis latronibus? o pater et rex 
Iuppiter, ut pereat positum robigine telum 
nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis! 
       (Serm. 2.1.39–44) 
 
But: my stylus certainly won’t be going after anyone alive, and it’ll 
guard me like a sheathed sword.  Why should I try to whip it out 
when I’m safe from dangerous bandits?  Jupiter, king and father, I 
hope that my weapon is put to rest and falls apart with rust, and 
that nobody tries to hurt a peace-lover like me! 
 
                                                
33 Cf. Serm. 1.4.137–138: haec ego mecum | conpressis agito labris, “I go over all this in 
my head, with my lips sealed.” 
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The pen is not mightier than the sword, but serves as a defensive weapon, in opposition to 
the sword of Lucilian satire.34  Although this poem is full of irony and thus its contents 
are not to be read straightforwardly and uncritically, it does nevertheless contain impor-
tant commentary about the Horatian persona’s satiric positioning, and about his views on 
the uses of satire.35  Hooley sees in Serm. 2.1 “an anti-program, a resignation from a cer-
tain kind of satiric writing” [2007: 68].  The phrase “certain kind” is key here.  The sati-
rist, while still elusive and ambiguous, nonetheless maps out a path for his satire by 
which he is not forever doomed to be on the attack. 
The ego later (in Serm. 2.6) explicitly presents satura as a poetic form able to 
cover more subjects than mere attack, as a genre equally fit for talking about peaceful 
country life as it is for talking about the (urban) vices of humankind.36  Within the poetic 
                                                
34 On the association of Lucilius with the sword: Freudenburg [2001: 7]—the ego is “un-
able to hoist Lucilius’ long-rusted sword,” and Juvenal 1.165, ense…stricto…Lucilius 
ardens (“Lucilius burning with his sword drawn”), with Freudenburg [2001: 243–245].  
Freudenburg sees in Sermones a “satirist doomed to fail before he starts,” who neverthe-
less “can still bury a good amount of critical aggression under the surface of his poems” 
[2001: 7].  On the topos of the rusted weapon, see Catullus 64.42, with Gaisser [1995: 
586–587] and Warden [1998: 404]; Vergil Georgics 1.495; Ovid ex Ponto 1.1.71; and 
Statius Thebaid 3.582.  Freudenburg, citing Serm. 2.1.42–44, calls the poem “obsessed 
with satiric weaponry” [2010: 276]. 
Being doomed to fail, I point out, is different from being doomed to remain for-
ever on the attack, and at any rate this satirist’s predestined failure does not preclude the 
genuineness of his aspirations for a life free from mockery-making. 
35 Scholars who see in Serm. 2.1 a serious literary critical discussion of satire—including 
Knoche [1975/1949: 51], Fraenkel [1957: 147], Williams [1968: 448], Coffey [1976: 82], 
and LaFleur [1981]—have been challenged by those who see the poem as completely 
ironic, e.g., Anderson [1984], Clauss [1985], Harrison [1987], and Rudd [1966: 128].  
Freudenburg stakes out a more nuanced middle ground between pure program and pure 
posturing: “Horace exposes the satire’s real programmatic significance at the same time 
as he so obviously deflates his own character and the satire’s allegedly serious intent” 
[1990: 187]. 
36 After making a prayer for protection and healthy flocks (Serm. 2.6.13–15), the speaker 
remarks, “Well, since I’ve gotten away from the city to my mountain refuge, what better 
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sensibilities of the Horatian speaker, moreover, there is not only a time for satiric mock-
ery but also, I argue, a time for gentler, more inward-focused satire.  Serm. 1.4 looks 
ahead from the time of open attack to the period of cease-fire, while the ego of Sermones 
book 2, himself claiming to have reached the second phase, relinquishes the role of sati-
rist-on-the-offensive to a host of (often dominant) interlocutors. 
Furthermore, in both Horace and Juvenal, I believe, we can find moments where 
the speaker genuinely wants the world to become a better place as a result of his satiric 
criticism.  Juvenal first: the conclusion of poem 10 shows the ego, at least later in his po-
etic corpus, giving a bit of positive, constructive advice to the reader.37  Mortals’ prayers 
and wishes may not accomplish much, as the speaker has endeavored to demonstrate 
throughout the poem to this point, but there is hope, for two reasons.  One—the gods will 
provide for humans (pro iucundis aptissima quaeque dabunt di, “the gods will give us not 
what we want but everything we need,” 10.349).  Two—happiness is achievable: pray for 
physical and psychological health (mens sana in corpore sano, “a healthy mind in a 
healthy body,” 10.356), and you yourself can achieve a life of peace (monstro quod ipse 
tibi possis dare; semita certe | tranquillae per uirtutem patet unica uitae, “I’m pointing 
out what you can get on your own; the one path to a tranquil life is clearly accessed 
                                                
than this to depict with my satire and my mundane muse?” (Serm. 2.6.16–17: ergo ubi me 
in montes et in arcem ex urbe remoui, | quid prius inlustrem saturis musaque pedestri?). 
Examinations of this poem’s relation to the broader program of Horatian satire in-
clude Lyne [1995: 19–20], Reckford [1997], Oliensis [1998: 41–54], Fitzwilliam [1999], 
and Bowditch [2001: 142–154].  For a consideration of Serm. 2.7 as a “farewell to sat-
ire,” see Evans [1978: 311–312], but contra Sharland: “[r]ather than regarding this as a 
‘farewell to satire’, I see it as a statement of what satire is not and what Horace will not 
allow it to become” [2009: 306 n. 93].  Oliensis shows how Serm. 2.8 serves as an effec-
tive conclusion to the Horace-ego’s role as satirist [1998: 57–63]. 
37 On Juvenal poem 10—which is compared to DRN 3.1024–1052 by both Dudley 
[1965b: 116] and Kenney [1971: 232 ad loc.]—see Fishelov [1990]. 
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through excellence,” 10.363–364).  Here, at least, we can see a satirist who desires, and 
looks forward to, a world where the Vanity of Human Wishes, as Johnson titles his imita-
tion of Juvenal 10, has been corrected.38 
Again, the Horatian ego at times actively wants a world not only where the flaws 
he castigates are ameliorated, but also where satire and mockery are unnecessary, and I 
believe that the passages where the speaker’s desire is clearest are in his idealizing rumi-
nations on the circle of Maecenas.  Est locus uni | cuique suus, “everybody’s got his own 
right place,” the ego says to the fanboy (Serm. 1.9.51–52), in describing the lack of envy 
or malevolence in Maecenas’ coterie.  Questions of status “do not bother” him there (nil 
mi officit, Serm. 1.9.50), and so satiric mockery would, it seems, be out of place.  At the 
end of Serm. 1.3, not only does the ego portray himself as refraining from mockery, but 
he also envisions a life of pleasant (even Epicurean) friendship: 
    mihi dulces 
ignoscent, siquid peccaro stultus, amici 
inque uicem illorum patiar delicta libenter. 
           (Serm. 1.3.139–141) 
 
My dear friends’ll overlook it if I stupidly make a mistake, and in 
return I’ll gladly tolerate their faults. 
 
No mockery—Lucilian, iambic, or otherwise—in these lines, as I understand them.  Now, 
the Horace-ego is painting a picture for us here, an idealized picture of Maecenas’ circle 
that reflects the ego’s desire for a lack of interest in his own status (cf. Bowditch [2001: 
ch. 4], among others), so we should not take this to be a faithful representation of Roman 
reality at the time of the writing of Serm. book 2.  But this is my point exactly: the 
                                                
38 So also Courtney [1980: 447] and Griffin [1994: 100].  Cf. Keane [2006: 4]: 
“[s]atirists…do not just describe, distort, and criticize social life.  They claim to intervene 
in it as well—at least in an indirect manner.” 
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speaker’s portrait is an aspirational one, a better (but still attainable) world that would 
obviate the need for satiric blame. 
Similarly, the speaker in book 2, when he discusses his Sabine farm, presents it as 
a prayer granted (and then some) by the gods (Serm. 2.6.1–4), and further as a place free 
of the topics of satiric complaint (Serm. 2.6.6–13, 18–19: greed, jealousy, dissatisfaction, 
ambition, Rome’s foul weather).  For the ego of Horace’s Sermones, there is life after sat-
ire, a place beyond anger, a home for country mice and Maecenas’ friends: somewhere, 
the ego hopes, that will remain enduringly tranquil (“Son of Maia, I ask for nothing more, 
except that you make my gifts permanent,” Serm. 2.6.4–5: nil amplius oro, | Maia nate, 
nisi ut propria haec mihi munera faxis). 
Life after (mocking, modal) satire, perhaps; but not life without the genre of 
satura.  The end of Sermones book 1 presents satire as the poetic option best suited to the 
ego for the current stage of his life—and one to which he was pushed under dream-orders 
from Romulus (Serm. 1.10.31–49).  This whole concluding programmatic poem presents 
satire more as an artistic endeavor than as a critically moralistic one: we see poets and 
authors good and bad,39 we are given advice on writing well,40 we are taught about the 
                                                
39 Lucilius (Serm. 1.10.1–5, 48–71), Laberius (6), Old Comic poets (16–17), Catullus and 
Calvus (19), Pitholeon (22), Pedius Poplicola (28), Corvinus (29), the “overblown Alps-
dweller” Furius (turgidus Alpine, 36), Fundanius (42), Pollio (42, 85), Varius (44, 81), 
Vergil (45, 81), Varro of Atax (46), Homer (52), Accius (53), Ennius (54), Cassius (62), 
Fannius (80), Valgius and Octavius (82), and Furnius (86). 
40  saepe stilum uertas, iterum quae digna legi sint 
scripturus, neque te ut miretur turba labores, 
contentus paucis lectoribus. an tua demens 
uilibus in ludis dictari carmina malis?  
     (Serm. 1.10.72–75) 
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efficacy of humor,41 and we are informed of the ego’s own constructed audience, the non-
senatorial literary elites: “as far as I’m concerned, it’s enough that the equites applaud.”42  
The literary focus to his work, whereby satire (satura) extends beyond or even transcends 
satiric mockery, appears again in the second book of Sermones.43 
Yes, one could object that these passages to which I have pointed are common-
places, or even that they are so banal as to be (self-)parodic.  Perhaps so with Juvenal 10.  
In Horace’s Sermones, however, I do not think that such is the case, because of the pas-
sages’ wide diffusion across the two books,44 because of the relative intratextual consis-
tency of their tone, and because of the recurrent literary concerns that they voice.  And I 
do not see in them, however brief and scattered they may be, the same persistent vehe-
mence and haughty sanctimony that we see in other blame poets of ancient satiric verse. 
                                                
If you’re gonna write stuff that’s worth reading again, you gotta use the 
other end of your stylus, don’t try to make the crowd go wild for you—be 
satisfied with a few readers.  Or are you out of your mind, would you 
rather your poems be recited in cheapass schools? 
On this poem, see, e.g., Zetzel [1980] and Scodel [1987]. 
41 Serm. 10.15–16: “something silly usually skewers great things stronger and better than 
something shrill,” ridiculum acri | fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res. 
42 Serm. 1.10.76: satis est equitem mihi plaudere, presented as a quotation of the mima 
Arbuscula in the face of popular disapproval.  Cf. Serm. 1.10.87–90: the speaker men-
tions “learned friends whom I’d like to laugh at this stuff—however good or bad it is—
and I’ll be sad if they like it less than I hope” (doctos…amicos | …quibus haec, sint 
qualiacumque, | adridere uelim, doliturus, si placeant spe | deterius nostra).  
43 Serm. 2.1.28: “I like locking words in verse forms,” me pedibus delectat claudere 
uerba; and Serm. 2.1.60: “whatever my living conditions, I’ll keep writing,” quisquis erit 
uitae scribam color.  At the end of Serm. 1.4, the ego even threatens a forced conversion 
to satiric poetry like the conversions enacted on unwitting victims by Rome’s Jewish 
population (or, rather, the ego’s prejudicial distortion of it). 
44 The passages from Serm. 1.10 and book 2 fall outside of the poems on which Freuden-
burg [1993: ch. 1] focuses for the speaker as doctor ineptus (in Serm. 1.1–4). 
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Or one might suggest that in these passages the speaker is not being satiric, is not 
functioning as a satirist-mocker, but rather as a more straightforward moralist or espouser 
of a certain ethical philosophy or literary critic.  Inasmuch as the terms “mockery” and 
“satire” (satire as mode) are truly and wholly interchangeable, point taken.  Yet this equa-
tion of the two words is insufficient for understanding the overall work of Ennius, 
Horace, Persius, and even Juvenal: the genre of Roman satire, as we will explore in chap-
ters 4 and 5, is more than mere satiric mockery, but so also, I argue, there is more to the 
wider, modal category of satiric poetry than simple attack.  The mode of satire is, in this 
respect, a combination of literary tools, devices, and styles that, though they may appear 
independently in non-satiric works, together comprise the satirist’s textual product. 
 
The satirist’s double audience 
I have been focusing so far on the figure of the satirist, but if we focus on the 
point of reception, we can see that—however we take this last point on the (non-)genu-
ineness of the satirist’s desire for a better world—the satirist has a divided audience, be-
tween those who take his seriousness seriously and those who are cognizant of his ironi-
cally self-undercutting position, between those who “get it” and those who “don’t get it.”  
This divided audience is notional, since it may turn out that no one actually takes the sati-
rist seriously, but the division is important to the satirist’s self-construction and to the 
formation of a collusive relationship between satiric speaker and audience (cf. p. 39, 
above).  The “get it” crowd is the true focus of the satirist’s attention, and he must enable 
this crowd “to imagine that some people other than themselves will continue to regard 
him as an uncomplicated moralist, while they themselves remain free to laugh along with 
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his posing, preening, and ultimate elusiveness.”45  This elusiveness is the kind of thing 
that has driven a great deal of scholarship over the years on questions about the “sincer-
ity” of Juvenal, or Horace, in the content of their poetry. 
Two examples of the divided audience, from modern American political media.  
On 31 January 2011, MSNBC’s The Rachel Maddow Show (2008–present) presented a 
report on right-wing criticisms of President Obama’s handling of developing civil unrest 
in Egypt, with particular emphasis on an essay by a certain Stephenson Billings that 
called upon Sarah Palin, the Republican nominee for the vice presidency in 2008, to push 
for an American invasion of Egypt.  The essay, however, was part of a satiric website 
called Christwire, and Rachel Maddow was promptly mocked by other media outlets for 
her failure to pick up on the joke.46  Maddow was in the “don’t get it” crowd, and took the 
Billings ego as the serious-minded, uncomplicated, moralizing social critic that he 
claimed to be.  She fell for the realism generated by the satirist’s self-presentation.  Those 
who pointed to Maddow’s misunderstanding of the satirist were in the “get it” crowd, and 
were able to laugh at both his bombast and her misapprehension.47 
                                                
45 Rosen [2007: 244]; emphasis preserved. 
46 For the essay, see Billings [2011a].  Examples of the more gentle mockery of Maddow 
are Hudson [2011] and MacNicol [2011], and Maddow herself quickly addressed the is-
sue [2011], as did Billings [2011b].  Nor was her show the first media entity to take the 
satire seriously: Hudson details the bamboozlement of NBC Los Angeles [2010a] and 
The Huffington Post [2010b], cf. Oppenheimer [2010]; and Pasick notes that one Christ-
wire contributor, Marie Jon, is in fact a right-wing religious columnist who evidently did 
not realize that she was submitting her contributions to a satire website [2010]. 
47 Compare Hongo [2011]—comic mockery of the “don’t get it” portion of Facebook us-
ers who take articles published in The Onion as genuine news reporting, not satire.  Com-
pare Onion-Like [2011], which collects real-life headlines that sound like they belong in a 
satiric newspaper.  Compare also the incident in September 2011 when an article in The 
Onion [2011] that described the United States Congress as literally taking schoolchildren 
hostage (a send-up of congressional partisanship and of the over-usage of the metaphor of 
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More complicated is the matter of the satiric ego of Comedy Central’s news hu-
mor program The Colbert Report (2005–present).  The persona, which is modeled pri-
marily on Fox News political opinion host Bill O’Reilly, is an exaggerated, dimwitted, 
often self-undercutting advocate of right-wing political ideology, who engages in mock-
ery of liberal policies and politics.  He is akin to Homer’s Thersites: a foolish character 
who tries, and fails, to play the role of a blame poet.48  So, in broad strokes, the reader 
who “gets it” would understand Stephen Colbert to be using the ego, “Stephen Colbert,” 
as the medium for a center-left satiric critique of right-wing ideology, while the hypo-
thetical others who “don’t get it” would take “Stephen Colbert” at something close to 
face value, as an outspoken advocate of far-right politics, and would be an object of 
laughter for the audience that understands that the ego’s seriousness is not serious. 
These “others” are not hypothetical, in the case of The Colbert Report, however, 
and it is not immediately obvious that they are missing the joke.  As LaMarre et al. have 
shown, some conservative viewers of the program claim that Stephen Colbert “genuinely 
mean[s] what he said” [2009: 212, cf. 223].  Moreover, these viewers tend to see the sa-
tiric pose of The Colbert Report as itself the joke—the ego, that is, provides the authentic 
ideology, while the apparent mockery of the foolhardy ego is in fact a way of poking fun 
                                                
hostage-taking) prompted the Capitol Police in Washington, D. C., to undertake an offi-
cial investigation: see Flock [2011] and Kleefeld [2011]. 
48 In Rosen’s estimation, “Thersites does not emulate the prototypical blame 
poet.…Thersites can really only be regarded as the target within a psogos,” i.e., act of 
mockery [2007: 77; emphasis preserved].  The ego of The Colbert Report often, in the 
process of mocking an opposing political viewpoint, is himself mocked by textual com-
mentary that appears on screen during his recurring segment “The Wørd” (in the style of 
Bill O’Reilly’s “Talking Points” segment).  The producers who create the onscreen text 
thus play a role analogous to Odysseus, putting the would-be satirist in his proper (rather, 
his actual) place. 
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at liberal viewers who are the real “don’t get it” crowd.49  The liberal viewer sees satiric 
πονηρία in the ridiculous bloviating of the Colbert character, while for conservative fans 
the πονηρία is that the Colbert character is being used to pull a fast one on the liberal 
viewer.  In the words of The Week magazine, “So conservatives see a conservative?  That 
just means Colbert is a talented satirist” [2009].  Here, perhaps, is a prime example of the 
“ultimate elusiveness” of the satirist, one whose poses appeal to two (or more) audiences, 
each believing that the other is a target of mockery.  As Kuiper writes, “people seem 
more prone to perceive something as a satire if they already hold views which they feel 
the inferred author of the satire is trying to get them to adopt” [1985: 176]. 
 
 
The satiric speaker position and the Lucretian ego 
 
The speaker of the satiric mode is a comic instigator of mockery or blame poetry.  
This mockery, delivered with a personalized voice, is prompted by justified indignation at 
some fault or flaw and is founded upon the speaker’s declarations of legitimacy or moral 
                                                
49 Gallagher & Brown, leaders of the anti-marriage rights lobbying interest National Or-
ganization for Marriage, commend Colbert’s conservative credentials and claim that he is 
a “double-agent, pretending to pretend to be a conservative” [2008].  In the study of La-
Marre et al., conservative viewers considered Colbert to be “targeting liberals, but 
also…being conservative, Republican, and disliking liberals” [2009: 224].  A similar 
phenomenon has been observed by Vidmar & Rokeach [1974] in the case of the bigoted 
character Archie Bunker from the situation comedy All in the Family (1971–1979). 
Those who see satire as not undercutting but reinforcing the legitimacy of its tar-
gets might point either to the fact that the animated television comedy Family Guy 
(1999–2002, 2005–present)—whose own opening credit sequence is modeled on that of 
All the in Family—often has the victims of its mockery record their own voices for the 
show, or to the fact that the musical parodies of Weird Al Yankovic are always released 
with the original artists’ permission. 
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superiority.  Cutting against the self-righteous moral high ground claimed by the satirist 
is his abject status or living conditions.  The speaker’s façade of seriousness can be con-
sidered ironic by his narrative audience,50 who laugh collusively at the target of the 
mockery, at the satirist’s pomposity, and at the readers who take his seriousness seri-
ously.  Each of these traits, taken singly, may be found in a variety of other genres: so, for 
instance, there is a personalized voice in erotic elegy, humor in theatrical comedy, and a 
claim of the moral high ground in works of theology and straightforward philosophy.  
But, taken together, these traits make up the particular voice of the satirist. 
To what extent, and in what passages, can we see DRN’s speaker as a satirist?  Al-
though the poem presents itself as a serious, even straightforward, artistic/philosophic 
undertaking, an evaluation of the poem’s speaker from the framework detailed above 
shows him to have much in common with the satirist.  The Lucretian speaker regularly 
creates comic situations, particularly in his scorn for incorrect accounts of the universe; 
furthermore, he employs mockery and blame to great effect in his rejection of erroneous 
philosophical principles and in his castigation of misguided moral hypocrisy.  He repeat-
edly expresses indignation at the faults present in both flawed intellectual and ethical 
concepts, and through this indignation (and elsewhere) he claims the self-righteous high 
ground that satirists also claim.  At the same time, the ego uses certain traits of the satiric 
speaker—a personal voice, combined with certain types of abjection (including linguistic 
abjection!)—in order to create a collusive relationship with the reader. 
                                                
50 I use the term “narrative audience” as it is used by, e.g., Rabinowitz [1977: 127], to in-
dicate the hypothetical audience of the ego’s speech.  It runs parallel to the equally hypo-
thetical “authorial audience,” for whom the author (or “implied author”) rhetorically de-
signs the text, with “certain assumptions about his readers’ beliefs, knowledge, and fa-
miliarity with conventions” [1977: 126]—conventions such as blame poetry. 
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The moments in DRN where the ego speaks like a satirist are, unsurprisingly, 
clustered around passages often associated by scholars with invective or diatribe (al-
though we saw in chapter 1 how the concept “diatribe” is problematic): the refutation of 
the Presocratic philosophers in book 1, the critiques of the fear of death in book 3 and of 
love in book 4, and so on.  Yet these passages are not the only places where the speaker 
appears satiric, and we can see additional links between him and the satirist archetype 
throughout the text, even in the poem’s concluding passage on the plague in Athens.51  
And, as we will see, the Lucretian persona is not the only speaker in DRN who can be 
satiric—the Natura Rerum, given voice near the end of book 3, should herself be seen as 
a satirist (pp. 133–139, below). 
 
The Lucretian ego as comic speaker 
Satirists are comic, and so is the speaker of DRN on many occasions.  I proffer a 
few preliminary examples here, and deal with the principal examples of comic mockery 
and blame later (pp. 99–113, below).  Not all humorous elements of the poem are part of 
mockery or blame specifically, but they still play a part in the speaker’s potential to be a 
satirist, because they develop his comic voice, which (as we have seen) is essential to the 
definition of the speaker of Graeco-Roman satiric poetry.52  Puns and other wordplay, 
                                                
51 Cf. Waltz [1949: 79]: “ses démonstrations les plus géométriques alternent avec des ex-
plosions indignées dignes du plus fougueux pamphlétaire.”  Note Waltz’ own clever 
figura etymologica on the concept of indignatio. 
52 And because they can do important textual work beyond the purposes of pure satire: as 
Corbeill writes, “[j]okes become a means of ordering social realities” [1996: 6]. 
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important features of DRN, can be sources of humor.53  Likewise, the case can be made 
for significant connections between DRN and Graeco-Roman comic theater.54  For our 
purposes, however, I will take “comedy” more broadly, as humor in general, wherever it 
appears in the poem.55 
I discuss here four principal ways in which DRN’s ego speaks with a comic voice, 
at the expense of the targets of his scorn.  Particularly prominent is the use of humor in 
the reductio ad absurdum of erroneous philosophical beliefs, whether scientific or ethi-
                                                
53 For the use of puns in Roman humor, see Corbeill [1996: ch. 2, especially 91–95] and, 
on Horace’s Sermones specifically, Plaza [2006: 57–66].  According to Turpin, “[p]uns 
seem to have been specially important to Epicureans,” including Philodemus and Lu-
cretius both [1998: 137].  Wordplay in DRN has been thoroughly evaluated by Snyder 
[1980], building on the “atomologies” (atomic etymologies) of Friedländer [1941], with 
additional observations by Brown [1984: xxxv–xxxix], Hinds [1987a], Ferguson [1987], 
Farrell [1988], West [1994: 98], O’Hara [1996: 54–55], Dionigi [2003, 2006], and 
Holmes [2005]; cf. Dalzell [1987], contra.  For play in and out of DRN on Epicurus, 
ἐπίκουρος (“ally”), and curro, see Snyder [1980: 108], Frischer [1982: 275–276], Gale 
[1994a: 137], and O’Hara [1998].  Cf. also O’Hara’s survey of the role of wordplay in 
Greece and Rome [1996: ch. 1]. 
For the role of puns in the discourse of satire, see Simpson [2003: 20–29]; for the 
importance of puns in the satire of the Marx Brothers, see Gardner [2009: 2]. 
54 Connections to comedy: I suggest that the phrase postscaenia uitae (“life’s behind-the-
scenes,” DRN 4.1186) is a marker pointing to a broadly comedic/theatrical underpinning 
to the ego’s take on love and sex in the end of book 4.  Indeed, the exclusus amator 
(“locked-out lover,” 4.1177) looks back to the weepy protagonists of Menandrian New 
Comedy and the Roman comedy of Plautus and Terence. 
For further links between DRN and Plautus, see Rosivach [1980], Snyder [1980: 
72–73, 78–79, 104, 113, 125, 139 n. 17, and 144–146], as well as my brief connections in 
pp. 70–74, below.  Gale discusses connections between DRN and comedic theater more 
broadly [2007: 68–69], while Kenney notes the status of “[t]he lecture as a dramatic per-
formance” in the Roman world [1971: 18 n. 4] and points to homullis (DRN 3.914) as 
comic diction [1971: 209 ad loc.]. 
55 For a consideration of the concept “comic,” with reference to Aristotle, see Eco [1984].  
Comedy, for Rosen, is simply “performed humor” [2007: 19] through which “laughter is 
represented rather than lived” [2007: 15].  Cf. also Samuel Johnson’s Rambler 125, titled 
“The Difficulty of Defining Comedy,” in Murphy [1825: 217–219]. 
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cal.56  On occasion, too, the speaker employs funny examples to support his own positive 
argument or observation.  Humorous scenes highlight the speaker’s attack on ridiculous 
human behaviors, and we can detect comic aspects also in his mentions of language in 
book 1.  A few passages now; more below. 
Early in book 1, while marshalling evidence for the argument that no thing can 
arise from nothing, the speaker makes the claim that creation ex nihilo would result in an 
absurd chaos of procreation: 
nam si de nilo fierent, ex omnibu’ rebus 
omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret. 
e mare primum homines, e terra posset oriri 
squamigerum genus et uolucres erumpere caelo; 
armenta atque aliae pecudes, genus omne ferarum, 
incerto partu culta ac deserta tenerent; 
nec fructus idem arboribus constare solerent, 
sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia possent. 
           (DRN 1.159–166) 
 
So if things were to come from nothing, every breed could be pro-
duced out of everything—nothing would lack seed.  First off, hu-
mans could arise from the sea, the scaly breed from the land, and 
birds could burst out [or “hatch”] from the sky.  Cattle and the 
other flocks—the whole type of wild beasts—would with uncertain 
birth inhabit cultivated places and wilderness alike.  And the same 
fruits wouldn’t tend to grow on trees, but would change up: all the 
trees could produce everything. 
 
                                                
56 Waltz also identifies reductio ad absurdum as an important, even “natural” and “su-
perabundant” feature of DRN’s satiric bearing [1949: 85, continuing through 89]: 
La démonstration (ou la réfutation) par l’absurde, forme de raisonnement 
où la logique et l’esprit satirique se combinent et se fortifient mutuelle-
ment, est un des procédés le plus naturellement chers à Lucrèce.…les rai-
sonnements par l’absurde surabondent dans son poème. 
See also Wallach [1976: 27, 31, 105 and n. 127, 107–108]. 
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Humans from the sea, fish from the earth: such anomalies are laughable.57  Merrill calls 
mutarentur at line 166 “inelegant metrically” [1907: ad loc.]—prosodic clunkiness that 
could foster a sense of the passage’s farcical goings-on.  Solomon comments that, in this 
passage, the speaker ridicules “the plain childishness of ascribing intentionality to divine 
creators…through these humorous illustrations” [2004: 270].  The humor here moreover 
serves a polemical goal, of discrediting theories of hybrids in earlier philosophy.58 
The speaker kicks his humor into high gear when attacking the Presocratic phi-
losopher Anaxagoras’ principle explanation of how the universe works, namely 
ὁμοιομερία, the concept that all things are made up of smaller particles of themselves.  
At the conclusion of the long invective against non-atomic accounts of the universe, he 
comically both highlights the idea’s Greekness and ridicules its basic principle of the re-
cursiveness of matter: 
nunc et Anaxagorae scrutemur homoeomerian. 
........................................................................ 
principio, rerum quam dicit homoeomerian, 
ossa uidelicet e pauxillis atque minutis 
ossibus hic et de pauxillis atque minutis 
uisceribus uiscus gigni sanguenque creari 
sanguinis inter se multis coeuntibu’ guttis 
ex aurique putat micis consistere posse 
aurum et de terris terram concrescere paruis, 
ignibus ex ignis, umorem umoribus esse, 
cetera consimili fingit ratione putatque. 
          (DRN 1.830, 834–842) 
 
                                                
57 Leonard & Smith point to the specter of “horses, e.g., producing frogs” [1942: ad 164], 
while Duff remarks that “a cow might produce tiger cubs” and “you might find a tiger in 
your garden” [1962: ad 164, in the second quote following Bailey 1947: v. 2 ad 164]. 
58 So Woolerton: “Lucretius’ reference to tree-mammal hybrids at 2.702–3 is designed to 
engage with and discredit a now lost passage of Empedocles, who raised the possibility 
of such hybrids.  This fits well with Lucretius’ argumentative and poetic strategy” [2010: 
257]. 
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Now let’s also look at Anaxagoras’ ὁμοιομερία.…First off, as for 
what he says is the ὁμοιομερία of things, surely this guy thinks 
bones are produced from little bitty bones; and guts from little bitty 
guts; and blood is created by many drops of blood coalescing 
among themselves; and gold can come about from bits of gold; and 
soil can grow from little soils; that fire is from fires; water from 
waters; the rest he imagines and thinks in a similar vein. 
 
The passage is clearly marked as sarcasm by uidelicet at line 835, and by that point the 
reader has already twice come across the awkward and overlong transliterated accusative 
homoeomerian.59  Greek words are rare in DRN, and as Sedley observes, “concentration 
of Greek words in a passage is exploited…to conjure up for the readers a Greek or an 
otherwise exotic context” [1999: 238].  The preservation of the Greek term is a conscious 
choice that marks Anaxagoras’ precept as bizarre and off-base60—as bizarre as merper-
sons and landfish, as off-base as an apple growing on a grapevine.  The term’s repetition, 
combined with other repetitions throughout the passage—of words in polyptoton like uis-
                                                
59 Sedley calls 830 “[a] leading contender for the title of Lucretius’ worst line” [1999: 
237].  Brown points out that 1.830–842 is “one of the most repetitive passages in Lu-
cretius” [1983: 154], and suggests that “the sameness of expression emphasizes the uni-
versal applicability of the theory, and backs up the notion of material sameness 
(homoeomeria)” [1983: 153].  “Moreover, the theory of Anaxagoras is further prejudiced 
by a satirical tone, which owes much to repetition” [1983: 156].  See also West [1994: 
125] and Piazzi [2005: 52–58].  On the term ὁμοιομερία in the Greek doxographical tra-
dition, see Lanza [1963]. 
On DRN’s philosophical polemics in general, see, e.g., Wallach [1976: 65–66, 
91–108], Kleve [1978] and Piazzi [2005: 12–16]. 
60 Tatum shows that it is a choice: the ego “laments that the term cannot be translated into 
Latin.  This is, of course, untrue; since Cicero succinctly translates the idea in Acad. 
2.118…it was hardly beyond the poet’s ingenuity to turn the Greek into a Latin hexame-
ter” [1984: 183–184].  Sedley, discussing another Greek term left untranslated in DRN 
(ἁρμονία), claims that “the word’s undisguised alienness to the Latin language is symp-
tomatic of the concept’s irrelevance” [1999: 237].  This mutual bizarreness of term and 
concept applies equally well to Anaxagorean ὁμοιομερία—and its alienness is enhanced 
by the unusual, Greek long I before the final A, with Greek accusative ending N. 
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ceribus uiscus (DRN 1.836) or terris terram (840),61 of grammatical constructions in 
zeugma (as at 841), and of entire lines (835 ≈ 836)—form a raucous scene of philosophi-
cal parody.  The principle is shown to be, like the term itself and like the examples the 
Lucretian speaker uses to illustrate it, silly, clunky, and error-stricken.62  It becomes, sim-
ply put, a joke. 
The comedy follows along with the reductio ad absurdum.  In response to an anti-
homoeomerotic objection, that materials producing different substances would need to 
have particles of those other things within them (1.859–874: so, for instance, wood would 
need to contain particles of fire), the speaker fields an Anaxagorean counter-
argument63—namely, that every thing has particles of everything else within itself, but 
takes its outward properties from the preponderant constituent (875–879).  The speaker’s 
own counter-counter-argument further extends the absurdity of Anaxagoras’ position: 
quod tamen a uera longe ratione repulsumst. 
conueniebat enim fruges quoque saepe, minaci 
robore cum saxi franguntur, mittere signum 
sanguinis aut aliquid, nostro quae corpore aluntur; 
cum lapidi in lapidem terimus, manare cruorem. 
           (DRN 1.880–884) 
 
This is nonetheless hurled far away from the true explanation.64  
For it was appropriate that grain also often, when cracked by a 
                                                
61 Compare the threefold repetition of ex alienigenis at line-beginning in lines 865, 869, 
872, and 874 (transposed before 873 by Rouse, following Diels). 
62 Cf. Tatum: “The juxtaposition…of Anaxagoras’ jargon and Lucretius’ perfectly com-
prehensible exposition is sharp.…Lucretius’ refusal to translate Anaxagoras’ terminology 
and his lengthy definition are an implied criticism” [1984: 184]. 
63 I comment briefly on DRN’s use of interpolated questions like this one below (p. 129 n. 
184). 
64 This line is one of DRN’s frequently repeated barb lines, which I consider below (p. 
125 and nn. 172–173). 
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stone’s threatening strength, give a sign of blood or something of 
the things which are nourished in our body—and that, when we 
wear upon a rock with a rock, blood flow out. 
 
After the speaker raises and responds to a hypothetical counter-counter-counter-
argument, the passage on ὁμοιομερία concludes with a picture of primordia laughing 
and crying (“it’ll happen that they chuckle, struck through with shaking laughter, and wet 
their faces and cheeks with salted tears,” fiet uti risu tremulo concussa cachinnent | et 
lacrimis salsis umectent ora genasque, 1.919–920, cf. 2.976–982).  Designed to show the 
folly of supposing that perceptible phenomena are composed of smaller particles of them-
selves, these lines also highlight the satiric bite of the speaker’s comic bearing.  The im-
agery here is funny and sublimely absurd.  The atoms in this reductio are, evidently, the 
atoms that compose our speaker’s body—and they are supposed to be laughing because 
he is laughing at Anaxagoras, whose theory would suggest that a laughing person is made 
up of laughing particles.  The atoms themselves hypothetically join in on the mockery of 
Anaxagoras and of the comic episode that his ὁμοιομερία entails. 
The later books of DRN also include comedy in scenes of the rejection of philoso-
phical explanations of the way things work, as we can see from three further examples.  
When arguing against the theory of vision according to which the eyes are portals to the 
mind (animus), the Lucretian speaker remarks that people who believe as much should go 
ahead and rip their eyes out, since doors (portals) are not bothered by anything and just 
get in the way of a clear view.65  Similarly, he explicitly calls it laughable (deridiculum 
                                                
65   neque enim, qua cernimus ipsi, 
ostia suscipiunt ullum reclusa laborem. 
praeterea si pro foribus sunt lumina nostra, 
iam magis exemptis oculis debere uidetur 
cernere res animus sublatis postibus ipsis. 
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esse uidetur, 3.777) to think that the animus/anima enters the body from outside at the 
time of birth, for that would result in souls’ struggling earnestly (praeproperanter, 77966) 
against each other to make it into a body (778–782), unless by chance the souls had pre-
arranged agreements on who gets which body (foedera pacta, 78367).  This image, like 
that of the laughing and crying atoms—and also like the image of dreams trained to 
dance before our sleeping eyes (4.792–793)—draws its humor from the personification of 
inanimate concepts, and in this respect is similar to Plautus’ humorous treatment of dei-
fied abstracts, where the playwright pushes to the breaking point the Roman belief in 
numinous deities immanent in the world around them.68 
                                                
     (DRN 3.365–369) 
 
And opened doors that we ourselves look through don’t undergo any toil.  
Moreover if our eyes are as portals, it seems like the mind ought to per-
ceive things more with eyes removed, with the gates themselves taken 
away. 
 
The speaker goes on to explicate the (in his view) correct theory of vision at 3.408–415. 
66 Snyder points out that the use in this line of figura etymologica (at innumero numero) 
“contributes to the sarcastic tone of an argument by reductio ad absurdum” [1980: 80]. 
67 On the programmatic importance of the term foedera (naturae) in DRN, see Asmis 
[2008]. 
68 Feeney calls these, appropriately for our current consideration, “personifications” 
[1998: 85].  See, for example, Bacchides 115–116, one character’s invocation of “Love, 
Pleasure, Venus, Venusness, Rejoicement, Joking, Play, Speech, Kissykissy” (Amor, Vo-
luptas, Venus, Venustas, Gaudium, | Iocus, Ludus, Sermo, Suauisauiatio), which last per-
sonification is too much for the speaker’s interlocutor, who challenges an deus est ullus 
Suauisauiatio? (“is there really any such god as Kissykissy?,” 120). 
Personification is not solely a comic device—we need look only to the important 
role in Roman domestic and public religion of Pudicitia, the divine personification of 
(female) sexual self-control, cf. Langlands [2006: ch. 1]—but it is an effective tool for 
humor both in Plautus and in these passages of DRN.  Compare Wallach’s continuous 
consideration of personification and prosopopoieia as part of her survey of diatribal traits 
in DRN 3’s attack on the fear of death [1976: 7, 33, 66–83, 91, 101, 107]. 
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Finally, in the account of how lightning (igniferum fulmen) is not supernatural 
(6.379–422), the Lucretian ego unleashes a battery of rhetorical questions, from why 
lightning strikes the innocent rather than the guilty to how strikes occur in multiple direc-
tions/locations at the exact same time.69  On the matter of lightning in uninhabited loca-
tions, the speaker asks if the gods who supposedly hurl it are merely practicing: “Or is it 
the case that they’re training their arms and strengthening up their muscles?” (an tum 
bracchia consuescunt firmantque lacertos?, 396).  The notion that the immortal gods 
need to do pilates is hilarious and in fact specifically Aristophanic.70  And it easily dis-
                                                
By creating an anthropomorphic image of spirits, dreams, and especially atoms 
(the impersonal, mechanical building blocks of the universe), DRN’s speaker is creating 
an absurdity—and an image that is inherently funny to humankind, cf. Wardenaar on 
American colonial literature [1975: 289–293]; Patten on modern American children’s 
popular culture [2009]; more generally, Buijzen & Valkenburg [2004] and Hurley et al. 
[2011: 155–157]; and, on humorous anthropomorphism in Homer, Schlesinger [1936: 
24–25].  West, too, uses a comic tone when discussing personification in DRN: “Lu-
cretius was an inveterate anthropomorphizer” [1994: 32], on which cf. also Reckford 
[1995: 32–33]; and, on the anthropomorphic atoms specifically, Kennedy [2002: 78]. 
69 Rhetorical questions are, as Wallach demonstrates, “a favorite device of the diatribal 
style” [1976: 63], cf. Stork [1970: 92]. 
70 Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 401: “but he [Zeus] hurls [lightning] at his own temple!” 
(ἀλλὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ γε νεὼν βάλλει).  The commonplace of the randomness of lightning 
strikes, a topos that appears commonly enough in Greek and Latin literature after DRN—
Pease [1977/1920–1923: 428 ad Cicero De Diuinatione 2.44] cites Seneca Quaestiones 
Naturales 2.51, Pliny Natural History 2.113, Lucan 7.447–451, and Lucian Iuppiter Con-
futatus 16, while Geffcken [1907: 129] cites Lucian Timon 10—derives from Anaxagoras 
(see Diels [1912: 393 no. 84]), followed by Democritus (fr. 152, with Plutarch Quaes-
tiones Conuiuales 665f and Guthrie [1962–1981: 425 n. 3]); cf. Geffcken [ibidem], Pease 
[ibidem], and O’Hara [1994: 387].  Meineck suggests that Anaximenes also lies behind 
the Aristophanic passage [2000: 107 ad 407]. 
DRN 6.396 is also connected intratextually to 2.1100–1104, where the speaker re-
jects the notion that gods hurl lightning because, if so, they would avoid striking their 
own temples or uninhabited places or innocent persons.  The Lucretian take on lightning 
is alluded to by the Horace-ego, who states at Serm. 1.5.101–103 that he has learned that 
nature’s marvels are not caused by the anger of the gods, who live a life free from care 
(deos securum agere aeuom—a direct quotation, in fact, of DRN 5.82).  Cf. also Persius 
2.24–25 and Juvenal 3.145–146. 
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penses with the notion that lightning in the wilderness is hurled by some sentient being.  
What makes this image funny is the ascription of mundane human necessities to divine 
beings, not unlike the humor derived in Plautus’ Amphitruo from a god’s castigation by a 
woman who thinks he is her husband. 
Furthermore, in his observations on the follies of human behavior, the speaker 
paints multiple portraits of funny foibles that reinforce his disparagement of romantic en-
tanglements—as we can see from two examples, both in book 4, whose conclusion is an 
important satiric passage in DRN that I will consider in greater detail in chapter 3.  First is 
a send-up of the costs of love during the speaker’s attack on romantic love.  Men, in vain, 
waste away physically and fiscally in pursuit of the object of their affections: 
adde quod absumunt uiris pereuntque labore, 
adde quod alterius sub nutu degitur aetas. 
labitur interea res et Babylonica fiunt, 
languent officia atque aegrotat fama uacillans. 
unguenta et pulchra in pedibus Sicyonia rident; 
scilicet, et grandes uiridi cum luce zmaragdi 
auro includuntur, teriturque thalassina uestis 
adsidue et ueneris sudorem exercita potat; 
et bene parta patrum fiunt anademata, mitrae, 
interdum in pallam atque Alidensia Ciaque uertunt; 
eximia ueste et uictu conuiuia, ludi, 
pocula crebra, unguenta, coronae, serta parantur— 
nequiquam. 
           (DRN 4.1121–1133) 
 
Add on that they consume their strength and waste away in toil, 
add on that their youth is spent under another’s authority.  Mean-
                                                
Cf., on DRN 6.379–422, Houghton [1912: xxxv]: “Even the gods are not spared 
as subjects of satire by this able assailant…The whole passage is one of grandeur and is 
filled with keen satirizing of the gods,” and Waltz [1949: 100], who compares this pas-
sage to Voltaire.  Hutchinson cites DRN 6.404–405, Cicero De Diuinatione 2.45, and Se-
neca Quaestiones Naturales 2.42.1 in support of the notion that “prose and poetry show a 
kindred intellectual energy, kindred stylistic devices and implicit and explicit interaction” 
[2009: 208 with 209 n. 30]. 
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while their wealth collapses and becomes bedspreads from Baby-
lon, obligations lie undone and reputation, tottering, grows ill.  
Pretty perfumed Sicyonian slippers laugh on her feet, hell yes they 
do!, and giant green emeralds with their light are set in gold, and 
the sea-colored clothing is attentively worn down and, well-
trained, it drinks the sweat of sex; and the well-gotten gains of the 
fathers become headbands, ribbons, occasionally they turn into a 
cloak, and Alidensian and Coan silks; they arrange for banquets 
with top-notch attire and hors d’œuvres, for games, for frequent 
flagons, for perfumes, for wreathes, for garlands—in vain. 
 
Two short, repetitive imperative clauses are followed by an almost absurdly long run-on 
sentence, capped off by a wry reversal at nequiquam (after which another sizeable sen-
tence will follow).  Wealth almost magically transforms into Babylonian duvets, as pat-
rimony metamorphoses into fancy clothes.  The abstracts officia and fama suffer from 
human ailments, while slippers, smiling (rident, 4.1125)71 on the beloved’s feet, mock the 
lover’s extravagance, and their derisive laughter is punctuated by the marker of sarcasm 
scilicet.  A long list of symposiastic accessories are purchased, in zeugma.  Most strik-
ingly, expensive clothing “well-trained, drinks the sweat of sex” (ueneris sudorem exer-
cita potat, 1128)—a jolting, provocative expression that makes explicit, perhaps even 
vulgar, the intent that lies beneath all the pricey trappings, an expression that comically 
sullies the efforts of lovers and the lengths to which they engage in these “elegiac expen-
ditures.”72 
                                                
71 For rideo in mockery, see OLD s. v. rideo 1d; for the transferred sense (the primary 
meaning in the DRN passage here), see OLD s. v. rideo 3. 
72 Barone [1978] discusses these expenditures in more detail; cf. also Rosivach [1980], 
and Brown’s listing of parallels from Roman comedy and elsewhere [1987: 248–251 ad 
loc. and 255–256 ad 1124 (1123)].  Brown calls Veneris sudorem exercita potat at line 
1128 “a masterly satirical stroke” [1987: 260 ad loc.].  Gale remarks that the speaker 
“satirizes the extravagance of the young lover in modern Rome” [1994a: 171]. 
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In fact, these gifts—particularly the jewelry and the Coan silks—are precisely the 
kinds of gifts given by the poet-lovers of Roman elegy to their doctae puellae in the work 
of Propertius, Tibullus, and Ovid.  This passage, in part, is tapping into the same comic 
tradition on which Roman erotic elegy draws, that of comoedia palliata.  In the works of 
Plautus (prime examples are Asinaria and Mostellaria), in DRN’s passage on love in sex, 
and in the elegists alike, that is, we see the wasting of family fortune (bene parta patrum, 
4.1129), lavish parties (eximia ueste et uictu conuiuia, 1131), slavish devotion to the be-
loved (alterius sub nutu, 1121), all for naught (nequiquam, 1133).  We even get an ex-
clusus amator!73  Comedy, here, at the expense of the witless, senseless lover.74 
Next I point to the prominent passage, during the same discourse on love, where 
physical defects are paired with (often Greek) terms of endearment (4.1160–1170).75  The 
girl who can’t speak is called “modest,” the hateful burning gossip is called “Starlet” 
(muta ‘pudens’ est; | at flagrans odiosa loquacula ‘Lampadium’ fit, 1164–1165), and so 
forth.  Again, men in love deceive themselves and act foolish—entertainingly so, as the 
                                                
73 DRN 4.1177—the only occurrence of this phrase in classical Latin—cf. Copley [1956] 
and p. 64 n. 54, above.  For this passage in satire after DRN, see Serm. 2.3, Persius 
5.161–174, Hooley [1997: 111–116], and Keane [2006: 24 and 147 n. 27]. 
74 On DRN 4’s debt to comedic theater, see Brown [1987: 135–136]; to love poetry, 
[1987: 139–143].  Smith places it the passage in the tradition of dissuasio amoris and ad-
duces the parallels of New Comedy (particularly Plautus), Ovid Remedia Amoris, and 
Juvenal poem 6 [2005c: 72]—whose self-defeating satirist Smith discusses elsewhere 
[2005d]. 
75 Dudley [1965b: 124–125] discusses the various proposals for this passage’s literary 
origins.  See also Lieberg [1962: 292–297], Barone [1978], Domenicucci [1981], and 
Brown [1987: 128–132, and 280–283 ad loc.], who mentions “the intriguing possibility 
that Lucretius’ treatment of the topos was influenced by an epigram of Philodemus” 
[1987: 130 n. 75] and remarks that DRN’s “various sources of inspiration enable Lu-
cretius to unite the roles of satirist and philosopher” [1987: 131].  I examine this pas-
sage’s allusion to Lucilius in chapter 4 (pp. 208–221, below). 
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reader can chuckle at the inventive Graecisms and slang that the poor blokes use as a de-
fense against seeing their girls how they really look.76 
The depiction of early human courtship in the “anthropology” of book 5 likewise 
includes comic elements, if not targeted mockery: 
et Venus in siluis iungebat corpora amantum; 
conciliabat enim uel mutua quamque cupido 
uel uiolenta uiri uis atque inpensa libido 
uel pretium, glandes atque arbita uel pira lecta. 
           (DRN 5.962–965) 
 
and Venus [or, reading uenus, “sex”] joined the bodies of lovers in 
the woods, because each woman became well-disposed either by 
requited desire or by vehement virile violence and excessive sex-
drive or by a reward—acorns and redberries or specially chosen 
pears. 
 
Besides the heavy alliteration with uel uiolenta uiri uis in line 964, the final line is the 
funny part.  Leonard and Smith call pira lecta “[a]n amusing touch” [1942: ad loc.].  
Moreover, gifts of choice produce are quaint, charming, and very different from the kinds 
of things contemporary lovers give, as exemplified by that passage on elegiac expendi-
tures in the previous book.  And the line also shows, tongue-in-cheek, the goal of the gifts 
in each era: Venus, iunctio, the satisfaction of mutua cupido or impensa libido.77 
                                                
76 Later incarnations of the theme show its affinity with satire: cf. Horace Serm. 1.2 with 
Hooley [2007: 38]; Serm. 1.3.38–75 with Canali [1988: 26–28] and Plaza [2006: 273–
279]; Ovid Amores 2.4 with Rayor & Batstone [1995: ad 2.4.10]; Ovid Ars Amatoria 
2.641–662 with Sommariva [1980] and Watson [1984].  Brown also adduces Ovid 
Heroides 4.73–74 and 15.31–42, Juvenal 8.30–38, Ausonius Epigrams 88, and Molière 
Le Misanthrope act 2 scene 5 [1987: 283 ad DRN 4.1160–1169]; and additionally Martial 
10.68.5–6 and Juvenal 6.185–198 [1987: 281], with Boyancé [1956: 125–126].  Bettini 
compares Don Giovanni’s ability to “make the best of each and every item in the endless 
catalog of women’s imperfections” [1999/1992: 87]. 
77 Additionally, Farrell sees in lines 1091–1095 an “ironic glance at…the Prometheus 
story” [1994: 91]. 
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One more topic where the Lucretian ego acts as a comic speaker is, I believe, in 
the matter of language.  In book 1, issues of language arise repeatedly, and are of great 
importance to the poem’s programmatic statements.  Tatum, for instance, remarks that 
“Lucretius’ attitude is determined not on philosophical but on linguistic grounds” [1984: 
180; emphasis preserved].  Within this discussion of linguistic grounds I find two points 
that can be taken comically.  When addressing the false teachings of the Presocratic phi-
losophers, DRN’s speaker introduces the famously lapidary Heraclitus as clarus ob ob-
scuram linguam magis inter inanis | quamde grauis inter Graios, “a shining star on ac-
count of his murky tongue more among idiots than among grave Greeks.”78  By means of 
witty oxymoron reinforced with the sound repetition in ob obscuram, inter inanis, and 
grauis…Graios,79 our speaker alleges that Heraclitus made it big not on the merit of his 
ideas but on the flashy opacity of his style, and that he is prominent not among serious 
                                                
78 DRN 1.639–640.  Piazzi notes the intensity of the speaker’s mocking attack on Heracli-
tus here: “contro Eraclito apre una polemica di inusitata virulenza” [2005: 85 ad 1.635–
704].  On the polemic against Heraclitus, see, e.g., Bollack [1969], Capasso [1983], and 
Piazzi [2005: 25–42]. 
79 And with a pun on clarus / Ἡράκλειτος: so Snyder [1980: 117–118].  Holtsmark 
[1968] sees a subtle reference to Epicurean atoms and void in the collocation of s(t)olidi 
(1.641) with inanis.  Some scholars would see in these lines anti-Stoic polemic, cf. my 
discussion at pp. 12–15, above. 
For the formulation clarus ob obscuram linguam in particular, compare the light-
dark polemical dialectic in anti-Epicurean propaganda, discussed by De Lacy: “The con-
trast expressed…between light and virtue and glory on the one hand, and darkness and 
vice and obscurity on the other, is again a commonplace of the anti-Epicurean polemic” 
[1941: 54].  The Lucretian persona turns the tables!  The light-dark dialectic in DRN is 
discussed as well by West [1994: 80–85] and Gale [1994a: 203–205]; Kollmann [1971] 
discusses DRN’s structural and stylistic imitation of Heraclitus and Empedocles in the 
passages criticizing each philosopher; and Piazzi points out that “l’obscuritas non è di per 
sé negativa” [2005: 90 ad DRN 1.639].  Cf. also Timpanaro [1960] and Piazzi [2006: 21–
22]. 
 77 
scholars but with the dunces in the peanut gallery.  The invective against Heraclitus80 
continues with the claim that his words are “painted with charming sound” 
(lepido…fucata sonore, 1.644).  Implausible synaesthesia—and an “outrageous meta-
phor…a clear parody of H.’s style.”81  As with the parody of Anaxagoras’ ὁμοιομερία, 
the speaker of DRN uses humor to detract from opposing philosophical world systems, 
but unlike the attack on Anaxagoras, the refutation of Heraclitus begins with the comic 
reduction of linguistic presentation.  The philosopher’s bright reputation is ironic, drawn 
as it is from his lack of clarity. 
I propose another moment of irony in the language-focused portions of the 
poem’s first book.  Earlier in the book, the ego speaks of the difficulty of his undertaking: 
nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta 
difficile inlustrare Latinis uersibus esse, 
multa nouis uerbis praesertim cum sit agendum 
propter egestatem linguae et rerum nouitatem. 
           (DRN 1.136–139) 
 
And it doesn’t escape my mind that it’s hard to make clear the 
murky discoveries of the Greeks in Latin poetry, particularly be-
cause in many cases it has to be done with new words, on account 
of the language’s poverty and the newness of the subject matter. 
 
On the first read-through of DRN, these words may perhaps be taken at face value.  But 
in the second reading—even on the first, for an attentive reader, or one well-informed on 
                                                
80 And it is an invective against Heraclitus as much as against his ideas: Waltz remarks 
that DRN’s speaker “ne sépare pas l’homme de la doctrine; il n’a, pour lui comme pour 
elle, que mépris hautain, qu’injurieuse ironie” [1949: 84].  See, further, Brown [1983: 
146]: “Towards Heraclitus he adopts an aggressively satirical tone and deftly mocks his 
style, which he judges to be all show, devoid of content.” 
81 Rouse & Smith [1975: 53 n. d], and further: “Moreover, init…dux proelia ironically 
hints at H.’s contention that ‘strife is right’ and ‘war is the father of all and king of all.’ ”  
Heraclitus is thus portrayed a comically overinflated figure, a fancy-talking general amid 
the battles of cosmic strife.  On synaesthesia in Roman poetry, see Catrein [2003]. 
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the philosophy of the day—the lines can, I argue, come across as ironic, even comical.  
To wit, the egestas linguae (cf. sermonis egestas, 1.832 and 3.260).  The speaker does not 
actually struggle with his native language, but in fact uses its polysemy to poetic advan-
tage, as Warren persuasively shows [2007: 22, underline added]: 
In just a few lines of DRN 1, for example (1.54–61), he uses the 
terms rerum primordia (‘first beginnings of things’), materies 
(‘matter’), genitalia corpora (‘productive bodies’), semina rerum 
(‘seeds of things’) and corpora prima (‘first bodies’).  Later books 
occasionally also use corpuscula (‘little bodies’) and elementa 
(‘elements’).  This range of terms belies any complaints of the 
lexical poverty of Latin and allows Lucretius to express the impor-
tance of atoms by noting the various roles they play as the funda-
mental existents, components, and material substance, for all other 
things. 
 
I add that there is very little Greek present in the poem.  The speaker has, contrary to 
claims of linguistic exigencies, found a Latin equivalent (or multiple equivalents) for 
each Greek term or concept that he wishes to discuss.82  The range of terms in DRN for 
atoms—none of which, we should note, is ἄτομοι83—gives the lie as well to the ego’s 
                                                
82 Except for the rare instances when he leaves a word untranslated to make a point, as is 
the case with ἁρμονία and ὁμοιομερία, the latter of which is discussed above. 
83 Despite the fact that other Latin authors use atomus.  Most notable among them is 
Lucilius (fr. 28.15C = 753M = 820W = 774K; for these abbreviations, see p. xii, above), 
writing before Lucretius (a fragment that I discuss at pp. 215–216, below).  Also: Cicero 
De Finibus 1.6.17, De Natura Deorum 1.54, and De Fato 22; Seneca Quaestiones Natu-
rales 2.6.2; Quintilian Institutio Oratoriae 7.2.2.  Lévy points out that, according to 
Cicero, Amafinius also used corpusculum rather than atomus [2003: 52], and Piazzi in-
cludes Catius as well [2005: 87 ad DRN 1.635].  Minyard highlights the fact that DRN 
does not transliterate as evidence of the poem’s having goals beyond simple philosophi-
cal didaxis [1985: 45]: 
Using the old Latin words in fact increased the difficulty of communica-
tion for Lucretius, a difficulty which would have been lessened had he 
simply imported the established Greek terms for his principal technical 
categories.  Had his purpose been purely explanatory, didactic, and de-
scriptive, purely philosophical, this is what he should have done. 
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claim that his task must be accomplished with new vocabulary.  Instead, the terminology 
is in many cases exceedingly familiar: res, semina, corpora, and so on.  It is not, then, so 
difficult to elucidate this topic in Latini uersus; there is in DRN no evidence of the eges-
tas linguae; and the speaker has no demonstrated need of noua uerba.84  The rerum noui-
tas is suspect to a knowledgeable reader, too, given the presence in Roman libraries of 
Amafinius’ Latin adaptations of Epicurean texts (discussed at pp. 7–10, above).  We 
might even see jeu de mots here on the term res as DRN’s term for both subject and 
atomic matter.  These four lines are packed with such clever, intratextually allusive, 




The voice of the satirist is both personal-ized and persona-lized.  Satirists speak 
from a first-person subject position, not from that of an impersonal, external observer.  
But they speak also from a constructed persona, from a mask (perhaps an eminently be-
lievable and convincing one) that embodies the shiftiness of the satirist’s relationship to 
                                                
84 Cf. Wardy [1988: 126]: “Commentators have too easily accepted at face value Lu-
cretius’ excuse of the patrii sermonis egestas,” and cf. also Fögen [2000: 61–76] and the 
citations I provide below (p. 158 n. 39). Contrast Minyard’s passing reference to “the se-
verely restricted Latin language” [1985: 75], Roggen’s mention of DRN’s “coinages, 
necessary because of the patrii sermonis egestas” [2008: 548], and Crawley [1963: 4]: 
“No one can question his sincerity, when he speaks of the difficulties presented by the 
lack of an established vocabulary and idiom for his subject, by patrii sermonis egestas.” 
None of these Latin terms means “uncut thing,” as does ἄτομος, but there is (at 
least in authors after Lucretius) a Latin term that does: indiuiduum, with corpus or prin-
cipium understood or explicit, in Cicero De Finibus 1.6.17, De Natura Deorum 1.23 and 
1.71, Academica 2.17, De Fato 25, and elsewhere; Vitruvius 2.2.1; Manilius 1.128 (an-
other Latin didactic poet also talking about the nature of the universe); and Gellius 
5.15.8. 
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his audience and the ambiguity that often characterizes his satire.  Although DRN, on a 
broad view, may seem to possess an impersonal narrator—expounding upon the composi-
tion of the cosmos, omniscient like the narrators of epic—in fact the speaker again and 
again provides the reader with personal references and anecdotes, as I will show.  The 
constructed persona is closer to the ego of Hesiod’s Works and Days than to the ego of 
his Theogony.  Though there is no feud with a brother like Perses in the background plot 
of DRN, there are in fact pre-existing relationships of great import to the Lucretian ego: 
namely, his discipleship of Epicurus, invoked particularly in the proem to book 3, and the 
connection to his patron-addressee Memmius, whose friendship the speaker desires 
(1.140–141).85 
DRN, I mean, is much more personalized than extant earlier epic, and thus the 
Lucretian speaker is arguably closer to a satirist than to an epic narrator.86  Now in part, 
                                                
85 Clay [1983: 214], Donohue [1993: 120–121], and Volk [2002a: 79–82] in fact compare 
Memmius to Perses (cf. Gale [2005: 179], contra).  Cf. Kenney [1971: 11], Keen [1985], 
and Cox [1969: 126; emphasis preserved]: 
We may see in the underlying moral earnestness the origins of a mood [or, 
for our purposes, mode] which pervaded the later masterpieces of didactic 
poetry and was perhaps an essential element in their success as works of 
art: for poetry seems most easily to combine with a didactic purposes 
when teaching rises to preaching. 
The identification of Memmius as the Lucretian persona’s patron is not completely cer-
tain: DRN’s speaker uses the term amicitia for the relationship he wants with Memmius 
(1.141), a term that can mean “political alliance”—so, e.g., Syme [1956: 12], Brunt 
[1965], and Ross [1969: 83]—and here is ambiguous or, in Gold’s words, “troubling” 
[1987: 53].  Scholars are divided on whether the persona is seeking patronage.  Among 
the “yes” votes are Allen [1938: 178], Roller [1970], White [1978], Wiseman [1982], and 
Gold [1987: 51].  Those with doubts include Treggiari [1977], Kenney [1977], Williams 
[1982: 8], Clay [1983: 218–219], and Donohue [1993: 114–116]. 
86 This is not, however, to say that the epic narrator is himself impersonal: see de Jong 
[2004/1987], arguing against the earlier communis opinio (represented by Fränkel 
[1976/1951], among many others) that Homer’s narrator was “objective,” cf. de Jong & 
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the speaker’s personal voice is simply the one that leads us readers to think about what 
makes us all human.  Each of us knows what it is like to see in our dreams the games we 
were playing when awake (4.973–983), to wet the bed (4.1026–1036), to see the sky re-
flected in puddles, to feel laundry that has dried in the sun (1.305–310, 6.617–618, 
6.470–475).  By conjuring such images, the ego taps into shared experiences to create the 
sense of a personal connection between philosophical doctrinarian (speaker) and amena-
ble, even rapt pupil (reader).87 
This “we” voice is explicit in the ego’s early mention of the need to offer a mate-
rial account of ghastly apparitions: 
et quae res nobis uigilantibus obuia mentes 
terrificet morbo adfectis somnoque sepultis, 
cernere uti uideamur eos audireque coram, 
morte obita quorum tellus amplectitur ossa. 
           (DRN 1.132–135) 
 
And we must give an explanation concerning [habenda | nobis est 
ratio, 1.127–128] what thing gets in and terrifies our minds while 
we’re kept awake affected by illness and while we’re buried in 
sleep, such that we seem to see and hear plainly those whose 
bones, fallen in death, the earth embraces. 
 
                                                
Nünlist [2004] and Ready [2011].  Rather, DRN’s narrator creates a relationship between 
narrator and narratee that is markedly different from what we can see in Homer, Apollo-
nius, “the cool detachment characteristic of Hellenistic didactic” (as Gale [2005: 175] 
puts it), Ennius’ Annales, and even Hesiod’s Works and Days, which itself (as Tortorelli 
[2010] and others have examined) systematically engages with non-epic narratival 
modes. 
Unlike the narrator of much epic poetry, that is, the Lucretian ego uses a rhetori-
cal strategy of identifying with the reader to create a certain collusive closeness that is in 
many respects like the narratorial position of a satirist.  For more on the relationship of 
DRN’s narrator to his audience, see Mitsis [1993], with my discussion below (pp. 123–
127); Clay [1983: 213–217]; Segal [1990]; and my references below (p. 96 n. 116). 
87 Cf. Clay [1983: 223]: “To reach his reader, Lucretius must put himself in his 
place…This technique of psychagogia explains why…Lucretius professes to be his 
reader’s fellow in fear.” 
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The speaker intimates to the reader that he himself is familiar with this phenomenon, that 
he has undergone similar experiences, that he knows what it is like to be so deep in sleep 
as to feel buried by it.  Likewise, he perhaps offers the reader some degree of consolation 
in the conclusion of his rejection of the fear of death (3.1076–1089) by explicitly includ-
ing himself among the number of those (all of us) who are fated to die.  The first person 
plural personal pronoun appears twice, accompanied by no fewer than eight first person 
plural verbs.88  The Lucretian speaker shares the changing cravings (auemus…auemus, 
1082–1083), the uncertain end (quiue exitus instet, 1086), and the inability to reduce the 
duration of death (nec delibare ualemus, 1088).  “Finally, what such great ill desire for 
life coerces us so greatly to have fear amid uncertain dangers?” (denique tanto opere in 
dubiis trepidare periclis | quae mala nos subigit uitai tanta cupido?, 1076–1077).  Not 
“you all,” not “fools,” not the stolidi or inanes, but us.89  By speaking inclusively, by ac-
knowledging a share in the common anxieties and concerns of humans, the speaker be-
comes more connected to the reader, his voice more personalized. 
We can also find numerous passages in which DRN’s ego speaks to the reader 
from an “I” perspective, where an unmistakeably personal voice is in action.  Simple ex-
amples: “I’m now trying to talk about the matter itself” (de re nunc ipsa dicere conor, 
6.668); “let me sing” the causes of celestial motion (canamus, a poetic plural, 5.509); and 
“I am scarcely led” to believe that commanders actually sent boars, bulls, or lions into 
battle (5.1341).  The speaker further twice threatens to “chase after” or “hunt down” his 
                                                
88 Nos (1077), nobis (1086); obeamus (1079), uersamur and insumus (1080), auemus 
(1082 and 1083), demimus (1087), ualemus (1088), possimus (1089). 
89 Of course, the Lucretian speaker does often call people fools (cf. Mitsis [1993] and my 
discussion at pp. 123–127, below).  But not here. 
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errant/erroneous narratee.90  Such notional pursuit enlivens the speaker-reader relation 
and adds character to the speaker’s persona. 
In another moment of synaesthesia, the speaker almost casually links himself and 
the reader: sex etiam aut septem loca uidi reddere uoces, | unam cum iaceres, “I’ve seen 
places return even six or seven calls though you’ve only sent out one of your own” 
(4.577–578).  The speech is colloquial, like two acquaintances exchanging fishing stories, 
and the switch from first to second person results in a sense of familiarity.  Similarly, the 
ego relates that he has heard Sicily is a tourist hotspot (regio uisendaque fertur, 1.727) 
and that he himself has seen the power of magnetism at work in shows of Samothracian 
ironwork (Samothracea ferrea uidi, 6.1044).91 
                                                
90 1.980, hoc pacto sequar; 2.983, quippe sequar. 
91 Cf. Sedley [1999: 241 n. 36] on the echo-filled locales and magnetic tricks: “Given 
how sparing he is with them, I would take these autopsy claims seriously.  When he has 
not witnessed something in person, Lucretius is ready to admit it: cf. his indication at 
1.727 that he has never been to Sicily.”  Sedley continues, however, to claim that “[a] 
picture of Lucretius the seasoned Aegean tourist does not carry conviction, and should 
become still less plausible when we proceed to explore his wary attitude to things Greek” 
[1999: 241]. 
Sedley is not quite on target here.  Though the speaker does have a wary attitude 
towards incorrect Greek philosophy, particularly in book 1, he nevertheless expresses 
great esteem for the Greek philosopher Epicurus (as in the proem to book 5) and the 
Greek city of Athens (as in the proem to book 6).  And whether the historical Lucretius 
had traveled in Greece or not, the speaker is nonetheless constructed as having seen (or 
“seen”) this Samothracian spectacle. 
The scholarship on the matter of autopsy in Greek historiography is massive.  Im-
portant examples include Schepens [1970, 1975, 1980], Armayor [1978, 1980], West 
[1985: 293–294], and Armayor [1985] with West [1987].  Marincola calls historians’ 
claims of autopsy “authenticating devices” [1997: 83], and see Potter discusses the unre-
liable veracity of such claims [1999: 28].  The use of such reports in Homer is discussed 
by de Jong [2004/1987: 210–218].  On the use of uidi(mus) in didactic autopsy claims in 
Latin authors, see Thomas for such expressions in Vergil’s Georgics [1988: ad 1.193 and 
1.316–318]; Thomas [1992: 44–51] for autopsy and poetic memory at Georgics 4.116–
148, cf. Perkell [1981: 170]; and Simpson [2001: 66–68] on autopsy in Horace.  Accord-
 84 
One of the main avenues through which the speaker’s personal voice develops is 
his (presentation of his) fondness for Epicurus.  As the speaker says, “I follow in his foot-
steps while I thoroughly pursue [his?] philosophical principles and teach them with my 
writings” (cuius ego ingressus uestigia dum rationes | persequor ac doceo dictis, 5.55–
56).  A picture of an avid disciple, and a brief reiteration of the opening lines of book 3: 
te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc 
ficta pedum pono pressis uestigia signis, 
non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem 
quod te imitari aueo. 
           (DRN 3.3–6) 
 
I follow you, grace of the Greek race, and in your imprinted tracks 
I now put the fixed steps of my feet, not so much eager to compete 
as on account of love—because I want to copy you.  
 
A personal voice indeed.  And the effect of Epicurus’ teachings on the persona—as he 
perceives that matter is handled across the whole void (totum uideo per inane geri res, 
17), and as Epicurus causes a release from fear (diffugiunt animi terrores, 16)—is a kind 
of sublime experience: “a certain godlike pleasure takes me, and an awe/goosebumps” 
(me…quaedam diuina uoluptas | percipit atque horror, 28–29).  The sense of affection 
that pupil (speaker) holds for instructor (Epicurus) is intense, and perhaps this affection is 
to be found as well in the relationship in DRN between reader (notionally a pupil) and 
speaker (now himself the instructor).  As the Lucretian persona takes on the role of 
teacher—once more following in Epicurus’ footsteps—and as the reader is placed in the 
position of student, depiction of the prior pedagogical interaction models for us the 
reader’s response: namely enthusiastic, embrace of the instructor and his ideas. 
                                                
ing to Nisbet & Hubbard, uidimus at Horace Odes 1.2.13 is a “familiar rhetorical device” 
[1978: 15 ad loc.]. 
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The format of the ego’s teaching—poetry—speaks to his personalized voice, as 
well.  The proem to the fourth book (4.1–25 = 1.926–950), one of DRN’s poetic pinna-
cles, is replete with first-person syntax,92 as the ego details his poetic journeys and poetic 
pleasures.  On the other side of the topos of DRN’s composition, the speaker also shares 
his poetic struggles in creating DRN.  For instance, at the inception of his argument on 
the mortality of the animus and the anima, the speaker states, “I’ll proceed to set out 
long-sought poetry uncovered with sweet toil and worthy of your mode of life” (conqui-
sita diu dulcique reperta labore | digna tua pergam disponere carmina uita, 3.419–
420).93  The speaker here presents himself sympathetically, as an artist devoted to his 
craft, undertaking significant yet rewarding efforts to achieve his poetic goal.94 
                                                
92 First-person verbs: peragro (4.1), doceo (6), pergo (7), pango (8), uolui (20), possem 
(24).  First-person personal adjectives and pronouns: meo (4), ego (18), nostram (21), 
uersibus in nostris (24).  For this passage’s “civic significance” see Minyard [1985: 57]. 
93 Cf. the lines immediately following the first mention of the supposed egestas linguae: 
sed tua me uirtus tamen et sperata uoluptas 
suauis amicitiae quemuis efferre laborem 
suadet, et inducit noctes uigilare serenas. 
     (DRN 1.140–142) 
 
But your excellence and the hoped-for pleasure of sweet friendship never-
theless convinces me to endure to the end whatsoever toil, and leads me to 
stay awake through peaceful nights. 
 
Lines 140–145 contain allusions to Callimachus Epigrams 27 (on Aratus and ἀγρυπνίη) 
and to Leonidas of Tarentum’s epigram on Aratus (Greek Anthology 9.25).  On the con-
nections of noctes uigilare serenas to Aratus and Callimachus, see Thomas [1979], 
Brown [1982: 83 and n. 34], Gale [1994a: 107 n. 41], and Henkel [2009: 16–18]; and fur-
ther Henkel [forthcoming] on a similar allusion at Vergil Georgics 1.291–296. 
94 The ego also claims oracular authority (5.110–112), though an intratextual repetition 
here (5.111–112 = 1.738–739) may link our speaker with wrongheaded physicists like 
Empedocles and so may undercut the claim in book 5.  He also claims to be the first able 
to translate the reperta of Epicurus into patriae uoces (5.336–337), irrespective of the 
work of Amafinius (cf. pp. 7–10, above).  If the reader picks up on these observations and 
consequently considers the ego to be self-contradictory, perhaps we have here an instance 
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Poetry in fact comes to be an important defining feature of the speaker’s personal-
ity95—for when giving examples of how creatures dream of doing things to which they 
are habituated in waking life, the Lucretian ego says: 
in somnis eadem plerumque uidemur obire: 
..................................................................... 
nos agere hoc autem et naturam quaerere rerum 
semper et inuentam patriis exponere chartis. 
          (DRN 4.965, 969–970) 
 
We often seem to go about doing the same things in our 
dreams.…I meanwhile [seem] to do this, and to seek out the Na-
ture of Things, and to explain it, once discovered, in mother-
tongue writings.  
 
As essential as pleading cases is to a lawyer (4.966) or battle is to a general (967), so es-
sential to our speaker’s identity is studying Epicurean philosophy and adapting it for Ro-
mans.  An important facet of his personalized voice is a kind of self-identification with 
his poetry, as seen both in these lines and in such simple phrases as “many things have 
been set forth by me” (sunt a me multa profecta, 6.81).  The speaker’s personality is 
wrapped up in philosophic-poetic production,96 and his persona pervades the poem, not 
only in the proems and purple passages but in the atomic argumentation, as well. 
 
 
                                                
of the tension between the speaker’s claims of the (in this case poetic) high ground and 
his satirist-like elusiveness, on which see my points below (pp. 99, 130, and 159). 
95 Volk remarks, “[i]n those passages where he refers to his own ongoing composition, he 
stresses his enjoyment, his pride in his achievement, and his intense concentration” 
[2010: 129, with citations in n. 7]. 
96 See further Segal [1989: 201–204], who argues that DRN 1.102–126, 1.140–144, and 
3.1024–1044 correct for the near-ecstatic poetic claims of 1.926–950 ( = 4.1–25), so that 
“the poet’s journey seems an ultimately more limited, more self-centered, and more nar-
rowly emotional achievement” [1989: 204]. 
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The “high ground” 
A satirist’s voice is not merely personalized, but self-righteous and preening, as 
the satirist claims the moral high ground over his opponents, targets, and victims.  It is 
because of his superior moral vantage point that the satirist can effectively assess the 
faults and shortcomings and baseness of others in his society.  The personalized voice in 
DRN, too, is preening and self-righteous, for the ego (as I will show) claims moral, intel-
lectual, and even poetic high ground as he expatiates on the nature of things and the path 
to an ataractic life.  In DRN as in the whole tradition of Graeco-Roman satiric genres, 
these claims are often linked with the speaker’s use of mockery and indignation, both of 
which I treat separately below. 
An ownership of the moral high ground is implicit in the ego’s stated goal of the 
poem—to share in Latin verse Epicurus’ scientific explanation of the cosmos, and 
thereby to demonstrate how to attain a life free from the fear of death, from ambition, and 
from other crippling anxieties.  And such ownership is explicit in well-known excerpts 
like the exemplum of Iphigenia/Iphianassa in book 1, particularly in its closing moral, 
tantum religio potuit suadere malorum (“to such a height of ills has religion/superstition 
been able to push” humankind, 1.101).  In moments like this one, the Lucretian speaker 
sets himself apart from and above those complicit in the object of his criticism, in this 
instance Agamemnon and all who engage in perverted ritual that has (according to our 
speaker) no bearing on the gods themselves.97 
                                                
97 Cf. 1.44–49, the celebrated passage on the nature of the gods; for Epicurus on the na-
ture of the gods, see, e.g., Konstan [2011] and Sedley [2011]. 
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Two passages late in book 5 serve as important illustrations of the speaker’s self-
righteousness.  5.1117–1135 is an account of the vanity of human greed and ambition, 
and it includes an expression of the Epicurean principle “live hidden” (λάθε βιώσας).  
“It’s much more preferable indeed to obey in peace than to want to guide the world in 
command and hold kingdoms” (satius multo iam sit parere quietum | quam regere impe-
rio res uelle et regna tenere, 1127–1128).  The speaker sets up a simple lifestyle with-
drawn from public affairs—the kind of lifestyle he suggests that he himself lives—as the 
best kind of living. 
Again, at 5.1194–1203, the speaker laments the plight of humans who believe that 
the gods have great power and great anger: “Unhappy human race, since it has imputed to 
the gods such deeds and has added on harsh wraths!” (o genus infelix humanum, talia di-
uis | cum tribuit facta atque iras adiunxit acerbas!, 1194–1195).  Unhappy not simply 
because of their misconception of the nature of divinity, but rather because it has led to 
pain for us and our progeny (1196–1197: us and ours—the speaker once more includes 
himself!) and moreover results in an improper attempt to show pietas towards the gods 
(1197–1202).  The Lucretian ego here places himself in the same position of moral, even 
religious superiority in which we see him telling the tale of Iphigenia (DRN 1.80–101).  
Unlike the uneducated masses, the speaker knows that it is false doctrine to think that the 
gods can be placated by ritual obeisances.  But in the passage from book 5, he also makes 
a positive assertion about proper religious behavior.  True pietas, he says, is not animal 
sacrifice and the rest, “but rather being able to observe everything with a becalmed mind” 
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(sed mage placata posse omnia mente tueri, 1203).  True pietas is, in other words, behav-
ing like an Epicurean—being like the speaker himself.98 
And the speaker is, in his turn, like Epicurus.  We have examined his representa-
tion of his discipleship to Epicurus (p. 84, above), and how he claims in the proem of 
book 3 to follow Epicurus’ “imprinted tracks” (signa pressa, 3.4).  In the proem to book 
6, now, the speaker uses intratextual allusion to align himself with Epicurus’ moral high 
ground, the very high ground that the proem itself exalts.  After describing Epicurus’ 
grand accomplishment of revealing the summum bonum (6.26) and the folly of an anxi-
ety-filled life (33–34), he repeats a passage that has appeared multiple times before, in 
important sections describing his own philosophic-poetic program: 
nam ueluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 
interdum nil quae sunt metuenda magis quam 
quae pueri in tenebris pauitant finguntque futura. 
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 
non radii solis nec lucida tela diei 
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque. 
       (DRN 6.35–4199) 
 
For just as boys tremble and fear everything in blind darknesses, so 
also do we from time to time frighten in the light at things that 
ought to be feared no more than what the boys in the darkness are 
afraid of and imagine is about to happen.  This mental fright and 
darkness, then, must be dispelled not by the sun’s rays, nor the 
day’s bright shafts, but by the appearance and explanation of na-
ture.  
 
He then avers a causal relationship between the contents of the proem and the argument 
that follows.100  By invoking himself as salutary didact immediately after representing 
                                                
98 Cf. Testard [1976] and Cottier [1999]. 
99 6.35–41 = 2.55–61 = 3.87–93; and also 6.39–41 = 1.146–148.  I discuss these lines’ 
allusion to Lucilius in chapter 4 (pp. 228–230, below). 
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Epicurus in the same fashion, the speaker identifies with him, appropriates his moral 
authority—and his intellectual authority, as well. 
The speaker of DRN repeatedly claims the intellectual high ground, over both his 
philosophical rivals (as with the invective against the Presocratics in book 1) and even at 
times his addressee.  In fact, in the opening of book 2, he actually positions himself on 
literal (if metaphorical) high ground: 
sed nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere 
edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, 
despicere unde queas alios passimque uidere 
errare atque uiam palantis quaerere uitae. 
       (DRN 2.7–10) 
 
But nothing is sweeter than to hold the wise men’s well-defended 
precincts, lofty with placid teaching, wherefrom you could look 
down on the rest and see them all over, going astray and wandering 
as they seek life’s way.101 
  
The speaker comes across as almost arrogant.102  Common folk are, to him, objects of ob-
servation, items for study or even amusement.  The tone is moralistic, yes,103 but the point 
                                                
100 “All the more, then, I’ll proceed to finish word-weaving what I’ve begun” (quo magis 
inceptum pergam pertexere dictis, 6.42). 
101 I have translated doctrina as ablative of means with edita, and serena in agreement 
with doctrina.  Alternatively, doctrina can be taken as ablative of means with bene mu-
nita instead and serena can agree with templa instead of doctrina.  Rouse & Smith trans-
late: “lofty sanctuaries serene, well fortified by the teachings of the wise” [1975: 95].  
Fowler [2002: 54 ad loc.] puts serena “surely with templa, as both rhythm and sense sug-
gest,” contra Flores [1965: 122]. 
102 Bailey finds “an unpleasant taste of egoism and even cruelty” in the suaue mari magno 
sentiment of book 2’s opening lines [1947: v. 2 p. 797]; Ernout & Robin refer to 2.1 as 
“cette exclamation égoïste” [1962/1925–1928: 203 ad loc.]; Nichols sees it as “selfish 
and anything but humanitarian” [1976: 62].  Fowler claims that “the consciousness of 
one’s own lack of pain [is] the main element” [2002: 39], cf. Boyancé [1963: 43] and 
Smith [2001: 35 n. 1].  Konstan points out antecedents in the Greek dramatists Sophocles 
and Archippus [2008/1973: 31–32], and demonstrates that the people in trouble at sea 
exemplify avoidable ills since, in the Roman worldview, the impetus for seafaring was 
greed [2008/1973: 33–37].  Morel adduces the parallel of Democritus fr. 191 [2000: 54, 
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is also one of intellectual superiority: note that the templa belong to the sapientes, and are 
marked by doctrina.  The denizens of this lofty realm despise (or at least pity patroniz-
ingly—despicere104) the outsiders (the Others, alios) for their error, because they cannot 
find the true path (uia).  Their minds are the first part of the problem (o miseras hominum 
mentes, 2.14).  Implicit in this passage, and the entire proem (2.1–61), is that the Lu-
cretian speaker can show the reader how to walk along the uia uitae, and how to reach the 
templa sapientum; indeed, another iteration of the repeated passage just mentioned (here 
2.55–61) states that the path is enlightenment through the study of “the appearance and 
explanation of nature.”105 
The satirist preens, and so does DRN’s speaker, particularly when it comes to his 
intellectual stature.  His teachings are gifts, painstakingly prepared for the addressee: 
quod superest, uacuas auris animumque sagacem 
semotum a curis adhibe ueram ad rationem, 
ne mea dona tibi studio disposta fideli, 
intellecta prius quam sint, contempta relinquas. 
       (DRN 1.50–53) 
 
                                                
60–61].  Cf. also Clay [1983: 65, 186, 219–220], Gale [2005: 180–181], and Konstan 
[2007].  I discuss and provide further citations in my discussion of the poem’s very open-
ing lines (p. 151, p. 155–157, and p. 155 n. 36, below). 
103 Bailey, for instance, notes that the proem “is interesting as containing Lucr.’s most 
explicit references to the moral theory of Epicurus” [1947: 794]. 
104 Cf. Fowler [2002: 55 ad loc.]: “as well as the literal sense, there is an element of con-
tempt…stronger than contemno.” 
105 Sedley points out that this phrase, naturae species ratioque, is the standard way in 
which DRN adapts the Greek philosophical term φυσιολογία, and that “in Lucretius’ 
rendition it has lost all terminological technicality, and become a subtly descriptive for-
mula for the poem’s theme” [1999: 229].  See further Clay [1969, and 1983: 105–109], 
Long [1977, and 1997: 130], Duban [1982: 167], Thury [1987], Fowler [2002: 141–143 
ad loc.], and Gale [2005: 184].  Natura, in this poem, is active as well as passive.  On the 
term natura in DRN, see Merrill [1891]. 
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As for what follows, apply to true reasoning your unoccupied ears 
and a wise mind removed from cares, so that you don’t disdain and 
abandon my gifts—arranged for you with loyal enthusiasm—
before they’ve been comprehended. 
 
He portrays his literary output not only as a valuable gift (mea dona) but also an intellec-
tual accomplishment (studio disposta fideli), one that requires careful attentiveness 
(uacuas auris), sagacity (animumque sagacem), and time (intellecta prius quam sint) 
simply to understand.  He later describes his work as being (or as providing) clara lumina 
for the addressee (1.144).106  And his intellectual capacity, he later says, is vast—even 
limitless, enough to supply didactic verse (or at least philosophical arguments) until he 
and the dedicatee Memmius have both died of old age.107  So, relatively early in the first 
book of the poem, the picture develops of a speaker who is self-righteous about his moral 
                                                
106 Cf. 1.933–934 = 4.8–9: “I compose such clear songs about a murky subject,” obscura 
de re tam lucida pango | carmina. 
107  quod si pigraris paulumue recesseris ab re, 
hoc tibi de plano possum promittere, Memmi: 
usque adeo largos haustus e fontibu’ magnis 
lingua meo suauis diti de pectore fundet, 
ut uerear ne tarda prius per membra senectus 
serpat et in nobis uitai claustra resoluat, 
quam tibi de quauis una re uersibus omnis 
argumentorum sit copia missa per auris. 
     (DRN 1.410–417) 
But if you’ll’ve gotten lazy or pulled a bit away from the matter at hand, 
Memmius, I can plainly promise you this: my sweet tongue will pour out 
from my rich heart soooo-lavish drafts from giant springs that I’m afraid 
old age might sooner creep through our slow limbs and undo the gates of 
life in us, [sooner] than the whole supply of proofs concerning any one 
given thing has been sent into your ears by means of my poetry. 
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In satiric poetry, self-righteous claims to the moral high ground are often paired 
with reference to or acknowledgement of the ego’s abject status or physical condition.  In 
DRN, references to this sort of abjection are sparse and subtle, but are present nonethe-
less.  The speaker’s social status is linked with his relationship to Epicurus and the gen-
eral social status of Epicureanism, his psychological and physical status is on occasion 
connected to the baser experiences of the human condition, and he professes (as I will 
suggest) a kind of linguistic abjection for his mother tongue. 
The speaker tells us that he follows in Epicurus’ footsteps, as we have seen, and 
he fleshes out his bond with Epicurus by comparing the two of them: 
…te imitari aueo: quid enim contendat hirundo 
cycnis, aut quidnam tremulis facere artubus haedi 
consimile in cursu possint et fortis equi uis? 
tu pater es, rerum inuentor, tu patria nobis 
suppeditas praecepta, tuis ex, inclute, chartis, 
floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant, 
omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta. 
       (DRN 3.6–12) 
 
[I follow in your footsteps because] I want to copy you—for how 
could a swallow compete with swans, how on earth could kids with 
wobbly legs do the same at running as the strong force of the 
horse?  You are the father, the discoverer of the universe, you fur-
nish us our paternal precepts; from your writings, you glorious 
man, we—just like bees in flowering glens sip on everything—we 
likewise feed off all your golden words. 
                                                
108 I consider the treatment of Memmius/addressee, and its interpretation by Mitsis 
[1993], at pp. 123–127, below, in connection with the speaker’s satiric collusiveness. 
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Our speaker is the lowly swallow to Epicurus’ gallant swan.109  He is the baby goat just 
getting on its feet, while Epicurus is the mighty horse, mighty enough to merit an almost 
Homeric epic periphrasis.110  He is the son, the schoolboy.  He is even a bee, feeding off 
of Epicurus’ teachings.111  The speaker of DRN positions himself thoroughly subordinate 
to the figure of Epicurus, using metaphors not only of social status but also of physical 
stature and comeliness. 
The lifestyle of the Epicurean philosopher represents a sort of voluntary social ab-
jection.  The speaker’s λάθε βιώσας sentiment cited previously (p. 88, above) shows the 
true follower of Epicurus in a position of silent obedience: “it’s much more preferable 
                                                
109 Donohue calls this line “the most paradoxical compliment in De Rerum Natura” 
[1993: 148].  For Greek antecedents to the imagery in this passage, Brown [1997: 92 ad 
3.6–8] cites Aristophanes Frogs 93 and 680 (swallows), and Theocritus 5.136–137 (swan 
song), while Kenney [1971: 75 ad 3.6–8] cites Pindar Olympians 2.87–88 (rival poets as 
ravens squawking at an eagle).  Compare Vergil Eclogues 9.35–36: “for I don’t yet seem 
to say things worthy of Varius or Cinna, but to squawk as a gander among keen-tuned 
swans,” nam neque adhuc Vario uideor nec dicere Cinna | digna, sed argutos inter 
strepere anser olores.  Donohue also provides an overview of swan-imagery in Graeco-
Roman literature [1993: 18–29], and Papaioannou [2004] treats swan imagery in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses.  Sedley points out DRN’s use here of the Graecism cycnus instead of the 
native Latin olor [1998: 57–58], and Kenney calls the swan imagery “quite explicitly Al-
exandrian” [1970: 371], though see contra Knox [1999] and p. 185 n. 89, below. 
Hunter connects to Hellenistic poetic practice the images in DRN of both the hon-
eyed cup [2006: 84, on DRN 1.933–950] and the development of professional poetry 
among early humankind [2006: 135, on 5.1444–1447]. 
110 And, later, a god: “it must be said, he was a god, a god!” (dicendum est, deus ille fuit, 
deus, 5.8)—an image that Sedley situates in a trend of near-religious loyalty to a school’s 
founder that is present in much of Hellenistic philosophy [1989: 97]. 
111 The image derives ultimately from Pindar, who refers to “the honey-voiced Muses” 
(μελίφθογγοι…Μοῖσαι, Olympians 6.21, among others).  See Race [1997: 6], as well as 
Pausanias 9.23.2 and Greek Anthology 7.34, 16.305, all three with Ransome [2004/1937: 
91–111]; and further, e.g., Norwood [1945: 124–126, 159, 170, 250] and Fogelmark 
[2002] (with White [2004], contra).  Hughes [1993] examines the adoption of Pindar’s 
bees by Milton and Shakespeare. 
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indeed to obey in peace” (satius multo iam sit parere quietum, 5.1127).  Members of the 
Garden, we should note, are not merely downcast, but also outcasts.  For, as Gordon 
demonstrates, “in the eyes of the dominant culture, there was something fundamentally 
unmanly about the Garden…[DRN] serves to confirm, rather than to challenge, the domi-
nant culture’s suspicions about the deficient virility of the Epicurean male.”112  I add an-
other piece of evidence: 
illud in his rebus uereor, ne forte rearis 
impia te rationis inire elementa uiamque 
indugredi sceleris.  quod contra saepius illa 
religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta. 
       (DRN 1.80–84) 
 
In this matter I’m concerned about this—that perchance you’ll 
think you’re entering into the impious first-beginnings of philoso-
phy and treading on a path of crime.  But on the contrary, more of-
ten it is that superstition/religion that has birthed criminal and im-
pious deeds. 
 
The reader may think that philosophy is impius, the Lucretian speaker says, but actually 
religio is.  The speaker presumes that his addressee will view philosophy (particularly 
                                                
112 Gordon [2002: 87].  Cf. Fowler [1989: 130]: “early Epicureanism…presupposes that 
its supporters will be a minority in a hostile world.” 
Gordon’s argument is that the renunciation in book 4 of sex, love, and (most) 
marriages constitutes a “radical Epicurean critique of the Priapic [i.e., Roman] model of 
sexuality” [2002: 94]; and that the portrayals of Venus in Mars in the proem to book 1 are 
“subversive of more widely accepted Roman notions” of the divinities [2002: 101, cf. 
101–104].  The poem’s satiric attacks—which are in fact “a social critique…[of] the 
paradigmatic Roman uir”—therefore confirm and even embrace as “salutary…the domi-
nant culture’s complaint that the Garden was teaching men not to be men” [2002: 106]. 
There is a connection between DRN and Roman satire, here, as well.  Gunderson, 
discussing the rhetoric and imagery of the body in satire—“satirework on the body,” as 
he calls it—poses and answers the fundamental question behind such body-talk: “what is 
the proper relationship between good men?…[T]here are no good men in satire.  They are 
missing objects” [2005: 239].  Contrast Momigliano [1941: 157]: “the whole of Lucretius 
is a vigorous invitation to work and fight for high ideals.  An atmosphere of magnani-
mous enthusiasm—so different from the Λάθε βιώσας.” 
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Epicurean philosophy?) with suspicion, as philosophy seems to have a reputation for be-
ing irreligious.113  The voice of the philosopher is constructed as an object of scorn in 
Roman eyes, even if such claims of Epicureanism’s unpopularity are exaggerated.114 
The philosopher-speaker of DRN claims to be scorned, and he claims to be afraid, 
as well.  Afraid of what goes on in the sky, of what takes place after death, of what is 
mysterious or insufficiently explained: 
nam ueluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 
interdum nilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam 
quae pueri in tenebris pauitant finguntque futura. 
      (DRN 2.55–58 = 3.87–90 = 6.35–38) 
 
For just as boys tremble and fear everything in blind darknesses, so 
also do we from time to time frighten in the light at things that 
ought to be feared no more than what the boys in the darkness are 
afraid of and imagine is about to happen. 
 
Again, the speaker (as part of this global “we”) is childlike, but here because of his ad-
mittedly unnecessary anxiety, not because of his filial esteem for Epicurus.115  When the 
speaker looks up with us (suspicimus, 5.1204) at the sky, he, like us,116 is struck with a 
                                                
113 Cf. Clay [1983: 221–222], and De Lacy [1941: 50]: “Epicureans were accused of im-
piety” because of their notion that the gods stand aloof from humankind. 
114 So, for instance, Howe [1951: 59]: “it is hard to reconcile the Lucretian volgus abhor-
ret ab hac (I, 945) with Cicero’s account [at Tusculan Disputations 4.5–7] of the popular-
ity of Epicureanism after Amafinius,” cf. my discussion of Amafinius in chapter 1 (pp. 7–
10, above). 
115 Gale also points out the first-person plural timemus here as “striking” [2005: 181]. 
116 The speaker’s identification with “us,” with the reader, is part of a rhetorical strategy 
to make his argument more effective.  Thus Segal [1990: 239]: “to overcome our denial 
of death, and thus bring the fears of it into the light where they can be dealt with thera-
peutically, Lucretius must make death real and present to us as a process”; O’Hara [2007: 
62–69], particularly [2007: 62] on “Lucretius’ strategy for identifying with the reader, so 
as to be able to move the reader from his Roman religious beliefs, which Lucretius is go-
ing to suggest are wrong, towards Lucretius’ Greek, philosophical, Epicurean teachings,” 
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new cura in his “heart already crushed by other ills” (aliis oppressa malis in pectora 
cura, 1207)—namely, concern whether the celestial motions are controlled by divinities 
whom we must placate (1209–1217).  This concern with the anger of the gods is one of 
the fundamental problems of human life that DRN’s speaker says he aims to correct, and 
he includes himself among the number of those affected by it, oppressed by it.  The threat 
of divine punishment, in the ego’s view, causes people to live dejected lives, with a celes-
tial sword of Damocles hanging over them. 
So a life “crushed by ills” is an abject existence.  And made worse by the hell on 
earth that the speaker creates out of ambition, greed, and the like, in an allegory of the 
underworld (3.978–1023).  Again, first-person pronouns abound.117  The Lucretian ego, 
along with the reader, is implicated in the experience of the oppressive burden that the 
anxieties of social life (and the earthly punishments inflicted by powers and principali-
ties, 1014–1022) bring, and the consequent psychological debasement that, according to 
his argument, afflicts us.  “The life of idiots, finally, becomes Hellish” (Acherusia fit stul-
torum denique uita, 1023). 
The speaker likewise counts himself in the number of the blameworthy when he 
criticizes humankind’s shift from simple pelts to fancy clothes: 
tunc igitur pelles, nunc aurum et purpura curis 
exercent hominum uitam belloque fatigant; 
quo magis in nobis, ut opinor, culpa resedit. 
..................................................................... 
                                                
cf. Kleve [1966], Summers [1995], and Gale, who points to the “innovative” nature of the 
relationship between speaker and addressee in DRN [2005: 177 and passim]; also Clay 
[1983: 216]: “what is remarkable about this didactic poem is the effort its poet expends in 
attracting his reader to its argument.” 
117 DRN 3.979, 992, 995, 1005 (nobis in all instances).  First-person verbs at 1007 (ex-
plemur) and 1008 (opinor). 
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…at nos nil laedit ueste carere 
purpurea atque auro signisque ingentibus apta, 
dum plebeia tamen sit quae defendere possit. 
      (DRN 5.1423–1425, 1427–1429) 
 
So then it was skins, now it’s gold and purple vestments that trou-
ble people’s life with anxieties and wear them out with war—and 
as I see it, the blame lies all the more with us.…But it doesn’t hurt 
us any to go without purple clothing fit out with gold and giant 
decorations, provided that nevertheless there’s commoner’s cloth-
ing to be able to protect us. 
 
We are at fault for overvaluing expensive accoutrements, and we come to no harm if we 
do not have them.  The speaker is included in this criticism; he is part of the problem.  
His solution, sticking with plebeian garb, cloaks him (literally as well as metaphorically!) 
in reduced social stature.118 
He claims his clothing is (or should be) poor, and so, he claims, is his language.  
The ego makes remarks, previously cited, concerning the egestas linguae in the opening 
of book 1 (p. 77, above), and returns to the notion in his introduction of the term 
homoeomeria: “and [it’s a term that] the poverty of our mother-tongue speech doesn’t 
grant us to say in our language” (nec nostra dicere lingua | concedit nobis patrii sermonis 
egestas, 1.831–832).  Both times, he is feeding the reader a line, since (as I have noted) 
DRN has no trouble discussing complex philosophical principles in polysemous Latin 
                                                
118 The exemplum in this passage additionally constructs both speaker and addressee as 
rich people of the leisure class: gold and purple is not part of a poor person’s experience, 
or everyday concerns. 
The speaker admits as well that he is, like everyone else, prone to false, flawed, or 
otherwise faulty judgments.  When making deductions, he says, “and we ourselves bring 
ourselves into the delusion of deception” (ac nos in fraudem induimus frustraminis ipsi, 
4.817).  The pronouns nos and ipsi are very emphatic here, especially for first-person us-
ages in DRN—and we can even take nos…ipsi to refer to the ego alone, since soon there-
after he says auemus | te fugere (4.822–823), an unambiguous use of the first-person plu-
ral in place of the first-person singular. 
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terms, and Cicero has no trouble explaining ὁμοιομερία in straightforward prose.  Like-
wise with the ego’s complaint that “the poverty of the mother-tongue speech drags me 
unwilling” from explaining the interconnectedness of the four elements (abstrahit inui-
tum patrii sermonis egestas, 3.260). 
But the line he is feeding the reader is, I believe, one of linguistic abjection.  
Latin, the speaker suggests, is inferior to Greek, as evidenced by its smaller vocabulary, 
and so an author of Latin verse is similarly diminished.  According to the Lucretian per-
sona, Greek is the prestige language of philosophy.119  The speaker’s comments on lan-
guage reflect his own abject status.  And his disingenuousness in making such comments 




Mockery and blame in DRN 
The hallmarks of the satirist, mockery and blame, occur again and again in DRN.  
An important character trait of DRN’s persona is his vigorous mocking and satiric blam-
ing of his various targets.120  The basic goal of the poem’s didactic speaker is to show 
how to better one’s life through a true account of the universe, and the rectification of 
                                                
119 For Greek as a prestige language of intellectuals and aristocrats at Rome, see (among 
others) Kahane & Kahane [1979: 183–184], Kaimio [1979], Kahane [1986: 495], Sihler 
[1995: 12]. 
120 See, e.g., Waltz [1949: 79]: “Il aime à railler, à ridiculiser sans ménagement ses adver-
saires philosophiques, ou le vulgum pecus des malheureux humains que n’a pas touchés 
la grâce épicurienne, ou la religion traditionelle, avec ses rites et ses légendes absurdes.”  
The ego’s attacks on his philosophical adversaries, on the unfortunate commonfolk who 
are subject to un-Epicurean anxieties, and on traditional religion are all included in my 
discussion here. 
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wrong beliefs and behaviors is thus implicit in his stated task.  Oftentimes in DRN such 
correction is delivered in straightforward manner, without the derisive humor of mockery 
or the critical animus of blame.  But the scornful comic voice of a satirist frequently 
arises in the text, most often in the mockery of incorrect suppositions, yet also when the 
speaker is inveighing against moral failings, when he engages in parody, and when the 
addressee finds himself in the speaker’s crosshairs. 
We can point generally to a plethora of instances in DRN where there is mockery 
of incorrect suppositions: mockery of the uates (1.102–106),121 of people who think that 
there is movement without the existence of a void (1.370–383), of ὁμοιομερία (1.830–
858), of Democritus’ notion of a one-to-one linkage between body and soul (3.370–395), 
of metempsychosis,122 of the idea that chimaerae could exist in the world’s younger days 
(5.910), and of anyone who would seek an explanation of fulmen in Tyrrhena carmina, 
Etruscan texts (6.379–386).123  We can also note explicit usage of the lexicon of blame 
and mockery—for example, ridicula…ludibriaque (2.47),124 the sarcastic scilicet (3.641), 
                                                
121 Cf. Waltz [1949: 82]: “Ce mot de uates…est à la fois méprisant et ironique,” and Fer-
rero [1949: 133]. 
122 3.754–755: “for that thing people say—that a spirit, being immortal, is transformed by 
a change in body—is based on false reasoning” (illud enim falsa fertur ratione, quod ai-
unt | inmortalem animam mutato corpore flecti).  The speaker, in his twenty-second proof 
of the mortality of mind and spirit, points out the impossibility of the transmigration of 
souls from one body to another after death.  Cf. Hardie [1913: 190–194] and Brown 
[1997: 179–180 ad 3.741–775]. 
123 Waltz asserts that the speaker is mocking the Etruscan texts in his citation of them in 
these lines [1949: 101].  Cf. Hutchinson [2009: 208]: “we do not here find Lucretius di-
rectly confronting narrative epic (contrast 1.68–9).…A plurality of divinities wielding 
thunder (6.387–98) suggests Etruscan belief, not the world of epic (cf. Plin. HN 2.138).” 
124 Fowler remarks that the adjective ridiculus is comic and colloquial, found in Roman 
comedy and satire, but nowhere in epic, elegy, or tragedy [2002: 127 ad loc.]. 
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deridiculum esse uidetur (3.776), culpa (5.1423–1435, and 2.181 = 5.199).  We even see 
the goddess of love (or, more simply, sex) playing the part of mocker: “thus in love does 
Venus [or “sex”] mock/trick/play lovers with visions” (sic in amore Venus [or uenus] 
simulacris ludit amantis, 4.1101). 
Let us consider three particular passages where DRN’s speaker mocks invalid 
ideas.  First: the Lucretian ego makes quick work of refuting the Skeptics, in fewer than 
ten lines (4.469–477).  He opens with a bit of mockery, and with an image close to the 
American colloquialism “he’s got his head up his ass”: 
denique si nil sciri siquis putat, id quoque nescit 
an sciri possit, quoniam nil scire fatetur. 
hunc igitur contra mittam contendere causam, 
qui capite ipse sua in statuit uestigia sese. 
       (DRN 4.469–472) 
 
Furthermore, if someone adjudges that nothing is known, he also 
doesn’t know whether that can be known, since he admits to know-
ing nothing.  So I’ll pass on going to court against this very guy 
who’s positioned himself with his head in his footprints [“where 
his feet should be”]. 
 
Comic repetition with nil sciri…sciri…nil scire followed by a comic image that meta-
phorically represents the ass-backwards epistemological hypotheses of the Skeptics’ phi-
losophy.  The final two lines quoted here are added value—they are not integral to the 
refutation of the erroneous philosophical principle.125  They are what makes the passage 
mockery: they (literally) embody the error, they turn the one holding the faulty belief into 
                                                
125 Compare Waltz [1949: 85]: “aussitôt après la logique, l’imagination entre en scène et 
nous peint cette position des sceptiques d’une manière purement burlesque…qui ne con-
tribue à transformer ces malheureux sceptiques en imbeciles, aussi déséquilibrés que pré-
tentieux.” 
 102 
a laughingstock by applying his internal (intellectual) failure into a physically absurd 
contortion. 
My second example involves an image we have seen before.  I have discussed (at 
p. 69, above) the passage in book 1 where the speaker uses the image of laughing and 
crying atoms to mock Anaxagoras.  In book 2, he uses the same image to argue that at-
oms have no sense perception.126  If they could feel, he argues sarcastically (note scilicet), 
then the logical conclusion is that “obviously they also cackle, concussed with shaky 
snickers, and sprinkle their faces and cheeks with bedewing tears” (scilicet et risu 
tremulo concussa cachinnant et lacrimis spargunt rorantibus ora genasque, 2.976–977).  
They will also dissertate de rerum mixtura (978) and research what their own primordia 
are (979). 
After this mocking reductio ad absurdum, the Lucretian ego labels the idea under 
consideration for what (he wants us to think) it is: craziness.  “If we perceive that these 
things are silly and mad, and if it is possible to laugh though we are not grown out of 
laughing particles,” we can see that we can have sensation though our bodies are com-
posed of insensate matter (si delira haec furiosaque cernimus esse, | et ridere potest non 
ex ridentibus auctus, 985–986).  At delira and especially ridere, the “we” of the poem—
the speaker and his readership—converge with the laughing atoms, which previously 
laughed mockingly at the proponents of ὁμοιομερία (1.919–920).  The laughter trans-
forms from subject of scientific inquiry into tool for mockery of that subject. 
                                                
126 On DRN’s use of this repetition to reinforce the strength of its theories over particular 
phenomena, see Clay [1983: 195–196]. 
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Third, early in book 3, the speaker takes on the fear of death and the twin griefs of 
ambition and greed (3.31–93).  His entry point is the men who claim that death is prefer-
able to a life of disgrace (41–45)—the same men who, if exiled, 
et quocumque tamen miseri uenere parentant 
et nigras mactant pecudes et manibu’ diuis 
inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis 
acrius aduertunt animos ad religionem. 
       (DRN 3.51–54) 
 
nevertheless offer appeasement sacrifices wherever they go (those 
pathetic people!) and immolate black livestock and send death-
offerings to the Ghost Gods and pay attention to relig-
ion/superstition more ardently in harsh circumstances. 
 
In other words, these men are all talk and no action.  They are blameworthy for their hy-
pocrisy, their fear of death, and their obsequy to the dictates of religio; and so the speaker 
ridicules them, in four lines that can be understood as mock-epic.127 
The passage continues with the speaker’s railing against “avarice and the blind 
lust for political office” (auarities et honorum caeca cupido, 3.59), a recurring theme of 
the poem.  We see attacks on the greedy and the ambitious not only here, but also at 2.7–
19, 3.995–1010 (in the allegorical interpretation of the torments of the underworld), and 
elsewhere.  People who fall prey to these passions are allowing needless anxiety and dis-
turbance into their lives.128  They are, in short, foolish, and the speaker calls them such, at 
                                                
127 Cf. Kenney [1971: 82 ad 51–54]: the speaker’s “scorn is accentuated by the allitera-
tion in the verses and by the climactic position of religionem.”  Bailey compares Vergil 
Aeneid 6.153 [1947: 999 ad DRN 3.52] and elsewhere [1935: 284]; Kenney [1971: 82 ad 
DRN 3.52] compares Ovid Fasti 5.421 and Horace Odes 1.4.16; Brown [1997: 99 ad 
DRN 3.51–54] additionally compares Serm. 1.8.27. 
128 As Waltz points out, the raillery against human passions is where the Lucretian ego’s 
role as satirist is keenest and most intense: “l’intention satirique éclate bien davantage 
dans les passages du poème—qui abondent—où Lucrèce…raille les faiblesses et les pas-
sions du genre humain en général.…sa satire se fait non seulement mordante, incisive, 
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the end of his underworld scene: “in this way, the life of idiots, finally, becomes Hellish” 
(hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique uita, once again 3.1023).  On at least two other occa-
sions, the speaker humorously calls attention to the limited intellectual capacity of the 
targets of his mockery, with the phrase “it’s possible to understand this [point of doctrine 
under consideration] from this [proof soon to follow] no matter how dull the mind” (id 
licet hinc quamuis hebeti cognoscere corde, 4.44 = 5.882, cf. Mitsis [1993] and pp. 123–
127, below). 
Mockery and blame of the moral failings of others is also prominent in DRN, as 
we will see from two examples.  First, Lucretius’ speaker at the end of book 4 mocks 
lovers for a variety of reasons, among them because lovers themselves mock other lovers: 
“and they laugh at each other and encourage them to appease Venus on the grounds that 
they’re vexed by a loathsome love.”129  The speaker has outsourced part of his satiric cri-
tique to a set of internal characters,130 but their position as satirist is, as we might expect, 
paired with abjection—and an abjection that undercuts their own critique, since they 
themselves are lovers in the same situation as the ones they mock!  “And often they 
(those poor people!) do not pay attention to / reflect on their own giant ills.”131  I believe 
                                                
mais virulente, impitoyable, parfois tout à fait brutale” [1949: 89].  Cf. Waltz [1949: 99]: 
“cette dureté sarcastique à l’égard de l’humanité souffrante.” 
129 DRN 4.1157–1158: atque alios alii inrident Veneremque suädent | ut placent, quoniam 
foedo adflictentur amore.  It may not be the best idea for them to try appeasing Venus, 
since she herself mocks lovers (Venus…ludit amantis, 4.1101, cf. p. 101, above).  Waltz, 
in his discussion of book 4’s satire on love and sex, refers to “cette brutalité absurde des 
amants” [1949: 92]. 
130 Cf. p. 47, above, as well as p. 129 n. 184. 
131 DRN 4.1159: nec sua respiciunt miseri mala maxima saepe.  Brown [1987: 280 ad 
loc.] compares this line to Semonides 7.112–114, Menander fr. 521, Cicero Tusculan 
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that the word miseri here, as with the exiled hypocrites who make sacrifice in order to 
stave off death in 3.51, is a signpost for the mockery in progress.132  By showing us 
would-be mockers—failed blame poets, like Rosen’s Thersites—the Lucretian persona 
both entertains us with the notion of a fool spitting into the wind (or of a pot calling a ket-
tle dense) and reveals a double source of shame and blame for deluded, delusional lovers. 
Our second example of mockery that targets a moral failing comes from the de-
scription of early humans during the “archaeology” of book 5.  With a lack of technology 
and with the ignorance of evolutionary youth, these proto-humans often died on account 
of their lack of resources, in contrast to the decadence of the modern age: 
tum penuria deinde cibi languentia leto 
membra dabat, contra nunc rerum copia mersat. 
illi inprudentes ipsi sibi saepe uenenum 
uergebant, nunc se perdunt sollertius ipsi. 
       (DRN 5.1007–1010) 
 
At that time, then, a poverty of food gave their weakening limbs 
over to death, while on the other hand nowadays an abundance of 
things drowns [people].  They themselves often unknowingly 
poured poison for themselves—nowadays people themselves de-
stroy themselves more cleverly. 
 
                                                
Disputations 3.73, Catullus 22.21, Horace Serm. 2.3.299, Seneca Dialogues 4.28.8, 
Phaedrus 4.10, and Babrius 66. 
132 The Lucretian speaker’s use of miser in respect to debased, ridiculed others can be 
compared to the Plautine lover’s use of the adjective to express his comic abjection: e.g., 
Pseudolus line 13 has the young lover Calidorus lamenting, “I’m super-duper sad ’n’ de-
pressed, Pseudolus!,” misere miser sum, Pseudole. 
Hinds [1998: 29–34] discusses the idiomatic phrase me miserum at Ovid Amores 
1.1.25—with reference to the comic playwright Terence, among others—as a test case for 
his hypothesis that “there is no such thing as a wholly non-negotiable confluence” when 
trying to assess allusion in Roman poetry [1998: 34]; his discussion builds on that of 
McKeown [1987: ad Amores 1.1.25]. 
 106 
The sarcasm is potent in these lines, and particularly bitter in the last five-word phrase.133  
Modern folks’ self-destructive behaviors are characterized as skillfulness, as a set of 
techniques that were perhaps developed alongside the other technologies that early hu-
mans lacked, like shipwrightry (5.1000–1006).  The speaker presents them causing their 
own demise intentionally, even gleefully. 
The mockery in DRN also extends to parodies (cf. pp. 154–157, below).  During 
his assault on the fear of death, the speaker undertakes an extended parody of the senti-
mental commonplaces on the topic of death (3.884–930).  First, a sample funeral oration 
and lamentations of mourners, identified by Kenney and others as satiric parody inserted 
more for tone and rhetorical effect than for logical relevancy.134  Second, a sympotic con-
text, and the uita breuis, carpe diem-like theme familiar from lyric verse and from later 
scenes in Roman satire (e.g., Serm. 1.1 and 2.6, with Freudenburg [2006] among others) 
and Petronius (as with the speeches of the freedmen during the dinner of Trimalchio).  
Martindale refers to the “strongly satirical setting” here in DRN [2005: 195], while 
Wallach points out its parodic elements.135  The parodies here function in support of the 
                                                
133 Cf. Houghton [1912: xxxviii]: “Two fine satiric touches are here felt.”  Dudley calls 
5.1010: “a sudden twist” [1965b: 115]. 
134 Parody: Waltz [1949: 96]; Wallach [1976: 51–55], with parallels in earlier Greek and 
Roman literature and inscriptions; and Kenney [1971: 206 ad 3.904–908]: “the speaker is 
made to express the feelings of the bereaved in unmistakably satirical terms.”  For the 
relevancy of the attack on those who are overly concerned with funeral customs, see 
Kenney [1971: 202 ad 3.888–393]: DRN “develops it more because it offers an opportu-
nity for a series of crushing sarcasms than because it was strictly relevant to his main ar-
gument.” 
135 Parody: Wallach [1976: 57], with parallels in other Graeco-Roman literature [1976: 
56–59 and 56 n. 73].  On the sympotic lament in DRN, see Lattimore [1962: 172–177, 
243–246], Martindale [2005: 194–197], Gale [2007: 68 n. 24], and West [1994: 29]: 
“these pathetic rhetorical figures…are meant as sarcastic caricatures of the mawkish cli-
 107 
satiric thrust of the Lucretian ego’s argument.  In adopting and mocking these familiar, 
emotional expressions of grief and mortal anxiety, the speaker also mocks the underlying 
emotions themselves and thereby downplays their importance.  Thus, the concerns over 
death are minimalized, more to be laughed at by the “in-crowd” than to be objects of ob-
session. 
The mockery here is gentler than, say, what we saw in the polemics against the 
Presocratic philosophers in book 1.  Still satire, still satiric, but in a different satiric regis-
ter.  Satirists do not operate with full force at all times; some occasions call for brunt 
mockery and blame, while others call for subtle irony, and yet others for sardonic resig-
nation.  Graf—who argues for a multi-tiered conception of satiric tone in Roman satire, 
as I am arguing here for DRN—considers performativity and ritual in the Roman genre, 
and in so doing he finds connections between satiric mockery and Roman funeral rites 
[2005: 204 and passim].  Ultimately, he believes, “Roman satire appears as the literariza-
tion of fundamental social concerns and ways of behavior” [2005: 205]. 
It is in this respect that I believe we may see another, more tentative link between 
DRN’s mockery of mourners et cetera and satire.  Not only does DRN, like satire (and 
much other Roman poetry, we might add), constitute a “literarization of fundamental so-
cial concerns,” but also DRN often enacts such literarization in ways very similar to sat-
ire.  Both satire and DRN have an overriding moral or ethical bearing, as we have seen, 
and both, as we will see, couch the discussion of social concerns in a narratorial pose of 
didaxis.  Furthermore, both claim to offer an ethical/moral corrective: for DRN in this 
                                                
chés used by such stulti and barbari.”  Cf. my discussion in chapter 5 of the image of the 
conuiua at DRN 3.938–939 (pp. 269–271, below). 
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passage specifically, a refutation of the crushing fear of death, and for satire generally, a 
better world, a more tranquil society.136 
Back to parodies: the almost-hymnic praise of Epicurus in the proem to DRN 5 is 
arguably a parody of mythologists.137  As well, the Lucretian speaker tells the tale of 
Phaethon (5.396–404) in elevated style, only to undercut it with a sarcastic (another scili-
cet, 405) attribution to “the old poets of the Greeks” (ueteres Graium…poetae, again 
405)138 and with a stock barb line of his, “this is too far removed from true reasoning” 
(quod procul a uera nimis est ratione repulsum, 406, cf. p. 125, below).  In using parody 
for these passages, the Lucretian speaker is mocking the style of his targets; and by mak-
ing fun of how they write, he suggests by extension that what they write is risible as 
well—not unlike his criticism of Heraclitus’ dicta on the basis of their style (discussed at 
p. 76, above).  The blame of the target is implicit in the speaker’s send-up of the blame-
worthy target’s literary encasement. 
                                                
136 Moral/ethical bearing: pp. 40–43, above.  Didactic pose: pp. 163–171, below.  Satire’s 
goal of tranquility: p. 142, below.  I consider similar aspects of DRN in my discussions of 
the poem’s “civic satires” and of the Roman genre of satire’s “civic discourse” (pp. 271–
286, below). 
137 West [1994: 28], Rouse & Smith [1975: 381 n. a].  The praise of Epicurus here is 
made in comparison to Hercules, a hero of special import to the Stoics, and so may con-
stitute Lucretian engagement with the Stoic school; Kenney refers to “the deflation of the 
Stoic hero Hercules” [1970: 380], and Lévy claims that scholarly consensus accepts a 
reference here to the Stoics: “il est très communément admis qu’en comparant Épicure à 
Hercule, au bénéfice du philosophe, Lucrèce s’en prend aux Stoïciens, puisque pour 
ceux-ci le demi-dieu symbolisait le sage” [1999: 93].  Sedley argues that the Stoic em-
brace of Heracles as an “allegorized moral hero is a separate tradition” not in force until 
the 1st century CE [1998: 75 n. 62], but I do not find his claim persuasive.  See also 
Chambert [1999]. 
138 Cf. West [1994: 52–52], Rouse & Smith [1975: 409 n. c]. 
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Another basic avenue for mockery in DRN is when the speaker in addition inter-
mittently targets the addressee.  Once more I offer two examples.  Return to the first pas-
sage with crying and laughing primordia (cf. p. 69, above): 
denique iam quaecumque in rebus cernis apertis 
si fieri non posse putas, quin materiai 
corpora consimili natura praedita fingas, 
hac ratione tibi pereunt primordia rerum: 
fiet uti risu tremulo concussa cachinnent 
et lacrimis salsis umectent ora genasque. 
       (DRN 1.914–920) 
 
Finally, if you judge that whatever you see in manifest reality can-
not come about without your imagining that the components of 
matter are gifted with a self-similar nature, by this reasoning the 
first-beginnings of things are destroyed for you— it’ll happen that 
they chuckle, struck through with shaking laughter, and wet their 
faces and cheeks with salted139 tears. 
 
The criticism is of Anaxagoras’ principle of ὁμοιομερία, but it is here not directed at 
Anaxagoras.  It is directed at the addressee.  The addressee is the one who judges (putas), 
who imagines (fingas), who loses the atoms (tibi)—and who finds himself, I suggest, the 
implicit object of the primordial guffaws.  Again, the Lucretian ego engages in mockery 
by proxy, so to speak, as he puts before the reader an internal character (in fact, the insen-
sate protagonists of DRN, the atoms themselves!) to satirize the target.  Like the lovers 
mocking other lovers, the subject and stand-in satirist(s) bleed together, although in this 
case the proxy satirists do not undercut themselves, but rather elude the target’s misun-
derstanding of nature.  They dissolve into laughter just as the logical force of the ad-
                                                
139 Or “witty” (salsis, cf. Catullus 12.4)? 
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dressee’s Anaxagorean argument dissolves under the ego’s rigorous intellectual scru-
tiny.140 
Finally, DRN’s speaker has the addressee turn against himself, in a tirade that is 
put into the mouth of the addressee (3.1025–1052).  Part of the invective combating the 
fear of death at the end of book 3, the tirade is introduced as a digression on what the ad-
dressee could say to himself during the Lucretian persona’s deliberations about the fear 
of death,141 and represents the most extended instance in DRN of the interpolated inter-
locutor (see p. 129 n. 184, below).  It is, moreover, thoroughly satiric.142  The self-lecture 
begins, “even good Ancus abandoned the light with his eyes, Ancus who was in many 
affairs better than you, wicked man!”143  Through his use of improbus, another word with 
                                                
140 Their tears (lacrimis salsis, 1.920) form an intratextual link with the tears that DRN’s 
Homer sheds in front of Ennius prior to expounding the Nature of Things (lacri-
mas…salsas, 1.125), and may suggest that the Ennius-Homer scene, too, is parodic.  
Kenney [1970: 374–375] seconds Ferrero’s suggestion that the scene is one of Alexan-
drian-style polemic against Ennius [1949: 27, 51–57], and a similar suggestion is also 
made by Marconi [1961: 244–245].  Cf. Kenney [1970: 378]: “he [DRN’s speaker] is 
throwing his great predecessor’s own polemic in his teeth.”  Ferrero compares this scene 
to the critique of Lucilius and Plautus in Horace’s Sermones [1949: 52].  See, contra, 
Boyancé [1963: 41 n. 2].  For parody of Ennius in DRN book 3, see Wallach [1976: 95–
96]. 
141 “You could even yourself say this to yourself in the meantime,” hoc etiam tibi tute in-
terdum dicere possis (3.1024). 
142 On this passage overall, see Wallach [1976: 91–100], who refers to its “definitely po-
lemical tone” and sees it as derived from diatribe rather than consolatory literature [1976: 
93], pace Stork [1970].  Cf. also Conte [1965] and Kenney [1971: 232 ad 3.1024–1052], 
who calls the lines “a harangue placed by a fresh variation in the mouth of the imaginary 
and typical individual to whom the consolation is directed.  The argument is none the less 
effective because it is hackneyed; indeed it is because it is hackneyed that it is effective.” 
143 DRN 3.1025–1026: lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancu’ reliquit, | qui melior multis 
quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus.  Line 1025 is a quotation from Ennius’ Annales; Kenney 
calls it an imitation [1971: 233–234 ad loc.], while Wallach prefers to term it parody 
[1976: 95]. 
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comic connotations, as well as through the amusing and perhaps Terentian uigilans stertis 
(at DRN 3.1048, quoted below),144 the speaker signals that the addressee’s voice inserted 
here is the voice of a satiric mocker.  Yet at the same time, since this very mocker (the 
addressee) is himself also the target of the mockery, he is labeled as worthless—he is 
made abject. 
After mentioning the inevitability of death for even great figures like Xerxes 
(1029–1033), Scipio (1034–1035), Homer (1037–1038), Democritus (1039–1041), and 
Epicurus! (1042–1044), the ventriloquist-dummy addressee returns to his target, himself: 
tu uero dubitabis et indignabere obire, 
mortua cui uita est prope iam uiuo atque uidenti, 
qui somno partem maiorem conteris aeui 
et uigilans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas 
sollicitamque geris cassa formidine mentem 
nec reperire potes tibi quid sit saepe mali, cum 
ebrius urgeris multis miser undique curis 
atque animi incerto fluitans errore uagaris? 
       (DRN 3.1045–1052) 
 
Will you indeed hesitate and become indignant [!] at having to die, 
you, living and breathing [“seeing”], whose life is nearly dead, you 
who waste the greater part of your age in sleep and snore while 
awake and don’t stop seeing dreams and carry around a mind tor-
mented with empty fear and often cannot discover what’s wrong 
with you, when you’re beset—you poor drunk, you!—on all sides 
by many anxieties and you roam wavering in an uncertain wander-
ing of the mind? 
 
                                                
144 Improbus: for instance, Plautus Truculentus 833: “he’s wicked from [because of] his 
character,” ab ingenio improbust (and also improbust once earlier at 832).  Cf. my com-
ment on Plautine (and Aristophanic) heroic badness (p. 50 n. 29, above). 
Vigilans stertis: Kenney [1971: 237 ad 3.1048] adduces Terence Eunuchus 1079: 
“he’s a fathead, witless, slow, he snores night and day” (fatuos est, insulsu’ tardu’, stertit 
noctes et dies).  Compare also Persius 3.58–59: “now you’re just snoring and your droop-
ing head, joint loosened, jaws entirely unstitched, yawns yesterday away” (stertis adhuc 
laxumque caput conpage soluta | oscitat hesternum dissutis undique malis). 
 112 
We can start with a quick rundown of the traits shared between this passage and the pas-
sages previously considered in this section.  A forceful rhetorical question that heightens 
the passage’s sense of blame, evident furthermore in formulations like cassa formidine 
and animi incerto…errore.  A term related to the satiric persona, indignabere—
indignation, which I discuss immediately below—akin to terms of blame (e.g., culpa) and 
mockery (e.g., ludibria).  The topsy-turvy contradictions of dead life for a living man 
(mortua uita…uiuo)145 and wakeful snoring (uigilans stertis), contradictions similar to the 
turnabout in ancient and modern self-destruction in book 5 or in the primordia and their 
laughter in book 1.  Lastly, that recurring adjective miser, comic in tone and expressive of 
the target-cum-speaker’s abjection. 
What about the passage is new, and different from the speaker’s own satiric 
voice?  The indignation here, unlike the Lucretian ego’s justified indignation, is illegiti-
mate—indignabere is one of two main verbs in the damning rhetorical question that 
comprises the passage and that expects a “no” answer.  No, the addressee should not be-
come indignant, for it is nonsensical to do so (and thus any such indignation is unjusti-
fied).  Miser, in addition, is paired with ebrius, and the two thus augment the (semi-?) 
comic abjection of the poor man. 
The addressee’s speech (as the speaker composes it) turns him into a failed sati-
rist.  He may have indignation, but his is not justified indignation.  He may mock and 
blame, but his target is himself.  He is not merely a victim of abject living conditions (not 
merely miser, say) but also a debased body (ebrius) and mind (uigilans stertis; sollici-
                                                
145 Compare, elsewhere in the same book, mors aeterna (3.1091) and mortalem uitam 
mors…inmortalis ademit (869). 
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tam…cassa formidine mentem).  The addressee’s intellect, as the Lucretian persona has 
him portray it, is debilitated: he cannot hope to understand why he is racked with worry 
(nec reperire potes…).  The basis of the addressee’s self-critique—that he is foolish to 
fear dying—is solid, but the delivery shows us an anti-fear satirist who fears death, who 
therefore lacks the moral high ground of a genuine, successful satirist.  True satire eludes 
him. 
 
The speaker’s justified indignation 
A satirist expresses indignation at some fault or flaw, indignation justified by the 
satirist’s hold on moral high ground.  When in DRN is the speaker indignant?  During his 
invective against the fear of death, particularly, though his indignation there is not un-
tempered by pity.  The anxieties that this terror causes are the chief concern of the 
poem’s speaker and a chief motivation (cf. 1.102–135) for his exposition of Epicurus’ 
physical explanation of the universe. 
We see this combination of indignancy and pity during the description of the 
plague in Athens that concludes DRN.  The account of infected men who excised their 
own genitalia or limbs or eyes in hopes of avoiding death (6.1207–1212) wraps up with 
the comment “to such an extent did the sharp fear of death get into them.”146  This closing 
line is gentler and less indignant than it could be, but it does not need to exude indigna-
                                                
146 DRN 6.1212: usque adeo mortis metus his incesserat acer.  Compare 3.79–84, where 
the speaker comments on the illogicalness and extremity of those who commit suicide 
because of their fear of death, with Wallach [1976: 65] and Hill [2004: ch. 3].  For the 
Epicurean take on suicide, see Epicurus Letter to Meneoceus 126, Sententiae Vaticanae 
9; Cicero De Finibus 1.19.62, Tusculan Disputations 5.41.118; and, among others, 
Englert [1994: 67–98] and Cooper [1999: 515–541]. 
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tion, since earlier lines demarcate the amputees as abject, emasculated half-humans: 
“they lived deprived by a knife of their manly parts, and many without hands and feet 
remained in life nevertheless.”147  The fear that drives them to such extremes also makes 
them the “out” group, a set of Others that speaker and reader can critique and contem-
plate in tranquil health. 
Shortly thereafter the Lucretian ego describes another effect of the fear of death, 
whereby frightened individuals “kept fleeing from going to visit their sick relatives” 
(suos fugitabant uisere ad aegros, 6.1238148).  The result? 
uitai nimium cupidos mortisque timentis 
poenibat paulo post turpi morte malaque, 
desertos, opis expertis, incuria mactans. 
       (DRN 6.1239–1241149) 
                                                
147 6.1209–1211: uiuebant ferro priuati parte uirili, | et manibus sine nonnulli pedibusque 
manebant | in uita tamen, 1209–1211.  Compare, in book 5, the deformed beings pro-
duced during the early phase of life on earth, with Campbell [2003: 103–109 ad loc.]: 
multaque tum tellus etiam portenta creare 
conatast mira facie membrisque coorta, 
........................................................................ 
orba pedum partim, manuum uiduata uicissim, 
muta sine ore etiam, sine uoltu caeca reperta, 
uinctaque membrorum per totum corpus adhaesu, 
nec facere ut possent quicquam nec cedere quoquam 
nec uitare malum nec sumere quod foret usus. 
     (DRN 5.837–838, 840–844) 
 
At that time the earth also tried to create many monsters, arising with 
wondrous appearance and limbs…some deprived of feet, others in turn be-
reft of hands, some also silent without mouths, some found blind without a 
visage, and some constricted by adhesion of their limbs across their entire 
body, so that they could neither do anything nor go anywhere nor avoid 
ills nor get what they needed.  
148 In the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975], 6.1239, as line 1245 is transposed to pre-
cede line 1237. 
149 In the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975], 6.1240–1242. 
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Too desirous of life and too fearing of death, they soon afterwards 
endured the punishment of a base and bad death, deserted, without 
help, at the hands of slaughtering neglect. 
 
Fear of death led to the neglect of attendance upon their loved ones, and that neglect in 
turn led to the specter of dying alone (neglected)—another source for the fear of death.150  
The fate of the negligent is melodramatized (in dantesque legge del contrappasso fash-
ion, no less), yet it is also prejudiced by the moralistic word nimium.  Again, a combina-
tion of minor indignation with an eye for the experience of the fearful; again, the fearful 
are marked as separate, outcast (desertos, opis expertis). 
Now, full-on indignation appears throughout the work—as do humor, mockery, 
and a personalized voice.  The next question, then, is what in DRN drives the speaker’s 
indignation at the flaws and faults that he decries.  The answer is: the mind, the source of 
misjudgments and misinterpretations of sense data.  In a passage in book 4, in the course 
of considering why shadows appear to follow us as we walk, the ego takes time to point 
out, “nonetheless we do not grant even a little bit that the eyes are deceived in this mat-
ter” (nec tamen hic oculos falli concedimus hilum, 4.379).  Eyes are organs of sense-
perception, the foundation of Epicurean epistemology.151  It is not our eyes or other 
senses but rather the flawed deductions that we often make from them that are the factor 
responsible for such deceptive “tricks of the eye” (our speaker would insist on “tricks of 
the mind”).  Hence, “reason at last ought to decide, and eyes can’t recognize the nature of 
                                                
150 Compare the deaths of those animal species that could not find protection in others 
(namely, in humans: praesidio nostro, 5.874) during life’s beginnings (5.871–877), with 
Shelton [1995, 1996] and Spittler [: 23–24]. 
151 On sense-perception in Lucretius, see, e.g., Glidden [1979], Graver [1990], Rosen-
meyer [1996], and Koenen [1997, 1999a, 1999b]. 
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things,152 so don’t ascribe this fault/flaw of the mind to the eyes” (animi demum ratio dis-
cernere debet, | nec possunt oculi naturam noscere rerum. | proinde animi uitium hoc 
oculis adfingere noli, 384–386, cf. 462–468153).  The mind produces the fault. 
Flaws extending beyond mere misinterpretation of sense-perception also derive 
from the intellect.  We need think only of passages such as the invective against love and 
sex, where we see that our passions prevent us from thinking and acting rationally.  The 
mind, again, produces the fault.  Because it is not the senses that are culpable, but rather 
incorrect assessments that the mind makes on the basis of information provided by the 
senses, the mind is the source of satirically blameworthy flaws—and thus the critique of 
the intellect in DRN is tantamount to satiric attack.  For the Lucretian speaker, the cri-
tique of beliefs, behaviors, and philosophical principles results in a satire of intellectual 
and social flaws, and such critique is, in essence, satiric critique.  Accordingly, the criti-
cal, satiric indignation of DRN’s speaker falls into two broad categories, which we will 
                                                
152 Or, if we want to wax metapoetic, “eyes can’t recognize The Nature of Things”! 
153  cetera de genere hoc mirande multa uidemus, 
quae uiolare fidem quasi sensibus omnia quaerunt— 
nequiquam, quoniam pars horum maxima fallit 
propter opinatus animi quos addimus ipsi, 
pro uisis ut sint quae non sunt sensibu’ uisa. 
nam nil aegrius est quam res secernere apertas 
ab dubiis, animus quas ab se protinus addit. 
     (DRN 4.462–468) 
 
We see, bewilderingly, many other things of this sort, things which all 
seek to dishonor (so to speak) our loyalty to our senses—but they do so in 
vain, since the greatest part of these things tricks us because of the mind’s 
suppositions that we ourselves add, so that things which have not been 
perceived through the senses are held as if so perceived.  For nothing is 
more painful than to separate manifest things from uncertain things that 
the mind in and of itself adds straightaway. 
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now survey: academic indignation against faulty philosophical doctrines and, in particu-
lar, indignant moralizing about the flawed beliefs and behaviors of humankind. 
We have seen how in book 1 Heraclitus (p. 76, above) and the other philosophers 
are the subjects of comic ridicule.  Their philosophies are also the subjects of harsh, 
sometimes satiric criticism.  One technique the Lucretian speaker uses is not so much in-
dignation as critique justified on the basis of a scientific proof that he has just offered.  
For instance, after showing that all matter must be composed out of a varied collection of 
different types of atoms (1.628–634), the speaker states: 
quapropter qui materiem rerum esse putarunt 
ignem atque ex igni summam consistere solo, 
magno opere a uera lapsi ratione uidentur. 
       (DRN 1.635–637) 
 
Therefore those who have adjudged that the constituent material of 
the universe is fire and that the sum total is established out of fire 
alone appear to have slipped greatly from true reasoning. 
 
The censure follows, rather than precedes, its basis.  The indignation comes in later, at 
1.690–704, where the ego throws his hands up in despair at the faultiness of Heraclitus’ 
teaching.  Heraclitus, he says, “himself fights against the senses on the basis of the senses 
and undermines them, the source of all belief” (contra sensus ab sensibus ipse repugnat | 
et labefactat eos, unde omnia credita pendent, 1.693–694).  The speaker ends the section 
with three rhetorical questions,154 a technique already familiar to us from passages of 
mockery previously discussed.  And in the passage, he calls Heraclitus’ claim “downright 
                                                
154 “So what can we turn to for proof?  What can be more sure for us than our senses 
themselves, by which we pick out true and false things?” (quo referemus enim? quid no-
bis certius ipsis sensibus esse potest, qui uera ac falsa notemus?, 1.699–700).  “Why 
should anyone take away everything and try to leave the nature of burning itself?” (quare 
quisquam…omnia tollat | et uelit ardoris naturam linquere solam, 701–702). 
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crazy” (perdelirum, 692), “both vacuous and crazy” (cum uanum tum delirum, 698), and 
“insanity” (dementia, 704155).  Not merely is Heraclitus blameworthy, but also he is men-
tally flawed—and he is more explicitly flawed than is the addressee, portrayed as miser 
ebrius in the self-directed tirade of 3.1025–1052. 
More prevalent than indignant refutation of wrongheaded precepts (though there 
are more examples156) is the speaker’s moralizing.157  The speaker shows the reader his 
indignation in heated laments about the state of humankind, in snarky assaults on flawed 
behaviors, and in more broadly applied aphoristic aspersions on people’s moral faulti-
ness.  A sample lament: “oh, wretched [miser again!] are human minds, blind their 
hearts!  In what kinds of shadows of life and in what great dangers is this whatever-it-is 
of an age lived out!” (o miseras hominum mentes, o pectora caeca! | qualibus in tenebris 
uitae quantisque periclis | degitur hoc aeui quodcumquest!, 2.14–16). 
Sample snarky assaults: the Lucretian ego has no problem with a person’s meta-
phorically calling the sea “Neptune” or grain “Ceres” or the earth “Mother of the Gods” 
                                                
155 The term dementia, appearing only here in DRN, may be drawn from the comic 
authors Plautus and Terence: cf. Piazzi [2005: 137 ad loc.]. 
156 Elsewhere, for instance, DRN’s speaker hurls indignant (if indirect) criticism against 
Anaxagoras (2.865–930, with Rouse & Smith [1975: 164–165 n. a]), against Plato (and, 
with Rouse & Smith [1975: 185 n. c], perhaps the Stoics) for his allegorical espousal of a 
golden thread from the sky for the delivery of animals (2.1153–1156), and against Aristo-
telian (and, with Rouse & Smith [1975: 342–343 n. a], Stoic) teleological accounts of the 
development of limbs and the senses (4.833: “everything’s turned backwards in topsy-
turvy reasoning,” omnia peruersa praepostera sunt ratione). 
157 Waltz calls the speaker “implacable moraliste” [1949: 92].  Indeed, Fowler points out 
that the refutation of the moral flaws of worldly fears are ubiquitous: “[t]hroughout the 
purely physical sections of the work, the De rerum natura constantly insinuates argu-
ments against its two main targets, the fear of the gods and of death” [2000c: 148].  The 
speaker’s moralizing extends to the end of the work; for moralizing in DRN’s account of 
the Athenian plague in late book 6, see Commager [1957: 107–109].  
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(2.655–659)—no problem, that is, “so long as he himself in reality still avoids infect-
ing/tainting his mind with foul superstition/religion” (dum uera re tamen ipse | religione 
animum turpi contingere parcat, 659–660158).  Dreaded religio is “foul” or “base”—it is a 
source of abjection.159  By indignantly shunning it and thus the debased lives of its un-
thinking devotees, the ego—who has preemptively justified his indignation by demon-
strating that the gods have nothing to do with our concerns and that the earth is not really 
an animate/immanent entity (2.646–654160)—stakes his claim to moral high ground.  
Also: during the attack on love and sex, the Lucretian ego accuses even the pretty women 
(Veneres nostrae) of physical repulsiveness161—they, too, have their “real-life behind-the-
scenes” (postscaenia uitae, 4.1171–1187).  The indignation is targeted at the women for 
trying to conceal their flawed corporeality, and at men for their uncritical obedience to 
their unchecked passions. 
Sample aphoristic aspersion: “the human race is too desirous of hearers” (hu-
manum genus est auidum nimis auricularum, 4.594).  The moralizing nimis appears once 
more, and an instinct to entertain or a wish to be heard is cast as avarice.  But there is a 
                                                
158 2.660 is the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975] for 2.680, which has been transposed 
from its position in the manuscripts to follow 2.559. 
159 Cf. Clay [1983: 94–95, 151–152, 210–212, 217, 221–225] on DRN and religion. 
160 2.646–651 = 1.44–49.  The Stoics may be a target of these lines, according to Rouse & 
Smith [1975: 146–147 n. b], who also caution the reader to “[n]ote the emphatic wording 
of this important qualification” against the use of religio turpis.  See my discussion of the 
Stoics issue at pp. 12–15, above. 
161 Cf. Bakhtin [1984/1968: 306]: “the grotesque is always satire”; Griffin’s point that 
“[o]ne of the special features of satire is to give form to deformity” [1994: 167; emphasis 
preserved]; and Bloom [2009].  On the grotesque in Lucretius (and Catullus and the Al-
exandrian poets), see Ferrero [1949: 141–143]; on Juvenal and the grotesque, see Plaza 
[2006: 305–337]; on the grotesque in Roman satire generally, Miller [1998], and on satire 
in the post-classical period, Simpson [2003: 52, 129, 138–140]. 
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potential here for irony, or for the possibility that the speaker is undercutting himself in 
making this pronouncement.  For he himself is desirous of hearers: “I demand heedful 
ears and mind” (attentas auris animumque reposco, 6.920).162  Maybe the distinction is 
that the speaker demands specifically attentive ears and throws the mind in as well.  The 
verb reposco, however, is nevertheless emphatic and markedly contradictory to the self-
assured sanctimony of the aphorism at 4.594.  If the speaker is among the number of peo-
ple desirous of listeners, how is his indignation at people desirous of listeners justified?  
The answer, like many aspects of a satirist, eludes. 
The opening of the sixth book homes in on Epicurus and his amelioration of trou-
bled human society during his lifetime.  According to DRN’s persona, Epicurus looked at 
lives racked with greed and anxiety and “perceived that the jar itself makes the flaw/fault, 
and that everything inside of it is ruined by the flaw/fault.”163  The mind produces the 
fault.  Epicurus, in response, “therefore scoured/cleansed their hearts with true-speaking 
speeches and established a limit to desire and fear” (ueridicis igitur purgauit pectora dic-
tis | et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris, 24–25).  Epicurus scoured the flaws and 
offered a means for the betterment of life, not unlike the ego of Horace’s Sermones or the 
speaker at the end of Juvenal 10.164  Moreover, in accomplishing his task, Epicurus—
already deified in the proem of DRN 5—gains unassailable moral high ground.  What is 
                                                
162 Compare also earlier, 1.50–51: “summon to true reasoning unpreoccupied ears and an 
acute mind isolated from anxieties,” uacuas auris animumque sagacem | semotum a curis 
adhibe ueram ad rationem. 
163 6.17–18: intellegit…uitium uas efficere ipsum, | omniaque illius uitio corrumpier in-
tus.  On the imagery of the uas in DRN and its Greek antecedents—all non-Epicurean—
see Görler [1997].  This image appears in a later satirist, Persius, at 3.20–24, with Keane 
[2006: 163 n. 72] and p. 265, below. 
164 Both discussed at pp. 51–58, above. 
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important here is that the Lucretian ego aligns himself with Epicurus (see p. 89, above) 
and thus also associates himself with the rough cleansing of intellective faults—and justi-
fies his own indignation at those who have failed to adopt the well-reasoned doctrines of 
Epicurus. 
I come last to Iphigenia (or, for DRN, Iphianassa).  This early passage (1.80–101), 
one of the most famous in DRN, paints a tragic portrait of the girl’s sacrifice, and a men-
acing one of the madness that drove her father to officiate it.  The tone is heightened—
tragic—throughout.  The terms “foremost of the men” (prima uirorum, 86) and “fruitful 
and favorable” (felix faustusque, 100) are, in Gale’s words, “savagely ironic,” and could 
suggest that the speaker here “almost parodies” allegorical interpretations of the Iphi-
genia myth [1994a: 96].  We could add to the savage irony a troubling figura etymologica 
at DRN 1.98 (casta inceste) and the bitterness (misera yet again, though with not a comic 
but a tragic timbre here) of 93–94: “nor was it able to benefit the poor girl in such a time 
that she first had gifted the king with the name of father” (nec miserae prodesse in tali 
tempore quibat | quod patrio princeps donarat nomine regem).  The story is furthermore 
bookended with nearly wrathful pronouncements on the moral turpitude of religio—here 
indistinguishable between “superstition” and “religion,” or between “religious belief” and 
“religious practice.”  First bookend: “that religio has quite often generated criminal and 
impious deeds” (saepius illa | religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta, 83–84).  Note 
the force of scelerosa atque impia, the pejorative tone of the demonstrative illa.  Second 
bookend: “to such a height of evils has religio been able to push” (tantum religio potuit 
suadere malorum, 101). 
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DRN’s speaker performs for the reader a height of indignation to match the height 
of evils instigated by religio.  In this instance, I believe that the speaker claims moral su-
periority through the very act of indignation itself.  This is a situation where an observer, 
as it were, sees something wrong and speaks out against it.165  The speech-act creates self-
justification enough, and the value-laden terminology—scelerosa, impia, turparunt and 
foede at 85, miserae, sollemni at 96, claro at 97, casta inceste, felix faustusque, and tan-
tum malorum—allows the speaker to arrogate to himself a sense of moral rectitude con-
ventionally linked with the religious practices and beliefs he is combating.  The Lucretian 
ego is thus a blame poet in this passage, and his poetry is mockery.166  But it is a bitter, 





                                                
165 Even if the something in question happened centuries ago, or not at all—cf. Clay 
[1983: 217]: “Lucretius is careful to set in Greece and in a remote past both his philoso-
phy and his account of the monstrous religion it overthrew.  Yet both his ratio and his 
sense of the threats of religio are made Roman and present. “ 
166 For links among the Iphigenia scene, the mourning cow who has lost her calf to sacri-
fice at DRN 2.352–365, and the writings of Empedocles, see Gale [1994a: 72; and 2000: 
46–47].  For the issue of poetic anxiety over the cruelty of sacrifice in DRN and Vergil’s 
Georgics, see Morgan [1999: 105–149] and Gale [2000: 101–112].  Elsewhere Gale, cit-
ing DRN 5.855–861 and 2.1161, writes: “a kind of partnership exists between man and 
domestic animals in Lucretius, and relations are generally cordial.…The sacrifice of the 
calf in 2.352–66 is presented very much as a perversion of this relationship” [1991: 425; 
emphasis preserved]. 
167 The place for smoking altars is not in our lives, but in our dreams, as the speaker 
shows two books later: “asleep we in dreams see altars breathe steam out and bear smoke 
on high” (in somnis sopiti…cernimus alte | exhalare uaporem altaria ferreque fumum, 
3.431–432).  
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Collusion: speaker, reader, addressee  
The final essential component of a satirist is his creation of a collusive relation-
ship with his audience, his formation of an “in” crowd that includes the audience and ex-
cludes the objects of mockery and scornful laughter.  In Serm. 1.4, for instance, the 
Horace-ego instructs the addressee to pick the satiric target, and thereby prompts the 
reader to ally with the satirist in the act of mockery.168  At the very end of the same poem, 
the ego even threatens to coerce the addressee to join the “in” crowd, a gang of poets 
(1.4.138–143, with poetarum…manus at 141)—so the reader is given the choice either to 
collude with the satirist and his entourage or to risk becoming the target of satiric attack 
and subsequent forced conversion. 
I will demonstrate that DRN’s speaker does collusively engage his readership, and 
that he occasionally points to a derisible group of outsiders.  First, I address the compli-
cated interrelationship in DRN of speaker, addressee, and reader.  Mitsis has discussed a 
problem with how the speaker of DRN renders the interaction between himself and his 
addressee.  In short, the speaker treats the addressee (whom Mitsis identifies as Memmius 
throughout) rather demeaningly.  Indeed, Hahn, discussing the invocation of Venus, 
comments that “there is no hint of deep affection here or anywhere else on Lucretius’ part 
for Memmius” [1966: 137]. 
One of Mitsis’ prime examples is the wormwood passage (1.936–950), where the 
speaker compares his poetic adaptation of Epicurean philosophy to doctors who add 
honey to doses of wormwood for sick boys, to trick them into taking the lifesaving medi-
                                                
168 1.4.25: “pick anyone you want from the middle of the crowd—s/he’s suffering for 
greed or ’cause of pathetic ambition” (quemuis media elige turba: | aut ob auaritiam aut 
misera ambitione laborat). 
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cine.  The adult audience of DRN is thus implicitly compared to children, Mitsis argues, 
so “why shouldn’t many readers come to the much more obvious conclusion that the poet 
is claiming to treat them as sick children, rather than as autonomous equals in search of 
commonly shared goals?”169  This issue is exacerbated by DRN’s portrayal of children as 
weak and whiny creatures [1993: 116–117], and may represent “an air of condescension 
and treat[ment of] his readers as children” motivated by “specific rhetorical and didactic 
goals” [1993: 114].170 
In sum, according to Mitsis, the named addressee of DRN, Memmius, becomes 
the target of the speaker’s authoritarian positioning, and serves as a didactic fool (a 
νήπιος) who never catches on to what the speaker is trying to teach [1993: 123–124].171  
                                                
169 Mitsis [1993: 112], and further: “the poet, just as the doctor, must administer treatment 
as he sees fit” [1993: 114].  At the same time, however, I suggest that we, as adult read-
ers, can be aware of the deception that the honey on the cup comprises, but our awareness 
of it does not mean that we see it as a bad thing, or that we do not still want, say, our ibu-
profen to have a candy coating.  Likewise, when it comes to the Lucretian speaker’s 
forewarning the reader about the supposedly bad-tasting medicine of philosophy, my 
take—that the doctor’s treatment of the boys does not necessarily reflect negatively on 
the ego’s treatment of the reader—again differs from Mitsis [1993: 120]: “[a]ny pediatri-
cian, even one with an extremely robust god-complex, knows better than to explain to 
children in advance how bad the medicine is really going to taste or how she plans to 
trick them.”  My point exactly: doctors may trick children with honey on the cup, but 
they do in fact tell adults ahead of time.  We should be wary, furthermore, of pushing the 
simile too far.  As Culler writes, “statements authors make about the process of composi-
tion are notoriously problematic” [1980: 105]. 
170 This sort of treatment fits with DRN’s wider “system of connected imagery” and is in 
keeping with the poem’s generic predecessors Hesiod, Parmenides, and Empedocles 
[Mitsis 1993: 114]. 
171 Mitsis [1993: 123–124].  Memmius, therefore, is like Hesiod’s addressee Perses in 
Works and Days—so Tortorelli: “Hesiod explicitly figures Perses as his intellectual infe-
rior” [2011: 166].  Cf. p. 80, above, and Rosen [2007: 232 n. 31]: “although this is obvi-
ously not, generically or formally speaking, a work of ‘satire,’ its didactic stance and 
authorial stance against a target, Perses, give much of it a satiric cast.”  For satirical ele-
ments of Hesiod, see Hunt [1981], Nisbet [2004], and Tortorelli [2011: 34–45].  The Lu-
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We see the speaker mocking the addressee again and again—not only with phrases of co-
ercive argumentation of the type “you must admit that…” (fateare necesse est + indirect 
statement), “it must certainly be granted that…” (certe…dandum est + indirect state-
ment), and “it’s idiocy to think that…” (desipere est),172 but also by calling the addressee 
flat wrong.173  This mocking repetition constitutes a conscious, nontrivial phenomenon.174 
                                                
cretian persona, too, has a didactic stance, and a stance against the addressee—and so 
likewise, I believe, Memmius takes on a satiric cast. 
 Another view on Memmius (or “Memmius”), akin to Mitsis’ view, is that of 
Donohue, who also suggests that Memmius, as fictive reader, serves to allay the harsh-
ness of the attacks on the reader [1993: 117–118].  For the term “fictive reader,” which 
denotes the persona (implied by the text) that a real reader must adopt as part of the act of 
reading, see Ong [1977: 60].  The views of both Mitsis and Donohue are in part prefig-
ured by Roller [1970]. 
172 Fateare necesse(st): 2.1064, 3.513, 3.578, 3.677, 3.766, 4.216, 5.343, 5.376 (neces-
sumst confiteare).  Certe…dandum est: 2.1129.  Desipere(st): 3.800–805, 5.165, 5.1042.  
Of the phrase desiperest, Waltz remarks, “c’est un de ses refrains” [1949: 89].  Another 
example of coercive argumentation in DRN is the speaker’s use of the verb fingo: accord-
ing to Leonard & Smith, it “[c]onnotes falsity” [1942: 213 ad 1.104], Lenaghan calls it 
“one of Lucretius’ favorite verbs for denoting futile or deliberately deceitful rationaliza-
tion” [1967: 233 n. 41], and Brown calls the verb “palpably derogatory” [1983: 155]. 
173 E.g., “you’ve wandered way off the path of true reasoning” if you disbelieve atomic 
motion (2.80–82: auius a uera longe ratione uagaris).  Similar examples at 1.370–383, 
1.637, 1.659, 1.711, 1.880, 2.82, 2.174–176, 2.229, 2.645, 2.740, 3.105, 4.915, 4.931, 
5.23, 5.406, 6.767, and 6.853.  See Minyard [1978: 30–31] and Fowler [2002: 256 ad 
2.176]; and cf. also Bailey [1947: 713 ad 1.635–637; 1008 ad 3.105], Clay [1983: 237], 
Costa [1984: 77 ad 5.405], Piazzi [2005: 87–88 ad 1.637; 259 ad 1.880], and Gale [2009: 
112 ad 5.23; 139 ad 5.406].  Piazzi points out the general-purpose use of these lines in 
DRN, against any adversary: “[s]i tratta di una fraseologia tipica che Lucrezio applica a 
tutti coloro che seguono dottrine diverse da quella epicurea” [2005: 259 ad 1.880]. 
174 Mitsis [1993: 127]: “Lucretius is not a poet afflicted with doubts and conflicting alle-
giances; rather he is employing a rhetorical strategy that deliberately exploits…responses 
from his readers.”  Compare Gale [1994a: 57]: the speaker of DRN “self-consciously ma-
nipulates the literary expectations of his reader, who is to be ‘deceived not harmed’ ”—an 
image from the “honey on the cup” passage.  Cf. Clay [1983: 212–225, and especially 
185]: “Lucretius is constantly at pains to give his reader an overview of how the essential 
parts of his philosophy fit into a whole,” and my references above (p. 96 n. 116). 
Compare also the explanation in Rhetorica ad Herennium (a text basically con-
temporary with DRN) of how to gain goodwill from the abuse of one’s adversaries: 
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The effect of the speaker’s endlessly berating the addressee?  The readers, as Mit-
sis writes, see him “attempting to deal with someone who embraces all the conventional 
and mistaken attitudes that the poet is out to eliminate.…[I]t makes us more inclined to 
join his [the ego’s] side and take his point of view” [1993: 125–126].  The addressee 
comes off as ignorant175 and thus becomes an undesirable associate for the reader. 
The speaker enacts upon the reader a shift in alignment, from identifying with the 
addressee (Memmius, or “Memmius”) to identifying with the Lucretian ego himself.  
We—or at least the implied reader176—relinquish anything we have in common with 
Memmius and look upon him with the kind of enjoyment that an observer on the shore 
looks upon a ship in trouble at sea (suaue mari magno and so forth, the proem to DRN 
2).177  In other words, I would add, DRN’s didactic plot178 moves the reader from ad-
dressee-aligned student to knowing collaborator of the speaker, collusively mocking the 
faults and shortcomings of others, the plot’s objects of scorn.  And we can detect this 
shift, subtly marked, in the text itself, for the speaker shifts from repeatedly insinuating 
                                                
“goodwill will be obtained from the persona of our adversaries if we drive them into ha-
tred, into ill will, into disdain” (ab aduersariorum persona beniuolentia captabitur si eos 
in odium, in inuidiam, in contemptionem adducemus, 1.8). 
175 Ignorant—and thus similar to Perses, and to the farmers in the Georgics who are “ig-
norant of the path” (ignarosque uiae…agrestis, 1.41).  Gibson suggests that the appear-
ance of ignorance is an unusual feature for (supposedly) didactic poetry before Ovid’s 
Ars Amatoria [1998: 298]. 
176 The term is from Iser [1978: 34], and refers to a hypothetical figure who anticipates 
the recipient of the text.  The implied reader designates a network of response-inviting 
structures that impel the reader to grasp the text.  Cf. p. 130 n. 186, below. 
177 Mitsis [1993: 126]: “whenever we come to the realization that we share beliefs with a 
népios, we are more likely to want to give them up.” 
178 For the term, see Fowler [2000].  Compare also the “satiric plot” of Kernan [1959: 30–
35; 1962b]. 
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that the reader is an idiot (e.g., 2.740, procul auius erras, “you’re far and away mis-
taken”; and p. 125 n. 173, above) to including the reader among the “in” crowd of those 
who scrutinize the erroneousness of others: “notice how far away this has been pushed 
from true reasoning.”179  A sign of Mitsis’ shift in the reader’s allegiance, yes, but also a 
sign of the Lucretian persona’s satiric collusiveness. 
So this persona pulls the allegiance of the reader away from the addressee and to-
wards himself.  He takes it another step farther by including (or perhaps implicating) the 
reader in his line of reasoning and argumentation.  Those now-familiar “we” statements 
draw the reader and speaker closer together, and make the revelation of the nature of 
things a joint project.  While coercive argumentation like the lines introduced with 
fateare necessest (p. 125 n. 172, above) is part of the addressee’s browbeating, meted out 
by the ego, at the same time it makes the reader complicit in confirming the proof.  Simi-
larly, the potentially coercive (and at least patronizing) language of statements introduced 
by nonne uides180 both presume the patent veracity of the speakers’s claims and simulta-
neously, ungenerous tone notwithstanding, involve the reader in the furthering of the ar-
gument. 
                                                
179 6.767–768: quod procul a uera quam sit ratione repulsum | percipe.  The imperative 
percipe is extremely emphatic, placed in enjambment after a near-exact repetition of a 
stock barb line in DRN—compare 5.405, quod procul a uera nimis est ratione repulsum.  
The only difference is the replacement of nimis est with quam sit to allow for the indirect 
question after percipe. 
Further evidence for the shift: the ego says, with a third-person verb, that the kind 
of person who believes in the possibility of chimaerae “could babble out many similar 
things from his mouth” (multa licet simili ratione effutiat ore, 5.910).  Clay traces the 
shift from Memmius to “[t]he reader by himself, for himself” [1983: 225]; Townend re-
fers to the “fading” of Memmius [1978].  This notion of a shift is, we should note, not the 
only reader-position possible, and not the only possible reading of the poem. 
180 DRN 4.1286, 5.602, 5.646, and elsewhere; cf. Schiesaro [1990]. 
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The ego’s incorporation of the reader in a shared philosophical undertaking pro-
duces kinder evidence, too, material that suggests a more optimistic opinion of the 
reader.181  The speaker “ask[s] all the more for attentive ears and mind” for his pending 
explanation of magnets (quo magis attentas auris animumque reposco, 6.920).  He takes 
his reader to be a ready listener.  The speaker introduces his note on how the body is 
weakened by long-lasting speech-giving with the words “nor does it escape you” (nec te 
fallit, 4.535).  He takes his reader to be a keen observer.  In his discussion of echoes, the 
speaker tells us, “once you’ve seen this [the dispersion of sound after hitting a surface], 
you yourself could supply an explanation to yourself and others” (quae bene cum uideas, 
rationem reddere possis | tute tibi atque aliis, 4.572–573).  He takes his reader to be a 
quick learner.182  When presenting his argument on the mortality of the world, the speaker 
supplies a defense against charges of begging the question,183 and when expounding the 
nature of Aetna the volcano, the speaker fields an objection interpolated by his (momen-
                                                
181 Here my argument is in line with Gale [2005], who, in an argument framed as being 
against that of Mitsis [1993] and others, considers the addressee “a positive model for the 
ideal reader, one who is actively and critically engaged with the poet’s teaching, who 
stands to benefit hugely from it” [2005: 179; emphasis preserved].  But where Gale sees a 
conflict between her reading and Mitsis’, I see two different levels of speaker-reader in-
teraction: Mitsis identifies the problematic relationship between Lucretian ego and inter-
nal addressee (“Memmius” or otherwise), while Gale focuses on the relationship between 
implied author and authorial, expert, or (as she puts it) ideal reader.  My point is that, 
where Gale sees the ideal reader’s apprehension of the ego-addressee interactions as an 
effective teaching tool, we can also detect a collusive relationship between satirist (Lu-
cretian ego) and audience (expert reader) against satirized target (addressee). 
182 Perhaps the reader has learned from the speaker’s dogged, near-“Socratic” instruction 
on the unboundedness of the universe—wherever “you” say the boundary is, “I’ll ask 
what finally happens with the spear” thrown outwards from that purported borderline 
(quaeram quid telo denique fiat, 1.981). 
183 5.247–248: illud in his rebus ne corripuisse rearis | me mihi, “in order that you not 
think I’ve snatched this point up for me in these matters,” the point in question being the 
mortality of earth and fire. 
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tary) interlocutor.184  He takes his reader to be a sharp critical thinker—at least after four 
books of scientific instruction!  In the same section on Aetna, the speaker puts the task of 
discovery on the reader (6.647–654),185 and in so doing makes clear the shared, even col-
lusive nature of this Epicurean enterprise. 
In satire, collusion of this sort enables the reader to laugh with the satirist at the 
people who do not pick up on the satiric comedy.  DRN gives us an explicit glimpse of 
this “out”-group, during the invective against Heraclitus (see also p. 76, above): 
omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque 
inuersis quae sub uerbis latitantia cernunt, 
ueraque constituunt quae belle tangere possunt 
auris et lepido quae sunt fucata sonore. 
       (DRN 1.641–644) 
 
’Cause dullards more marvel at and just adore things they see hid-
ing beneath topsy-turvy terms, and they establish to be true things 
that can touch their ears prettily and that have been painted with 
charming sound. 
 
“[H]ere sounds the poet’s pride which looks down upon the learned,” says Houghton 
[1912: xxiv].  Heraclitus and his followers are stolidi.  They are the “don’t get it” crowd.  
                                                
184 6.673: at nimis est ingens incendi turbidus ardor, “but the stormy blaze of the fire is 
too gigantic!”  On the contents of this objection, see Bollack [1978: 336–337] and Furley 
[1982: 38], contra. 
It is not immediately clear who exactly the speaker of this objection, or of other 
objections raised by an interlocutor at 1.803, 1.897, and 3.356, is.  Merrill [1907: ad 
1.897] rejects an identification with Memmius; Leonard & Smith [1942: ad 1.803 and 
1.897] suggest a student of the philosophers under attack in those lines; Bailey [1947: 
739] refers to “the imaginary objector”; Lenaghan [1967: 232] says “probably…the stu-
dent”; Townend claims that “the presence of an actual participant in the argument is in-
tended to be kept in mind” [1978: 272]; and Solomon calls the objector “the uninitiate” 
[2004: 275 n. 42] who “is in need of constant distraction to resist slipping back into his 
old ways” [2004: 268].  Cf. p. 47 and p. 104, above. 
185 Cf. Clay [1983: 225], Gale [2005: 178], and the speaker’s promise, at the beginning of 
DRN, that readers themselves will “be able to recognize the rest” (possis cognoscere cet-
era tute, 1.403). 
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The ideal reader—the term, from Iser [1978: 30], refers to a hypothetical reader who is 
like an exact copy of the author, a useful construct for puzzling out difficult texts186—has, 
by this point in the poem, adopted the principle that the universe consists of atoms and 
void, and will now side with the speaker against the faulty ideas of “those who have de-
cided that the matter of the universe is fire” (qui materiem rerum esse putarunt | ignem, 
1.635–636).  We see the “don’t get it” stolidi again at 1.1068 (in a fragmentary passage, 
unfortunately) and once more in the formulation “certain people who are ignorant of mat-
ter” (quidam…ignari materiai, 2.167), this time in regards to the belief that gods created 
the world for humankind. 
Lurking in these passages is the issue of the Stoics: whether DRN ignores or en-
gages them (as I mentioned in the introduction, pp. 12–15, above).  I proffer here a read-
ing of the matter that can stand even with the scholarly debate in a state of aporia.  I see 
our difficulty pinning the speaker down on the presence or absence of the Stoics in his 
invectives not just as a question about DRN’s grasp of intellectual history but also as a 
testament to the ultimate elusiveness of the speaker’s voice, akin to the satirist’s elusive-
ness, which is tied up with the collusive rapport that a satiric speaker forms with his audi-
ence.  So Mitsis: “[i]n winking with the poet behind the back of the fool, we ourselves 
may be swallowing more of the poet’s medicine than we suspect” [1993: 128].  In DRN 
as in other Graeco-Roman satiric poetry, the reader becomes part of the “in” or “get it” 
crowd, mocking the “doesn’t get it” target (or, in DRN, addressee)—but this “becoming” 
                                                
186 The concept of the ideal reader is applied to Petronius Satyricon by Slater [1990] (and 
cf. Conte [1996] as well).  Alternatively the reader here could be the “competent reader” 
of Culler [1980].  Cf. p. 126 n. 176, above. 
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is a manipulation of the reader by the speaker, and it implicates the reader in the 
speaker’s satiric/didactic program. 
 
 
Summary: DRN’s ego as satirist 
 
We have seen that the speaker of DRN takes up the pose or trappings of the sati-
rist on many occasions.  A major tool that he employs is comic reductio ad absurdum, 
while his verses are peppered with comedic words and the rare comedic scene.  He is a 
character with a personalized voice, exploiting both the communal “we” statements about 
the global experiences of humankind and the speaker’s discipular connection to Epicurus.  
This Lucretian persona preeningly and self-righteously claims the high ground on intel-
lectual, moral, and even poetic levels.  He makes disingenuous claims of abjection, per-
haps most notably a sort of linguistic abjection.  His mockery and blame consists mainly 
of the revelation of others’ hypocrisy and folly, both intellectual and moral.  He expresses 
(sometimes intense) indignation at flaws and faults of the mind, based on misjudgment of 
the senses or moral failings—whether the failing is a wish to be a respected storyteller (as 
with the ear-greedy humans at 5.594) or the sacrifice of your own daughter.  This indig-
nation is perhaps even an originating motive for the poem itself.187  Finally, the ego sets 
up a collusive connection between himself and the reader: he constructs the addressee 
                                                
187 Kenney [1971: 19]: “it was precisely Lucretius’ indignatio of what he had read and of 
what he saw and heard around him that motivated the writing of the D.R.N. in the first 
place.”  Or in other words, “the indignatio makes the poetry” (facit indignatio uersum, 
Juvenal 1.79)! 
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(“Memmius”) as the out-group and pulls the reader towards himself in order to form the 
in-group that laughs at the satiric verses and at the addressee, who does not get the joke.  
Memmius himself, furthermore, is satirized. 
So we can, with confidence, say that DRN’s persona frequently acts as a satirist, 
as a speaker in the mode of satire.  But what about my claim that some satirists do in fact 
try to achieve the improved world that they claim as the object of their indignant cri-
tiques?  Does DRN’s satiric poetry include such expectation of positive change?  Abso-
lutely.  The Lucretian ego does try to make the world better.188  He does make a positive 
suggestion on love.189  He does believe that it is even possible to overcome the darker 
parts of human nature: 
illud in his rebus uideo firmare potesse, 
usque adeo naturarum uestigia linqui 
paruola quae nequeat ratio depellere nobis, 
ut nil inpediat dignam dis degere uitam. 
       (DRN 2.319–322) 
 
This at least I see that I can assure you about in the midst of all 
these matters: so tiny are the tracks left by our natures, the kinds of 
tracks that reasoning can push away from us, that as a result it’s 
not at all a hassle to live a life fit for gods. 
 
The speaker not only envisions a utopian life here on earth, but also guarantees our capa-
bility of realizing such a utopia.  Inborn flaws can be conquered by ratio, specifically the 
ratio that the speaker himself wishes to divulge. 
                                                
188 Cf. Fowler [1989: 149]: “He is concerned with the state of Rome, but the solution is a 
personal one: everyone should become an Epicurean.” 
189 DRN 4.1191: “give in a little to human nature,” humanis concedere rebus.  On this 
line, see, among others, Nussbaum [2009/1994: ch. 5], Hall [2000: 227–239], and Brown 
[1987: ad loc.]. 
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The speaker not only is a part-time satirist, but also puts onstage for the reader a 
virtual parade of satirists.  There are the lovers who mock each other at 4.1157–1158, the 
self-directed satiric rant about the addressee’s own fear of death at 3.1026–1052, the sat-
ire-like scouring of faults by Epicurus at 6.9–41.  Now, the first two of the mini-parade 
are both failed satirists: the latter is explicitly criticizing himself and the former are un-
dercutting themselves by attacking their matching counterparts.  Epicurus is wildly suc-
cessful, but does not play a true satirist (he is not, and does not claim to be, abject; he 
does not engage in comic mockery; he does not even speak directly to the addressee).  
There is one guest satirist in DRN who I will argue is successful, however.  
 
 
Epilogue: Natura Rerum as satirist 
 
The speaker of DRN acts as a satirist at times, particularly in his rejection of in-
correct philosophies and of anxieties based on false beliefs about love and death.  DRN 
has a second speaker, though, one given voice by the Lucretian ego towards the end of 
book 3 (lines 931–949, 955–962).  This speaker is the Nature of Things herself, the 
Natura Rerum.  In a soliloquy that the Lucretian persona has the reader imagine—an in-
novative one that does not have clear parallels in other Epicurean texts190—she takes the 
addressee to task for fearing death.191  And Natura Rerum is, I argue, a satirist.192 
                                                
190 Cf. Reinhardt [2002: 294]: “connections with extant Epicurean texts are comparatively 
loose.” 
191 This passage merits more attention than it has received in Lucretian studies, as Rein-
hardt points out, calling it “a conspicuous climax” in the poem [2002: 294].  See Stork 
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Personalized voice?  Check.  Though the passage is brief and Natura Rerum’s at-
tention is focused primarily on her addressee, she does make it somewhat personal.  “Fur-
thermore, there’s nothing that I could devise or discover that could please you,” tibi 
praeterea quod machiner inueniamque, | quod placeat, nil est (3.944–945).  Inasmuch as 
she is the constitutor of the universe in which humans exist, Natura Rerum was already 
implicitly involved in the human problem she critiques; in these two lines, she inserts 
herself into the situation explicitly. 
Comic mockery and blame?  Check.  Natura Rerum castigates the addressee with 
salvos like “you gratify yourself too much with sickly sorrows” (nimis aegris | luctibus 
indulges, 933–934) and “why are you looking to give yourself more trouble?” (cur am-
                                                
[1970] for connections to consolatory literature in this passage, Wallach [1976: 61–83] 
for connections to diatribe with Bion of Borysthenes Πενία (fr. 17 in Kindstrand [1976]), 
and cf. Rambaux [1980]. 
On the issue of DRN, Epicureanism, and the fear of death, see, among others, Fish 
[1998], Warren [2004: ch. 1], and Morrison [forthcoming]; and on Natura Rerum and ka-
tabasis in DRN book 3, see Reinhardt [2004]. 
192 Pace Waltz [1949: 97]: “La satire, ici, confine au drame; et c’est ce ton dramatique qui 
fait, dans le développement où elle s’insère, sa force démonstrative.”  Wallach, by con-
trast, argues that the passage is, like the rest of the attack on the fear of death in book 3, 
heavily indebted to diatribe [1976: 61–77, cf. Oltramare 1926: 111–112], and that the 
passage may even be a translation of Bion’s Penia [1976: 63, 65]. 
Reinhardt undertakes a straight philosophical reading of Natura Rerum’s tirade, 
and argues that “the speech is meant to coerce the reader into an attitude about 
death…similar to that of the Epicurean sage, thus compensating for the fact that Lucretius 
cannot in his arguments rely on the reader’s having already accepted the Epicurean the-
ory of pleasure” [2002: 302].  This analysis is not inconsistent with my reading of these 
lines, since coercive argumentation is part and parcel of the satiric voice of DRN’s speak-
ers (cf. p. 125, above, and my consideration of Natura Rerum’s collusiveness directly be-
low).  The interpretation I offer here does, however, provide a fuller explanation for 
DRN’s inclusion of this passage than Reinhardt’s ultimate suggestion that DRN draws on 
diatribe here because it needed “an alternative method of inducing something like unper-
turbedness of the soul” because the poem does not explicitly expound the Epicurean the-
ory of pleasure [2002: 304]. 
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plius addere quaeris?, 940).  Her language is colloquial.193  She portrays the target of her 
mockery as never satisfied—“you always desire what you don’t have, you disdain what 
you do” (semper aues quod abest, praesentia temnis, 957)—in a satiric fashion similar to 
the satirist’s criticisms at the opening of Horace Serm. 1.1.194  And she humorously de-
means the target: “get them tears outta here, you great chasm, and quit your whining!” 
(aufer abhinc lacrimas, baratre, et compesce querellas!, 954195).  Barathrum (whence 
DRN’s baratre) is, I note, a word with comic connotations, and it appears as such in both 
Plautus and Horace;196 and Natura Rerum employs comic language elsewhere, as well.197 
                                                
193 Cf. Reinhardt [2002: 299]: “the context obviously is colloquial.” 
194 qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem 
seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa 
contentus uiuat, laudet diuersa sequentis? 
     (Serm. 1.1.1–3) 
 
How is it, Maecenas, that nobody lives satisfied with his lot in life, 
whether reason gave it to ’im or chance threw it at ’im, and instead he 
praises the different things that the next guy has? 
On this satiric/diatribal trope of μεμψιμοιρία, see, e.g., Keane [2007: 49–50] and, 
on the theme in DRN, Wallach [1976: 69–71, 73, 99]. 
195 Line 955 in the renumbering of Rouse & Smith [1975]. 
196 In Plautus’ Curculio, the seruus Palinurus tells the young lover Phaedromus to hasten 
his quasi-ritual offering of wine to the drunkard ancilla Leaena: “quick, pour [it] into this 
great pit here, hurry up and wash the gutter clean” (effunde hoc cito in barathrum, prop-
ere | prolue cloacam, 123–124).  Horace’s ego calls a greedy person a barathrum macelli, 
a “great grocer’s chasm” (Epist. 1.5.31).  Martial, too, uses the term comically: “a belch 
comes back up from the farthest-off chasm” of a digusting glutton (extremo ructus…redit 
a barathro, 1.87.4) and the speaker elsewhere incredulously asks “what d’you, Baeticus 
the Castrated, got to do with a woman’s chasm?” (quid cum femineo tibi, Baetice galle, 
barathro?, 3.81.1). 
Kenney discusses some difficulties with the word baratre in DRN [1971: 216–217 
ad 3.955]; cf. Wallach [1976: 54, 71, 75, 95].  Compare also Natura Rerum’s use of stulte 
(3.939), with Wallach [1976: 66]. 
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Justified indignation?  Check.  She uses four rhetorical questions (DRN 3.931–
943) in her first speech alone, a rhetorical stance echoed by the Lucretian ego (950–
951198) immediately after her speech ends.  We see her being both indignant and, again, 
funny at line 954.  And the ego tells us that she is justified, waging a “just lawsuit” 
(iustem litem, 950), advocating a “true cause” (ueram causam, 951), and speaking 
“rightly, rightly!” (iure, iure, 963).199  The satiric trope of abjection is present, as well, 
though here it is pushed onto the addressee, the target of the satiric attack, who weeps and 
wails (“you bemoan and bewail death,” mortem congemis ac fles, 934), wastes away un-
fulfilled (“having used up all life’s rewards, you wither,” omnia perfunctus uitai praemia 
marces, 956), and dies unhappy (“your life has slipped by incomplete and unsatisfying,” 
inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque uita, 958).  The ego outright calls the victim of the 
second speech pathetic (miser, one of our watchwords, line 954).200 
Collusion?  Check.  As with the Lucretian persona, we see with Natura Rerum 
harsh treatment of the addressee (the insulting vocatives stulte at 939 and baratre at 954) 
                                                
197 Cf. Kenney [1971: 212–213 ad 3.932 and 933].  Furthermore, the Lucretian ego’s in-
troduction of Natura Rerum uses the Latin word increpet (3.932), as Reinhardt points 
out: “[h]er tone is described as strident” [2002: 296]. 
198 In the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975], 950–951 designates line 955 (transposed) 
followed by line 952. 
199 Reinhardt remarks that 3.931–977 is “stylized like a trial” and begins “a virtual 
κατάβασις being undertaken by the reader” through the end of the book: “to use the mo-
tif of a κατάβασις in a passage arguing against the existence of the underworld would of 
course be just another example of a typically Lucretian strategy” [2002: 300 n. 29].  A 
strategy, I add, that heightens the speaker (in this case, Natura Rerum)’s ambiguity—and 
so also a satirist’s strategy. 
200 On the attack against the old man in Natura Rerum’s second speech, see Reinhardt 
[2002: 300 n. 26]: DRN “has not just taken over the traditional ‘butt’ known from diatri-
bal literature, but has turned this butt into a quite sophisticated construct.” 
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that pushes the reader to identify not with the fool but with the satiric speaker.  There is, 
as well, the same kind of implication of the reader in the argumentation process (the im-
perative concede paired with the coercive formulation necessest, 962).201  The Lucretian 
ego, following up on Natura Rerum’s invective, even puts self-criticism into the ad-
dressee’s mouth (1024–1052, cf. p. 112, above)—he makes the addressee into an agent of 
his own (failed) satire.  In addition, certain stylistic traits shared between Natura Rerum 
and DRN’s main speaker may suggest further an affiliation of the two as satiric speak-
ers—she, like the ego, uses the imagery of the flawed uas (936–937) that crops up in 
DRN both before and after her speeches.202  Moreover, her metaphor of “the dinner-guest 
full of life” (plenus uitae conuiua, 938 cf. 960)—notable both for its (potentially generi-
cally significant) use of the term satur at 960 and for its connection to Horace’s conuiua 
satur at Serm. 1.1.119—reoccurs in the ego’s voice at 1004, where it is augmented with a 
kind of symposiastic carpe diem lament.203 
So Natura Rerum of DRN 3 fits our model of the “modal” satirist.204  Brought on 
to criticize the moral and intellectual faultiness of the fear of death, she uses a personal 
                                                
201 Cf. Wallach [1967: 66]: “Natura…is not merely castigating the ‘stupid man’ for his 
ridiculous opinions, but she is also urging him to accept death without weeping or com-
plaining, an approach which mitigates the negativism of pure polemic.” 
202 3.793, 3.1003–1010, 6.20–21; cf. 3.440–444, 6.233.  See p. 120, above. 
203 Cf. p. 106, above.  I return to the image of the conuiua in chapter 5 (pp. 269–271, be-
low). 
204 And thus Natura Rerum does not fit well into the three main roles for women that 
Nugent identifies in DRN: “the generative and the (repulsive) erotic body, both of which 
can be finally reduced to a bad smell” [1994: 196], as well as “non-creator/non-producer, 
in the cultural realm” [1994: 201].  Though the role of interpolated satirist is not neces-
sarily the most exalted role in the text, it is nevertheless a role of some importance, and 
aligned with the poem’s authorial voice.  Nugent does not discuss Natura Rerum in her 
article. 
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voice, comic mockery, justified indignation, and collusion with the reader to chastise her 
target, the addressee.  Aligned with DRN’s main speaker, she is comparable to the guest-
satirists of Juvenal (Laronia in poem 2,205 Umbricius in 3, and Naevolus in 9206)—satiric 
personas featured by the primary speaker to deliver a specific satiric sermon—more than 
to simple inset satirist-characters like Odysseus in Iliad 2 and Odyssey 9.  We can also 
adduce the opening of Juvenal poem 1, which Freudenburg calls the complaint “of satire 
herself” [2001: 212], and the competing figures of Tragedy and Elegy in Ovid Amores 
3.1.207 
The difference, though, is that Natura Rerum is arguably a persona of high stat-
ure,208 whereas Laronia and Naevolus are both essentially prostitutes, and Umbricius is a 
disenfranchised and disgruntled (and perhaps bigoted and idiotic) émigré from Rome 
who laments about getting beaten up in the streets and the drudgeries of the poverty-
stricken urban lifestyle.209  Thus while these other figures serve to debase the tone of the 
                                                
205 For the affiliation of Laronia with the Juvenal-ego, see Wiesen [1989: 722] and Nappa 
[1998: 97–98].  The ego explicitly endorses Laronia by describing her as “singing true 
and evident things” (uera ac manifesta canentem, 2.64), cf. Nappa [1998: 101].  Cf. 
Henderson [1989: 118]: “Best to see ‘Laronia’ as marking another absence of women?” 
206 According to Rosen, the Juvenal-ego “embrace[s] the character of Naevolus wholesale 
as a kind of ironized poetic alter-ego” [2007: 225, emphasis preserved], again pace 
Braund [1988] and others. 
207 On Amores 3.1, see Thomas [1978], Cahoon [1985], Hinds [1987b: 11], Wyke [1990], 
Keith [1994], Myers [1996: 21], and Perkins [2011]. 
208 Though perhaps we could find some degree of abject status in Natura Rerum’s place 
in the poem’s gender matrix.  As Nugent shows, “in Lucretius’ text, woman is indeed 
represented as close to nature, figured primarily as a maternal generative body” [1994: 
204], and as the poem progresses nature becomes increasingly associated with disgust 
and destruction, cf. Anderson [1960: 5–11, 19–20] and Clay [1983: 87–95, 226–234]. 
209 Larmour remarks that “Umbricius is at the very least another example of the mutilated 
Roman male” [2005: 164]. 
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poems in which they appear, and to take the Juvenal-ego down with them,210 Natura Re-
rum adds a sense of greater authority to what the Lucretian persona has been trying to say 
in the conclusion to book 3.211  With the voice of the universe on his side, with the en-
dorsement of Nature herself—artful/clever Nature! (Natura daedala rerum, 5.234)—the 
Lucretian ego carries more weight and can argue more persuasively against the fears of 
fools desperately clinging to mortal life. 
                                                
210 For Laronia, see Nappa [1998: 100]: 
Laronia’s very presence is an indication of baseness, and in this Satire, 
those being attacked tend to fall to the worst moral level mentioned along-
side them.…Juvenal cannot take the moral high ground here; those who 
profess to do so are under attack in this poem, and the poet must attack 
them without participating in the thing he denounces. 
Cf. Henderson [1999b: 196]: “it is Roman culture that speaks through Laronia…And 
‘Woman’ only appears to be granted a (strong and authoritative) voice so that you can 
know this is a joke-text.”  See also Romano [1979: 82–83], Braund & Cloud [1981: 203–
208], Anderson [1982: 209–221], Winkler [1983: 90–107], Konstan [1993], and espe-
cially  Braund [1995]. 
For Naevolus, see Rosen [2007: 225], who focuses on the identification of 
Naevolus with the Juvenal-ego: “the Juvenalian satirist…must at some level become what 
he attacks, and…this form of satire demands that he invariably play the role of an abject, 
disempowered underdog.”  Also Bellandi [1974], Braund [1988: 170], and Habinek 
[2005: 186]. 
Moodie [2012] advances an argument that the bully of Juvenal 3.278–301 should 
be considered a satirist—another comparandum for Lucretius’ Natura Rerum. 
211 Cf. Kenney [1971: 212]: 
Epicurus had personified Nature even if he did not put words into her 
mouth.…The hectoring tone and alliterative vehemence of Nature’s ha-
rangue are characteristic of the diatribe style.  But L. has far transcended 
his sources.  His Nature is no mere anthropomorphic poetical figment: she 
exists in her own right, as representing the immutable and inexorable laws 
of the universe that form the subject of the poem.…[I]t is not the argu-
ments deployed by the poet, nor even the authority of Epicurus, but the 
very Sum of Things that stands there to convict the fool of his folly. 
We could also, with Rouse & Smith, see the use of Natura Rerum as a way by which the 








“[I]t was, it seems, Lucretius who first harnessed the power of satire 
and applied it to the systematic exposure of error, folly, and superstition.” 




Having studied the role of the satiric speaker in DRN, we can now turn our atten-
tion to a smaller set of characteristics subsidiary to the mode of satire.  Parody and irony, 
ambivalence and ambiguity figure large in satiric works—and we will find ample evi-
dence of these features in DRN, as well.  One of the most important features of satire, be-
yond the persona and voice of the satirist-figure himself, is didacticism.  Satiric poetry 
regularly evinces instructive intent.  As I will discuss, one possible consequence is a fric-






Irony and other features of satire 
 
The preceding chapter has discussed what makes a speaker a satirist.  Now: what, 
besides the presence of a satirist-figure, makes satire satire?  According to Kuiper’s phe-
nomenological theory of the mode (not of ancient satire specifically), “the real essence of 
satire lies neither in its form nor its function but rather in the way both these are per-
ceived” [1985: 171; cf. Kuiper 1984].  In other words, Kuiper endeavors to define satire 
through a description of the common, universal elements that it appears to hold across 
time and genre.  On this perceptual basis, Kuiper ascribes to satire “three major character-
istics”: an object, an antecedent, and humor, to which we will add a fourth, ambiguity.1 
 
1. Object: prior offenses of the satiric target 
First, according to Kuiper, a satire must have an object, namely a “state of affairs” 
about which the satire’s “inferred creator” (i.e., the satirist) attempts to change the per-
ceiver’s opinion [1985: 172–173].  This state of affairs can be a vice, a particular human 
target, an event, and so forth.  What is important here is the satirist’s construction of a 
state of affairs that occurs or develops prior to satire’s “poetic plot”—prior to the incep-
tion of the satire proper.2  This satiric timeline furthermore provides moral justification 
for the satirist, who through the plot is cast not as initiator of aggression or blame but as 
righteous responder to some originary offense or shortcoming: “typically in satire, the 
                                                
1 Rudd views Roman satire in particular as a triangle composed of three “apices,” namely 
attack, entertainment, and preaching [1986: 1].  Cf. also Griffin [1994: 99–101]. 
2 For more on poetic plots, see Fowler [2000a] and Volk [2010: 127–128]. 
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audience enters into the narrative well after the target’s alleged misbehavior, with the re-
sult that the poem seems to be the one initiating the psogos.”3  By portraying the satirist 
as provoked by the target’s unjust action or mindset or state of being, the satiric plot af-
firms his own righteousness and grants him the moral high ground over his victim. 
This primordial and problematized state of affairs also implies a motivation 
within satire for change and improvement.  Indeed, a “common feature of satire…is ulti-
mate desire (however disingenuous and/or tacit) for tranquility, harmony, and peace.”4  
The prior state of affairs—the object of satire—constitutes a life out of joint, a disordered 
society, an individual more consonant with the real world’s dystopia than with the sati-
rist’s utopia.  The act of satire, therefore, supposes to address the problem, to set things 
aright.  In this respect, as I will soon relate in more detail, satire shares a common thread 
with didaxis. 
 
2. Formal antecedent: prior model for satiric discourse 
Second, a satire must have a model.  In Kuiper’s schema, “all satires have formal 
antecedents”—for instance, “the Dunciad could not be a satire without classical epic” 
[1985: 173].  This model, I would add, need not be an object of parody within the satire 
(though often there is at least some degree of formal parody).  The antecedent could be, 
for example, one purely of genre (as Hipponax is for Callimachus’ Iamboi or Lucilius for 
Horace, Persius, and Juvenal), of discourse (as courtroom altercations, linguistics, and 
                                                
3 Rosen [2007: 89].  Emphases preserved.  Psogos (ψόγος) is Rosen’s preferred term for 
satiric blame.  Fowler, I would point out, places DRN 2.24–28 as “part of a long tradition 
of the philosophic ψόγος” [2002: 96 ad loc.]. 
4 Rosen [2007: 179]. 
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other elite entertainments to Lucilius5), or even of medium (e.g., dramatic dialogue in 
Serm. 2.7).  Or the antecedent could be a hybrid, a subject of parody and generic prede-
cessor but not the target itself of the satire.6  At its most basic, in other words, satire is a 
derivative product.  It is built on the foundations of form (antecedent) and content (object 
of satiric critique), and its relationship to its antecedent is a prime way of establishing that 
it is, in fact, satire.  We might almost say that the mode of satire is parasitic (parasatiric?), 
feeding its stylistic or culpatory content from its antecedent(s).7 
 
3. Humor: parody and irony 
Third, says Kuiper, satire must be humorous [1985: 173].  Humor is the most ob-
vious element of satire,8 and we have already assessed how the satirist is a comic figure.  
Besides the speaker’s comedy, I mention two other important aspects of satiric humor: 
the parody frequently attached to satire’s antecedent, and irony.  Irony is “surely satire’s 
most conspicuous hallmark.”9  Irony in, say, Persius poem 4 (a dialogue between Socra-
tes and Alcibiades) lightens the poem’s didactic drive, as Dessen has shown: “Socrates is 
                                                
5 Cf. Gruen, who looks at Lucilius’ satires as a response to the development and excesses 
of Roman aristocratic identity during the Republic [1992: ch. 7]. 
6 E.g., Weird Al Yankovic’s “Syndicated Inc.,” a musical parody of “Misery” by the 
group Soul Asylum, but moreover a satire of American television culture. 
7 Or perhaps, to be more generous, symbiotic: for satire can well enrich and enliven a 
genre, discourse, or medium that it satirizes (read: in which it intervenes). 
8 Cf. Simpson [2003: 1–7]. 
9 Rosen [2007: 267]. Cf. also Test [1991: ch. 9]; and Simpson [2003: 113–124] on parody 
and irony as “theoretical preliminaries” for a practicum of satire.  Connery and Combe 
point out that “in the area of late modern and postmodern works…irony and, increas-
ingly, parody are crucial characteristics” [1995b: 9]. 
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primarily a critic whose most effective weapon is irony.…[I]t serves to relieve the didac-
tic tone of the Satire.”10  Irony indeed is a way for the audience to show its collusive 
alignment with the satiric speaker, by “getting” that the speaker’s statements are ironic 
and finding amusement in that irony. 
Parody, whose origins derive from Greek literature, is an essential element of sat-
ire.11  Aristophanes, for instance, employs parody repeatedly as a central tool in his 
plays.12  Roman literature too is full of examples of satiric parody.  Examples: Lucilius 
book 1 parodies Ennius Annales book 1, Horace Serm. 2.5 parodies Homer Odyssey 11, 
and Ovid Metamorphoses 13–14 parodies Vergil’s Aeneid.  The poems Culex and More-
                                                
10 Dessen [1968: 62], and compare also [1968: 29]: “[t]he facetious wit of Persius’ per-
sona succeeds in tempering his arrogance.”  On the tension between comic and didactic 
urges in satire, see pp. 162–174, below. 
11 Cf., for instance, Homeric parody in the Batrachomyomachia, cf. Wölke [1978]; Schi-
bli [1983], who publishes fragments of another parody (The Battle of the Mice and the 
Weasels); Olson & Sens [1999]; Sens [2006]; Kelly [2009]; and Acosta-Hughes et al. 
[2011].  Aristotle refers to a certain Hegemon of Thasos as “the first parodist,” <ὁ> τὰς 
παρῳδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος (Poetics 1448a), while Atheneaeus  relates that Polemon 
called Hipponax the inventor of parody (698b–c), cf. Hipponax fr. 126 and Rosen [2007: 
155 n. 71].  On ancient parody in general, see Rose [1993]; on parody and iambic verse, 
Scodel [2010].  Määtä [2004], in a reassessment and modification of the analysis by Bry-
ant [1998] of Terry Pratchett’s satiric fantasy novels, evaluates and problematizes theo-
retical work on parody and its interaction with the mode of satire by Hutcheon [1985], 
Rose [1993], Dentith [2000: 192–194] and Hoesterey [2001: 13–14]. 
12 On parody and paratragedy in Aristophanic comedy, see, e.g., Rau [1967], Goldhill 
[1991: ch. 3] (though see, contra, Olson [1991], a highly acerbic review), Silk [1993], 
and Sidwell [2009: ch. 3 and p. 53].  Compare Arnott [1972] on parody in Euripides Cy-
clops.  Simpson includes Aristophanes in the category of “Graeco-Roman satirists” 
[2003: 49]; on Aristophanes and satire, see Halliwell [1984] and Sommerstein [2004].  
Parody and paratragedy are important as well to Menandrian New Comedy and the Ro-
man comedy that adapts it: see, among others, Fraenkel [2007/1922: 50, 70, 104, 11, 
254], Duckworth [1952: 103 n. 12, 146, 301, and elsewhere], Sheets [1983], Phillips 
[1984–1985], Manuwald [1999], and Scafoglio [2005]. 
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tum, in the Appendix Vergiliana, are also arguably works of parody,13 while Ars Poetica 
may itself be a parody of literary criticism, and in Petronius’ Satyrica the protagonist 
Eumolpus recites a poem on civil war (119–124) that may be serious or parody.14  Ac-
cording to Wallach, parody is a “diatribal trait” [1976: 36]; parody is natural as well for 
the Roman genre of satire.15  Satirists even parody other satirists: Juvenal poem 5, for in-
stance, ends with a parody of Lucilian satire, according to Freudenburg [2001: 274–277]. 
Fundamental to Rosen’s account of satiric humor is the idea that it derives from 
the observer’s safety from harm—that is, from the satirist’s formulation of a subject-
space in which the audience feels itself insulated from the satiric act.  “[H]umor arises 
precisely from the artificiality of the context and a consciousness that, however aggres-
sive or transgressive a mimetic act may be, the participants and bystanders remain safe 
from physical or emotional harm” [2007: 56].  Satire, his argument goes, is mimetic, at 
least one degree removed from reality.16  Thus it takes place in an artificial, constructed 
                                                
13 Cf. Ross [1975].  On Roman parody in general, see, e.g., Courtney [1962] and Cèbe 
[1966]. 
14 Ars Poetica: so Frischer [1991], though his proposition has been received with varying 
degrees of skepticism by, among others, Sacks [1992], Keyser [1992], O’Hara [1992], 
and Johnson [1993]; Harrison [2008] proposes that Ars Poetica, along with Epist. 2.1–2, 
may in fact have been a third book of Sermones.  Satyrica: cf. Baldwin [1911: 13–22, 71–
88], Zeitlin [1971], and Slater [1990: 18]: Satyrica “parodies an astonishingly wide range 
of other literature.”  On Petronius’ poems, see Connors [1998], Rimell [2002], and Se-
taioli [2011]. 
15 So Barchiesi & Cucchiarelli [2005: 208]: “Because it does not present itself as a fixed 
and separate literary form…satire enjoys ample freedom of movement.  It can mimic the 
text it stands alongside, or parody it.” 
16 Cf. Rosen [2007: 22]: “I assume that ‘poetry’ implies ‘fictionality.’ ”  So also, on the 
mode of satire, Matz [2010: ix]: “satire must also be realistic, for it must persuade us that 
our failings are so entrenched in everyday life…that they need no embellishment or fan-
tasy when transmuted to fiction”; and on Roman satire specifically, Barchiesi & Cuc-
chiarelli [2005: 208], Keane [2006: 3 and 8], Gardner [2009: 9], and Cloud [1989: 53–
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environment unlike the environment of the basis for satire’s mimesis, namely real-world 
mockery with its non-literary, non-satiric aggression.  With the risk of physical or social 
retaliation removed, the audience can collude with the satiric speaker in deriding the tar-
get of his mockery and blame. 
 
4. Ambiguity 
The complications that can follow along with satiric humor and the artificiality of 
satire’s context together touch on another elemental characteristic of the mode of satire: 
ambiguity.  Thus Thomson writes, “ambiguity and ambivalence have always been part of 
satire, as they have always been at the heart of parody and irony, satire’s close relations” 
[1985: 112].  Irony’s presence is notoriously difficult to confirm or discount, and this 
very difficulty is essential to irony’s ability to generate humor.  Parody, likewise, can be 
ambiguous.  A parody may constitute an insult of the source material—or homage to it. 
Take the case of Weird Al Yankovic’s 2011 song “Perform This Way,” a parody of 
singer Lady Gaga’s “Born This Way” (also 2011).  The artist herself views the parody as 
an act of respect and recognition for her status as a musician—a “rite of passage” that is 
“empowering,” according to Hiatt [2011]—while her manager, who initially refused to 
grant Lady Gaga’s blessing to Yankovic’s endeavor, evidently considered the parody an 
insult.17 
                                                
54]: “Roman satirists, like their modern successors, are out to entertain.…The joke’s the 
thing, not actuality.”  In contrast, some theorists of satire of all periods, like Snyder 
[1991: 215 ad ch. 4 n. 1], arguing contra Guilhamet [1987], reject the notion that satire is 
mimetic and rhetorical; Knight, likewise, keeps satire distinct from mimesis [2004: 38–
47].  On satire and “anti-mimetic aversion,” see Bogel [2001: 52]. 
17 Yankovic [2011a, 2011b]. 
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Altogether, satire itself can be hard for the observer to pin down with any convic-
tion: in Kuiper’s words, “it should be possible to be uncertain whether a particular in-
stance…is satire or not” [1985: 177].  Satire’s ambiguity is what makes the satirist elu-
sive, what leads to the formation of a divided audience.  The irony, parody, and ambiva-
lence of satire allow readers to assume that there are people who get the joke and people 
who do not; to assign themselves to the “get it” in-group; and to laugh at the out-group.  
And to criticize the out-group, as Rosen suggests: “[w]hen someone comes along who 
wants to censor a satirist they are often accused by the satirist’s fans and devotees of fail-
ing to understand what is really going on with such performances, failing to appreciate 
what we have come to call a poetics of satire” [2007: 247].  Censors and critics misun-
derstand satire.  Rachel Maddow, as we saw in chapter 2 (p. 59, above), took the Christ-
wire parody/satire website seriously; Casaubon mocked Isidorus for misunderstanding 
Roman satire; readers and interpreters of (for instance) Jonathan Swift, the Persian poet 
Hafiz, and the 16th-century French author Philibert de Vienne have mistakenly offered 
straightforward assessments of satiric passages in their authors; and the television and 
film satires by Sacha Baron Cohen, from Da Ali G Show to Borat and Bruno, are predi-




                                                
18  Maddow: p. 59, above.  Casaubon: “Good ol’ Isidorus has been drinking from the 
dregs as usual,” e faece haurit Isidorus bonus, ut saepe [1605/1973: 279].  Swift: so 
Louis [1981].  Hafiz: so Chenari [2005].  de Vienne: so Javitch [1971].  Cohen: Adelman 
[2007], Freedman [2009: 57, 164–165]. 
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DRN’s satiric traits 
 
Our poem is certainly not a poem of satire exclusively, but, as I will now show, it 
engages with elements of the mode repeatedly and systematically.  Sellar, one of the first 
scholars to remark on satirical traits of the poem, saw in DRN “the searching insight of a 
great satirist,” and in its satire the objective “not to make men seem objects of ridicule or 
scorn, but to restore them to the dignity which they had forfeited through weakness and 
ignorance.”19  Perhaps Sellar here is falling into a potential trap similar to that of taking a 
satirist’s moral posturing too seriously, of treating the Lucretian ego too generously and 
excusing the import and impact of his vitriol.  But he touches on two important, some-
times countervailing tendencies of satire—the tendency towards ridicule and the drive to 
make the world a better place—that are operative not only in satire but also in DRN, as I 
will show.  Chapter 2 has described numerous instances of satiric style, tone, or diction in 
DRN.  This chapter treats representative examples relevant to the basic building blocks of 
satire, and afterwards considers a few other specific examples from DRN. 
 
1. Object 
We return to Kuiper’s major characteristics of satire, now with more details.  
First, satire has an object, a state of affairs to be satirized; the satirist enters the equation 
after the object’s alleged offense and ultimately wishes for social harmony.  The core 
elements of DRN’s satiric invectives—the fear of death, the passions, misguided philoso-
phies—are, we have seen, both recurrent across the work and persistent throughout the 
                                                
19 Sellar [1881: 372–373].  See, contra, Waltz [1949: passim]. 
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poem’s satiric plot, from pre-poem background to beyond poem’s end.  One satiric object 
in particular, though, could be construed as the initial anataractic offense that prompts the 
Lucretian speaker’s satiric response within the venue of DRN: religio. 
Itself based (in the eyes of DRN’s persona) on the seemingly omnipresent fear of 
death, religio is a more concrete derivation from the more abstract mortal fears, and it 
leads to finite, blameworthy action.  Religio was also, according to the speaker, the origi-
nal provocation for Epicurus’ inquiries into the nature of the universe (DRN 1.62–79).  
Waltz identifies book 1’s early, “unforgettable” passage on religio (1.62–101) with the 
start of the poem’s actual content and the start of its satire;20 he also asserts that the pas-
sage sets the tone for the entire poem—a tone of indignation, no less.21  The originary of-
fense is the existence and ills of religio, which thus is the object of DRN’s satire.  The 
equation of DRN’s satiric object with Epicurus’ own provocation both aligns the Lu-
cretian ego with Epicurus and, I would argue, grants him Epicurus’ intellectual and ethi-
cal authority.  The scelerosa atque impia facta that religio has committed (1.83) provide 
the ego with the moral justification that is required for his indignation to be satirically 
successful. 
                                                
20 Waltz [1949: 80]: “[l]e tempérament satirique de Lucrèce éclate dès le début de son 
poème.…[P]assés quelques vers qui annoncent le sujet du poème, l’entrée en matière, ex 
abrupto, est l’inoubliable et sinistre caricature de la Religion.” 
21 Waltz [1949: 81]: the verses “donnent la note fondamentale du poème.  C’est sur le ton 
de l’indignation, d’une indignation farouche et débordante, que commence le poème; et 
ce ton se mantiendra.”  The epigram tantum religio potuit suadere malorum! (DRN 
1.101) is followed, says Waltz, by irony most rash: “ce qui suit reste encore imprégné de 
la plus fiévreuse ironie” [ibidem].  At its conclusion, Waltz argues, the indignant tone 
yields (in the remainder of books 1 and 2) to gentler mockery of a polemical nature, in 
the refutation of the Presocratics and so forth: “à la diatribe initiale a succédé une douce 
et inoffensive moquerie.  Et à partir de là il n’y en a plus guère de traces dans les deux 
premier livres, sauf aux endroits où le théoricien cède de nouveau, incidemment, la place 
au polémiste.” [1949: 83]. 
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Religio is the initial (and recurrent22) object of DRN’s satire, then.  As we have 
seen, a satirist professes a desire for peace and tranquility, though he is possibly disin-
genuous in his profession.  The Lucretian speaker, similarly, asks Venus for peace in 
troubled times in his initial proem, a hymnic invocation whose interpretation is compli-
cated by its seeming inconsistency with the task of an Epicurean didactic poem and its 
seeming contradiction by the very Epicurean, almost atheistic lines (1.44–49) that, in the 
manuscript tradition at least, immediately follow the proem.23  The key point of the invo-
cation, as Volk highlights, is to enable the poet to write in peace, and his prayer for peace 
is evidently successful, since the poem has been written and we are reading it [2010: pas-
sim].  So we see, from the very beginning, the Lucretian ego seeking peace and tranquil-
ity, seeking an improvement in the social (or political) circumstances in which he begins 
his poetic production.  And, like a satirist, the Lucretian ego expresses such a wish in a 
complicated, potentially self-undercutting way. 
Let us return to Sellar’s claim for the ultimate goal of DRN’s satire—i.e., to re-
store humans to their proper dignity (p. 148, above).  This goal, combined with Sellar’s 
allusion to the speaker’s potentially scornful and derisive demeanor, encapsulates the 
presence in DRN of this basic satiric characteristic of a desire for peace and tranquility.  
                                                
22 It appears throughout the poem, particularly at 6.379–422 (so Houghton [1912: xxxix]) 
and near the end of book 5, cf. Minyard [1985: 49]: “The civil allusions draw out the 
point at the beginning of the satirical comment at 1194–1203, for Lucretius started from 
the ridicule of the specific forms of religio Romana.”  See also my discussion of DRN’s 
“civic satires” in chapter 5 (pp. 278–286, below). 
23 For important, sophisticated interpretations of DRN’s opening invocation of Venus, see 
Asmis [1982], Clay [1983: 82–110], Gale [1994a: 208–223; 2005: 185–188], Summers 
[1995], Sedley [1998: ch. 1], Farrell [2007: 87–88], O’Hara [2007: 57–64], and Garani 
[2007: 34–43]. 
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Recuperating human dignity is a therapeutic purpose,24 one that generates greater har-
mony and tranquility within humankind, but the techniques of satire that the Lucretian 
ego uses for this purpose are harsh enough to be able to undercut achievement of the goal 
itself. 
We can see this juxtaposition also at the beginning of book 2, where the well-
known and (I have suggested in chapter 2) satiric scene of watching from shore’s safety 
the struggles of a storm-racked ship (an allegory for the anxieties and troubles of ambi-
tion, greed, and the like) is followed immediately by a peaceful scene of a pleasant 
streamside picnic: 
gratius interdum neque natura ipsa requirit, 
........................................................................25 
cum tamen inter se prostrati in gramine molli 
propter aquae riuum sub ramis arboris altae 
non magnis opibus iucunde corpora currant, 
praesertim cum tempestas adridet et anni 
tempora conspergunt uiridantis floribus herbas. 
       (DRN 2.23, 29–33) 
 
And Nature herself doesn’t even ask now and again for something 
more gratifying…Just as long as people can lie down together in 
the soft grass beside a rivulet of water, beneath the branches of a 
tall tree, and can happily take care of their bodies (and not with 
great luxuries)—especially when the weather smiles down on them 
and the seasons of the year sprinkle the grasses with green-growing 
flowers. 
 
The epitome of tranquility and harmony—the picture of an ideal day in the Garden of 
Epicurus (or perhaps the Roman Garden of Lucretius!)—follows a satire on the folly of 
                                                
24 And therapy is central to Nussbaum’s account of our poem [2009/1994: chh. 5–7]. 
25 The intervening lines (2.24–28) consist of conditional clauses expressing the idea that it 
is not necessary to surround oneself with expensive luxuries. 
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ambition, and is itself interrupted by another satire, on luxury.26  Here, though, the attacks 
on the satiric object and the yearning for the satiric object’s peaceful resolution reinforce 
each other, as the pain of one and the pleasure of the other are heightened by their collo-
cation. 
 
2. Formal antecedent 
Satire also requires a formal antecedent, be it one of genre, medium, or discourse.  
I suggest that we can find in DRN at least one antecedent of each kind.  Genre: DRN par-
ticipates in the genre of Roman satura, as I demonstrate in chapters 4 and 5, and plays a 
part also in Roman epic.27  Medium: poetry generally and hexameter specifically.  DRN is 
novel as a work of expository philosophy written not in prose but in verse, while the use 
of the hexameter allows DRN to draw on the traditions of several key genres as part of 
the broader category of hexameter (as opposed to lyric/dramatic) poetry.28 
                                                
26 Cf. Houghton [1912: xxxv]: “[2.]22–36 are especially to be noted as they satirize lux-
ury, and again war, religion, pomp.” 
27 See, among others, Murley [1947], Hardie [1986: 193–219], Mayer [1990], Gale [1991: 
415; 2005: 181–188], Keith [2000: 4–6, 17–18, 32–42, 108–111], and O’Hara [1998: 74]: 
“De Rerum Natura 1.1–135 is much concerned with Homer, Ennius, Lucretius’ relation-
ship to Greco-Roman epic tradition, and his own role in memorializing the accomplish-
ments of Epicurus.”  Gale suggests “that Lucretius self-consciously sets out to revitalize 
the didactic tradition with a new infusion of ‘epic-ness’ ” [2005: 182].  Cf. also the phras-
ing “didactic epic” of Gale’s title Lucretius and the Didactic Epic [2001], a term labeled 
“unhelpful” by Volk [2002b], but also present earlier (as “epos didascalio”) in the Italian 
subtitle of MD 31, cf. Mitsis [1993]; Volk remarks that the didactic features of DRN “are 
so dominant and so obviously ‘didactic’ that it appears counter-intuitive to understand the 
poem rather as an example of the epic genre” [2002a: 69]. 
28 On the (overhyped) conflict between Epicurean philosophy and poetry, see Wigodsky 
[1995] (contra Ronconi [1963], e.g.), Obbink [1996], Porter [1996], Sedley [1998: 43–
46], Auvray-Assayas [2003], Holmes [2005: 527–528 and, for further citations, n. 3], and 
more generally all the essays in Obbink [1995].  On “poetry generally”, see my discus-
sion of the “poetry vs. philosophy” debate in Lucretian scholarship (pp. 182–187, below).  
 153 
And discourse: most notable for our purposes is DRN’s connection to the literary 
discourse or tradition of diatribe, discussed in more detail in my introduction (pp. 27–29).  
Scholars on DRN are quick to point out connections to diatribe: Anderson calls the pas-
sage beginning at 3.830 “satiric diatribe,” while Sosin points out that DRN’s “occasional 
predilection for satiric and Cynic/Bionic technique has been noted many times.”29  This is 
not simple, flat engagement, however.  DRN employs diatribe, I believe, as a discourse—
and for specific, persuasive ends.  According to Minyard, the Lucretian persona “uses the 
diatribe…in the way he used Iphigeneia and the quotation from the Odyssey at 3.19–22: 
the inherited literature, properly understood, contains evidence for the…truth of Epicure-
anism” [1985: 62].  The formal antecedent supports the philosophical goal.  Diatribe “is 
made to confirm Epicureanism, to be an added proof of not only the necessity for some 
alternative but for this alternative.”30  At the same time, the literary model situates the 
philosophical goal within its own literary tradition, and marks DRN (and its ego) as hav-
ing a place in Graeco-Roman cultural inheritance.31 
 
 
                                                
On “hexameter specifically,” see the metrical considerations in chapter 4 (pp. 202–203, 
below). 
29 Anderson [1993b: 167]; Sosin [1999: 62], with citations at n. 20, including Waltz 
[1949], Dudley [1965b], and Wallach [1976], whose title is Lucretius and the Diatribe 
against the Fear of Death. 
30 Minyard [1985: 62]; emphasis preserved. 
31 Formal antecedents for DRN abound.  Gale, for example, has examined at length the 
poem’s connections to Euhemerism [1994a: passim, especially 75–80 and 195–200] and 
argues that DRN should be read as engaging with the epic tradition [1994a: 99–128], cf. 
Harrison [2002] and Henkel [2009: 179–180].  For an overview of DRN’s various mod-
els, see Gale [2007]. 
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3. Humor 
We have already evaluated humor in DRN to a great extent, so a few notices here 
will suffice.  The two hallmarks of satiric humor, irony and parody, leave their tracks all 
across our poem.  Kenney finds, in book 3 alone, no fewer than 12 passages featuring 
irony (including reductio ad absurdum) and 4 where parody is operative.32  Parody is es-
sentially a passage-length source of humor,33 while irony can operate on scales as small 
as a phoneme.34  Brown, in his discussion of the invective against Anaxagorean 
ὁμοιομερία, refers to “the satirical nature of the whole passage which draws upon a large 
arsenal of techniques,” as DRN’s speaker “infus[es] irony and parody into his outline of 
and initial objections to the Anaxagorean theory” [1983: 152], cf. pp. 66–69, above.  
                                                
32 Irony: DRN 3.367–369, 573–575, 612–614, 624–633, 665–666, 717, 727–728, 772–
783, 888, 894–911 (so Kenney [1971: 203 ad loc.]: “the spirit of irony, rising at times to 
parody and overt mockery…pervades the argument”), 992–994, and 1089, all apud Ken-
ney [1971: 252, s. v. “irony”].  Compare, again on book 3, Wallach [1976: 26–31, 106–
107].  I point out that, among the many effects of repetition or iteration in DRN—on 
which see Schrijvers [1969: 370-376], Clay [1983: 183–185], Schiesaro [1994, 1996], 
Gale [1994b: 5–6], Erler [1998], Murgia [2000: 311], Reinhardt [2002: 303–304 n. 37], 
Hardie [2006], O’Hara [2007: 62], and, contra, Deufert [1996: 27–31]—there is also the 
potential for satiric irony, cf. Womble [1961: 537] on Horace and Dessen [1968: 13] on 
Persius.  
Parody: 3.832–842, 894–899, 904–908, and 1012, apud Kenney [1971: 254, s. v. 
“parody”]; and Wallach [1976: 7, 28–40, 46–61, 95–96, 107–108].  Waltz furthermore 
points to irony in the passage beginning at 3.748 [1949: 88], West to parody of epic im-
agery at 5.15 [1994: 28], and Wallach notes parody “or at least satirical usage” of uita 
breuis statements in book 3 [1976: 57–58, cf. also 7–8, 28–29, 33–37, 49–54, 60–61, 
108].  Cf. also my consideration of parody above (pp. 106–108). 
33 Although it can come down to the imitation of certain words or rhetorical techniques, 
as with the speaker’s parodic adoption of Anaxagoras’ (or perhaps Empedocles’) repeti-
tive, polyptotic style—so Brown: “Lucretius deliberately borrowed a stylistic feature 
which he associated with the Presocratics in order to aid his satirical critique of the 
Presocratic Anaxagoras” [1983: 160].  Cf. also Tatum [1984]. 
34 Cf. Sidwell [2009: 349] on λ, ρ, the verb τραυλίζειν, and (mis)pronunciation jokes in 
Aristophanes Wasps (line 45) and Clouds (868–873); and Culler [1988b]. 
 155 
Irony and parody on a broad view, here.  But there are examples too of humor on the lin-
guistic level.  For Kenney and Waltz alike, alliteration can generate ironic (and thus sa-
tiric) humor, and Waltz additionally finds irony in DRN’s use of the Latin words uates 
and diuinitus.35 
From the suaue mari magno proem of book 2 mentioned just previously, we can 
also glean a bit more detail about satiric humor.  We have seen that the humor of satire is 
dependent on the audience’s sense of safety from the satiric aggression and the risk of the 
satirized object’s aggressive retaliation.  It is, I believe, just this sort of isolation that the 
ego shows us in this scene:36 
suaue, mari magno turbantibus aequora uentis, 
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; 
non quia uexari quemquamst iucunda uoluptas, 
sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suaue est. 
suaue etiam belli certamina magna tueri 
per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli. 
                                                
35 Alliteration: Kenney writes on DRN 3.888 that “[t]he alliteration and word-play 
(mălumst mālis) strike a note of scornful irony that is sustained in what follows” [1971: 
202 ad loc.], and Waltz observes alliteration’s role in producing sarcasm: “allitera-
tions…soulignent si bien l’intention sarcastique” [1949: 81].  On alliteration in DRN 
more generally, see Schön [1970], Petruzziello [1980], Dionigi [1992/1988: 52–54], and 
Piazzi [2005: 91–92 ad 1.641]. 
Waltz on uates: “[c]e mot de uates…est à la fois méprisant et ironique” [1949: 
82].  On diuinitus: “[c]e bel adverbe diuinitus est, lui aussi, dans la bouche de Lucrèce, 
chargé de raillerie et d’ironie” [ibidem].  Waltz furthermore suggests undertones of trag-
edy in passages beginning at 2.1129 and 3.62—“[l]a satire, dans ces deux derniers textes, 
prend une couleur presque tragique”—but the tone is not strong enough to overwhelm the 
comic nature of the satiric passages as a whole [1949: 90]. 
For a theoretical account, not limited to the classical period, of lingustic-level 
humor in explanation of what satire is and does, see Simpson [2003: 16–29]. 
36 Cf. Segal [1989], Gale [1994a: 211], and Porter [2007: 172]: “There is something sub-
lime to the thought, which the physicist entertains as he stands…on the edge of a preci-
pice looking down, safely detached, upon the turmoil below.”  Lucretian sublimity, ac-
cording to Porter, is an awareness of the maiestas rerum (at DRN 5.7) that “results from 
the sheer exhilaration that a glimpse of scientific truth affords” [2007: 169].  See also the 
scholarship on the proem to DRN 2 cited above (pp. 90–91 and n. 102). 
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       (DRN 2.1–6) 
 
Sweet it is, when the winds throw into uproar the waves on the 
great sea, to watch another’s great struggle from the shore—not 
because it’s a pleasant joy that someone is in trouble, but because 
it’s sweet to understand the ills you’re free from.  Sweet it is as 
well to watch war’s great contests arranged across the fields—
without you having any part in the danger. 
 
The soldiers and sailors placed in adversity in the passage, as subsequent lines make 
clear, are representative of those who have not adopted the true Epicurean school of 
physics and ethics.  Thus these lines are showing us (metasatirically, perhaps?) how the 
objects of DRN’s satiric verses face a rough situation.  The reader is, with the speaker, 
placed away from the sea, away from the battle: we have here exactly the kind of safety 
for the speaker and any reader who joins him that Rosen and others have brought up in 
their analyses of satire.  The reader is safe from harm, and so can appreciate the satire, 
even if he does not find this passage funny or ironic. 
It is ironic, though.  Sosin, for one, calls the first 14 lines of book 2 a “satiric 
proem.”37  Our viewpoint in the passage is one of satiric safety; but the Lucretian persona 
possesses and proffers a better one in the passage’s second half.  Nothing is sweeter than 
holding (nil dulcius est bene quam…tenere, 2.7)—as the persona holds and invites the 
reader to hold—the edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, “the wise men’s well-
defended precincts, lofty with placid teaching” (2.8), a fastness even more redoubtable 
than both the seashore in a storm and the lookout point away from the battlefield.  With 
edita, with the loftiness of the speaker’s stronghold from which to be removed and take 
                                                
37 Sosin [1999: 285]: the ego “delights in philosophy’s lofty vantage, which affords a 
comfortable view down on all the strife, struggle and error of humankind below.  This is 
precisely the rhetorical stance of the satirist, who dutifully notes humanity’s every fault 
and vice.”  Cf. Dudley [1965b: 216]. 
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pleasure in the anxiety-ridden lives of others, we have a literalization of the satirist’s 
metaphorical moral high ground. 
I would further interpret this passage metapoetically (and metasatirically!).  The 
observation of troubles at sea, in war, and in the wandering lives of non-Epicureans is a 
stand-in for the act of reading DRN itself.38  In the process of reading DRN, just as in the 
action of these lines, the audience shares with the speaker the experience of looking down 
(in both physical and affective senses) upon the objects of satire, the soldiers and sailors 
and lovers and scaredy-cats and Presocratics and stolidi and those others who go astray 
and seek the road of wandering life (alios…errare atque uiam palantis quaerere uitae, 
2.9–10).  Consequently—since in this passage the ego describes such observations as a 
source of pleasure (suaue, iucunda uoluptas, suaue twice more, dulcius)—reading DRN, 
too, is thus a pleasure.  For the Epicurean who reads the poem, the stolidi of book 1 and 
the unfortunate navigator of 2.2 are one and the same, and the insulated, superior subjec-
tivity from which this reader placidly (and satirically) tracks their folly/plight is likewise 
the same.  For readers not yet successful in the mastery of Epicurus’ discipline, book 2’s 
proem is a synecdochic model for the poem as a whole: the path to ἀταραξία that occu-
pies the entirety of DRN is presented here in short-form. 
 
4. Ambiguity 
Satire, moreover, is ambiguous and ambivalent, and its critics and censors misun-
derstand it.  To begin with, I offer two micro-level examples of ambiguity in book 3, both 
                                                
38 Compare Keane [2006: 107–108]: “Teaching and learning symbolize literary produc-
tion and generic evolution.”  Braund finds “metasatire” especially in the figure of 
Naevolus, in Juvenal poem 9 [2004b: 426]. 
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proffered by Kenney.  First, the description of the locales of Acheron in DRN is a bit 
muddled: “the ambiguity, and the inflated epicizing vocabulary, are no doubt designed to 
ridicule the vagueness and confusion of the underworld geography and popular supersti-
tions in general” [1971: 230 ad 3.1012].  Style reflects moral content, and both depict a 
disordered, ambivalently constructed under-cosmos.  Second, there is ambiguity involv-
ing the verb ambigitur itself, in a passage where the verb can mean “is the matter at 
hand” or, with a legal connotation, “is the issue of law facing the court.”  It is uncertain 
from context which meaning is correct.  “In view of L.’s use of legal phraseology else-
where…the ambiguity may be deliberate” [1971: 242 ad 3.1074, with reference to 3.971]. 
From the smaller now to the larger.  A defining characteristic of DRN is its com-
plicated relationship to words, and its belying the speaker’s asseveration concerning the 
egestas linguae.39  Latin’s smaller vocabulary resulted in an accretion of varied denota-
tions and connotations for many words, and DRN takes full advantage of their semantic 
range.  The polyvalence allows for puns and other wordplay, for sophisticated allegory, 
and for (on occasion satiric) ambiguity.40 
There is additionally a kind of philosophical ambivalence in DRN.  In scientific 
matters where certainty was not feasibly attainable, Epicurean principles allowed for an 
                                                
39 Cf. Farrell [2001: 39–51]; Holmes [2005: 575–576], cf. Dionigi [1992/1988: 11–14]; 
and my discussion above (p. 77).  Farrell, for instance, states, “[w]e tend to take Lu-
cretius’ disclaimer about ‘poverty’ too literally, to interpret it simplistically, and to be-
lieve it in implicitly; but we should not.  For that matter, we should be careful of assum-
ing too easily that poverty does in fact connote inadequacy” [2001: 39]. 
40 The text itself as it has survived, too, is in many places lacunose, crux-plagued, interpo-
lated, or corrupt—a philologist’s version of ambiguity. 
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aporetic submission of reasonable alternative explanations.41  An example from DRN: 
6.712–737 details four potential explanations for the estival swelling of the Nile, among 
them the influence of the etesian winds, a buildup of sand at the river-mouth, rain at the 
source, or melting snow.  For the speaker of DRN, it is sufficient to give these hypotheses 
equal weight and equal exposure, to leave the question unsettled.42  This is a less slippery 
kind of ambiguity than the satirist’s hard-to-pin-down self-composition, but it is never-
theless intellectually evasive, and may contribute to the elusive nature of the (satiric) rela-
tionship between the speaker and his audience. 
Finally, as we will see in detail below, there is potential for tension in DRN (as in 
satire) caused by ambiguity or ambivalence regarding the speaker’s role—over the con-
flict between comic-satiric interests and didactic goals.  The basic question: “Is the ego 
satirist or didact, poet or philosopher?”  These ambiguities can create confusion that re-
sults in censure of the satirist or his work.  In DRN, the speaker apparently anticipates 
such misunderstanding and criticism, and attempts to forestall it: “perchance you’ll think 
you’re entering into the impious first-beginnings of philosophy and treading on a path of 
crime.  But on the contrary, more often it is that superstition/religion that has birthed 
criminal and impious deeds” (1.80–84, with Latin text at p. 95, above).  In the introduc-
tion to a bitter satire on the ills of religio, the ego tries to establish a disclaimer against 
accusations of impiety and concurrent attempts to silence him and his work.  We could 
                                                
41 Long & Sedley [1987: 95], with Epicurus Letter to Pythocles 85–88, DRN 5.509–533, 
and 6.703–711.  Also Gale: “a plurality of explanations in accordance with the phenom-
ena is preferable to…dogmatic assertions” [1994a: 18]. 
42 Cf. Hardie [2007: 117]: “Lucretius uses multiple alternative explanations of phenom-
ena in conformity with Epicurean orthodoxy to reinforce materialist certainty,” and fur-
ther Hardie [2009: ch. 7]. 
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add as well a variety of long-held misapprehensions of DRN and its speaker-persona, 
from Jerome’s story of the love potion onwards, as evidence for the uncertainty and ensu-
ing hostility that the ambiguity of DRN’s (satiric) poetry can educe. 
 
Poetic initiation 
It is worth our while to consider briefly one last feature of the mode of satire and 
its potential for a place in DRN.  Rosen argues that Callimachus Iamboi 4 “is essentially 
concerned with the question of ‘initiation’ into a world of poetic satire—who is ‘allowed’ 
access to it, who is capable of understanding it” [2007: 196].  Understanding or identify-
ing irony, parody, and the other elements of satire can be quite difficult, and satires them-
selves are generally directed towards a more or less restricted, even exclusive, audience.  
The audience has responsibilities within the execution of satire, as well, for “[s]atire, if it 
is to be effective, requires an understanding on the part of his audience of an author’s 
standard of value and truth, the standard against which the object of satire is measured.”43  
The audience, in other words, must either already understand intrinsically the satirist and 
his poetic output—i.e., must be the authorial reader, a reader like the satirist himself—or 
must be taught the discourse, must be initiated into the mode.  The issue of access to the 
poetic-satiric world runs parallel, I believe, to the notion of the “get it” and “don’t get it” 
crowds, of the serious-minded audience and the smaller, select collusive readership.  Yet 
the idea of “initiation” suggests that these audiences are not immutably fixed, but rather 
                                                
43 Minyard [1985: 61], and continuing: “It does not depend on an agreement between 
author and audience about the validity of the standard, but it does need clear perception 
of what the standard is, if his comments are to be seen as satire, as anything more than a 
kind of floating bitterness.” 
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are able to gain entrance into the “get it” crowd, into the set of readers who are capable of 
understanding satire. 
It is in this respect that I see an intersection between satire and the explicitly ex-
pressed objective of DRN.  The goal of the work, the speaker tells us, is to persuade the 
addressee to relinquish his fear of death and his other anxieties so as to begin life anew as 
an ataractic disciple of Lucretius and Epicurus.  The poem, I mean to say, self-presents as 
a poem of philosophical initiation.  We have seen the extent and import of DRN’s use of 
the mode of satire; as a consequence, we are able to look for what shape satiric initiation 
might take in DRN.  I believe that the act of siding with the mocking speaker over the ob-
jects of blame—particularly the Presocratics in book 1, the death-fearers in book 3, and 
the love-crazed in book 4—constitutes a sort of satiric initiation, as the reader recognizes 
the speaker as satirist and more importantly acknowledges that his satiric indignation is 
justified. 
Besides, the poem’s satiric initiation aids the process of philosophical initiation.44  
By correctly identifying the speaker’s elusive irony, by negotiating his ambiguity, by 
adopting his stance against opposing positions, we undertake the journey from ignorance 
to indoctrination.  Philosophical initiation, I would add, is for the most part a didactic 
goal, in DRN and in philosophical literature more generally.  There is a crossroads in 
DRN of two initiation pathways, one satiric and one didactic.  Give a man a satire, and 
you entertain him for a day; teach a man to satirize, and you give him tools for a better 
                                                
44 Compare Waltz, who argues that satire is just as much a means of persuasion as it is a 
means of refuting rival doctrines: “il se sert fort habillement de la satire tant comme 
moyen de persuasion à l’adresse de son lecteur que comme moyen de combat contre les 
adeptes d’autres doctrines ou les fidèles d’autres fois que la sienne” [1949: 79]. 
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life.45  In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider in greater detail the convergences 
and conflicts between satire and didact, first in the broadly defined satiric poetry of an-
tiquity and then in DRN specifically. 
 
 
Didactic tension in satire 
 
Satire thus aims not only to attack and to entertain, but also to teach.46  Keane ana-
lyzes the “didactic agenda” in the genre of Roman satire specifically [2006: ch. 4], and 
Rosen refers to “the didactic underpinnings” of the Graeco-Roman satiric mode as a 
whole [2007: 231].  Works that employ the mode of satire have, explicitly or implicitly, a 
goal of instruction and thus (often moral) improvement of the reader.  On one level, this 
paedagogical impulse coincides neatly with the satirist’s supposed desire to make the 
world a better place (pp. 51–56, above).  Part of changing society for the better is prepar-
ing others for change and showing them how to do so. 
At the same time, however, we have seen that satire generally takes place in a dis-
tinct, isolated subjective space constructed by the satirist’s collusive relationship with his 
(double) audience—a space where satirist and reader of satire jointly disparage the sati-
                                                
45 Cf. Rosen [again 2007: 196]: “In the end, the poem offers commentary not only on how 
to ‘do’ the iambus, but also on how to ‘be’ an audience for iambic satire.”  By analogy I 
propose that DRN offers commentary not only on how to “do” Epicurean living and phi-
losophical didaxis, but also on how to “be” an audience for didactic satire (or satiric di-
daxis).  
46 Cf. Keane [2006: 4]: “Satirists…do not just describe, distort, and criticize social life.  
They claim to intervene in it as well—at least in an indirect manner.” 
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rized object, or where satiric poet and reader of satiric poetry share amusement in appre-
ciation of the self-undercutting critical persona of the satirist.  Just as the satirist’s stance 
of abjection can subvert his claims to moral high ground (cf. p. 44, above), so also the 
aggressive drive for comic mockery can undermine, or at least challenge, the educational 
goals of satire. 
There is thus the possibility in satire for what I term “didactic tension.”47  The 
satirist’s roles of teacher and of abject moralist sometimes intersect, but at other times 
they contradict and undercut each other, work at cross-purposes, or pull the satire in op-
posite directions.  Whereas “a certain ruthless definiteness is essential in education,”48 the 
satirist is fundamentally indefinite, ambiguous, and elusive.  This potential for conflict 
between the multiple goals, expressed and implicit, can result in this didactic tension 
(akin to the tension between sanctimony and πονηρία, between self-righteousness and 
abjection: p. 50, above) that rises to the surface of the poetry. 
 
Satire’s didactic pose 
Let us start by considering the didactic features of the mode of satire, and address 
tensions thereafter.  According to Griffin, writing on satire both modern and ancient, “the 
satirist writes in order to discover, to explore, to survey, to attempt to clarify” [1994: 39].  
In other words, satire can be seen as a process of investigation, of learning.  Keane points 
out that satire has truck with the pose of didact, the role of a teacher.  This pose, in turn, 
                                                
47 Cf. Keane [2006: 49]: “[s]atire can at once be uncomfortable and beneficial,” and fur-
ther: “Persius may be a dedicated healer of illness, or he may conjure suffering only to 
mock it” [2006: 62]. 
48 Whitehead [1929: 36], quoted by Cahn [1986: 12]. 
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“draws attention to the satiric text as a practical product offered to the outside world” 
[2006: 12].  Take two brief examples.  First, the satirist’s didactic pose is made explicit, 
for example, early in Horace’s Sermones, with the (Lucretian) image of the students be-
ing given cookies in order to learn the alphabet.49  Later in the same poem, in an admon-
ishment to avoid extremes in living life, the speaker intimates his role as a teacher of 
morals: “when I prohibit you from becoming a money-grubber, I’m not ordering you to 
become a scamp and scoundrel” (non ego auarum | cum ueto te, fieri uappam iubeo ac 
nebulonem, 1.1.103–104).  Second, the Persius-ego similarly refers to himself as the stern 
paternal uncle (sapimus patruos, 1.11), who was responsible for holding his nephew to 
high standards of moral conduct and social achievement,50 and presents himself as a 
knowledgeable lecturer (in, e.g., poems 2 and 5). 
The didactic pose of satire furthermore enables the satirist to co-opt his audience 
more effectively into the production of satire, since education functions as a mutual 
(though not egalitarian) dialectic between teacher and student.51  This very interaction 
between instructor and pupil also provides grounds for allusions to and adaptations from 
theatrical comedy—and indeed the satiric speaker of Serm. 1.1–4 may himself be seen as 
                                                
49 Serm. 1.1.24–26: “What stops me from telling the truth with a laugh?—Just like whee-
dling teachers at a certain point give boys cookies so they’ll be willing to learn their 
ABCs” (ridentem dicere uerum | quid uetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi | doc-
tores, elementa uelint ut discere prima).  Cf., e.g., Rudd [1986: 11], and pp. 262–267, 
below. 
50 On the patruus, see Hallett [1984] and James [1998; 2003: 234–235]. 
51 So Keane [2006: 107]: “Horace’s initial pose as the teacher imparting lessons sets in 
motion a more realistic process of active participation by its internal audience.” 
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a self-undercutting doctor ineptus drawn from the Graeco-Roman stage.52  Satirists’ 
claims to teach are mirrored on a structural level with the frequent use of dialogue, an-
other way of co-opting the (internal) audience of satire.  To name just a few: Aristo-
phanes (the ἀγών in Clouds between Good and Bad Reasoning), Ennius,53 Horace (Serm. 
2.1), and Persius (poem 4), cf. Griffin [1994: 40]. 
So: poems of satire are tools for the reader, goods that will help the reader learn 
how to live life better or see the world as it really is.  The satirist is not merely a critic but 
also a moralist and educator.  In fact, as Rawson indicates in connection with drama, lit-
erature (especially comic literature) in the time of Lucretius served for many Romans as 
the basic fount of moral knowledge.54  Hunter makes a similar observation in the case of 
Horace’s Sermones, where the ego shares with his audience the quality and teachings that 
                                                
52 So Freudenburg argues [1993: ch. 1], in my view persuasively (and see Turpin [1998] 
for a similar argument), though see, contra, Sharland [2009: 81–82].  Cf. Keane [2006: 
136]: “[t]he struggles enacted between student and teacher figures, at least in Horace and 
Persius, evoke satire’s ancestor comedy, with its agonistic authorial postures and its stock 
characters.” 
53 A dialogue between Mors and Vita in Ennius’ Saturae is attested by Quintilian Institu-
tio Oratoria 9.2.36, cf. Knoche [1975: 22]. 
54 Rawson [1987: 79]: “for the poorer classes at least theatrical moralizing was, at all 
events in the second and early first centuries B.C., the chief source from which they drew 
not their moral conventions, but much of their capacity to articulate them.”  Rawson also 
mentions that literature-based moral education was fundamental to Roman culture: “the 
very first work of Roman literature was probably a book of maxims, by Appius Claudius 
Caecus.…[I]t may well have derived at least in part from a collection of Greek gnomes of 
dramatic origin” [1987: 86]. 
Compare Cicero’s comments in Pro Archia that the “precepts of many [authors] 
and much literature” have made him the man he is (multorum praeceptis multisque lit-
teris, 14) and that great men like Scipio and Cato (the Elder) would not have had interest 
in literary studies “if they weren’t at all helped by literature to find and foster excellence” 
(si nihil ad percipiendam colendamque uirtutem litteris adiuuarentur, 16), with, e.g., Por-
ter [1990] and Berry [2004].  Keith [2000] examines the role of epic in the education of 
the Roman elite male. 
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he has received from his moral and literary predecessors, from his father (Serm. 1.4, with 
Leach [1981], and 1.6), from Lucilius (1.4, 1.10, 2.1), and from the poets of Old and New 
Greek Comedy (1.4, 1.10, 2.3.11–12).  “Like all good poetry, the satires are a deterrent to 
vice, an encouragement to virtue and a preparation for philosophy” [1985: 490]. 
This observation need not be limited to the Sermones of Horace alone.  It can be 
well applied also to other “good poetry”: the satires of Lucilius, Persius, and Juvenal, the 
Iamboi of Callimachus, and DRN can all on some level be conceived of as moral deter-
rents and philosophical preparation (cf. pp. 40–43 and n. 8, above).  Nor is this observa-
tion solely modern, since Eratosthenes attests that “the ancients described poetry as a cer-
tain First Philosophy that leads us into life from youth and teaches us with pleasure char-
acter and emotion and action” (οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινὰ λέγουσι πρώτην τὴν 
ποιητικὴν εἰσάγουσαν εἰς τὸν βίον ἡμᾶς ἐκ νέων καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἤθη καὶ πάθη 
καὶ πράξεις μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, quoted in Strabo 1.3). 
Authors who write satire thus engage with a tradition of moralistic literary pro-
duction, and can use the expectation of practical utility to their advantage.55  Satirists 
sometimes exploit didactic expectations for the purposes of comic (satiric) mockery, as 
we can see from two short examples, each drawn from different moments when Horace’s 
Sermones engage specifically with our own DRN.  Serm. 1.2 plays with the convention of 
protreptic/hortatory diatribe in its discussion of sexual misconduct; one such diatribal 
(and Lucretian) tool in particular is that of prosopopoieia, namely in this case a personifi-
cation of the generic Roman male’s own penis (muto, 1.2.69–71).  Though a talking phal-
                                                
55 So Hunter: “[s]uch a literary stance allows Horace the maximum freedom to include 
widely diverse material in his sermones; it was, in other words, just the stance he needed” 
[1985: 490]. 
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lus may not immediately call to mind DRN’s prosopopoieia of Natura Rerum (on whom 
see pp. 133–139, above), the Horace-ego includes a pointer to the Lucretian personifica-
tion by using the term natura itself as the subject of a verb immediately after the penis’ 
speech.56  Again, in Serm. 1.3, the satirist allows himself to become sidetracked by sex 
during his DRN-style anthropological account of the development of human society 
(Serm. 1.3.96–117), and this digression reveals the Horatian account to be a parody of 
DRN.57  In both instances, the satiric ego of Sermones uses a didactic façade as a tool for 
engendering humor and adding weight to the satiric sexual invective. 
That it is a characteristic of satire to take advantage of the expectations of utility 
attendant with the didactic pose is moreover evident from the opposing scholarly views—
that is to say, the prevailing ambiguity—on the seriousness of didaxis and literary criti-
cism not only in Horace’s Sermones but also in his Ars Poetica.58  But, at core, the didac-
                                                
56 Serm. 1.2.72–73: “and how much better are the things that nature advises, rich in the 
help she has to offer—things that are diametrically opposed to these [i.e., your irrational 
and detrimental sexual proclivities]” (at quanto meliora monet pugnantia istis | diues opis 
natura suae). 
57 Parodic elements: natura here is powerless when it comes to justice (Serm. 1.3.112: 
“and Nature cannot separate the unjust from the just,” nec natura potest iusto secernere 
iniquum), much unlike the Natura Rerum in DRN.  The advice in DRN to foster concep-
tion by copulating “in the custom of wild beasts” (more ferarum, 4.1264) becomes the 
circumstances for a quick death at the hands of a more powerful, sexually aggressive 
male (Serm. 1.3.109).  We even see the Lucretian watchwords ratio and fateare necessest 
repurposed here (Serm. 1.3.115 and 111, respectively).  For more on the connections be-
tween Serm. 1.3 and DRN, see, e.g., Reckford [1997], Harrison [2007c: 84–85], and 
Kemp [2009]. 
58 A brief survey: Freudenburg takes Serm. 1.1–1.4 as parody [1993: ch. 1].  Both Rudd 
[1966: 118–124] and Freudenburg see the literary criticism in Serm. 1.10, on the other 
hand, as authentic, whereas Zetzel [1980: 63–64] and Goldberg [2005: 174–176 and 174 
n. 74] argue that it is fictional and thus to be applied back onto the literary persona of the 
satirist himself.  As Lowrie [1993] asks, in a critique of Freudenburg on this point, “what 
are the limits to the parodied persona?” 
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tic pose is a tool for the satirist to get his audience to side with him, to collude with him.  
Teachers have (moral, social, developmental) authority over their pupils59 and so didactic 
posturing confers authority over readers upon the satirist.  Such authority may be used to 
push readers into aligning themselves with the speaker against his opponent, or to grant 
weight to the satirist’s arguments and precepts. 
Sometimes this authority is used tendentiously.  A recurrent element of satire is its 
biased, and even coercive, argumentation.  Through the misrepresentation or non-
presentation of alternate explanations or accounts of its targets’ words and actions, satire 
tries to compel readers to admit its own version as the only acceptable account.  As 
Rosen states: “[s]atirists tend towards a soapbox rhetoric, and have little interest in enter-
                                                
Frischer [1991] takes Ars Poetica to be parody, though his claims have been 
roundly rejected by some others (cf. p. 145, n. 14, above); Seeck [1995] considers Ars 
Poetica satiric; and Reitz [2005] describes it as a generic experiment that engages with 
satire, didactic, and other literary forms and modes.  Harrison [2008] proposes that Ars 
Poetica is part of a third book of Sermones, a third book of Horatian satire. 
59 Cf. Horace Epist. 2.1.126–131: 
os tenerum pueri balbumque poeta figurat, 
torquet ab obscenis iam nunc sermonibus aurem, 
mox etiam pectus praeceptis format amicis, 
asperitatis et inuidiae corrector et irae, 
recte facta refert, orientia tempora notis 
instruit exemplis, inopem solatur et aegrum. 
 
The poet shapes the boy’s tender and babbling mouth; already now twists 
his ear away from vulgar conversations; soon even molds the heart with 
friendly teachings; corrects harshness and envy and wrath; righteously re-
lates things that have happened; equips the rising generation with well-
known examples; and comforts the boy when he [or “a person who”] is 
helpless and sick. 
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taining opposing points of view, so it often takes a considerable effort for an audience not 
to take their ranting at face value” [2007: x].  Satire, as I put it, creates straw men.60 
Targets of ancient satiric mockery are often not real targets, but caricatures, effi-
gies that enable the ostentatious attack-display of satiric blame and mockery.  For con-
firmation we need only look to four examples of the the figures that populate satiric texts.  
First is Thersites, the failed blame poet (in Rosen’s view) of the Iliad, whose ugliness, 
unruliness, and low social status prefigure and prejudice him as beneath and beholden to 
the aristocratic protagonists of the epic, particularly to his adversary (in Iliad book 2) 
King Odysseus61—in a society of καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, Thersites is pointedly neither, and 
                                                
60 Cf. Kenney (on DRN 3.894–899, where the speaker impersonates mourners of the re-
cently deceased): “To put an argument to which you already know the answer into the 
mouth of a real or imagined adversary is one of the oldest of rhetorical devices; it was 
valued in diatribe and satire for its dramatic and enlivening potentialities” [1971: 203–
204]. 
61 Take Homer’s description of Thersites, Iliad 2.212–223: 
Θερσίτης δ’ ἔτι μοῦνος ἀμετροεπὴς ἐκολῴα, 
ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ᾔδη 
μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν, 
ἀλλ’ ὅ τι οἱ εἴσαιτο γελοίϊον Ἀργείοισιν 
ἔμμεναι: αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε: 
φολκὸς ἔην, χωλὸς δ’ ἕτερον πόδα: τὼ δέ οἱ ὤμω 
κυρτὼ ἐπὶ στῆθος συνοχωκότε: αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε 
φοξὸς ἔην κεφαλήν, ψεδνὴ δ’ ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη. 
ἔχθιστος δ’ Ἀχιλῆϊ μάλιστ’ ἦν ἠδ’ Ὀδυσῆϊ: 
τὼ γὰρ νεικείεσκε: τότ’ αὖτ’ Ἀγαμέμνονι δίῳ 
ὀξέα κεκλήγων λέγ’ ὀνείδεα: τῷ δ’ ἄρ’ Ἀχαιοὶ 
ἐκπάγλως κοτέοντο νεμέσσηθέν τ’ ἐνὶ θυμῷ. 
 
[The rest of the soldiers gave in,] but Thersites still alone, measureless in 
speech, kept whining, Thersites who wantonly knew in his mind many 
disorderly words, and again knew how, behaving not at all in order, to 
start strife with kings—but whatever seemed fit to him would be a joke to 
the Argives.  And he was the ugliest man who came to Troy: he was bow-
legged, lame in one foot, his two shoulders, arched, contracted inwards 
upon his chest, and again above he was pointy-headed, and his hair grew 
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so is primed to take a dive in the unfair matchup between himself and the man of many 
turns.  Second: Terence’s alleged rival Luscius Lanuvinus, constantly subjected to pre-
emptive counter-invective in the prologues of Terence’s plays, though never himself ap-
pearing onstage and leaving no extra-textual traces in the historical record.62  Third, the 
Tigellius who appears in Serm. 1.2, 3, 4, and 10—already in Cicero a stereotype of the 
disreputable but influential musician63—is introduced for the first time in Sermones with 
patently prejudicial language.64  Finally, I point to the straw women who populate Juvenal 
poem 6.  They are altogether preposterous, grotesquely exaggerated for the Juvenal-ego’s 
own purposes, which have more to do with himself than with the female gender that he 
                                                
thin.  And he was most especially hateful to Achilles and Odysseus—for 
he kept fighting with the two of them.  But now instead, screaming, he 
spoke sharp reproaches against godlike Agamemnon, and then the Achae-
ans got terribly mad at him and held just indignation against him in their 
spirits. 
Note that the Achaeans—the internal audience to this scene in the epic—already, before 
he has spoken, hate Thersites not just with κόλος but also with νέμεσις, justified indig-
nation or wrath.  Benardete, by referring to “a figuration of wickedness as self-evident as 
Thersites—the ugliest man who came to Troy,” equates Thersites’ appearance with his 
straw-man villainy [1991: 101]; compare Burke’s discussion of the Hegelian concept of 
“Thersitism” [1966: 110–111].  Cf. also Postlethwaite [1988], Thalmann [1988], Hooghe 
[1999], Stuurman [2004], and (for a Marxist interpretation) Rose [1988]. 
62 On Luscius Lanuvinus and the rhetoric of the prologues, see Ehrman [1985], Dér 
[1989], and Dombrowski [2010]. 
63 See, e.g., Epistulae ad Atticum 13.49–51 and Epistular ad Familiares 7.24, with Syme 
[1986: 274]. 
64 First, Tigellius has died before the poem’s beginning; but, moreover, his mourners are 
the dregs of society—“chorus-line prostitutes, drug-dealers, beggers, mimes, jokesters, 
that whole lot” (ambubaiarum collegia, pharmacopolae, | mendici, mimae, balatrones, 
hoc genus omne, 1.2.1–2).  On Tigellius see, among others, Baldwin [1970], Scodel 
[1987: 200], Hooley [1999], and Miller [2007].  Similar to Tigellius is Crispinus in Serm. 
1.1, 3, and 4, who is invoked in the very first line of Juvenal poem 4: ecce iterum 
Crispinus, et est mihi saepe uocandus, “look, here comes Crispinus again, and I gotta call 
on him pretty often.” 
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purports to be attacking in this satire.65  The satirist’s representations are in each case far 
from fair or balanced, but are rather designed to predispose the audience to agree with the 
satirist automatically. 
 
Conflict between teacher and satirist 
But the poetic metaphor of teaching brings with it a complication.  As Keane 
writes, “[b]ecause teaching prompts change in individual students, satire’s didactic plot 
appears linear and finite, aiming ultimately toward the removal of the satirist” [2006: 
120].  Good teachers-for-hire put themselves out of a job, or at least render their services 
unneeded by the very individuals who employ their services.  In Keane’s estimation, “the 
narratives about teaching embedded in satire point up the transitory nature of the peda-
gogical—and so the satiric—career.  Didactic and literary success for the author also 
means transformation into a completed text, which is fated to be critiqued” [2006: 12].  If 
satire achieves its goal of moral improvement in the world or in its readership, in other 
words, it loses its raison d’être.66 
That this phenomenon is a problem for satire is evident from my discussion of 
whether satirists truly want to achieve the utopia they present in their poetry (again pp. 
51–56, above).  If satiric critiques are successful, the opponents of satire are vanquished 
or silenced, the faults and flaws ameliorated, and satire must become something different, 
                                                
65 So Henderson [1989, 1999b], Gold [1994], and Warren [2005d]; cf. also Plaza [2006: 
127–155]. 
66 Compare the problem of success for the poet-lover in Roman elegy: the poetry is driven 
by the obstacles to successful elegiac liaison.  See, e.g., Myerowitz [1985: ch. 4], as well 
as Fear’s suggestion that Ovid’s (poetic) success is correlated with the poet-lover’s (ele-
giac) failure [2000: 232]. 
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beyond comic mockery and blame.  Habinek contrasts Roman satire with political invec-
tive and legal action: while these forms of direct invective can “silence their opponents, 
depriving them of their libertas,” satire does not do so, because it “needs its playmates 
too much to destroy them.”67 
In fact, the “playmates” or targets of the mode of satire are frequently moral de-
fects and shortcomings in belief or behavior that, fortunately for the continuance of satire, 
are not easily eliminated.  Greed, ambition, lust, anger, hypocrisy will stick around even 
if a particular satiric poem is successful, even if a specific villain is cast down or cast out.  
These kinds of “playmates” form a central basis for satiric criticisms, and sustain the sa-
tiric mode. 
But the two ends of moral betterment and continued satiric/poetic production can 
and do work at cross-purposes, which are in many cases left to the reader to comprehend 
and manage.  “[T]he essential crux…of all satirical poetics,” according to Rosen, is “how 
an audience can reconcile a poem’s didactic pretense with all the transgressive impulses, 
whether dictional or thematic, that inevitably arise in its relentless drive toward comedy” 
[2007: 218].  The comic urge, so to speak, can cause the reader to call into question the 
satirist’s seriousness about his goal—and it is in fact this very crux of reconciling comedy 
and didactic that spurs the development of the “get it” audience, the people who believe 
that the point of the satiric poetry is not teaching or social amelioration but simply com-
                                                
67 Habinek [2005: 182].  Rosen points out that Juvenal’s satire (specifically in poems 5 
and 9) requires Virro to mistreat Naevolus and Trebius—otherwise, there is no comedy, 
and thus no satire [2007: 240].  Compare, again, the elegiac poet-lover’s need to keep 
around his opponents, from custos to lena, in order to perpetuate the motives for elegiac 
composition.  On the necessity of the lena to the poet-lover, see Gutzwiller [1985] and 
Myers [1996]. 
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edy at the expense of the “don’t get it” crowd that takes the satirist as a straightforward, 
serious teacher.  As Henderson writes [1989: 90; emphasis preserved]: 
whereas, on the whole, ‘Student Textbooks’ don’t usually in-
vite…their readers to pick holes in their unargued prejudices—
Sorry: judgments—, it could well be a standard feature of ‘Satire’ 
that you be expected to ask yourself continuously whether you 
agree, are supposed to agree, keep catching yourself agreeing, and 
so on (or whether you dis-agree, etc.). 
 
For our purposes, replace “Student Textbooks” with didactic.  Didaxis is supposed to be 
straightforward, fair, and consistent.  Satire, on the other hand, is often complicated, 
prejudicial, and self-contradictory, so when satire applies to its frame a didactic façade, it 
is adopting a standard of veracity and trustworthiness that it does not generally merit.  
Satire, we might say, is thus using a kind of coercive argumentation against its readers, in 
an attempt to trick them into accepting the validity of the satiric critique; and those who 
are not tricked by it will pick up on the gaps, the tension between what satire is doing and 
what it is claiming to do (teach). 
Rosen furthermore asserts that a basic theme of Juvenal poem 9 is how “comedy 
and didacticism are, in the end, if not antithetical to one another, then certainly in con-
stant tension” [2007: 223].  Not antithetical, indeed—but the tension, whether constant or 
intermittent, moreover can itself be a tool for comedy and didactic alike.  An unexpected 
joke from the instructor renders the student more available to instruction and perhaps 
more likely to remember the specific point to which the joke is tied; some of the most 
memorable comedy is that which teaches, as the Roman affection for Terence’s explora-
tion of parenting illustrates.68 
                                                
68 Cf. Cicero De Senectute 65 (on Adelphoe) and Horace Serm. 1.2.19–22 (on Heauton 
Timoroumenos). 
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Over all, though, we can say that there is a discord built into satiric poetry be-
tween the conflicting ends of amusement and education.  First, the comic scenes and of-
ten scurrilous language that are so consistently present in ancient satire can call into ques-
tion the legitimacy or seriousness of the ego’s purported paedagogical motivations.  A 
simple formulation of this point might be that “mirator cunni Cupiennius albi (Serm. 
1.2.36) is not appropriate language for the classroom.”  While this statement is very re-
ductive, it nonetheless touches on or even emblematizes the disconnect between the aims 
and methods of comedy and those of (moral) instruction.69 
This disconnect can indeed threaten to undermine the literary productivity of the 
satirist.  Horace’s ego, for instance, suggests at one point that his moral-didactic goal im-
pedes his satiric-poetic success (and, I imagine, vice versa).70  And in Persius poem 5, the 
satirist’s protracted, seemingly earnest (even if diatribal) disquisition on hardline Stoi-
cism (5.52–118) is followed up by a group of grotesque soldiers (“veiny centurions,” 
uaricosi centuriones, 189) who mock said disquisition.  Their criticism of what the 
                                                
69 See, for instance, Goldberg’s account of why Roman satire developed in the time of 
Lucilius: “[c]omedy too often rewards the ‘wrong’ actions.  The virtues of real life be-
come liabilities on the stage, while the more outrageous a character behaves, the greater 
his reward” [2005: 148]. 
70 Serm. 1.4.22–25: 
    cum mea nemo 
scripta legat uulgo recitare timentis ob hanc rem, 
quod sunt quos genus hoc minime iuuat, utpote pluris 
culpari dignos. 
 
[Other poets are very successful,] though no one reads my writings, as I’m 
afraid to recite them publicly, for this reason: because there’re people that 
don’t much like this genre, since there’re many people who [or “since 
many of them”] are themselves blameworthy. 
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speaker does in this satire finishes the poem, as well.  These comic figures have the last 
word, which in turn detracts from the force and authority of the poem’s message. 
Additionally, humor and teaching can come into conflict in the figure of the sati-
rist-didact himself.  For although the pose of the abject underdog is funny, and it can en-
list the audience’s collusive allegiance, nevertheless someone who is playing a debased 
role such as this does not make for a very convincing teacher.  When the speaker of 
Horace’s Sermones makes (dubious) claims of psycho-social or intellectual abjection, he 
aligns himself more closely with the conventions of the satirist at the expense of his mag-
isterial credibility.71  Persius’ speaker, likewise, damages his paedagogical qualifications 
(the unspoken basis of his moral-philosophic explications elsewhere in his satires) when 
he shows himself to be the recipient of stern, critical lectures from a figure with greater 
intellectual poise or moral authority, as with his unnamed interlocutor in poem 3 and his 
mentor Cornutus at 5.1–51.72  If the teacher’s methods, worldview, and moral principles 
are suspect—as these characters suggest that the Persius-ego’s are—then the teaching it-




                                                
71 Psycho-social abjection: at the end of his attack on sexual overindulgence at Rome, the 
ego himself takes on one of the roles he has been satirizing, that of adulterer caught by 
the husband’s unexpected return home (Serm. 1.2.125–134).  Intellectual abjection: cf. 
the ego’s (patently disingenuous) remark that “the gods did well in creating me with a 
puny pauper-mind that speaks rarely and in piddling quantities,” di bene fecerunt, inopis 
me quodque pusilli | finxerunt animi, raro et perpauca loquentis (Serm. 1.4.17–18). 
72 Compare also the lectures that the Horatian ego receives throughout Sermones book 2. 
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Satire and didactic in DRN 
 
Satirists pose as teachers and thereby take advantage of a Graeco-Roman cultural 
tradition that holds poetry to be a primary means of moral edification.  From this tradition 
they draw, and sometimes abuse, instructive authority.  But at the same time, their hu-
mor—and their divided audience—can undercut their magisterial credibility.  As well, the 
role of instructor is a transient one, since successful acts of teaching may obviate the 
reader’s need for more teaching texts. 
In DRN, the roles are reversed.  The Lucretian ego, who presents himself as a di-
dact,73 at times poses as a satirist, a phenomenon that we have scrutinized at length.  This 
adoption of a satiric persona, I believe, in effect fuses didactic and satiric authority.74  The 
ego adds the satirist’s moral (self-)righteousness to his own implicitly established credi-
bility as a teacher.75  Doing so legitimizes his often harsh, even arrogant tone, and his in-




                                                
73 On DRN and the tradition of didactic, see Gale [2007: 68–69]. 
74 Glazewski, in making the case that there is a greater link between DRN and satire than 
has generally been recognized, points out that DRN “had a didactic purpose as did 
Horace” [1971: 88 n. 2]. 
75 His credibility is explicitly established, as well, for readers who accept his claims of 
poetic and didactic excellence, as for instance in the proem to book 4, repeated from late 




The guise of a satirist explains the sometimes-contemptuous attitude in the 
speaker’s refutations of opposing philosophical viewpoints.  It also works to mask the 
true nature of DRN’s straw men.  Throughout the text, explanations that run counter to 
the ego’s own Epicurean account of the universe are presented, often unfairly, and biased 
portraits of people who believe or behave contrary to his teachings are brought forth for 
ridicule.  For example, the speaker mocks the notion (and thus implicitly those who be-
lieve) that animals were introduced to the earth via a golden thread suspended from the 
sky (cf. p. 118 n. 156, above), without describing or even noting the existence of the alle-
gorical interpretation that some who hold the belief (including Plato) provide for it. 
In similar fashion, the mise en scène of Natura Rerum at the end of book 3 (cf. pp. 
133–139, above) constructs a second-person addressee who aggregates a remarkable 
number of negative, un-Epicurean traits into one fictionalized identity—a second-person 
identity, in other words, that does not allow to the addressee (or reader) anything of his 
(or her) own subjectivity.  Natura Rerum satirizes a straw man figure, makes the “you” of 
her satire a caricature.  And yet: her satiric bluster papers over this tendentious addressee-
construction, and, to adapt Rosen writing on the satirist-figure more generally, “it takes 
considerable effort for an audience not to take [her] ranting at face value” [2007: x]. 
Now, chief among these straw men are the Presocratics, whom the Lucretian ego 
conjures, rejects, and mocks in the poem’s first book.  The critiques of Heraclitus and 
Anaxagoras are, as we have seen, satiric through and through.  Part and parcel of this sa-
tiric invective is a skewed portrayal of the philosophers’ doctrines.  There is no mention, 
for instance, of the interpretive richness of Heraclitus’ seemingly murky sayings, and the 
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reductio ad absurdum of Anaxagorean ὁμοιομερία is in many respects unfairly reduc-
tive.76  The straw-man argument against the Presocratics is part of what Brown terms the 
“satirical strategy” of DRN [1983: 155].  By doing here what a satirist does, by becoming 
a satirist (if only for a few-score lines), the ego taps into the set of characteristics associ-
ated with the mode of satire and thus purveys an image of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras as 
debased, turpitudinous victims of satire. 
At the same time, however, there is an important didactic point to the passage.  As 
Brown writes, the ego “also wishes to convey a serious epistemological point about the 
limitations of arguing from the visible to the invisible” [1983: 152 n. 41].  I suggest that 
the potential for tension between earnest intellectual argumentation and humorous, satiric 
attack in this instance actually enhances the force of the argument, in predisposing the 
reader to spurn the principles of the Presocratics and adopt that which the ego advocates.  
Satiric strategy bolsters epistemological intent.77 
My account allows us to understand the philosophic invective, therefore, not as 
Lucretian error or isolation from the maisntream of contemporary philosophical inqury 
and debate, but rather as part of DRN’s persistent, even systematic engagement with the 
mode of satire.  A philosopher engaged in  doxography—an innovator like Epicurus or 
even an honest but partisan heir to the tradition like Philodemus (or, elsewhere on the 
                                                
76 Cf. Brown [1983], Tatum [1984], Wardy [1988: 116–117, 125–127], and others, contra 
Eckman [1899: 43]: DRN’s “representation of the position of Anaxagoras is certainly a 
fair one.” 
77 As Warren writes after discussing the refutation of the Presocratics, the Lucretian ego’s 
“concerns are primarily didactic and therapeutic” [2007: 31], cf., again, Nussbaum 
[2009/1994]. 
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philosophical spectrum, Cicero78)—aims to expound opposing viewpoints well enough to 
be able to offer genuine, informed critique of those viewpoints’ intellectual weaknesses, 
although the presentation of these viewpoints may be polemical and may highlight the 
weaknesses more than is due.  A satirist, on the other hand, unflinchingly distorts the 
facts in his favor, so that his cause seems inherently moral, seems obviously justifed, and 
so that his straw-man opponents can become the targets of collusive blame and comic 
mockery shared between satirist and audience.  DRN does not present Heraclitus, Anax-
agoras, the Skeptics, and the rest in completely fair light because DRN is in these mo-
ments a satiric text, employing a larger-scale version of coercive argumentation to pre-
dispose the reader, placed by the text into the role of student, towards the speaker’s own 
beliefs and asseverations.79  Thus any supposed “gaps” in DRN between actual philoso-
phies and their representations in the text may perhaps in fact be not really gaps, but 
rather the footprints of satire.80 
 
                                                
78 On Cicero’s doxography, see, e.g., McKirahan [1996].  For DRN’s own use of dox-
ography, see, e.g., Rösler [1973: 50 and passim] and Piazzi [2006: 12–15].  Piazzi re-
marks on the contrast between Ciceronian doxography and DRN’s own “slealtà e faz-
iosità argomentativa—che è l’opposto del fair play cui è improntato il dialogo platonico e 
ciceroniano” [2006: 17; emphasis preserved]. 
79 Cf. Brown [1983: 150 n. 26]: “Lucretius advocates Epicureanism in the proselytizing 
spirit of a missionary, not like an objective scholar, so it is only natural to expect unfair-
ness in his polemics.”  Compare also Runia’s remark that Greek doxographers’ treatises 
“were grist for the Lucretian mill, because he could use their diaereses to make the right 
answers quite clear” [1997: 103].  Piazzi refers to “la tendenza a stravolgere e banalizzare 
le dottrine avversarie,” particularly in DRN’s attack on Anaxagoras [2006: 16]. 
Dessen similarly points to a straw man-like use of Alcibiades in Persius poem 4: 
“Persius needs an obvious vice to satirize and so he introduces Alcibiades after he has 
entered politics and his corruption by the people has already begun” [1968: 62]. 
80 Cf. Clay [1983: 238]: “In their [“some readers”] attachment to what is familiar and 




Another part of the satiric strategy is dogma.  The essential foundation for the Lu-
cretian persona’s argument is the doctrine of Epicurus,81 and it is on this basis that he 
criticizes alternative or opposing physical theories.  Furthermore, the speaker consistently 
recurs to certain Epicurean doctrinal standards—that the universe consists of matter and 
void, that the transformation of something is the death of that which existed before, that 
nothing can be created from nothing—when disproving his philosophical adversaries’ 
standpoints.  Thus Brown refers to “the dogmatic standpoint from which Lucretius criti-
cizes the Presocratics”82 and remarks that “often in his treatment of the Presocratics, Lu-
cretius falls back on a point of dogma which has been previously established” [1983: 
156].  Through the assumption that Epicurus’ first principles of natural philosophy (so to 
speak) are rock-solid Fact, the speaker is able to mock and satirize academic dissidents as 
unquestionably erroneous and misguided. 
Dogma promotes a framework of didaxis in DRN, one that has an effect on the 
reader’s reception of the work.  Based dogmatically on fixed precepts of Epicurus in his 
consideration and rejection of countervailing philosophies, DRN establishes a master-
teacher bond, anterior to the poem itself, between Epicurus and the Lucretian ego.  This 
relationship is then in the course of the work applied by transference to ego and reader, as 
Warren explains: the “relationship of dogmatic master and accepting pupil…is a relation-
ship which is replicated between Lucretius, now the instructor, and his readers” [2007: 
                                                
81 Particularly Περὶ φύσεως (On Nature), cf. Sedley [1998: ch. 5]. 
82 Cf. Waltz’ attribution to DRN’s speaker of “un tour d’esprit idéologique et dog-
matique” [1949: 80]. 
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31].  Dogmatic master and accepting pupil, indeed.  Use of the straw-men Presocratics 
coerces the reader into following the speaker’s critique unquestioningly, and the dog-
matic standpoint that the speaker takes in the critique coerces the reader into accepting 
his disparagements and animadversions wholesale. 
Yet we do not see here (or much elsewhere) a relentless drive toward comedy un-
dercutting the didactic claims of satire.  Although there are points in DRN where some 
modern readers have felt that serious philosophical argument is in fact undercut by affec-
tation of comic style—take, for instance, the criticisms leveled upon portions of the refu-
tation of the fear of death in book 3, or upon the invective against love and sex in book 
483—the poem overall seems to manage successfully the twin impetus of teaching and 
entertaining.  Tension between satiric and didactic impulses, yes, but not completely ir-
resolvable tension.  Both forces work to push the reader into a discipular position of ac-
ceptance, of susceptibility to the speaker’s occasionally tendentious argumentation. 
So it is in the case of the straw-men Presocratics.  Of the Lucretian ego’s invec-
tive against them, Tatum comments, “Lucretius’ approach is doxographical.  The use of 
such a polemical doxography is hardly surprising, however, since it was a regular feature 
                                                
83 Book 3, e.g., Kenney: “This paragraph marks the point at which the diatribe-
satirist…takes control of the argument” [1971: 199 ad 3.870–839]; and “the vividness 
and particularity of the illustration suggests that the influence of the diatribe here too pre-
dominates over Epicurean doctrine” [1971: 238 ad 3.1053–1075]. 
Book 4, e.g., Stearns [1936: 349] (“[i]ts violent spirit is quite un-Epicurean”), 
MacKendrick & Howe [1952: 171] (it is “savage”), Miner & Dearing [1969: 12] cited in 
Gillespie & Hardie [2007b: 12] (Dryden acknowledges its “Obscenity”), and Prosperi 
[2007: 216] (Speroni’s prior enthusiasm for the passage metamorphosed into allegations 
of its impiety after Speroni himself was denounced to the Inquisition). 
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of Epicurean writing.”84  Sedley, however, says that ancient accusations that Epicurus 
himself harshly abused his philosophical rivals are perhaps explained more by hostile 
anti-Epicurean propaganda than by Epicurus’ actual practice (and cf. Brown [1983: 150 
n. 26] as well).  Where Tatum writes “polemical,” then, we might well instead insert “sa-
tiric”: the traits of the anti-Presocratic invective that Tatum identifies as polemical are 
ones that we have considered under the rubric of the satirist (p. 67 nn. 60 and 62, and p. 
76, above).  At any rate, the point here is that the use of the mode of satire does not nec-
essarily generate incontrovertible conflict with a poem’s didacticism. 
Nor is it in absolute conflict with a didact’s poetry.  Tatum again makes a claim of 
this type, while evaluating the persona’s defense of poetry as a legitimate medium for the 
transmission of Epicurean principles: “[t]he polemical doxography, a common feature of 
Epicurean writing and a traditional outlet for the Epicurean writer’s creativity, is ex-
ploited by Lucretius to make his case for Epicurean philosophical poetry” [1984: 189].  
In other words, DRN’s adaptation of polemical doxography (by refiguring it as satiric in-
vective) creates grounds for the justification of a poetic exposition of Epicurean ideology.  
It is possible to comprehend how such justification may have seemed necessary by look-
ing at the longtime scholarly debate over the supposed opposition between poetry and 
philosophy in this poem. 
                                                
84 Tatum [1984: 178].  See further Edwards [1989]; Gale points to “[t]he polemical ele-
ment present in Lucretius’ exploitation of the heroic epic tradition” [2005: 185].  Waltz 
states that philosophy is essentially linked with and supported by polemic: “[t]out phi-
losophie, en effet, et tout disciple des philosophes, en même temps qu’il affirme sa propre 
conviction, est porté par état à la controverse, à la polémique doctrinale” [1949: 83].  The 
Lucretian ego is no exception, and brings polemic in line with satire: “l’attitude de Lu-
crèce est toujours celle du combat; son arme favorite, la moquerie méprisante; son ton, 
celui de la satire la plus acerbe” [ibidem]. 
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Poetry vs. philosophy? 
The debate is massive85—we will merely skim its surface here—and the “poetry 
vs. philosophy” concept is in many ways the heir of the notion of “anti-Lucrèce chez Lu-
crèce,” the famous formulation of Patin [1900/1868] whereby DRN reflects psychological 
vacillations within the historical Lucretius between rational espousal of Epicurus’ physics 
and passages of unsound, ecstatic emotion driven by the love potion that Jerome claims 
made Lucretius insane (and eventually killed him).86  The poetry-philosophy line of rea-
soning, thankfully, tends to focus more on the text than on “Lucretius,” but it neverthe-
less consists of identifying places where the poetic tendencies in DRN override the 
poem’s philosophical program, or vice versa.  It is worth consideration here because 
some of the resolutions for the poetry-philosophy “conflict” that have been provided in 
scholarship shed light on ways in which we can understand potential tensions between 
satire and didaxis. 
                                                
85 Fowler refers to “[t]he celebrated opposition between philosophy and poetry in the De 
rerum natura,” which in his view “can to an extent be rephrased in terms of an opposition 
between the differing reading practices of two interpretive communities” [2000c: 138].  
The term “interpretive community” is from Fish [1976]; cf. the “superreader” of Rif-
faterre [1980].  On the supposed conflict between philosophy and poetry, see Asmis 
[1991a, 1991b, 1995], Fowler [1991: 237], Obbink [1995], Holmes [2005: 527 and n. 2], 
O’Hara [2007: 65–67], Barfield [2011], and especially Martindale [2005: 182–200], on 
philosophy and poetry in DRN and in its reception during the 19th and 20th centuries. 
For a similar opposition between didactic poetry and didactic prose, see Philode-
mus De Poematis 5 and Strabo 1 (especially 1.2.3–6) with, among others, Mangoni 
[1988], Hutchinson [2009], and Sedley [1999: 233]: DRN’s speaker “was ready in princi-
ple simply to draw his imagery from the technical terminology of Greek Epicurean prose, 
but…such borrowings only survived if they could prove their independent worth in the 
context of Latin poetic imagery.”  For one such technical term, see my comments on 
naturae species ratioque (p. 91 n. 105, above). 
86 Cf. also Clay [1983: 234–238], Johnson [2000: 123–127], and O’Hara [2007: 64–69]. 
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West gives us an emblematic example, in regard to 4.528–534, where he takes is-
sue with the speaker’s exemplum of hoarseness as proof of the corporeality of sound: 
“[j]udged as an exposition of a philosophical argument it is unsatisfac-
tory…Pedagogically this is not as it should be.  The pedagogue has been overborne by 
the poet” [1994: 42].  The assumption here is that poetic pleasure or art and scientific in-
struction are mutually exclusive—or at least, to repurpose Rosen, that poetry and phi-
losophy are “if not antithetical to one another, then certainly in constant tension” [2007: 
223].  Or again, Goar: “the poet in Lucretius occasionally overcomes the philosopher and 
the scientist” [1971: 76].  In Lucretius, as these scholars would have it, the poem’s 
speaker is divided into discrete personas, the poet and the philosopher and the scientist.  
The proponents of the “poetry vs. philosophy” reading of DRN prefer analytical reduction 
of the Lucretian ego into component parts rather than a unified, multivalent interpreta-
tion.  The speaker cannot multitask; he must take off his thinking cap if he wants to put 
on his artist’s beret.87 
Now, the speaker himself claims that DRN is the first systematic expression of 
Epicurean philosophy in poetic form (cf. 1.926–934 = 4.1–9).  And the extant evidence 
appears to bear him out: “in using poetry to expound Epicureanism he made a conscious 
and significant innovation in the Garden.”88  DRN’s speaker defines himself as a philoso-
                                                
87 Compare Minyard’s comment that “[a]nalysis and art are two fundamentally different 
and differing modes of knowing” [1985: 58], and O’Hara’s that “there is some soundness 
in the basic idea that there is a tension between the fervor of the poem and the claim that 
it is written in serenity” [2007: 65].  Cf. also Segal [1990: 46–47]; and Martindale’s 
overview of the history of this idea in the generation after Kant [2005: 182–190]. 
88 Tatum [1984: 189].  Cf. Minyard [1985: 57]: “Lucretius added a literary dimension to 
Epicureanism, and in this he was novel both as an Epicurean and as a poet.  To this point, 
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pher-poet, not a poet-philosopher—according to him, the locus of his genius is in the 
form, not the content.  So also Warren: “[h]e himself makes clear that his innovations are 
confined to the method of expression of Epicurean ideas.  In all philosophical matters he 
is merely following the path already worked by Epicurus’ footprints” [2007: 21].  War-
ren’s mention of Epicurus’ footprints is an allusion to DRN 5.55–56 (cited and translated 
at p. 84, above).  We can thus on the one hand take these (Epicurus’) footprints to be phi-
losophical footprints, the tracks of content, and on the other hand consider the footprints 
whose absence is highlighted in 1.926–927 = 4.1–2 (auia Pieridum peragro loca nullius 
ante | trita solo, “I wander along the pathless tracts of the Muses, places touched by no 
foot before”) to be poetic footprints, the trackless path of a verse adaptation of Epicurean 
philosophy.89  If we do so, the apparent conflict between the statements “I walk where no 
one has before” (proem to book 4) and “I walk in tracks made by Epicurus” (proem to 
book 5) is resolved. 
And yet the newness of DRN may not be poetic alone.  In Schrijvers’ view, “[t]he 
propagandistic prologues of De Rerum Natura offer a somewhat simplified and popular-
ized version of the philosophical teaching of pleasure” [2007: 61].  We could count this 
                                                
there had been no poetic rendition of Epicurean doctrines.”  Compare Sider [1987, 1995], 
Asmis [1995], and Janko [1995]. 
89 Paratore & Pizzani [1960: 311–312] and Kenney [1970], among many others, connect 
this image to Alexandrian poetic topoi—cf. Paratore & Pizzani [1960: 310], Cupaiuolo 
[1966: 137–141], and Kenney [1970: 369–370]—and to Callimachus in particular.  For 
connections between DRN, Philodemus, and the Neoterics in Rome, see Ferrero [1949], 
Neudling [1949], Minyard [1985: 28 and n. 14], and Armstrong [1995].  See also O’Hara 
[1998: 70]: “deliberate allusion or borrowing is consistent with Lucretian practice and 
with his apparently broad knowledge of Greek poetry.”  Knox [1999] argues ardently that 
the footprints DRN’s speaker follows are indeed philosophical, and not Alexandrian or 
Callimachean poetic tracks.  Schindler discusses this passage as part of DRN’s program 
of allegory [2000: 132–137, 146–148]. 
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as an innovation—the adaptation of Epicurus’ teachings not only linguistically and poeti-
cally, into Latin and into verse, but also substantively, into a work accessible to an audi-
ence broader than the philosophic literati of Hellenistic Greece.90 
Moreover, the boundaries between philosophy and poetry, between instruction 
and entertainment, are not so finite as the simple “poetry vs. philosophy” (or “satire vs. 
didactic”) debate might suggest.  For instance, Wallach points out that “the act of learn-
ing can be connected with pleasure, and one should not assume that a didactic work itself 
cannot be beautiful poetry” [1976: 116].  Learning can be pleasurable: it can embody the 
ethical principles that undergird DRN’s scientific explanations of the universe.  And, in 
turn, teaching can be a thing of beauty: it is possible to present serious concepts and ma-
terial in an aesthetically pleasing (!) manner.91  The two impulses can, and do, intermin-
gle. 
I believe that the alleged poetry-philosophy conundrum (that is, the tension be-
tween didactic and poetic imperatives) is thus no more unsolvable and no less manipula-
ble for the speaker than is the potential for tension between didactic and satiric impera-
tives.  At any rate, the “problem” of DRN’s use of poetry is extrinsic, not intrinsic, to the 
poem.  In other words, the poem does not problematize its status as didactic poetry, but 
rather makes its very poeticism integral to the didactic plot’s success.  Perhaps the best 
support for my contention is the honey on the cup simile of 1.936–950 (discussed at p. 
123, above).  Poetry, for the Lucretian speaker, is the tool by which he makes accessible, 
                                                
90 Though see my evaluation of the complex debate over DRN’s audience at pp. 15–23.  I 
also note that the Lucretian speaker’s problematic claims of originality mirror Epicurus’ 
own claims of being an autodidact, on which see Erler [2011]. 
91 Compare my discussion of types of didactic at pp. 20–21. 
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palatable, comprehensible the contents and objectives of his didaxis.  (Along these same 
lines, satire is the tool by which he makes appreciable and persuasive the philosophical 
and moral criticisms of his didaxis.)  “In Lucretius, poetry and philosophy do not fight.”92 
Yet, as scholarship on DRN has shown, the utility of poetry is not limited to pur-
ple passages as might be suggested by the metaphor of the honeyed cup-rim, but instead 
poetic artfulness in fact pervades the work and is inextricably incorporated with philoso-
phical argument.  In the same way, the moral or ethical (we might say “satiric”) objec-
tives of the poem are, as Fowler relates, constantly and deliberately at hand during the 
work’s discussions of physics: 
Throughout the purely physical sections of the work, the De rerum 
natura constantly insinuates arguments against its two main tar-
gets, the fear of the gods and of death…the poem shows itself per-
fectly aware of the way in which its own meaning is constituted.93 
 
DRN, Fowler is arguing, exhibits an objectival heterogeneity that does not undercut but 
indeed reinforces its component purposes. 
In this way we can perceive an integration of satire with didactic, because DRN’s 
targets, I argue—targets of moralizing blame and satiric mockery—are integrated with 
the poem’s more straightforward scientific doctrine.  Didactic and satiric impulses coex-
ist, mutually enhance the speaker’s aims; and the speaker’s interweaving of the two is 
                                                
92 Wardy [1988: 128].  Cf. also Segal [1990] and, contra, Anderson [1993b: 169]; O’Hara 
[2007: 64–69], who does not completely endorse easy resolution of the problem; and 
Hardie on “the now orthodox version whereby the poet’s powers of empathy and imagis-
tic association are working with rather than against the philosophical message” [1992: 
299]. 
93 Fowler [2000c: 148].  Fowler, whose study is focused on literary intertexts in DRN, 
favors “emphasis on the way in which they contribute to the master argument rather than 
on their potential for disruption” [2000c: 155].  Instead of conceding multiple personali-
ties (“the poet” and “the philosopher”) to the poem’s ego, we can with Fowler look for a 
unified, more complex interpretation of the poem’s self-presentation. 
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intentional.94  Thus Wardy writes, on 2.973–990,95 “[t]his is satire, but not in lieu of ar-
gument” [1988: 128].  Two more examples: first, the mockery of the belief that motion 
can exist without void (DRN 1.370–383) is a step along the path of atoms and void that 
the speaker unfolds in the first book, a misconception that must be eliminated for the 
reader to understand properly the atomic theory of Epicurus.  And second, after the 
acerbically satiric rhetorical questions in the first speech of Natura Rerum comes an im-
portant new take on DRN’s rejection of the fear of death (3.945–949, cf. pp. 133–139, 
above).  In sum, whether the Lucretian persona is using satire to produce a straw man 
against which to argue (as we have seen previously) or is instead, as in these examples, 
fusing satiric attack with extended and legitimate argument, he successfully reconciles 
the (at times divergent) drives for education and entertainment of the reader. 
 
The teacher’s transitoriness 
I turn now to the issue in DRN of teaching’s transitory nature—the possibility that 
didactic success may close off the potential for continued didactic production, a modal 
                                                
94 Compare Waltz, who sees didactic intent behind all of DRN’s raillery: “jamais Lucrèce 
ne raille pour railler, mais bien toujours pour nous ouvrir les yeux et nous instruire; c’est 
dans le péril [we might say “le péril satirique”] et le malheur qu’il faut juger les homes” 
[1949: 95].  The satiric attacks, in turn, are strengthened by the work’s philosophical un-
derpinnings, which keep the argument from becoming feeble: “[c]e ton combatif et iro-
nique…pourrait, semble-t-il, affaiblir son argumentation, sans la forte armature dialec-
tique dont il la soutient constamment” [1949: 103].  
95 In this passage the Lucretian ego suggests that atoms with sense-perception would ex-
hibit laughter, tears, and infighting.  Cf. 1.915–920, the reductio ad absurdum of 
ὁμοιομερία into laughing and crying atoms; this passage is discussed at pp. 69 and 109, 
above. 
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concern for satire (and a generic concern for Roman satura96).  Can such a concern, or the 
Lucretian speaker’s response to it, be detected within his poem?  We can well point to 
DRN’s infrequent but important references to poetic/didactic glory.  Epicurus is, accord-
ing to DRN’s speaker, metaphorically divine (DRN 5.8) and in possession of skywards-
borne posthumous glory (6.7–9)—both because of his teachings.  As for himself, the 
speaker seeks an insignis corona from the Muses (1.929 = 4.4) not singularly because of 
his poetic achievements (1.933–934 = 4.8–9) but also because of his moral-didactic ac-
complishment (1.931–932 = 4.6–7).  Success of the didactic plot, therefore, brings with it 
tangible and sizeable rewards, despite the (perhaps inevitable) end of the teacher-student 
relation. 
So the transience of didaxis is not in and of itself inherently or expressly problem-
atic for didactic poetry, although it may be for satire.  Perhaps even the seeming abrupt-
ness, and the doom and gloom, of DRN’s final, plague-ridden scene can be seen to in-
clude a tacit allusion to the end of the teaching relationship?  That the plague scene can 
be read as a sort of final exam testing the reader’s apprehension and adoption of the Epi-
curean anti-anxiety mindset has been suggested by, among others, Segal, who argues that 
the plague passage is the ultimate embodiment of the poem’s teaching against the fear of 
death.97  I would furthermore point out that we can consider the description of the plague 
                                                
96 Cf. Keane [2006: 113], on Sermones book 2: “The series of poems plays with the 
metaphor of satire as teaching by making Horace both redundant and vulnerable while his 
acquaintances make forays into didacticism and satire.” 
97 Segal [1990: ch. 10], cf. Minadeo [1969: 30], Bright [1971], Johnson [2000: 31], and 
especially Commager [1957: 114]: “The architecture of the poem culminates here, as the 
various perceptions of man’s folly unite in a final despairing integrity of vision.”  Maybe 
not so much despairing as exacting, or trying.  See also Clay [1983: 225] and, contra, 
Porter [2003: 219–225] and [2007: 172]: “Scenes of natural disaster are fearful because 
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to be a joint intellectual inquiry between master (speaker) and disciple (reader), as evi-
denced by the speaker’s use of second-person verbs of observation—for instance, DRN 
6.1163–1664, nec nimio cuiquam posses ardore tueri | corporis in summo summam 
feruescere partem (“and yet you couldn’t see the outermost part of anyone’s body fever-
ish in excessive heat”).98 
This cooperative learning experience is not one simply of the history of epidemi-
ology, as was DRN’s source passage in Thucydides, but one also of how best to live life 
and avoid the ills that anxiety produces.  As Commager remarks, the Lucretian speaker 
“view[s] physical phenomena in moral or psychological terms” [1957: 105].  In fact, I 
believe, the speaker belabors the linking of ataractic moral allegory with the clinical 
symptomatology of the plague.  Take a passage describing plague symptoms: 
multaque praeterea mortis tum signa dabantur: 
perturbata animi mens in maerore metuque, 
triste supercilium, furiosus uoltus et acer, 
sollicitae porro plenaeque sonoribus aures, 
creber spiritus aut ingens raroque coortus, 
sudorisque madens per collum splendidus umor, 
tenuia sputa minuta, croci contacta colore 
salsaque, per fauces rauca uix edita tussi. 
       (DRN 6.1182–1189) 
 
Furthermore, many signs of death would then be provided: an in-
tellect disordered amid the grief and fear of the mind, a gloomy 
expression, a wild and fierce countenance; additionally ears both-
ered and filled with sounds, hyperventilation or infrequent deep-
seated gasps; and the sheening moisture of sweat dripping across 
                                                
they portend the unimaginable…But for an atomist it can be a sublime sensation…All of 
Book 6 has this feel of a detached spectacle about it.”  I have earlier touched on Lucretian 
sublimity (p. 155 n. 36, above); and cf. Conte’s “sublime reader” in DRN [1994: ch. 1] 
and, for Horace’s (sometimes ironic) reception of the Lucretian sublime, see Hardie 
[2009: ch. 6]. 
98 Additionally: posses…uidere (6.1257) and uideres (1268). 
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the neck, thin bits of mucus, tinged with saffron hue and salty, 
produced with difficulty through the pharynx by a hoarse cough. 
 
The symptomatology is there: mental imbalance, tinnitus, respiratory difficulties, sweats, 
phlegm, tussiculation.  But it is paired with, and preceded by, an account of the psychic 
symptoms much akin to the emotional complications that attend upon ambition, greed, 
lust, and the like earlier in DRN.  Anxiety (perturbata…mens), mental anguish 
(animi…in maerore), fear (metus), madness (furiosus uoltus).  The two lines of psycho-
somatic troubles overshadow—or at least help shape our reception of—the reader’s re-
ception of the subsequent five lines on purely the disease’s somatic components.99  We 
may even take away from this passage the implication that the physical manifestations of 
the disease are a result of the individuals’ lack of psychological/intellectual equilib-
rium—or that this lack heightens the effects and the emotional repercussions of somatic 
afflictions that could otherwise have been tolerable.100 
The plague is (subtly) marked as a closing lesson for the student of Epicureanism.  
The radical/acute divergence/variance between the Epicurean’s ataractic life and the typi-
cal plague victim’s manifestly anataractic death could represent the disciple’s final com-
mitment either to the off-the-main-road path of Epicureanism, success, happiness, and 
independence or to an unenlightened life that is nasty, brutish, and short.  However the 
student decides, the finality of the choice—coupled with both the finality of plague-borne 
death and the obvious finality of the poem’s conclusion (note the final word: desereren-
                                                
99 Cf. Commager [1957: 105–107] on the novel diction and intratextual resonances of 
anxius angor at DRN 6.1158. 
100 Compare Rouse & Smith [1975: 579 n. a]: “[t]he truth is that the prospect of salvation 
and of a heaven on earth which Lucr. offers in the DRN shines with a brighter and 
stronger light on account of this dark and hellish picture of what life is like without the 
guidance of Epicurus.” 
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tur, 6.1286101)—amounts to the end of DRN’s didaxis.  The didactic plot does not allow 
for a teacher-student relationship after the work is over; and yet, the didactic plot is suc-
cessful,102 there is no problem with didaxis’ transitory nature. 
Finally, let us look at DRN through the lens of Habinek’s claim that a concern of 
satire is keeping its playmates, its targets, around [2005: 182].  The Lucretian ego, too, 
hangs on to his targets.  Things like the fear of death, lust and greed and ambition, mis-
judgments of sense-perception, and the idiotic stolidi serve well as perennial targets.  
They are not going away; the out-group, when it consists of characters with such basic 
human faults, is continually present. 
The poem’s didactic plot, in other words, provides for its self-replication.  Both 
satire and protreptic philosophy like DRN have a vested interest in assuring their self-
continuation—because their respective rhetorical stances (or poetic plots) have expiration 
dates, so to speak, built into them.  The satiric poet is intrinsically concerned with further 
poetic production, and the didact, the teacher, the tutor always welcomes or even seeks 
out more students.  And in a society as misguided, as flawed, as intellectually and mor-
ally abject as the one in which the Lucretian ego locates himself, his supply of recruits 
will never run dry. 
 
 
                                                
101 Bockemüller & Martin both proposed moving DRN 6.1247–1251 to follow the last 
line (1286), according to Rouse & Smith [1975: 586–587 ad 6.1237/1245] and Fowler 
[1997] provides some stylistic support for the emendation.  Cf. also Bright [1971], Kelly 
[1980], and Gale [1994a: 224 n. 69]. 
102 Volk states that the simple existence of DRN proves that the didactic plot it constructs 
has been successful [2010: 130]. 
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Conclusion to chapters 2 and 3 
 
The satirist in the Graeco-Roman mode of satire is comic, personalized, mocking, 
indignant, self-righteous yet socially abject, and collusive, as we saw in chapter 2.  He 
(rarely she) addresses a divided or double audience, including those who take his critique 
of the target seriously and those who see themselves as part of the “in-group,” aware of 
the satirist’s game of self-contradictory stances.  He can also, as I have argued, seek or 
desire actual improvement of the flaws and faults he chides, even if he portrays himself 
as disenfranchised (as with the Juvenal-ego) and even if such improvement could obviate 
the specific instantiation of his satiric verse.  The discrepancies between high ground and 
abjection, between seriousness and comedy, and between need for the continuation of 
satire and genuine desire for a better world altogether generate the satirist’s characteristic 
ambivalence and fundamental elusiveness. 
The speaker of DRN adopts each of these aspects of the satirist multiple times.  
His invective against the Presocratic philosophers Heraclitus and Anaxagoras is a particu-
larly good example of comic, intellectually self-righteous mockery that uses reductio ad 
absurdum, coercive argumentation, and straw-man figures to refute the opposing ideo-
logues’ viewpoints.  His personalized voice makes disingenuous claims of linguistic ab-
jection and is often expressed in collusive terms, linking speaker and addressee, speaker 
and reader through shared experiences—and, eventually, linking speaker and reader 
through shared contempt for the addressee (“Memmius”) and other satiric targets, who 
are often described with the pathetic, even comic epithet miser. 
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Satire’s three main characteristics are an object or target that provokes the satire, a 
formal (generally literary) antecedent, and humor, particularly irony and parody.  Ambi-
guity is another hallmark of satire—just like the elusiveness of the satirist.  Occasionally, 
satire’s ambiguity elicits criticism and censure from individuals who do not properly un-
derstand the mode’s function. 
Among the many targets of satire in DRN, I have identified the originary object as 
religio.  For antecedents to DRN’s use of satire we can look to satura (genre), to hexame-
ter poetry (medium/form), and particularly to the discourse of Graeco-Roman diatribe.  
Humor generated from irony and parody is evident throughout DRN, especially in (again 
and again) the anti-Presocratic invective.  We can detect ambiguity and ambivalence in 
DRN on the level of specific words, description, linguistics, and even philosophical ra-
tionales for natural phenomena. 
The proem to book 2, I argue, is emblematic of DRN’s relation to satire.  It is 
ironic, and mockingly assigns blame to its target.  It is ambiguous enough that some 
readers will misunderstand it, and hence react negatively to its contents.  It criticizes the 
degraded experience of public/civic life in Roman society and thereby places the 
ἀταραξία of Epicureanism well above the toil and trouble of Roman business and poli-
tics.  It can, further, be read metapoetically and metasatirically, as a note on the pleasure 
of reading DRN and its satire for an Epicurean audience. 
A significant thematic puzzle of Graeco-Roman satiric poetry is the tension be-
tween satire proper and didactic.  Satirists, that is to say, adopt the pose of a didact; at the 
same time, the comedic impetus underlying their satiric work creates the potential for 
conflict and discontinuity.  Within the stance of didaxis, satire can and does exploit the 
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teacher’s authority—satire, for example, creates straw men for targets of its blame.  But 
the didactic pose also brings with it the fleeting nature of the teacher’s role, a problem 
that pushes satirists to find ways to keep their playmates around. 
In DRN, the possibility of tension between satire and didactic works the other way 
around: the didactic pose comes prior to the pose of a satirist.  The speaker’s adoption of 
this satiric persona fuses the satirist’s moral high ground with a teacher’s credibility, and 
thus inhibits the fictive addressee’s ability to pick up on the various coercive techniques 
that the speaker employs, not least among them the straw-man arguments.  Satire—
DRN’s engagement with the mode of satire—helps us better understand why the sum-
mary and representation of opposing scientific viewpoints, particularly those of the 
Presocratics near the end of book 1, are skewed and unfair.  In essence, the ego’s invec-
tive against the Presocratics is not merely polemical but also satiric doxography; his sa-
tiric mockery of targets like Anaxagoras comes from a dogmatic standpoint, which repli-
cates between speaker and reader the same kind of master-pupil relationship that the 
speaker constructs between Epicurus and himself.  Moreover, just as DRN amalgamates 
philosophy and poetry in a more comprehensive fashion than was granted by earlier gen-
erations of Lucretian scholarship, so also tension between didactic and satire is not over-
whelmingly palpable in DRN. 
In closing, I propose that the essential trait which, at core, puts DRN in line with 
the mode of satire is a concern with observation of the world and society.  Both satire and 
didactic describe the world that their poetry inhabits; didactic additionally explains the 
world, while satire additionally judges it, criticizes the shortcomings of its denizens.  
DRN does both.  Evaluation and censure sharpen the persuasiveness of an explanation; 
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explanation in turn advances justification for censure and evaluation.  DRN, we could 
say, straddles the divide between philosophy and satire, and does so successfully by ex-
ploiting philosophy and satire’s shared goals and affinities: adoption of didactic stances, 
exposure of and admonition against vice, and professed desire for moral betterment of 
reader or society. 
My assertion is not that DRN “is” satire, any more than we would say that Aristo-
phanes “is” satire on the basis of his satiric parodies.  Rather, DRN uses the mode of sat-
ire for the numerous specific purposes that we have considered above.  I would like to 
end by raising the question of a more general, underlying intent that may be operative in 
DRN’s engagement with the satiric mode.  Does DRN’s speaker inhabit, so to speak, the 
satiric persona as a part of the process of the addressee’s or reader’s conversion to Epicu-
rean ideology?  In other words, does the serene ego whose stated goal is conversion adopt 
the satirist figure’s subjectivity in a manner similar to how, say, he invokes Venus at the 
very beginning of the poem? 
This ego, as Clay writes, “can transport himself into a world of beliefs that are en-
tirely unlike his own” [1983: 238].  He can transfer himself into the mindset of someone 
who believes false explanations of reality—witness the in-depth, effective version of the 
Phaethon tale (DRN 5.396–404, with p. 108, above)—and he can turn himself into a sati-
rist, whether through his own voice or that of the Nature of Things herself.  The ego, 
however, is in this capability unlike others: “[t]here are, of course, some readers who 
cannot easily pass from their world to his.”103  Such is the very reason for the ego’s trans-
                                                
103 Again Clay [1983: 238], and continuing: “[i]n their attachment to what is familiar and 
congenial in the world of De rerum natura they fill the poem with contradictions.”  See 
further O’Hara [2007: 66–67]. 
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portations and transformations—to make his material more accessible and acceptable to 
his audience.  Accessibility, in turn, is a crucial prerequisite for the audience’s successful 
conversion.  So, perhaps, the smaller-scale fusion of satiric and didactic impulses in the 
text of DRN is matched on the long view by a global junction of satire and didactic, both 








“Fragmentary though our knowledge of Lucilius is, 
enough survives to make the Lucretian borrowing unmistakeable, 
and to suggest that it was even more ample than we can now substantiate.” 
Dudley [1965: 122] 
 
“Lucretius may be considered…as both orthodox and heterodox.” 




In the preceding two chapters, we examined the mode of satire, its role in Graeco-
Roman satiric poetry, and the uses of it on display in DRN.  We turn now to the specific 
genre of satire, a Roman verse genre with which, I will argue, Lucretius’ poem engages 
in important ways.  Over the course of this chapter and the next, I will make the case for 
DRN’s purposeful allusion to satiric verse and adoption of satire’s generic tropes; ulti-
mately, I suggest, we should view DRN as influencing the development and trajectory of 
Roman satire, while not itself being a member proper of the genre.  In this chapter, I con-
sider DRN’s connections to earlier Roman satire, particularly to the surviving fragmen-
tary corpus of Lucilius, and in the next chapter I will take up how DRN’s engagement 
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with the genre affects later satirists from Horace to Juvenal.  Given the fragmentary na-
ture of the corpus of satire before Lucretius’ time, some suggestions of satire’s influence 
on DRN must remain tentative, but it is worthwhile to catalogue possible allusions com-
pletely. 
First, though, a few remarks are in order on the Latin term for the genre of Roman 
satire, satura—whence the English word “satire” is derived.  Quintilian’s description of 
the genre is cited most frequently: satura quidem tota nostra est, “satire indeed is entirely 
our own,” not taken over from Greek models.1  Certain aspects of Roman satire can be 
found in earlier Greek poetry—Serm. 1.6 and 1.10.16–17 point to Old Comedy, and of 
course the Roman genre of satire makes use of the Graeco-Roman mode of satire2—but, 
at core, satura is a Roman innovation.  Less often cited is the description of satire by the 
4th-century grammarian Diomedes (GLK 1.485): 
satyra dicitur carmen apud Romanos nunc quidem maledicum et ad 
carpenda hominum uitia archaeae comoediae charactere conposi-
tum, quale scripserunt Lucilius et Horatius et Persius. set olim 
carmen quod ex uariis poematibus constabat satyra uocabatur, 
quale scripserunt Pacuuius et Ennius. 
                                                
1 Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 10.1.93.  Cf., among many others, van Rooy [1955] and 
Freudenburg [2005b: 2]. 
2 Korus [1991] traces the development of Menippean satire—what he calls the only genre 
recognized as satiric in antiquity, “Die einzige Gattung, die in der Antike als satirisch an-
erkannt wurde, war die Menippeische Satire” [1991: 13]—from Homeric backgrounds 
through the now-lost works of Menippus into Latin and later Greek authors, namely 
Varro, Petronius, Apuleius, and Lucian.   Kronenberg adduces the influence of Socratic 
dialogues (as transmitted both by Plato and by Xenophon) on Menippean satire [2009: 4] 
and argues that Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, Varro’s De Re Rustica, and Vergil’s Georgics 
should all be considered Menippean satire [2009: passim].  (In her argument for treating 
Georgics as satire [2009: chh. 6–7], Kronenberg treats DRN as a straightforward account 
or ratio of the universe’s ordering based on scientific principles.)  On Menippean satire, 
see also Kirk [1980], Relihan [1984, 1993], Kaplan [2000], Rimell [2005], and Weinbrot 
[2005]; and see Long [1978] for an account of the Greek “satirist” Timon of Phlius. 
 200 
 
“Satire” is the term for a poetic form belonging to the Romans.  
Now, indeed, it is abusive, and put together for critiquing the flaws 
of people, in the style of Old Comedy, like the kind that Lucilius 
and Horace and Persius wrote.  But previously a poem that con-
sisted of various metrical forms was called “satire,” like the kind 
that Pacuvius and Ennius wrote. 
 
Roman satire is thus a polymorphous genre, consisting of both poetry and prose, of mul-
tiple styles and registers, and of a variety of topics and subject matter.  Besides the poems 
of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal—the four authors to whom the phrase “Roman 
satire” most often refers—satura encompasses the satiric prose works of Varro of Reate 
(his Menippean satires3) and the poetic medley titled Saturae by Ennius, and may argua-
bly include Petronius’ mostly-prose Satyrica as well.  This polyphony does justice to one 
of the ancient etymologies for the genre’s name: that the term derives from the lanx 
satura, a “full” or “mixed” dish, a kind of potpourri of different contents and flavors.4  I 
limit my discussion in this chapter to DRN’s connections to earlier verse satire: the scarce 
extant fragments of Ennius’ Saturae and the more plentiful ones of Lucilius.  DRN al-
ludes to both authors, as I will show, and to Lucilius specifically many times.  These allu-
sions, I argue, grant satiric, poetic, and even moral authority, standing, and heritage to the 
Lucretian ego in his critique of human foibles and of the flaws of Roman society. 
 
 
                                                
3 On Varro’s Satirarum Menippearum Libri CL, see, e.g., Cèbe [1972], Hooley [2007: 2–
5, 141–143], and Kronenberg [2009: 4–5, 85–87]. 
4 For more on the etymologies of satura, see, e.g., Knight [1990] and Rotstein [2010: 
125–130, esp. 128 n. 57], and note Muecke’s point about the varied contents of the genre: 
“in practice Roman satire was not always necessarily ‘satiric’ in tone” [2005: 34]. 
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Characteristics of Roman satura in DRN 
 
Before diving into the satires of Ennius and Lucilius, it is worth considering the 
basic features of Roman verse satire in general and their presence in DRN.  One of the 
most important such features is, simply put, the mode of satire, familiar to us from chap-
ters 2 and 3.  This mode is what makes Roman satire actually satire, what it holds in 
common at core with satiric literature from ancient Greece to modern-day America.  But 
just as important as Roman satire’s use of the mode of satire—that is, of the tools, tech-
niques, and topics that form the arsenal of most satiric works—is when it does not use it.  
Not every moment of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, or Juvenal is properly “satire.”  In each 
author, there are moments and passages devoted not to satiric attack or satiric humor but 
to non-satiric concerns (such as the function of language or the making of poetry) or to 
social and moral critique in a less satiric, more straightforward vein.  DRN, too, as I have 
shown, uses the mode of satire substantially, but not exclusively, not all the time—just as 
Lucretius’ poem also uses philosophical proofs and argumentation, but not exclusively or 
ubiquitously. 
A second feature of Roman satire, one shared also by DRN and by Graeco-Roman 
satiric verse more broadly, is a didactic pose, the subject of extended discussion in chap-
ter 3 (pp. 163–171, above).  The satiric and the Lucretian egos both claim to be teachers, 
to instruct the readers (or the internal audience) for moral or intellectual or social better-
ment.  Poetry, in Roman literate society, served an educatory purpose, as moral deterrent 
and as preparation for more sophisticated philosophical inquiry and cogitation—and yet 
both satire and DRN take advantage (sometimes similarly, sometimes in different ways) 
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of this expectation of utility attendant upon Roman poetry during the Republican period, 
and thus we see in satiric verse what I have termed didactic tension, between the stated 
instructional aims of the satirist-figure and the undercutting undercurrents of his charac-
terization. 
The didactic pose present in DRN and Roman satire alike may also, I suggest, 
help explain yet another trait of both corpora, namely their poetic meter.  Although En-
nius’ Saturae and Lucilius’ earlier works (the books numbered 26–30 by scholarly con-
vention) use a variety of meters, especially iambics, trochaics, and hexameters, Lucilius’ 
fifth book (30 in the conventional numbering) appears to settle on dactylic hexameter as 
the meter of choice, and all of Lucilius’ subsequent work (books 1–25) uses the meter 
exclusively.  The satires of Horace, Persius (besides his prologue), and Juvenal follow 
suit5—and so also DRN.  Hexameter is the meter first and foremost of epic, a fact that 
Roman satirists exploit in their own poetics,6 but Homer’s hexameters were followed by 
                                                
5 Persius’ prologue is not in hexameter but rather in choliambics: the prologic exception, 
perhaps, that proves the rule.  Petronius’ Satyrica includes poems in various meters, in-
cluding (atrocious) hexameter and (botched) elegiac couplets; cf. Connors [1998].  
Varro’s Menippean satire was “mixed with a variety of poetic forms,” according to the 
testimony of Quintilian (Institutio Oratoria 10.1.95: carminum uarietate mixtum).  Mar-
tial, whose work is not generically speaking satire proper but does influence Juvenalian 
satire to great extent, writes primarily in elegiacs, choliambics, and hendecasyllables, fol-
lowing the epigrammatic model of Catullus. 
6 Cf. Muecke [2005: 41]: 
The hexameter itself was a suitable vehicle for what has been dubbed sty-
listic “mobility,” the comic or ironic switch from one stylistic register to 
another, exploited by all the Roman verse satirists.  Writing in this meter 
allowed them to adopt…the technical advances of the writers of serious 
hexameter poetry (epic, didactic), and to parody their style. 
On Lucilius and epic in particular, see Christes [2001]. 
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those of Hesiod, and later by those of several Presocratic philosophers, most notably Em-
pedocles, who serves as an important poetic exemplar for DRN.7 
Roman satire and Lucretian didactic both use hexameters: what I am proposing 
here is a relationship between the two that is more than coincidence and less than de-
pendence.8  Lucilian satire may have settled on hexameter because while the hexameter’s 
association with epic allowed for stylistic parody and play, its association with didactic 
reinforced the satiric didaxis or didactic pose.  And, likewise, the association with hex-
ameter that is one of the Lucilian corpus’ foundational contributions to the genre offered 
DRN the built-in flexibility of tone and mood that we see in the Lucretian employment of 
satire.  DRN exploits primarily the epic associations of the hexameter, but its role as the 
generic meter also of didactic and satire facilitates DRN’s shifts into a satiric register. 
We saw in chapter 2 that the Lucretian speaker has a significant interest in matters 
of language, whether in issues of translation (as with the unrenderable Anaxagorean 
ὁμοιομερία: DRN 1.830 and pp. 66–69, above) or punning etymologies (p. 64 n. 53, 
above, cf. Snyder [1980] and the “atomologies” that Friedländer [1941] discusses), or 
even complaints about the supposed poverty of the Latin language (the egestas linguae: 
DRN 1.832 and pp. 77–79, above).  Here, once more, I would point out a kinship be-
                                                
7 Sedley [1998: ch. 1]—modified by Garani [2007]—and Woolerton [2010], among oth-
ers.  And after Hesiod and the Presocratics, dactylic hexameter was the fixed meter of the 
didactic poets, as for instance Aratus and Cicero, who translated Aratus’ Phaenomena not 
long before the composition of DRN. 
8 Cf. Murley [1939: 381]: “Lucretius was in time between Lucilus and Horace, used the 
same language and what became the accepted metre of satire.”  Kenney, commenting on 
DRN 3.1082, discusses metrical links between DRN, Lucilian satire, and comedy [1971: 
243 ad loc.]. 
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tween DRN and Roman satire, particularly that of Lucilius.9  Among the fragments of 
Lucilius are at least 38 pieces dealing with language and especially linguistics—
grammar, orthography, pronunciation, and so forth.10  This kind of close attention to how 
language functions and is constructed runs closely parallel to DRN’s concentration on the 
relationship between letters and the (trans)formation of words, an analogy for elements 
and the formation of matter (as with lignis and ignis, wood and fire, DRN 1.907–914). 
Matters of language arise occasionally in the later authors of Roman satire—for 
instance, the Horatian reference to the metrical impossibility of a certain toponym (Serm. 
1.5.87: “[a place] that cannot be mentioned in [dactylic] verse,” quod uersu dicere non 
est)—but they are never so detailed or prominent as they seem to be in Lucilius’ satires 
and as they are in DRN.  I suggest that repeated incorporation of linguistic commentary 
into Lucilius’ poetry in a sense paved the way for the inclusion of similar content in 
DRN: the presence of the subject in Lucilian satire made it a topic not only fruitful meta-
phorical terrain for the Lucretian speaker’s atomistic exposition but also germane to 
DRN’s didactic-epic-satiric hexameters. 
Another important shared aspect of satire’s and DRN’s approach to language is 
the purposeful, non-incidental use of Greek words.  DRN avoids Greek transliterations, 
with certain pointed exceptions, such as the use of homoeomeria in the ridicule of Anax-
                                                
9 Cf. also Keulen’s analysis of Aulus Gellius’ satiric employment of philology [2009: 
120–126].  On Lucilius’ literary criticism, see Koster [2001] and the citations provided 
by Goldberg [2005: 177]. 
10 Lucilius frr. 1.3, 9.4–21, 6.1 (with Serm. 1.5.87), 26.7, H.1, H.3, H.4, H.25, H.85, and 
H.174–185.  All references to the text and numbering of the fragments of Lucilius in this 
chapter are to the edition of Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003]; a concordance of citations 
is supplied in Appendix 1 (pp. 374–375, below).  “H” in Charpin’s numbering refers to 
the body of Lucilian hexameters of uncertain book placement.
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agorean natural philosophy in book 1.11  Lucilian satire, on the other hand, embraces 
them, and the Lucilian ego even says he speaks “like a half-Greek,” semigraece (fr. 
9.20.1).  But his usage of Greek is intentional, not flippant, as Petersmann points out: the 
Lucilian ego is “open to the use of Greek, but he always has some special point to make; 
it is not there for show or because he cannot find a Latin equivalent” [1999: 289].12  DRN 
here is like the satire of Lucilius, for the Lucretian ego’s use of Greek words serves par-
ticular ends, often (as we saw in chapter 2) to call attention to the strangeness of a con-
cept like ὁμοιομερία.  Horace’s speaker rejects Graecisms for reasons of poetic aesthet-
ics, as did, evidently, Ennius’ Saturae.13  The Juvenalian satirist-figure’s primary use of 
Graecisms is in recriminating excessive Greek influence on Roman society.14  Like its 
satiric counterparts, then, Lucretius’ poem engages consciously with Greek vocabulary 
most often in order to point to the strangeness of the concept, behavior, or custom under 
consideration. 
Besides language, DRN and satire (both that of Lucilius and of authors after DRN) 
treat many similar topics, themes, and tropes, as I discuss at length in chapter 5.  At this 
point, I offer one more basic feature of Roman satire that we may see also in Lucretius’ 
poem.  Satire is a poetry of fullness, of satiety—of being satur, “full” or “stuffed”—and it 
is also a poetry of potpourri, of miscellany, of the mixed plate (the lanx satura).  Accord-
                                                
11 DRN 1.830, 834, with pp. 66–69, above. 
12 Cf. also Goldberg [2005: 174 n. 73, with citations] and Rudd [1986: ch. 5]. 
13 Horace: cf. Serm. 1.10.20–35, with Oliensis [1998: 40].  Ennius: cf. Petersmann’s as-
sertion that “Ennius…appears to have avoided the use of Greek” [1999: 289]. 
14 Cf. Colton [1971].  On Juvenalian satire’s use of Greek more broadly, see, e.g., Thiel 
[1901] and Serafini [1957: 365–371].  For the broader issue of the satirists’ use of Greek, 
see Chahoud [2004], and on Lucilius specifically, see Baier [2001]. 
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ingly, satires from Ennius to Juvenal feature a wide variety of subject matter, juxtaposed 
with varying degrees of integration.  In Ennius’ 31 surviving fragments one can find 
grifters, gold-mining, gout, and gluttons, and the much larger Lucilian corpus includes 
items ranging from epic parody (the council of the gods in book 1) to travelogues (book 
3’s trip to Sicily, the model for Serm. 1.5’s journey to Brundisium) to courtroom drama 
(book 2, cf. Serm. 1.7).  This all-encompassing poetic menu, so to speak, is in my estima-
tion an important part of satire’s investment in human affairs, in representing and critiqu-
ing Roman life and society. 
I see DRN, too, as containing in some related sense a poetics of fullness.15  Where 
satire is stuffed (often overstuffed; sometimes in Sermones “just enough-ed,” cf. p. 269–
271, below) with moral and sociopolitical humor, mockery, and critique—filled full to 
claim inclusion of all of society’s foibles and faults16—Lucretius’ poem brims with ex-
planations, with rationales, with imagery, with refutations of flawed reasoning and failed 
accounts of the universe.  And, like satire, DRN’s fullness serves as a way of implying 
that the poem encompasses a totality: in this case, the totality not only of the natural 
world (from Venus gubernans to plague, from atoms to magnets, with sex and death and 
evolution between) but also of human ethics and psychology.  In poetic satiety, in ap-
proach to language, in didactic pretenses, in satiric mode, and in meter, then, DRN and 
the Roman genre of satura are kin, are linked by certain similar goals and intentions, 
                                                
15 Compare also Murley’s juxtaposition of Lucilian and Lucretian lines about fullness and 
a sated/satisfied life, Lucilius fr. 5.14 (cf. Epicurus fr. 473!) with DRN 3.938, 940–942, 
and 960 [1939: 383]. 
16 Cf. Juvenal 1.85–86: “whatever people do—vows, fear, anger, pleasure, joys, discus-
sions—is the horse-feed of my little book” (quidquid agunt homines, uotum, timor, ira, 
uoluptas, | gaudia, discursus, nostri farrago libelli est). 
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Ennius’ Saturae and DRN 
 
The earliest extant Latin text that can be assigned to the category of “satire” is the 
paltry collection of Ennian fragments gathered under the rubric Saturae.  Flintoff sug-
gests that Ennius’ Saturae may in fact have been a response to a similar set of satires by 
Pacuvius, and even proposes reclassifying a Pacuvian fragment (his self-epitaph) as part 
of these satires.17  Also attributed to Ennius are two poems on philosophical topics, 
Epicharmus and Euhemerus.  Now, each of these poems (which remain in only a few 
fragments) seems to focus on a particular philosophical figure and on a particular body of 
philosophical thought—not without some levity or humor, perhaps—and so these works 
may have had some effect on DRN’s treatment of its particular philosophical figure, Epi-
curus, and his corresponding body of philosophical thought, as Ennius’ Annales have 
demonstrably had an effect on DRN’s epic language and poetics.18  For our purposes, 
however, satura begins with Ennius’ fragments—a few of which, I will argue, have in-
                                                
17 Flintoff [1990], arguing against the communis opinio as reflected in, e.g., Kenney 
[1982: 160–162].  The contents of the epitaph, which totals four lines altogether, do not 
contribute anything to augment our discussion here. 
18 On epic language and poetics, see, for example, Gale [1994a: 59–62, 106–114; 2007] 
and Harrison [2002].  The figure of Ennius himself appears in Lucretius’ poem (DRN 
1.117–126), where he is said to have seen the specter of Homer, who “explain[s to him] 
the nature of things” (rerum naturam expandere, 126). 
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fluenced DRN at specific points.  Though Ennius’ Saturae is unlike the satire familiar 
from Horace and Juvenal in particular, I assert that it should nonetheless be considered 
part of the genre of verse satura, and it is categorized as “satire” both in Diomedes (cited 
above) and in Porphyrio (ad Serm. 1.10.47; ad Epist. 1.3).19 
First and foremost is Saturae fr. 2220: “it’s not my way to behave just as if a dog 
has bitten me” (non est meum ac si me canis memorderit).  The Ennian speaker raises 
(and rejects) the image of a poet who is being attacked, who must adopt a pose of self-
defensive aggression or attack—a self-defensive position that in later satirists becomes an 
important trope, as Keane shows [2006: 47, 79, and elsewhere].  I take this monostich as 
a programmatic statement that is key to Ennius’ satiric production: unlike the archetypal 
Roman satirist familiar from Lucilius, Persius, and the rest, the satirist figure who claims 
to be both subject to attack and himself goes on the attack like a biting dog (cf. Muecke 
[1985], among others), Ennius’ ego disclaims an aggressive or violently reactionary pose, 
although we should note that there is no extant evidence for what, if any, idea of the sati-
rist-figure Ennius’ ego was making distinct from his own approach.  Muecke [2005: 42, 
cf. 40] links the difference in tone between Ennius and Lucilius to differences in social 
status (Ennius as an immigrant in need of patronage, Lucilius as a wealthy and hence in-
dependent Roman insider21). 
                                                
19 Cf. Hooley [2007: 173 n. 4].  Other modern scholars who include Ennius in the genre 
as well include Flintoff [1990] and Conte [1999: 114].  See Waszink [1972: 101–105] on 
the debate over the authorship of Saturae; Waszink himself argues that it is authentically 
Ennian but that its title should properly be Satura. 
20 All citations of Ennius’ Saturae refer to the text and numbering of Warmington [1935]. 
21 See, e.g., Raschke [1987]. 
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Whatever the reason, the tone of Ennian satura, fr. 22 announces, will tend not to 
be biting, will be more blunted and controlled.22  This trait is one that I believe we see in 
DRN as well.  Lucretius’ ego is often satiric, as we saw in chapters 2 and 3, but his satiric 
passages tend to be good-natured—ultimately concerned, that is, with getting at the truth 
and discarding (and on occasion distorting) incorrect beliefs and practices, but generally 
not possessed of unbridled aggression and unflinching acerbic attack.  In this respect, 
DRN is unlike Lucilian satire, which (at least according to the testimony of Lucilius’ sa-
tiric heirs) revels, even wallows in its vehemence and no-holds-barred offensives against 
its targets.23  And in this respect, I propose, DRN follows the earlier of its two surviving 
Roman satiric predecessors, Ennius’ Saturae (as embodied here in fr. 22), by adopting its 
less belligerent bearing. 
I would also point out a few places where DRN’s text itself sounds like certain 
fragments of Saturae.  First, the asyndetic monostich of Saturae fr. 5—resistant occur-
                                                
22 And indeed, Ennius evidently avoids the obscenity present in Lucilian satire, according 
to Muecke [2005: 36–37]. 
23 We see Lucilius’ speaker on the attack or engaged in fierce mockery at, e.g., frr. 6.7, 
14.8, 15.19, 17.2, 29.1, 29.21, and H.41.  In Lucilius book 30 (the fifth in chronological 
order of composition), as part of what LaFleur calls “a programmatic poem” [1972: 1811 
n. 61], we see the satirist-figure accused by an interlocutor of vicious attack: “and you 
break [me] in half by badmouthing me in many sermones/satires” (et maledicendo in 
multis sermonibus differs, fr. 30.18); “now, Gaius [Lucilius], since in turn you harm 
me/us by lashing” (nunc, Gai, quoniam incilans nos laedis uicissim, 30.20); “you’re 
happy when you spread publicly these damn things about me in your sermones/satires” 
(gaudes cum de me ista foris sermonibus differs, 30.22); “why don’t you just eviscerate 
me entirely, pluck me bare and burn me up, mock me and harass me?” (quin totum 
purges, deuellas me atque deuras, | exultes <et> sollicites, 30.25).  On these lines, see 
Keane [2006: 45, 76]; compare, in the same book of Lucilius, frr. 30.9, 10, 17, 19, 21, 24, 
28–30, 32. 
But I note again that Lucilius’ satire includes much more than satiric attack (cf. p. 
201, above), as shown in the work of Baier [2001], Gärtner [2001], Koster [2001], Haß 
[2007], and numerous others.  The title of Lucilius’ satires may in fact have been Ser-
mones; cf., e.g., Scholz [2000]. 
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runt obstant obstringillant obagitant, “they stand nearby, they run up, they hinder and 
hamper and harass”—is matched by similar strings of asyndeton in DRN, such as with the 
motion of atoms or their formation of various kinds of matter, in analogy to letters’ com-
position of various kinds of words.24  If we follow Warmington’s suggestion that the En-
nian fragment refers to “busybodies” [1935: 385 ad loc.], then perhaps (though without 
more context for the fragment, we cannot say for certain) the Lucretian lines use refer-
ence (or even mere similarity) to Ennius’ asyndeton as a subtle means of characterizing 
the atoms themselves: the atoms go busily about their business, running up and colliding 
and parting just like the people described by the satiric fragment. 
Moreover, with Saturae frr. 3–4, contemplor | inde loci liquidas pilatasque 
aetheris oras (“I gaze there, in that place, upon the limpid and dense shores of other-
worldly flame”), we see the speaker transported outside the bounds of everyday mortals’ 
terrain, to a place of pensiveness and wonderment.  The speaker sublimely beholds the 
almost supernatural majesty of the natural world, in what could be considered (if the 
fragment’s original context had survived) a comment on the poetics of Ennian satura.  In 
Lucretius’ poem, too, we can find the speaker far removed from mundane affairs, in a 
locale of great natural beauty, on a meditative journey of poetic import: the “pathless 
                                                
24 Motion of atoms: DRN 2.725–727, semina cum porro distent, differre necessust | in-
terualla uias conexus pondera plagas | concursus motus (“therefore since atoms are dis-
tinct from one another, it necessarily follows that there is a difference also in their dis-
tances, paths, junctures, weights, collisions, meetings, motions”), with similar lines at 
1.633–634, 1.685, 2.1021, and 5.438–439. 
Composition of matter and of words: DRN 2.1015–1016, namque eadem caelum 
mare terras flumina solem | significant, eadem fruges arbusta animantis (“because the 
same [letters] indicate the sky, the sea, the lands, the rivers, the sun; the same [letters in-
dicate] grains, trees, animals”—and so also the various types of atoms make up the matter 
to which these words refer). 
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tracts of the Pierides” passage that appears late in book 1 and again as the proem to book 
4 (cf. pp. 184–185, above): 
auia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante 
trita solo.  iuuat integros accedere fontis 
atque haurire, iuuatque nouos decerpere flores 
insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam 
unde prius nulli uelarint tempora Musae. 
         (DRN 1.926–930 = 4.1–5) 
 
I wander through the pathless tracts of the Pierides, places not 
heretofore trodden by anyone’s footstep.  It is pleasurable to ap-
proach untouched fountains and to drink from them, and it is 
pleasurable to pluck out fresh flowers and to seek a distinguished 
wreath for my head from here, wherefrom the Muses have never 
before crowned the temples of anyone. 
 
Each poetic persona is located beyond normal experience, in a location (inde loci in 
Saturae and auia…loca in DRN) of remarkable sights to behold (the aether in Saturae, 
untouched springs and flora in DRN).  The poet-speaker of DRN speaks of his wander-
ings as physical (peragro), but he refers metaphorically to the creative wanderings of his 
mind, in answer to the Ennian contemplor.25  Both speakers come to their loca as observ-
ers, studying the phenomena of the universe in an undisturbed state.26  In the “limpid and 
                                                
25 DRN uses the verb contemplor elsewhere, only twice, both times as an imperative (in 
the phrase contemplator enim, “just notice”) directed at the didactic addressee at the be-
ginning of an example for the scientific concept under scrutiny (2.114, 6.189); the phrase 
contemplator enim is repurposed by the 18th-century British poety Isaac Hawkins Browne 
in his Latin poem De Animi Immortalitate (“On the Immortality of the Soul”): “just no-
tice where the sun rises or sets” (contemplator enim, quà sol oriturve caditve), 2.203, 
apud Lettice [1795: 85]. 
26 Compare as well the Lucretian ego’s experience upon seeing, thanks to Epicurus’ 
teachings, the “divine force/entity and the restful settlements” (diuum numen sedesque 
quietae, at DRN 3.19, a pleasant locale separated from worldly concerns and from harsh 
weather): 
his ibi me rebus quaedam diuina uoluptas 
percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua ui 
tam manifesta patens ex omni parte retecta est. 
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dense shores of otherworldly/celestial flame” (liquidas pilatasque aetheris oras) of 
Saturae we may see a prefigurement of DRN’s “shores of light” (luminis oras at, e.g., 
DRN 2.577) and “waves of otherworldly/celestial flame” (aetheris aestus at, e.g., DRN 
5.483).27  Lucretius’ text, in this programmatically important (and prominently repeated) 
statement of its poetic positioning in the Graeco-Roman tradition, invokes (among other 
works28) Ennius’ Saturae, I argue, and in doing so claims for the Lucretian speaker the 
mantle of contemplative, eclectic poet who engages in natural inquiry and assessment of 
philosophical systems, as did Ennius’ Epicharmus, Euhemerus, and evidently certain 
early portions of Saturae. 
Finally, I turn to a portion of Ennius’ Saturae that survives not even in fragments 
but only in attestation, in a statement of Quintilian’s: sed formas quoque fingimus saepe 
ut…Mortem et Vitam quas contendentes in satura tradidit Ennius (“but we also often 
fashion personifications like Death and Life, whom Ennius has in his satire passed down 
                                                
     (DRN 3.28–30) 
 
At that moment, because of these things, I am taken by a certain godlike 
pleasure and a shiver, because by your [Epicurus’] power Nature has been 
uncovered from all sides and is lying so plainly open. 
On these lines, see, e.g., Schrijvers [1970]. 
27 Cf. also Lucilius fr. 26.42: ita uti quisque nostrum e bulga est matris in lucem editus, 
translated and discussed at p. 217, below. 
28 Indeed, this passage in DRN has been shown to allude to Ennius’ Annales, as well.  
Bailey points out that nouos…flores (at DRN 1.928 = 4.3) is reminiscent of the praise of 
Ennius at DRN 1.117–126 [1947: 759 ad 1.928], and Harrison writes that this passage 
(1.926–930 = 4.1–5) “looks like an obvious piece of rivalry with Ennius; and perhaps 
there was a lost part of the opening scene of Ennius’ Annales in which the poet was given 
a garland” like the Lucretian speaker seeks at 1.929 = 4.4 [2002: 4].  See further p. 226 n. 
52, below. 
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in competition,” Institutio Oratoria 9.2.36).  The personified abstractions29 of life and 
death are in oratorical or physical combat, perhaps on the model of the ἀγών of Old 
Comedy, such as those between Euripides and Aeschylus in Aristophanes’ Frogs or be-
tween Good Reasoning and Bad Reasoning in his Clouds.  (Another model for Saturae’s 
contest between Life and Death may have been the diatribe of Poverty in the “popular 
philosopher” Bion of Borysthenes’ satiric writings.)  The victor of the struggle between 
Life and Death in this portion of Saturae is unknown. 
Here, I believe, Ennian satire provides a model for a specific Lucretian satiric 
character—namely Natura Rerum, the personified abstraction of nature, who appears dur-
ing the text’s assault on the fear of death in book 3 and, as I have shown, plays the role of 
satirist in her two highly rhetorical speeches.  Nature, in DRN, is the embodiment of the 
universe, the equivalent of the Ennian Vita, while Nature’s opponent is not Death per se 
but rather the fear of death.  In Natura Rerum’s contest against Death, her goal is not to 
beat it (as perhaps may have been the goal of Life in the ἀγών in Saturae) but to make it 
as inconsequential to the narratee’s life as possible: nil igitur mors est ad nos neque per-
tinet hilum (“death/Death is therefore nothing to us, and does not matter one bit,” 3.830), 
as the Lucretian ego says well in advance of Nature’s first speech.  By partly modeling 
this personification passage on the ἀγών between Life and Death in Saturae, Lucretius’ 
poem places the figure of Nature in a tradition of satiric arguers from Aristophanes to 
Ennius, picks up on possible popular-philosophy predecessors (if we count in the antece-
                                                
29 For the concept, see Feeney [1998: 85] and p. 70–71 n. 68, above. 
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dent of Πενία in Bion30), and positions Natura Rerum to claim victory over her oppo-
nent, the fear of death, in either a replication of Life’s triumph over Death in Ennius’ 
Saturae or a refutation of Life’s vanquishment. 
 
 
DRN and Lucilius’ satires 
 
Where the fragments of Ennius’ Saturae are few and the proposed Lucretian allu-
sions to it tentative, the Lucilian corpus is much larger and its connections to DRN more 
substantial, its influence on the poem of Lucretius more demonstrable.31  I consider it im-
portant to note first of all that philosophy, like language, is a recurrent and thematic topic 
in Lucilius’ satire, with many fragments evidencing philosophical subject matter and 
more than one set piece on philosophical topics, such as a philosophers’ banquet.32  Frr. 
26.64–66 contain an Epicurean-like account of sickness—humans consist of body and 
mind/spirit (animus or anima), illnesses of animus exhibit physical symptoms, and physi-
                                                
30 Cf. Wallach [1976: 61–68].  Cf. also Kenney [1971: 212]: “in the satires of 
L[ucretius]’s great contemporary M. Terentius Varro we meet such personifications as 
Infamia, Veritas and Existimatio.” 
31 I pass over the matter of a potential social connection between Lucilius and Lucretius 
themselves: Anderson draws a line from Gaius Memmius to Pompey [1963: 5, 10–12, 
77–78] and from Pompey to Lucilius [1963: 12] and ultimately finds that “[i]t is not im-
possible…[that] Catullus and Lucretius belonged to this [conjectural] Pompeian literary 
circle” [1963: 86]. 
32 Lucilius frr. 28.11–15; cf. Horace Serm. 2.4.  On the Lucilian philosophical fragments, 
see further Haß [2007: 76–89]. 
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cal ailments impede the mind33—and in subsequent books can be found other specific 
references to Epicurean philosophy in particular.  At fr. 29.23, the addressee is urged to 
acknowledge the wisdom of avoiding the various passions, and is told that “when you 
recognize this you could lead a life without anxiety,” a life of Epicurean ἀταραξία (cum 
cognoris uitam sine cura exigas). 
Moreover, fr. 28.15, a surviving part of the aforementioned philosopher’s banquet 
scene, has one speaker explicitly favoring or advocating the Epicurean accounts of vision 
and of matter during a debate or competition among rival philosophies: “I should like the 
simulacra/films/εἴδωλα and atoms of Epicurus to win out” (eidola atque atomus uincere 
Epicuri uolam).  The fragmentedness of this line prevents any degree of certainty in iden-
tification of the speaker, whether it is the satirist-figure, a foolish interlocutor who serves 
as a buffoon (or even as the satirist’s target), a sagely lecturer such as Damasippus in 
Serm. 2.3, or simply one of a number of argumentative intellectuals.  I would also point 
                                                
33 Lucilius fr. 26.64 (principio physici omnes constare hominem ex anima et corpore | 
dicunt, “first things first: all doctors/natural philosophers say that a person is made up of 
spirit and body”), cf. DRN 3.138–139 (sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto | 
consilium quod nos animum mentemque uocamus, “but [I say] that the head, so to speak, 
and that which dominates in all the body, is the faculty that we call the “spirit” and “the 
mind”); fr. 26.65 (animo qui aegrotat, uidemus corpore hunc signum dare, “we see the 
man who is sick in mind/spirit give an indication of this fact in his body”), cf. DRN 
3.159–160 (esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi ui | percussast, exim 
corpus propellit et icit, “[we can see] that the spirit has been conjoined with the mind, 
and when it hass been struck by the mind’s power, it immediately strikes the body and 
drives it forward”); and fr. 26.66 (tum doloribus confectum corpus animo obsistere, “and 
then again [we see that] a body afflicted with ailments impedes the mind), cf. DRN 
3.168–169 (praeterea pariter fungi cum corpore et una | consentire animum nobis in cor-
pore cernis, “furthermore you notice that the mind/spirit in our body performs/suffers 
along with the body and senses the same things”) and 3.175–176 (ergo corpoream 
naturam animi esse necessest, | corporeis quoniam telis ictuque laborat, “therefore the 
nature of the mind is necessarily bodily, since it [the mind] toils with bodily weapons and 
strikes”). 
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out the ambiguity of the idea of “winning out” (uincere).  Does this mean that the speaker 
wants Epicurean philosophy to win the acclaim of the banquet attendees?  To be the ex-
planation of the universe that ends up being more factually correct?  Or perhaps to be the 
philosophical school that eventually becomes dominant at Rome, given that in the time of 
Lucilius, Stoicism had not yet gained unquestioned majority acceptance among the edu-
cated elite, while Epicureanism held substantial popular appeal?34 
At any rate, this eidola atque atomus fragment evinces an interest in philosophy in 
general (and, on occasion, in Epicureanism in particular) that pervades the Lucilian cor-
pus and, I believe, sets the stage for a lengthier, more detailed (and still at times quite sa-
tiric) poetic treatment of philosophy such as we see in DRN.  Murley finds common phi-
losophical ground between Lucilius fr. 14.8–9 and DRN 2.11, 2.47, and 5.1229; Lucilius 
fr. 26.58 (cf. fr. H.23.4–5) and DRN 3.207, 4.25, 5.1029, and 5.1048; and Lucilius fr. 
26.37 and DRN 5.215 [1939: 387–388].  Philosophy and Roman satire are indeed related 
literary forms with important interconnections, as I will explain in greater focus in chap-
ter 5 (pp. 246–267, below).  I believe that Lucilius’ fragments are thus germane at the 
very least as literary background to Lucretius’ poem. 
And there are in DRN noteworthy resemblances to certain extant parts of Lucilius’ 
satires.  Lucilius fr. 1.1 (aetheris et terrae genitabile quaerere tempus, “to seek the fruit-
ful/formative time of the celestial flame and the earth”) describes a task similar to one the 
                                                
34 Cf. pp. 7–15, above.  Murley believes that “[t]he word order might more easily suggest: 
‘O that I might refute (or surpass in achievement in the same line) the films and atoms of 
Epicurus’ ” [1939: 389].  I do not accept the rendering of uincere as “refute,” but if we 
interpret the line as a desire to “surpass in achievement” Epicurus’ philosophical accom-
plishments, I believe we should take the line to be in praise of Epicurean philosophy, as 
with my own initial proposed translations of the line. 
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Lucretian ego sets before himself, as we see in the description of the formative time of 
the earth and the aether at DRN 5.443–508.  The fragment may also influence lines in 
DRN like terreno corpore terra | crescit, et ignem ignes procudunt aethera aether (“the 
earth grows from earthly body/atom/material, and fires bring forth fire, the celestial flame 
brings forth celestial flame,” 2.1114–1115).  Note also that the section in which these 
lines appear begins with a reference to “the formative time of the cosmos” (mundi tempus 
genitale, 1105).35  The Lucretian lines cum primum in luminis oras | nixibus ex aluo ma-
tris natura profudit (“when nature has first poured it [a newborn child] out with effort 
onto the shores of light from the mother’s womb,” 5.224–225) may be influenced by 
Lucilius fr. 26.42: ita uti quisque nostrum e bulga est matris in lucem editus, “just like 
each of us has been brought out into the light from mother’s bag/womb.”36  The recurrent 
Lucretian play on life and death terms—uita, mors, mortalis, inmortalis37—is likewise of 
a piece with Lucilius fr. 27.42, cum sciam nihil esse in uita proprium mortali datum (“be-
cause/although I know that nothing in life has been granted to mortals as their own”), and 
the thought as well as the stylistic expression of the fragment is also found in DRN, since 
much of the text of Lucretius’ third book consists of arguments against the fear of death 
                                                
35 Cf. my earlier discussion of aether in Ennius Saturae frr. 3–4 (pp. 210–212, above). 
36 Though see also Ennius Annales fr. 114, tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras (“you 
[Romulus] have brought us forth within the shores of light”) and Empedocles fr. 20, in 
the numbering of Diels [1912], πλάζεται ἄνδιχ’ ἕκαστα περὶ ῥηγμῖνι βίοιο (“split, 
they [parts of the body] wander separately along the shoreline of life”), with Williams 
[1983: 227].  Marx, commenting on the Lucilian fragment (119 in his numbering), also 
adduces the parallel of DRN 5.224–225 [1904/1905: ad loc.].  Murley [1939: 384] asserts 
that the line in DRN is “coarsely anticipated by Lucilius” and cites additionally fr. 3.14: 
non peperit, uerum postica parte profudit (“she didn’t give birth, but rather pushed it out 
the back end”). 
37 E.g., DRN 3.869: mortalem uitam mors cum inmortalis ademit, “when immortal mor-
tality has taken away mortal life.” 
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and against the attachment to material, perishable goods that tends to accompany such 
fears.  Confirming the Lucretian references to Lucilian satire on this topic, semantically 
and conceptually even closer to fr. 27.42, is DRN 3.971: uitaque mancipio nulli datur, 
omnibus usu (“life is given to nobody as property-in-possession, but to everybody for 
usufruct”).38 
Perhaps most interesting for our current considerations is Lucilius fr. 17.2, a pas-
sage of quasi-parody of epic, with the satiric ego setting Homeric women’s epic epithets 
(καλλιπλόκαμος, καλλίσφυρος, κούρη) in contrast against grotesquerie like warts and 
bucktooth grins: 
nunc censes καλλιπλόκαμον, καλλίσφυρον illam 
non licitum esse uterum atque etiam inguina tangere mammis? 
conpernem aut uaram fuisse Amphitryonis ἄκοιτιν 
Alcmenam, atque alias, Helenam ipsam denique—nolo 
dicere: tute uide atque disyllabon elige quoduis— 
κούρην eupatereiam aliquam rem insignem habuisse 
uerrucam, naeuum, rictum, dentem eminulum unum? 
 
Now do you think that it wasn’t okay for the famous Beautiful-
Haired Beautiful-Ankled heroine to touch her belly or even her 
lady parts with her boobs?  Or for Alcmene, the Spouse of Amphi-
tryon, to have been knock-kneed or bow-legged, and so on and so 
forth, and even for Helen herself the—eh, I don’t wanna say it: you 
go and look and pick out whatever epic epithet you like—the 
Maiden with a Noble Father to have had some prominent feature, a 
wart, a mole, a wicked grin, buck teeth? 
 
The speaker creates a bipolar opposition between conventional descriptors of epic 
women—based on their outstanding physical beauty—and the quotidian blemishes that 
could lie behind and between the lines of epic verse and the features that the epithets ad-
vertise.  DRN, I propose, alludes to this Lucilian mise en scène (alongside DRN’s Greek 
                                                
38 This famous line is part of Natura Rerum’s speech—on which see my discussion in 
chapter 2 (pp. 133–139, above). 
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models, cited below) in its own famous latter-day dichotomization between ugly physical 
features and flattering epithets given to the women who suffer from them: 
nigra “melichrus” est, inmunda et fetida “acosmos,” 
caesia “Palladium,” neruosa et lignea “dorcas,” 
paruula pumilio, “chariton mia,” “tota merum sal,” 
magna atque inmanis “cataplexis plenaque honoris.” 
balba loqui non quit—“traulizi”; muta “pudens” est; 
at flagrans odiosa loquacula “Lampadium” fit; 
“ischnon eromenion” tum fit, cum uiuere non quit 
prae macie; “rhadine” uerost iam mortua tussi; 
at tumida et mammosa “Ceres” est “ipsa ab Iaccho,” 
simula “Silena ac saturast,” labeosa, “philema.” 
cetera de genere hoc longum est si dicere coner. 
         (DRN 4.1160–1170) 
 
A woman with a dark complexion is “honey-tanned,” a filthy dirty 
one’s “shabby chic,” one with gray glaucoma is “Lil’ Athena,” a 
woman who’s sinewy and wooden is “a gazelle,” a little dwarfette 
is “my charmlet,” “just pure wit,” a big giant lady is “a wonder-
ment, full of dignity.”  She’s a stutterer, she can’t talk—“her 
thpeech ith tho thophithticated.”  A mute woman is “modest,” but a 
burning hateful gossipy diva becomes “Starlet,” and then when 
she’s too emaciated to live she becomes “lovably thin,” and for 
sure a woman on the verge of a coughing death is “slender”—but a 
chick with swollen big titties is “Ceres herself, from Iacchus,” a 
snub-nosed woman is “a woman Silenus, a woman satyr,” a big-
lipped one’s “a kiss.”  And it’d take a long time if I was gonna try 
to say the rest of the things of this type!  
 
As we have seen, this passage functions as a mockery of the foolish beliefs of lovers, an 
important part of the satiric Lucretian speaker’s critique of human foibles and faults (pp. 
74–75 above, with citations of relevant scholarship at p. 74 n. 75).  But it is also an inter-
text with Lucilius fr. 17.2, as can be seen from the numerous similarities between the two 
passages.39 
                                                
39 Dudley [1965: 125] adduces Lucilius fr. 6.7: thaunomeno inquit balba, sororem | lani-
ficam dici siccam atque abstemiam ubi audit, “ ‘I’m shocked!,’ she stammered after she 
heard it said that her sister was ‘a sober and temperate wool-worker.’ ” 
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In both, untranslated Greek is used liberally, and refers to the lustrous terms for 
women’s beauty (καλλιπλόκαμος and the like in the Lucilian lines, acosmos and the like 
in DRN), in stark contrast to the Latin terms for displeasing physical characteristics (for 
instance, the Lucilian uerruca, the Lucretian macies).40  The bilingual verse in fact consti-
tutes code-switching, as the Greek is elevated and laudatory, the Latin mundane and vis-
ceral.41  The language reflects the basic schtick of each passage, that there are two sides 
to women, the pretty and the ugly.  DRN expands this core concept beyond the physical-
ity of the Lucilian passage and into behavioral and social disgracefulnesses, which Lucil-
ius’ speaker may implicitly invoke with the social status term κούρη eupatereia, 
“Maiden with a Noble Father,” an attractive attribute not of the physical body but of de-
sirable lineage.  Both passages likewise treat women as mere objects, and treat amatory 
discourse as fundamentally deceptive, in that it focuses on high points of idealized beauty 
to the neglect of corporeal realities.  In each instance, the speaker has dissuasive motiva-
tions: he is trying to point out to his addressee what he sees as the truth about women’s 
                                                
40 Lucilius’ lines even include a transliterated Greek word, eupatereiam, like DRN’s 
Graecisms, which appear only in transliteration. 
41 And both passages feature the same epic-like rhetorical gesture of an inability or hesi-
tance to say all that can be said on the topic: compare the Lucilian nolo | dicere with the 
Lucretian longum est si dicere coner.  Cf. Petersmann [1999: 300] on “ridiculous mani-
festations of ‘code switching’ for which there is a lot of evidence in Lucilius’ Satires,” as 
well as Brown [1987: 282 ad loc.]: “[i]n nearly every case a direct and usually derogatory 
Latin description, often drawn from vulgar speech and ‘unpoetical’ in the usual sense, is 
set against a fanciful Greek hypercorism.” 
Dudley points to “the piling-up of Greek names for the expensive presents and 
luxuries with which the [beloved] girl is surrounded” at DRN 4.1125–1137, compares the 
passage to Juvenal 3.67–68, and finds “Lucilian echoes”: fr. H.11 with DRN 4.1125, fr. 
2.13 with DRN 4.1129, and fr. 30.72 with DRN 4.1133–1137 [1965: 123–124].  So also 
Lucilius fr. 8.2 with DRN 4.1099–1100 [1965: 123]. 
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bodies, so that the addressee does not become, like the satiric targets of DRN’s passage, a 
foolhardy lover subjected to the rule of his out-of-control passions. 
There are other, earlier parallels for this passage—such as Plato Republic 474d–e, 
cited by Rouse & Smith [1975: 366 n. a], cf. Dudley [1965b: 124–125], plus Theocritus 
10.24–37 (and 6.18–19) and Philaenis at P.Oxy.2891 fr. 3 col 2, both cited by Brown 
[1987: 280 ad loc.]—but, as we have just seen, there is pointed Lucilian allusion as well 
in these lines of Lucretius.42  An allusion to the earlier satirist here picks up on the Lucil-
ius-ego’s discourse on the passions, on sex, and on self-control, a subject that forms the 
focus of the earliest, and arguably most important, portion of book 29 (frr. 29.1–31), and 
shows up  in numerous places elsewhere.  Such an allusion underscores the satiric content 
and satiric bite of the passage, and gives to Lucretius’ speaker the poetic authority and 
moral credibility of Lucilius’ satiric persona.  Lucilian satire, I believe, furnishes DRN 
with an important model for satiric criticisms of the foolhardy and self-deceptive beliefs 
of men taken in by their passions and by their sexual zeal for pretty women—a model, 
that is, for a certain kind of bodily invective, so to speak. 
This critique of the body in Lucilian and Lucretian verse is evident as well in the 
matter of nocturnal emissions.  Take Lucilius fr. H.73: perminxi lectum, inposui pede pel-
                                                
42 Brown, citing Lucilius fr. 17.2, mentions in passing that “Lucilius’ satirical mockery of 
idealized heroines…contain[s] some similarities in style and conception to the Lucretius 
passage” [1987: 281 ad loc.], and that DRN’s “technique is highly satirical and may be 
indebted to Lucilius…Lucretius, however shows greater sophistication than Lucilius in 
his manipulation of the theme” [1987: 282 ad loc.], citing frr. 17.2 and also 1.12: porro 
clinopodas lychnosque ut diximus semnos; | ante pedes lecti atque lucernas (“moreover, 
[think about] how we’ve augustly called ‘trundle-masts’ and ‘incandescents’ what are 
really bedposts and lamps”). 
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libus labes, “I pissed/came43 all over the bed, I got stains onto the skins with my ‘third 
leg.’ ”  Lucretius’ text may be referring to this bed-wetting passage in its own pair of bed-
wetting scenes: 
<poti> saepe lacum propter si ac dolia curta 
somno deuincti credunt se extollere uestem, 
totius umorem saccatum corporis fundunt, 
cum Babylonica magnifico splendore rigantur. 
.......................................................................... 
ut quasi transactis saepe omnibus rebus profundant 
fluminis ingentis fluctus uestemque cruentent. 
     (DRN 4.1026–1029, 1035–1036)44 
 
If (as often happens) in sleep drunk people think they’re hiking up 
their clothes next to a lake or some broken pots, they pour the liq-
uid filtered from their whole body—that’s when the Babylonian 
bedcovers with their wondrous sheen are soaked.…[And when 
they become sexually mature, they have erotic dreams,] so that 
with the job done, as it were, they often pour out giant streams of 
liquid and stain their clothes. 
 
Although there are no direct verbal parallels, cruentent in DRN is a fair equivalent for 
Lucilius’ inposui…labes, and the more colloquial, vulgar perminxi would detract from 
the more clinical tone of the Lucretian passage.  Without a larger context for Lucilius (the 
quotation of him, by Porphyrio on Serm. 1.6.22, serves to prove that the Romans of yes-
teryear used to sleep in skins), the case is uncertain.  But Lucretius’ speaker, in the con-
                                                
43 Urination and ejaculation, urine and semen, can each be the referent of the verb meio in 
Latin, cf. Adams [1982: 142] and Kwintner [1992: 232]: “[u]rination often signifies 
ejaculation in Latin.”  This denotative overlap is also present in Aristophanes, as Hender-
son demonstrates [1991/1975: 50].  For a similarly multivalent usage of meiere at Catul-
lus 99.9 (commictae spurca saliua lupae), see O’Bryhim [2007: 143–144]. 
44 The text printed here follows that of Brown [1994], who briefly mentions the Lucilius 
fragment [1994: 193].  Reckford discusses the Lucilius and Lucretius passages in proxi-
mate, yet separate, contexts, each in connection to Horace Serm. 1.5 [1999: 544, 544–545 
n. 38]. 
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text of the satirical invective against love and sex, picks up on the topic of bedwetting, a 
topic present in earlier extant Latin literature only in the satirist Lucilius. 
A reference to Lucilius here would further enrich the Lucretian image of the 
soiled Babylonian bedcovers (Babylonica magnifico splendore, 4.1029).45  Taken by it-
self, the fancy bedcovers covered in urine are almost oxymoronic, as the wealthy ap-
pointments are coated in base filth.  With the Lucilius fragment in the background, how-
ever, we note moreover that the unadorned, rustic skins of the earlier author (pelles) have 
been replaced by Eastern finery in Lucretius, a shift marked by the appended descriptive 
ablative phrase that expands the mention of the bedcovers to take up almost an entire line.  
The straightforward (probably wine-induced) accident in Lucilius has become, in DRN, a 
subtle comment on the extravagance and decadence of contemporary Romans, who not 
only use expensive coverlets unnecessary for a people accustomed to using animal skins 
for a bed, but also ruin those coverlets with their drunken lack of urinary self-control or 
their lustful lack of sexual self-control.46 
In fact, the overlap in style and subject matter between DRN and Lucilian satire is 
consequential enough that certain fragments of poetry have—with perhaps the aid of the 
ambivalent scribal abbreviation “Luc.”—come down attributed to both authors in the 
manuscript tradition.  Persius 1.1, o curas hominum, o quantum est in rebus inane! (“ah, 
the anxieties of humankind!, oh, how much void there is in the universe!”), has been as-
                                                
45 Smith discusses another Lucretian instance of Babylonian splendor, DRN 4.1121–1124 
(the “elegiac expenditures” scene, cf. pp. 72–74, above), in connection with Lucilian ac-
counts of excessive luxury [2005c: 73–74]. 
46 If we accept this Lucilius-DRN connection, we can add this Lucretian use of Lucilian 
dreams to the somnia of DRN 1.105, which O’Hara [1987] links to Lucilius frr. 15.18–19; 
cf. pp. 228–230, below. 
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signed to Lucilius by some scholarly readings of the scholiast on Persius, and it indeed 
appears (as part of book 1) in three major editions of his satires (fr. 1.2C = 9M = 2W).  
Other scholars, however, prefer to see Persius’ opening line as an homage to DRN.  The 
issue is complicated and, as I will argue in detail in the next chapter (pp. 250–254, be-
low), it attests to the engagement of DRN with the tradition of Roman satura as well as 
DRN’s importance to that tradition’s continued development. 
Yet another fragment has been variously imputed to DRN or to Lucilius: non mihi 
si linguae centum sint oraque centum | aenea uox, “not if I had a hundred tongues and a 
hundred mouths, not if my vocal chords were made of bronze.”  This sentiment, an in-
stantiation of an important and allusive Graeco-Roman epic-satiric topos,47 is said by 
Servius (commenting on Vergil Georgics 2.42 and Aeneid 6.625) to belong to Lucretius, 
and Lachmann [1850] uses it to supplement the lacuna after DRN 6.839.48  But two major 
editors of the fragments of Lucilius suggest a different option.  Marx [1904/1905] be-
lieves that it should properly be considered Lucilian, and Charpin [1978–1991/2002–
2003: v. 3 p. 314 ad loc.] numbers it fr. D.21 (where “D” indicates that the lines are of 
dubious authenticity) while positing a source for it in Ennius.  Again, as with the debate 
over Persius 1.1, I believe that we should take the uncertainty over the fragment’s attribu-
tion as further evidence for DRN’s significant literary connection to and development of 
earlier Roman satire. 
In verses about poetry and praise, as well, we may find echoes of Lucilius in the 
text of Lucretius’ poem.  An unknown object of praise in Lucilius fr. 13.11 (unus modo 
                                                
47 Cf. Hinds [1998: 34–47]. 
48 See also Farrell [1991: 232 n. 56]. 
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de multis qui ingenio sit, “just one out of many who was a man of real talent/genius”49) 
and another in fr. 30.13 (et uirtute tua et claris conducere cartis, “to be of use / to bring 
together both by your excellence/courage and by your illustrious writings”) run parallel to 
Lucretian depictions of Epicurus: genus humanum ingenio superauit (3.1043: “he sur-
passed the human race in talent/genius”) and tu, pater, es rerum inuentor, tu patria nobis 
| suppeditas praecepta, tuisque ex, inclute, chartis (3.9–10: you, father, are the discoverer 
of things, you supply to us our paternal principles, from your writings, illustrious 
man…”).50  Charpin hesitantly associates fr. 30.13 with the epic of a certain Tuditanus 
[1978–1991/2002–2003: v. 3 pp. 205–206 ad loc.].  Perhaps Lucilian satire—whether 
praising an epic poet or some unknown other—furnished DRN with something lacking 
from most epic poetry, namely a model for fond praise of an intellectual heavyweight in a 
tone reverent but not fawning. 
Even more closely related, I argue, are DRN’s “pathless tracts of the Pierides” 
passage (1.926–930 = 4.1–5, cited and translated at p. 211, above) and Lucilius fr. 30.1: 
quantum haurire animus Musarum e fontibus gestit, “how much/greatly my mind/spirit 
desires to drink from the springs of the Muses.”51  In both authors’ lines there are Muses 
                                                
49 Charpin sees fr. 13.11 as referring to an unremarkable, but decent, man [1978–
1991/2002–2003: v. 2 p. 225], whereas I read it as referring to one man of remarkable 
ingenium out of the masses of people lacking it. 
50 Murley, citing Lucilius fr. 26.54 and DRN 5.10–12, remarks that “[b]oth Lucilius and 
Lucretius credit Epicurus with the salvation of” people wandering aimlessly through a 
life of error [1939: 389]. 
51 Charpin adduces, without further comment, the parallel of DRN, along with Palatine 
Anthology 7.55.5, Manilius 2.51–56, Propertius 3.35, and Juvenal 7.58 [1978–
1991/2002–2003: v. 3 p. 200 ad loc.].  All the Latin authors Charpin cites are, I note, 
later than DRN as well as Lucilius’ satire.  Chahoud also cites DRN without comment, 
along with Cicero Pro Archia 13 and Epistulae ad Familiares 10.3.4 [1998: 130, s. v. 
haurio]. 
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(Musae: DRN 1.930 = 4.5), drinking from fountains (haurire…e fontibus in Lucilius, cf. 
DRN 1.927–928 = 4.2–3: iuuat integros accedere fontis | atque haurire, “it is pleasurable 
to approach untouched sources and to drink from them”), and a special place of poetic 
distinction implied by the speaker for himself.52  Once again, I would argue that a satiric 
intertext should be added to the models in other genres already adduced for these lines.  
Where the Lucilian narrator (perhaps the satirist-ego, perhaps a guest lecturer or inter-
locutor) expresses a desire for the sublime gift of divine inspiration from the font of the 
Muses, the Lucretian ego himself claims it as essentially a fait accompli.  DRN develops 
and expands the Lucilian fragment (though there may originally have been more, now 
lost, to the scene in Lucilius’ intact poem) to enhance the Lucretian persona’s literary 
magnificence and accomplishment.  And at the same time, I propose, DRN may metapo-
etically (intergenerically, even) refer to its heritage of Roman satura—Lucilian and (as 
we saw above) Ennian alike. 
The poetry of Lucretius and of Roman satire are kindred in their primary narra-
tors’ use of a didactic pose, and indeed DRN’s words and ways of encouraging and in-
                                                
52 This passage in DRN echoes an earlier part of the same poem, 1.118, where the speaker 
describes Ennius receiving a crown from Helicon (cf. pp. 238–239, below), a moment 
that itself is reminiscent of the proem to Ennius’ own Annales, cf. Waszink [1954: 250–
251] and Brown [1982: 81].  The passage also runs parallel to certain lines of Callima-
chus, such as fr. 1.27–28 and Hymns 2.112, with Kenney [1970: 370] and, again Brown 
[1982: 81].  Knox [1999] argues against the conventional wisdom holding that DRN in-
vokes Callimachean poetics in these lines.  On the Lucretian passage (DRN 1.926–930 = 
4.1–5), see, among others, Boyancé [1956: 57–68], Minadeo [1969: 42–43], Schrijvers 
[1970: 27–47], Rist [1972: ch. 6], Clay [1976: 210], and Gosling & Taylor [1982: chh. 
18–20], in addition to the citations at p. 185 n. 89, above. 
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structing the didactic addressee mirror similar expressions in Lucilius’ corpus.53  For ex-
ample, Lucilius fr. 9.1 (labora | discere, ne te res ipsa ac ratio ipsa refellat, “work hard 
to learn so that the very matter and the very argument do not escape you”) is analogous to 
DRN 1.370 (illud in his rebus ne te deducere uero | possit, quod quidam fingunt, praecur-
rere cogor, “I am forced to anticipate the following thing that certain individuals believe 
falsely, so that it not be able to draw you away from the truth in these matters”).  Both the 
Lucilian and the Lucretian egos ask for or lay claim to the reader’s attention: compare 
Lucilius fr. 27.3 (rem cognoscas simul et dictis animum adtendas postulo, “I ask that you 
understand the matter and at the same time turn your mind/attention to my words”) with 
DRN 6.920 (attentas auris animumque reposco, “I ask for attentive ears and mind”), or 
Lucilius fr. 27.4 (quodsi paulisper captare atque obseruare haec uolueris, “but if in short 
you’re willing to lay hold of and pay attention to these things”) with DRN 1.948–949 (si 
tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere | uersibus in nostris possem, “but if I could perhaps 
in my poetry hold you attention on such a philosophical account”).54 
Both speakers demand attentive audiences, and guarantee comprehension of their 
intellectual message provided that such attention is given amply.  Meanwhile they portray 
their subject matter as tricky enough (the Lucilian refellat at fr. 9.1.2) that their didactic 
                                                
53 And this shared didactic pose is connected too to their shared poetic interest in matters 
of language, cf. Petersmann [1999: 310]: “Lucilius uses language as a means of satiric 
mockery in order to excite laughter as well as to instruct.” 
54 Cf. also Lucilius fr. 29.73 (praeterea ut nostris animos adtendere dictis | atque adhi-
bere uelis, “furthermore [I ask] that you be willing to pay and keep attention to my 
words”), with, e.g., DRN 1.50–51 (uacuas auris animumque sagacem | semotum a curis 
adhibe ueram ad rationem, “keep your unoccupied ears and keen mind/attention, re-
moved from concerns, fixed on my true philosophical account”) and 2.1023 (nunc ani-
mum nobis adhibe ueram ad rationem, “now keep your attention fixed on my true phi-
losophical account”).  Murley additionally compares Lucilius fr. 9.1 with DRN 1.623 and 
6.468, and Lucilius fr. 27.3 with DRN 4.912 and 1.948–949 [1939: 390]. 
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aid is necessary for the addressee’s successful understanding and eventual mastery of the 
material.  Similarly, in Lucilian satire and DRN both we see the same kinds of lines used 
for introducing subsidiary arguments (Lucilius fr. 30.27: hoc etiam accipe quod dico; 
nam pertinet ad rem, “also listen to this next thing I’m saying, because it’s relevant to the 
matter”; DRN 6.939: multas hoc pertinet ad res | noscere, “knowing this [piece of infor-
mation] is relevant to many matters”) and for returning to the primary subject matter after 
a digression (Lucilius fr. H.10: nunc ad te redeo ut, quae res me impendet, agatur, “now I 
return to you so that the matter incumbent upon me can be taken up”; DRN 5.780: nunc 
redeo ad mundi nouitatem, “now I return to the newness of the world”; DRN 5.91: quod 
superest, ne te in promissis plura moremur, “as for what’s left, so that I don’t delay you 
more in the promised/incumbent matters”). 
It is possible that the convergences between the verses of Lucilius and Lucretius 
here are ones of diegetical commonplaces, rather than of direct borrowing from Lucilius 
by DRN.55  Another aspect of these two texts’ shared didactic pose, however—namely, 
the imagery of little children, pueri, as a metaphor for the poetic educational process (a 
passage discussed also in chapter 2, pp. 89–90, above)—demonstrates an allusive rela-
tionship: 
nam ueluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis 
in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 
interdum nil quae sunt metuenda magis quam 
quae pueri in tenebris pauitant finguntque futura. 
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 
non radii solis nec lucida tela diei 
                                                
55 We should note, however, Hinds’ argument that many intertextual relationships com-
monly labeled “topoi” may in fact be allusions—to wit: “there are dangers of too easy an 
essentialism in such a firm distinction between allusion proper and participation in a 
topos” [1998: 34]. 
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discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque. 
       (DRN 6.35–4156) 
 
For just as boys tremble and fear everything in blind darknesses, so 
also do we from time to time frighten in the light at things that 
ought to be feared no more than what the boys in the darkness are 
afraid of and imagine is about to happen.  This mental fright and 
darkness, then, must be dispelled not by the sun’s rays, nor the 
day’s bright shafts, but by the appearance and explanation of na-
ture. 
 
DRN alludes here to Lucilius fr. 15.19, as Murley [1939: 382] and O’Hara [1987: 518] 
both point out: 
Terriculas, Lamias, Fauni quas Pompiliique 
instituere Numae, tremit has, hic omnia ponit. 
ut pueri infantes credunt signa omnia aena 
uiuere et esse homines, sic isti somnia ficta 
uera putant, credunt signis cor inesse in aenis. 
pergula pictorum, ueri nihil, omnia ficta. 
 
The Frighteners, the witch-demons whom the Faunuses and the 
Numa Pompiliuses introduced—these are what he fears, these are 
what he uses to determine everything.  Like infant boys believe 
that all bronze statues live and are human, so also these kinds of 
people believe that false dreams are true, they believe that a heart 
exists inside bronze statues.  It’s a painters’ studio, nothing real, 
everything invented.57 
 
The Lucretian passage picks up on the Lucilian ut pueri, omnia, and nihil, and DRN’s 
trepidant (plus, secondarily, metuunt, timemus, metuenda, pauitant, and terrorem) echoes 
the earlier satirist’s tremit.  Moreover, fingunt at DRN 6.38 mirrors lines 4 and 6 of the 
Lucilian fragment.  Whereas in Lucilius’ verse the “invented/false dreams” (somnia ficta) 
                                                
56 6.35–41 = 2.55–61 = 3.87–93; and also 6.39–41 = 1.146–148.  Cf. also the other, per-
haps more frequently cited, Lucretian pueri passage, where the speaker likens his poetic 
charm to the honey on the rim of the cup of wormwood that a doctor tries to give to a sick 
child: DRN 1.936–943 = 4.11–18. 
57 Cf. also the mystifying Lucilius fr. 19.7: ut pueri infantes faciunt, mulierculam hon-
estam, “a noble/decent woman, as infant boys do…”  Murley also points to pueri “in sa-
tiric comparison” at Serm. 1.125–126 and Juvenal 2.149–152 [1939: 384]. 
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sit outside the pueri simile, in Lucretius’ the ones who “invent/falsify” (fingunt) are the 
pueri themselves. 
This change in DRN points to the paired opposites in each text: boys and adults, 
boyish fear and adult apprehension, statue-monsters or shadow-monsters and supernatural 
entities spoken of in myth and religious legend.  In both Lucretius and Lucilius, the 
speaker possesses a rational, curative perspective, and epideictically attempts to dispel his 
audience’s irrational fear of the supernatural or the divine by comparing such fear to the 
night terrors of children, the spooks and frights that we cast aside when we become 
adults.  In this way, the Lucilian and Lucretian egos adopt the parent-like authority of a 
schoolteacher, pushing the adult narratees towards a fuller maturity of the mind.  And 
Lucretius’ lines gain an overtone of satiric cajolery, a subtle sense that the reader who 
disregards the speaker’s naturae species ratioque is as foolish, pathetic, and blameworthy 
as the dimwit trembling before the Terriculae and the Lamiae of Lucilius. 
So, as I have argued, DRN not only picks up on generic aspects of Roman satire 
and shares concerns and stylistic features of the genre’s authors but also makes several 
allusions to the poetry of the father of the genre, Lucilius, in passages about poetry and 
praise, about the didactic process, about ugly physiques of much-vaunted women, and 
elsewhere.  In closing, I turn my attention to a topos of thematic importance to both DRN 
and Lucilian satire, as well as to Roman literature in general: ambition and the health of 
contemporary society.  First, Lucilius fr. H.41, a description of politicking in the Roman 
Forum: 
nunc uero a mani ad noctem, festo atque profesto 
totus item pariterque die populusque patresque 
iactare indu foro se omnes, decedere nusquam, 
uni se atque eidem studio omnes dedere et arti, 
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uerba dare ut caute possint, pugnare dolose, 
blanditia certare, bonum simulare uirum se, 
insidias facere ut si hostes sint omnibus omnes. 
 
Now indeed from morning to night on workday and holiday like-
wise the whole populace and all the senators equally throw them-
selves about within the Forum, never do they leave it.  All have 
given themselves over to one and the same pursuit and skill—
namely that they be able safely to trick people, to fight trickily, to 
compete in sweet-talking, to pretend that they’re a good guy, to set 
traps as if everyone was everyone else’s enemy. 
 
These lines carry a tone similar to that of two well-known Lucretian passages.58  The first 
is DRN’s exemplum of Sisyphus in his “hell-on-earth” passage: 
Sisyphus in uita quoque nobis ante oculos est, 
qui petere a populo fasces saeuasque secures 
imbibit et semper uictus tristisque recedit. 
nam petere imperium, quod inanest nec datur umquam, 
atque in eo semper durum sufferre laborem, 
hoc est aduerso nixantem trudere monte 
saxum, quod tamen <e> summo iam uertice rusum 
uoluitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi. 
       (DRN 3.995–1002) 
 
Sisyphus, too, is before our eyes, in life, as the one who conceives 
of seeking from the populace the fasces and the savage secures—
and always goes home defeated and sad.  Because seeking power, 
which is empty and is never granted, and furthermore always en-
during harsh labor towards that end—that’s really struggling to 
push a rock uphill, which nevertheless already rolls back down 
from the peak and makes for the plains of the flat field at a run. 
 
In Lucilius, we see Romans hustling around the Forum from dawn to dusk in an ignoble 
attempt to gain power or influence; in Lucretius, we see a Roman hustling (presumably in 
the Forum, since that is where one would seek the fasces from the people) all the time in 
an (undesirable because anxiety-inducing) attempt to gain power and influence, never 
with success. 
                                                
58 Connors argues that Lucilius’ Forum scene alludes to Ennius [2005: 131]. 
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There are also, I argue, some verbal echoes in the Lucretian passage.  Where in 
Lucilius there is an emphasis on the universality of the objective—everyone does it (om-
nes, omnes, omnibus, omnes)—there is in Lucretius an emphasis on its perpetuity (sem-
per, umquam, semper).  Likewise, the Lucilian power-grabbers never leave the Forum 
(decedere nusquam), and DRN’s never get what they seek there (nec datur umquam).  
The studium…et ars of Lucilius’ fragment is answered in DRN by durus…labor, and 
both passages mention the struggle for power (the former: certare; the latter: nixantem 
trudere).  Finally, Lucilius’ speaker uses a military analogy (pugnare; insidias facere ut 
si hostes sint), which finds a parallel in DRN both with military imagery (uictus; im-
perium; and perhaps the saeuae secures) and with the mythical allegory of Sisyphus. 
If we accept a Lucretian reference to Lucilius’ satire here, the Epicurean critique 
of politics in the passage of DRN takes on an additional dimension, perhaps already in the 
background, but now drawn out by the intertext with Lucilius.59  On the surface, the Lu-
cretian ego decries political ambition because it is futile and brings nothing but grief 
(semper uictus tristisque recedit: you lose and go home sad), as does rolling a rock uphill.  
But by referring to the earlier satire on business in the Forum—an open declaration that 
forensic activity constitutes trickery and internecine strife—DRN’s speaker adds a 
“moral” concern (trickery of countrymen as if they were enemies), so to speak, to his 
“ethical” one (politics is difficult and prevents ἀταραξία; cf. Colman [2006], among 
others).  Thus uictus gains an additional sense to it: you do not merely lose, you are in 
                                                
59 See Fowler [1989] for a broader discussion of DRN and politics, which my comments 
here supplement. 
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fact defeated (in a battle-like context) by a fellow-citizen (and by his ambush-like decep-
tion). 
Even more than the Sisyphus scene, however, the proem to DRN book 2 (familiar 
to us from pp. 90–91 and 155–157, above) is redolent of this same scene from Lucilius fr. 
H.41: 
suaue etiam belli certamina magna tueri 
per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli.60 
sed nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere 
edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, 
despicere unde queas alios passimque uidere 
errare atque uiam palantis quaerere uitae, 
certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 
ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. 
o miseras hominum mentes, o pectora caeca! 
       (DRN 2.5–14) 
 
[In lines 1–4: it is pleasurable to watch trouble at sea from the 
safety of the shore, to know what anxieties you do not suffer.]  It is 
also pleasurable to watch the great struggles of war, arrayed across 
the plains, without yourself having a share of the danger.  But 
nothing is sweeter than to hold the wise men’s well-defended pre-
cincts, lofty with placid teaching, wherefrom you could look down 
on the rest and see them all over, going astray and wandering as 
they seek life’s way—competing in talent/character/pedigree, con-
testing in social status, striving during the nights and during the 
days with remarkable effort to climb up to the greatest levels of 
wealth and take power over things / the government / the world.  
Ah, the wretched minds of humankind!, oh, their unseeing hearts! 
 
The verbal likenesses and parallels are many and significant.61  The ambitious wretches 
described in each vignette hustle day and night unceasingly (Lucilius line 1, a mani ad 
                                                
60 For lines 5 and 6, I follow the re-ordering of Rouse & Smith [1975]. 
61 Fowler notes the Lucilian passage as a parallel to DRN 2.10–13 and notes that “L[ucre-
tius] in fact relates his description closely to the struggles of contemporary politics” 
[2002: 57–58 ad loc], cf. Wistrand [1979: 58].  Fowler also draws parallels [1989: 134 n. 
63] between DRN 2.7–14 and not only this Lucilian scene but also Dio Chrysostom 
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noctem, and DRN 2.12, noctes atque dies).  The setting is Roman and civic: the Lucilian 
foro (line 3) is the Roman Forum, the center of political life during the Republic, while 
the Lucretian campos (2.6), literally the fields of battle, may suggest the field of martial 
training at Rome, the Campus Martius (which is specifically invoked shortly thereafter, at 
DRN 2.40, and compare campus in the Sisyphus passage above, 3.1002, where Kenney 
[1971: 227 ad loc.] and others find explicit reference to the Campus Martius).  DRN’s 
“wandering all about” (passim…errare, 2.9–10) matches the Lucilian “hurl themselves 
into the Forum” (iactare indu foro se, line 3) and “never go away anywhere” (decedere 
nusquam, again line 3).  In both passages the verb certare is manifest and important 
(Lucilius’ line 6; DRN 2.11), summarizing the basic theme of and critique by the 
speaker—and the ablatives paired with certare (Lucilian “sweet-talk,” blanditia; Lu-
cretian “talent,” ingenio) could both be taken to refer to the art of rhetoric, the corner-
stone of political success and advancement in Roman affairs. 
The other verbs in the two authors’ set pieces—all or predominantly infinitives, 
serving to give the action described a generalizing applicability—are likewise similar in 
meaning and force.  Lucretian contendere (2.11) follows Lucilian pugnare (line 5), Lu-
cretian “striving with outstanding effort” (niti praestante labore, 2.12) responds to Lucil-
ian complete and singular dedication (uni se atque eidem studio omnes dedere, line 4), as 
does perhaps DRN’s quaerere (2.10).  Moreover, each passage is rife with imagery of 
battle, to signify the vehemence of political contests.  In the Lucilius fragment we find 
pugnare (line 5), certare (6), insidias facere (7), hostes (7 again), and perhaps even a vio-
                                                
13.13, Marcus Aurelius Meditations 7.48, Lucian Charon 15, Iamblichus Protrepticus p. 
13, and, interestingly for our concerns here, Varro Eumenides and Endymiones, two 
works of Menippean satire. 
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lent subtext to iactare…se (3: as of warriors “throwing themselves” into battle rather than 
into the Forum).  In DRN there appears the literal belli certamina magna…per campos 
instructa (2.5–6), the well-defended stronghold of philosophy (munita, 8), certare and 
contendere (11), and conquest (potiri, 13). 
Another image of import to Lucilius’ fragment is trickery and deceit.  The objects 
of the satirist’s scorn seek a particular kind of craftiness (ars, line 4), namely to be able to 
hoodwink cleverly (uerba dare et caute possint, 5), fight deceitfully (pugnare dolose, 
again line 5), use wheedling words (blanditia, 6) to get their way, set traps or stage am-
bushes (insidias facere, 7), and pretend falsely that they are righteous citizen men (bonum 
simulare uirum se, 6).  This technology of the trickster, so to speak, is another possible 
interpretation of DRN’s certare ingenio (2.11); and in contendere nobilitate (on the same 
line) we might even go so far as to think that there is a reference to the Lucilian frag-
ment’s allegation that the ambitious will lie in such a way as to seem to be good men—
men of high status, men of nobilitas (again, Lucilius’ line 6: bonum simulare uirum se).62  
All in all, I suggest, the Lucilian ego implicitly claims that this mode of business is impi-
ous, since the ambitious are active even on holidays (festo atque profesto…die, lines 1–
2), and this moral concern is matched in DRN’s claims of the moral-philosophical high 
ground, the templa (2.8) whose potential for religious connotations may be activated by 
allusion to the fragment of Lucilius.63 
                                                
62 Other skeptical Lucilian assessments of nobilitas include frr. 6.18 and 26.6, cf. Murley 
[1939: 386], as well as perhaps frr. 3.7 and H.33, with Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003: 
v. 3 p. 261 ad fr. H.33]. 
63 I would also point out that DRN 2.14 sounds much like Persius 1.1 = Lucilius fr. 1.2, 
the topic of detailed consideration in my next chapter (pp. 250–254, below). 
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Beyond linkages between specific words, there are broader allusive resonances of 
the fragment in DRN’s second proem.  Both offer a sort of bird’s-eye perspective on the 
situation, with the ambitious represented almost as ants scurrying across the field of vi-
sion, busying about their tasks.64  In Lucretius’ text, the view from on high is literal, 
marked by edita (2.8), despicere and uidere (9), and tueri (5).  Both passages communi-
cate a moralizing indictment of political and economic ambition, and therefore constitute 
a rejection of the current state of statesmanship in Rome (whose poor moral standing is 
indicated, again, by the religious terms festus and templa in Lucilius and DRN, respec-
tively).  And in effecting this rejection, the speaker pointedly separates himself from the 
masses of politicians jockeying for wealth and power: the Lucilian-ego’s emphatic, and I 
would say sarcastic, “both the whole populace and the senators equally one and the 
same” (totus item pariterque…populusque patresque, line 2) segregates the critical 
speaker from Roman society as a whole, and so does the Lucretian ego’s “looking down 
upon the Others” (despicere…alios, 2.9) from the heights of the stronghold of philoso-
phy. 
A noteworthy divergence from its Lucilian source-text that DRN undertakes here 
is that it spells out explicitly the implications of its rejection of Roman politicking.  What 
is unsaid (or unpreserved by the testimonia) in Lucilius is on display in DRN, specifically 
the serenity that follows forbearance from political life, the superiority that comes of the 
right kind of philosophical doctrine—and by contrast the misery and aimlessness (the 
miserae mentes and pectora caeca of 2.14) that accompany a life of greed and sociopoli-
tical ladder-climbing.  By alluding to Lucilius’ satire in a parable at the beginning of his 
                                                
64 Compare also Ennius Saturae fr. 5, mocking “busybodies,” cf. p. 210, above. 
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second book, DRN’s speaker reinforces the civic message, and especially the Roman-
ness, of his moral lesson.  At the same time, by gesturing to his satiric predecessor, a re-
portedly well-respected and securely established member of the powerful ruling Roman 
citizen class, the Lucretian ego blunts the potentially controversial advocacy of self-
seclusion from public life, a suggestion that is at its core anti-establishment and counter 
to traditional Republican mores. 
 
 
Conclusion to chapter 4 
 
DRN, we have seen, engages not only with the Graeco-Roman mode of satire, but 
also with the distinctly Roman genre of verse satura.  Lucretius’ poem alludes both to 
Ennius’ Saturae and extensively to Lucilius’ satires in language, in style, in content and 
in approach.  Add to this the fundamental characteristics that DRN and Roman satire 
from Lucilius through Juvenal hold in common (like didactic pose and self-conscious re-
lationship to Greek words and matters of linguistics), and we can with confidence assign 
to DRN an important place in the tradition of satura.  Lucretius’ text draws on the works 
of early Roman satire in programmatically important ways and places, and in turn influ-
ences, as we will see in the next chapter, the development of later satirists, from Horace 
onwards. 
The most crucial effect of DRN’s numerous allusions to Ennian and Lucilian sat-
ire is, I judge, the co-optation of the various types of authority belonging to their speak-
ers.  Ennius’ writing was perhaps the first of Latin literature to merge philosophical, po-
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etic, and satiric content, and Lucilius’ satiric verse likewise made ample use of philoso-
phy, both as target and as subject matter.  So while DRN derives its philosophical bona 
fides from the ultimate credibility and clout of Epicurus and his school of thought, by en-
gaging with Lucilius and with Ennius’ Saturae it adopts their poetic, satiric, and even 
moral legitimacy. 
Lucretian allusion to Saturae reinforces Lucretian allusion to Ennius’ Annales, 
and bolsters the Lucretian persona’s claim to be an heir to Ennius’ poetic legacy.  Ennius 
himself appears at DRN 1.112–126, where he receives a crown from the Muses’ moun-
tain in recognition of his “everlasting poetry” (aeternis…uersibus, 121) and has a vision 
of Homer, who expounds to Ennius the nature of things (rerum naturam expandere dictis, 
126)—making Ennius seem to be quite philosophical!  These lines are book-ended by 
false visions (somnia at 1.105, cf. O’Hara [1987]; ghosts at 1.132–135), and allude to the 
opening of Ennius’ Annales, where the poet-speaker describes his Homeric vision.  They 
also follow the Lucretian ego’s mention of “the threats of the poets/priests” 
(minis…uatum, 109) as opposed to reason (ratio, 108), and so the passage both sets En-
nius up as one of the false-speaking uates whom DRN’s speaker will refute and, as Para-
tore has argued, gestures to the Ennian ego’s own earlier dismissal of the poets who pre-
ceded him as uates [1939: 197].  Hardie, explaining DRN’s complicated take on the uates 
and ambiguous portrayal of Ennius in the proem to DRN book 1, points out that while the 
uates represent a misguided way of thinking about the world, nevertheless “they occupy a 
place as leaders and manipulators of society that Lucretius wishes to appropriate for him-
self, as the high priest [viz., uates] of Epicurean rationalism” [1986: 18].  While the fig-
ure of Ennius in Annales represents a potentially problematic exemplar of the empowered 
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class that claims authority both over religious matters and over the social domains (in-
cluding religion) celebrated by epic, the Ennius of Saturae functions instead as a source 
of authority for DRN’s satiric poetics, as a source of authority for the kinds of philosophi-
cal criticism and refutation that forms the core of the Lucretian speaker’s rejection of the 
authority of the uates. 
With Lucilius in particular, the Lucretian ego claims for his own, via his allusions 
to the earlier satirist’s poetry, a legitimizing forebear whose development of verse satire 
brought satura in line with (and in contact with) didactic and epic poetry, whose critiques 
of Roman social dysfunction and moral degeneration could serve as models for those of 
DRN, and whose unquestioned, high-ranking citizen status may have helped forestall the 
Roman reader’s possible suspicion of the Lucretian speaker’s own, often satiric anti-
establishment criticisms.  And in the case of the proem to DRN book 2, the evident con-
tinued failing of the nobilitas that is advertised by the Lucretian allusion to Lucilius fr. 
H.41 may in some sense justify the comparatively more extreme corrective measure that 
DRN’s speaker proposes (at, e.g., 2.20–39, within this same proem): an Epicurean with-
drawal from social and political affairs into a modest, private, contemplative life of 
ἀταραξία. 
 
DRN and the locus of satire 
Before proceeding to chapter 5, in which I consider the way in which DRN 
adopts, adapts, and influences subsequent satirists’ uses of the generic tropes of Roman 
satura, I proffer a tentative suggestion regarding one part of DRN’s role in the develop-
ment of the genre.  In the works of each author of satire, what I term the locus of satire—
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the focus of the brunt of its satiric critique, the main target of its satiric production—is 
different, sometimes dramatically so.  Ennius’ Saturae and the satires of Lucilius, though 
both fragmentary, can nevertheless be seen to offer two different models for and ap-
proaches to satire.  The locus of Ennian satire seems, as best as may be determined from 
its exiguous extant verses, internalized: not aggressive and biting (cf. Saturae fr. 22, 
translated and discussed at pp. 208–209, above) but turned inward, addressed to the po-
etic ego’s self (as in fr. 6, which begins with a direct address of “poet Ennius,” Enni po-
eta65).  In the much more copious, though no less fragmented, corpus of Lucilius, on the 
other hand, the primary target appears not to have been the self but rather specific targets, 
often members of the elite, such as Quintus Mucius Scaevola, satirized in a book-length 
trial scene (book 3).  The satirist’s ability to exercise his satiric attack-speech and criti-
cisms in so free a manner has been attributed to the author’s status as a wealthy, well-
respected citizen male with powerful friends at Rome.  Indeed, the brazenness and lack of 
restraint in Lucilian satire becomes a programmatic topos in later satirists, with the ego of 
Horace’s Sermones critiquing Lucilius’ “muddy” style (1.4.11) and the Juvenalian sati-
rist-figure creating the vivid metaphor of Lucilius with sword drawn (1.165).66 
Yet Lucilius’ influence alone does not fully explain the locus of satire in Horace, 
Persius, and Juvenal.  The satirist of Sermones directs his satire mostly at stock or at least 
stereotyped characters (examples: the discontented lawyers, farmers, and so forth in 
                                                
65 For interpretations of this fragment, see Jocelyn [1977] and Russo [2001]. 
66 Freudenburg refers to the later satirists’ programmatic gestures of inadequacy in com-
parison to Lucilius their “Lucilius problem” [2001: 2–3, 18, 153–154, and elsewhere]; 
and the thematics of this problem are treated as well by many scholars, including Ander-
son [1982: 30–32], Harrison [1987: 48–49], Scodel [1987], Henderson [1999b: 174, 191], 
Powell [1999: 320], Goldberg [2005: 12, 175–176], Keane [2006: 12], and Rosen [2007: 
14 n. 19]. 
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Serm. 1.1, Tigellius the bad actor in 1.2, the seruus callidus Dauus in 2.7, the legacy-
hunter in 2.5, the foolish know-it-all philosopher in 2.3), but also at himself (as with the 
speaker’s physical ailments in Serm 1.5 and his potentially self-undercutting experience 
with a fanboy in 1.9).  Persius’ ego attacks the intelligentsia (e.g., the literary rant in 
poem 1) and sometimes himself (he is subjected to satirization in his capacity as a de-
based student—a member of the intelligentsia, we might add in poem 3).  The targets of 
the Juvenalian satirist-figure are the past, grossly exaggerated, and stereotypes that are 
themselves grossly exaggerated and distorted in the extreme.  In all three authors, the lo-
cus of satire is different from that of Lucilius: in Horace and Persius it is less controver-
sial, less directed at figures of power, more introspective, and more literary, while in Ju-
venal, it is a shadow of Lucilian aggression, an overblown attack on the past by a satirist 
powerless to critique the present. 
I suggest that part of this change in locus should be attributed to the influence of 
DRN.  In Lucretius’ poem, the locus of satire (when satire is in fact in use) is directed not 
a specific living authority figures but at foolish individuals—either specific figures from 
the past like the Presocratics, stock types and stereotypes like the lovers of book 4 and the 
overly ambitious of book 2’s proem, or the fictive narratee who strays longe a uera ra-
tione (cf. p. 125 n. 173, above) and, accordingly, wanders into false, faulty, blameworthy 
belief.67  DRN, I believe, in a sense adapts the philosophical interests and satiric tech-
niques of Lucilian satura by taking from Ennius’ Saturae the toned-down, less aggressive 
bearing and thus creating a blended satiric approach.  And in doing so, DRN blazes the 
                                                
67 Compare Anderson on the Menippean satires of Varro [1963: 70–71]: they “did not 
attack specific people, or even specific parties.…[They contain] the persistent condemna-
tion of…moral corruption rather than political degeneracy.” 
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trail for the more philosophical, more reserved satiric styles of Horace’s and Persius’ sat-





Generic Tropes and Civic Discourse 




“If satire is inquiry and provocation, it shares a boundary 
not (as we usually hear) with polemical rhetoric but 
with philosophical (and especially ethical) writing.” 
Griffin [1994: 71] 
 
“The ‘satiric tradition’ was never self-contained and self-perpetuating.” 
Powell [1999: 315] 
 
est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines 
“there’s a limit to things, there are furthermore fixed boundaries” 
(Serm. 1.106) 
 
rebus reddita certa | finis 





The satirist of Horace’s Sermones famously describes satire as “telling the truth 
with a laugh” (ridentem dicere uerum, 1.1.24).  This is what the speaker of Lucretius’ 
poem does, too: he tells the reader the truth of the universe, often with laughter drawn 
from satiric mockery or a smirk caused by a subtle allusion to his satiric forebears.  
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(Sometimes the universe and its atoms and its Nature laugh at or attack the satiric target, 
too.)  Chapters 2 and 3 showed that DRN and its ego systematically employ the mode of 
satire throughout the poem—particularly in the famous invectives against Presocratic phi-
losophers in book 1, the fear of death in book 3, and love and sex in book 4—but also in 
passages small and large throughout the poem, including its ultimate conclusion with the 
scene of the plague in Athens.  Chapter 4, in turn, covered DRN’s allusions to, deriva-
tions from, and affinities with the Roman satire that preceded it, especially that of Lucil-
ius but also the smaller and more fragmentary work of Ennius. 
In this chapter, I address the later satirists’ reactions to Lucretius’ poem.  My 
starting point is the common ground that DRN shares with the Roman genre of satire—
specifically, its canonical (and non-fragmentary) authors Horace, Persius, and Juvenal—
from subject matter and topoi to style, themes, and interpretive problems.  This common 
ground is substantial and it is not coincidental.  DRN, I will argue, not only draws on 
Roman satire in important ways, but also plays a role in how the genre develops in sub-
sequent generations.  In this chapter I will present specific examples of allusion to and 
intertexts with DRN in the satirists after Lucretius’ time, examples that previously have 
not been fully understood. 
When it comes to subject matter, the poem of Lucretius and the works of the Ro-
man satirists hold much in common, despite the seeming distance between atomic theory 
and, say, the casual “conversations” (sermones) of Horace’s title.  DRN presents itself as 
an account of the universe, and this universe includes human life with all its flaws and 
foibles: its hangups about mortality, its morbidity, its often unchecked and insalubrious 
sexuality.  Murley, for instance, argues that DRN’s speaker “treat[s] as germane to his 
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subject (which was primarily ethical) many of the actual contemporary themes of Roman 
satire of private life” [1939: 381].  Satiric topoi, that is, have a noteworthy place in DRN.1  
I add that public life, too, comes under satiric scrutiny in both DRN and Roman satire. 
So DRN makes use not only of the Graeco-Roman mode of satire, but also of the 
generic tropes of Roman satura.  We traced in chapter 4 how some of the thematic ele-
ments of Lucilian and other early satire are picked up in DRN, and here we will consider 
also how DRN affects later Roman satire’s use of the genre’s satiric features.  In what 
follows, I examine certain representative examples of DRN’s use of topoi important to 
Roman satire—the common threads of the satiric landscape, from food to philosophical 
ideas.  The topical influence does not travel one way only, however.  DRN itself, I argue, 
helps shape the way these tropes are handled in subsequent satire. 
The menu of satiric topics is vast, the scholarship on it more so.  I will focus here 
on three examples of import to Lucretius’ poem, namely philosophy, in which I look par-
ticularly at Persius poem 1, Juvenal poem 12, and satiric responses to DRN’s image of 
atoms as letters (elementa); food, especially the way satirists after DRN adapt the Lu-
cretian figure of the conuiua, the dinner-guest (DRN 3.938); and civic concerns.  As part 
                                                
1 Murley finds (but does not discuss in detail) no fewer than 15 passages in DRN that he 
describes as “quite of a piece with what we know as the satire of the recognized satirists” 
[1939: 393, listed at n. 21]: 1.80–101, 1.635–644, 1.1021–1023, 2.11–58, 2.973–990, 
2.1095–1104, 3.41–93, 3.870–1094, 4.469–521, 4.1121–1191, 5.195–234, 5.1007–1010, 
5.1115–1135, 6.17–23, and 6.379–422.  Sosin, likewise, finds in the proem to book 2 “a 
list of several of Roman satire’s principal commonplaces,” including aimless wanderers, 
corruption, ambition, and “somewhat questionable behavior” [1999: 285, with nn. 13–
17]; cf. my discussion of this passage’s satiric bearing in chapter 3 (pp. 155–157, above).  
Houghton sees “[s]atire worthy of a Persius” at DRN 1.641–644 [1912: xxiv], a “fine sa-
tiric theme, man’s self-sufficiency” at 2.1038–1039 [1912: xxxv], and “the poet’s power 
at sketching in Juvenalian style” at 4.1141–1191 [1912: xxxvii].  Houghton’s point is that 
DRN at times exemplifies the stylistic and thematic tropes that are the hallmarks of Ro-
man satire, from Lucilius to Juvenal. 
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of this last topic, I will argue that the ends to DRN books 2–6 are satires of Roman civic 
life.  In doing so, I synthesize what many scholars have written about the satiric nature of 
Lucretian attacks on the fear of death in book 3, love and sex in book 4, and the history of 
human society in book 5 with novel claims about and new interpretation of the farmers 
who complain about their fields’ diminished fertility at the end of book 2 and the scene of 
the Athenian plague in book 6. 
In my considerations here, I pass over numerous significant satiric tropes that 
possess potentially quite fruitful linkages between DRN and satire.  Most notable among 
them are verbal violence, city and country, animals, disease, sexuality/masculinity, anger, 
and the use of a persona.2  At any rate, taken together, the three topics treated in this 
chapter amply show how DRN participates in the generic discourse of satire, and how 
later satire intertextually reacts to DRN’s participation.  
 
 
Satiric takes on philosophy, a philosophical take on satire 
 
Although the title of Mayer’s contribution to the Cambridge Companion to Ro-
man Satire, “Sleeping with the Enemy” [2005], playfully suggests that philosophy and 
satire are enemies, in fact philosophy and its discontents constitute a recurrent motif of 
satiric discourse.  We have seen in chapter 4 how the progenitors of the Roman genre of 
satire concerned themselves with philosophy (pp. 214–216, above).  The satirists after 
DRN, as well, are intimately connected to philosophy.  Horace’s Sermones repeatedly 
                                                
2 See Appendix 2 for relevant citations (pp. 376–380, below). 
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engage with the same Epicurean philosophy that DRN expounds, as has been shown am-
ply by a number of scholars, including Ferri [1993], Oberhelman & Armstrong [1995], 
and Turpin [1998].3  Persius’ satire presents itself as aligned in many ways with Stoicism, 
and the Juvenalian speaker adopts poses of “Democritean tranquillity” in poems 10–12, 
then undertakes a protracted, programmatic engagement with philosophical texts in po-
ems 13–16.4  Keane suggests, in my view rightly, that we should “regard philosophical 
discourse…as a set of tools for which a satirist devises new uses, thereby engaging in a 
kind of philosophical inquiry that becomes a part of his own genre” [2007: 29].  For rep-
resentative examples of how the satirists appropriate philosophy as part of their own sa-
tiric-philosophic inquiries, I point to Horace’s Damasippus (Serm. 2.3), Persius’ Socrates 
and Alcibiades (poem 4), and the explicit quotation in Juvenal of the Greek philosophical 
maxim γνῶθι σεαυτόν, “know thyself” (11.27).  As Murley succinctly puts it, with ref-
erence to the philosopher-speaker of DRN and the Roman satirists, “as the philosopher is 
satirical, conversely the satirists are philosophical.”5 
                                                
3 Cf. also Giesecke [2000] and Hardie [2009: ch. 6]. 
4 Persius and Stoicism: e.g., La Penna [1995: 297–343], Howley [1997], Cuchiarelli 
[2005], and, contra, Henderson [1991]; Reckford [1962: 490–498] discusses how the 
Stoicism in Persius is neither wholly orthodox nor ubiquitous across the six satires, and 
Takács [2010] explores the idea, suggested in the Vita Persii de Commentario Probi Va-
leri Sublata, that Persius possessed a singularly complete collection of the Stoic Chrysip-
pus’ works.  Cf. also Reckford [2009: 96–101] on Persius and “diatribe.”  The Juvenal-
ego’s “Democritean tranquillity”: so Braund [2004: 23]; cf. also Anderson [1982: 340–
361].  Philosophy in Juvenal poems 13–16: Keane [2007]; cf. also Highet [1949].  Highet 
[1951] includes consideration of Juvenal’s reception of DRN. 
5 Murley [1939: 387].  So we may, with some confidence, reject Mayer’s earlier claim 
that the satirist in Persius’ poetry “is the only satirist whose point of view is philosophi-
cally shaded” [1989: 15]. 
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The satirists are still satirists, though, and thus much of their contact with phi-
losophy is from a position of mockery.  Stoics—the conventional opponents of the Epi-
cureans in republican and imperial Rome, I note6—form a major portion of this mockery 
indeed.  A few samples: Serm. 1.1.4 and 1.2.134 (Fabius the Stoic adulterer / adulterous 
Stoic), Serm. 1.3.124–139 (a Stoic fool trying to explain the Stoic aphorism that the phi-
losopher/wise man is the best cobbler), Serm. 2.3.44 (an appearance by “Chrysippus’ 
Stoa and herd,” Chrysippi porticus et grex); Persius 5.86 (a “Stoic who’s had his ears 
washed out with biting vinegar,” Stoicus hic aurem mordaci lotus aceto); and Juvenal 
2.64 (the Stoicidae flee from Laronia’s castigation), 3.116 (Stoicus delator, a Stoic 
snitch).7  The satirists pick on Stoics and show them to be no more removed from the 
baseness (e.g., shameful adultery) and disgustingness (the vinegar in Persius 5.86 was at 
least dealing with deep-set filth, if not treating an actual ear infection) of everyday life 
than is anyone else.  The enduring popularity of Stoicism with Roman authors (e.g., 
Cicero, Vergil, Seneca, Lucan, and Musonius Rufus)8 may point towards a literary di-
mension to the Stoics satirized in Horace, Persius, and Juvenal.  By debasing Stoics in 
their satire, the satirists attempt to undercut the claim or tone of lofty detachment or intel-
                                                
6 On the issue of whether DRN subtly argues against them or ignores them altogether—I 
side with those who believe the former—see my discussion in chapter 1 (pp. 12–15, 
above). 
7 For the idea that the Caesar-character in Lucan’s Bellum Ciuile should himself be re-
garded as a Stoic fool, see George [1988].  On other satiric elements in Lucan’s poem, 
see Coffey [1996]. 
8 Cf., among others, Reydams-Schils [2005] and Long [2006: chh. 14–17].  For the com-
plex matter of Vergil and the influence of Stoicism, see Edwards [1960], Horsfall [1976], 
Parker [1989], Putnam [1990], Gill [1997], Wright [1997], Stevens [2007], and Cairns 
[1989: 33]: “it is increasingly difficult to believe…in Virgil as committed to a single 
brand of philosophy.” 
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lectual sublimity that these authors bring to their works via adoption of Stoic stances and 
standpoints.9 
Also particularly prominent in the satiric takes on philosophy—and particularly 
relevant for our considerations—is the frequent use in satire of atomistic imagery and 
other Epicurean elements, which I see as evidence of Lucretian influence on the satirists 
after DRN.  Horace’s satires give us the solid and void in an erotic context,10 Philodemus 
on women and sex (Serm. 1.2.121), and Lucretian-style socioanthropology (Serm. 1.3, 
with Keane [2006: 52–54] and Harrison [2007c: 83–85], among others).  In Persius, there 
is direct allusion to DRN on multiple occasions,11 and there are also lines that, while per-
haps not direct allusions, nevertheless have the flavor of DRN’s style, as with 5.52 (mille 
hominum species et rerum discolor usu, “there are a thousand types/appearances of hu-
mankind and [their?] enjoyment/profit/experience of things is different/disjointed”).  Ju-
venal’s poetry includes figures and imagery familiar from DRN (Democritus and Heracli-
                                                
9 Epicureans are not immune to mockery in satire, either: see, e.g., Persius 3.77–85 (Cen-
turions mocking the Epicurean-style principle of the conservation of matter) and Juvenal 
13.123 (the satirist’s rejection of Epicurus who is “productive/rejoiceful among the 
plantlife of his tiny garden,” exigui laetum plantaribus horti).  Serm. 1.1–3 present, ac-
cording to Turpin, “an incompetent Epicurean” [1998: 127]; compare the doctor ineptus 
of Serm. 1.1–4 proposed by Freudenburg [1993: ch.1 ] and the lector ineptus that Keane 
[2007: 52] suggests for Juvenal poems 13–16. 
10 Serm. 1.2.111–113: 
nonne, cupidinibus statuat natura modum quem, 
quid latura sibi, quid sit dolitura negatum, 
quaerere plus prodest et inane abscindere soldo? 
Isn’t it more useful to inquire into the limit that Nature sets on desires, and 
what she’ll tolerate for herself, and what she’ll be pained by if it’s denied 
her—and in so inquiring, to divide the void from the solid? 
11 Persius 3.83–84 alludes to DRN 1.150, 1.248; and Persius 2.24–25, 6.3, and 6.61 also 
contain Lucretian references, as Spaeth argues [1942: 120–121].  And see directly below. 
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tus, laughter and tears), atomic expression (so 14.16–17: animas seruorum et corpora 
nostra | materia constare putet paribusque elementis, “[is a father who abuses the people 
he holds as slaves teaching savagery, or teaching that] he judges the spirits of slaves and 
our own bodies to be comprised of the same matter and equivalent elements?”), and even 
a philosophical maxim that would fit right into the Lucretian speaker’s assessment of 
Natura Rerum’s tirade (cf. pp. 133–139, above): “it’s never the case that Nature/nature 
says one thing and philosophy something else” (numquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia 
dicit, 14.321).  DRN and the philosophy of Epicurus, as we can see from these examples, 
are an important part of the philosophic discourse that satire employs.12 
 
Persius 1.1, DRN, and Lucilius 
One of the most conspicuous allusions to DRN in Roman satire—one that I think 
has not been fully understood—is the opening line of Persius poem 1: o curas hominum! 
o quantum est in rebus inane! (“ah, the anxieties of humankind!, oh, how much 
void/emptiness there is in the universe!,” 1.1).  On the surface, this line smacks of allu-
sion to DRN (2.14: o miseras hominum mentes! o pectora caeca!, “ah, the wretched 
minds of humankind!, oh, their unseeing hearts!”; 1.330, 399, 511, 569, 658, 843, 5.365: 
in rebus inane), but the 9th-century CE compendium of scholia to Persius has occasioned 
debate among scholars as to whether the allusion is foremost to DRN, or if it should be 
taken instead as an invocation of Lucilius.  Zetzel, for instance, states that “[w]e will 
never know for certain whether Persius was alluding to Lucilius or Lucretius in his open-
                                                
12 For Epicurean aspects of Petronius’ Satyrica, see, e.g., Highet [1941] and Kragelund 
[1989]. 
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ing verse” [1977: 42], while scholars have not found consensus on whether to include this 
line among the fragments of Lucilius. 
The so-called Commentum Cornuti in Persium says, on Persius 1.2, that the poet 
“transferred this line from the first [book] of Lucilius” (hunc uersum de Lucili primo 
transtulit).13  Some scholars have argued that the comment should be taken to apply not 
to 1.2 but to 1.1, while others, including Bo [1991], prefer to see Lucili as a mistaken ex-
pansion of the abbreviation Luc., which could refer to either Lucilius or Lucretius.  Sosin 
[1999] summarizes the scholarly debate and offers his own solution: that 1.1 is indeed an 
allusion to DRN, that the scholiastic comment is correctly applied to 1.2, and that de 
Lucili primo refers neither to Lucretius nor to the satirist Lucilius but rather to Lucilius 
the addressee of Seneca’s Epistulae Morales, in the first book of which sentiments akin 
to the message of Persius 1.2 can be found. 
The support for an allusion to DRN is strong, however—whether or not there is 
also an allusion to Lucilius.14  Hendrickson argues for a Lucretian echo in Persius 1.1, 
Sosin calls it “essential to Persius’ argument,” and both Zetzel and Sosin appeal to the 
meaningful connections between DRN and satire, between satire and philosophy.15  
                                                
13 For the text of the Commentum Cornuti, see Clausen & Zetzel [2004] and Zetzel 
[2005]. 
14 Modern study of classical-era poetic reference has gotten away from intention—
whether the author meant to make an allusion—towards a methodology that focuses on 
intertexts, on whether such references can be shown to exist.  Cf., generally, Hinds [1997, 
1998] and Edmunds [2001].  On the difficult issue of authorial intention in satirical texts 
(beyond solely classical texts), see Pfaff & Gibbs [1997]. 
15 Lucretian echo: Hendrickson [1928: 98–100].  Essential to the argument: Sosin [1999: 
292].  On the connection between DRN and Persius’ satiric take on philosophy, Zetzel 
claims that “Persius…is interested in establishing himself as a philosophical poet no less 
than as a satirist in the Lucilian model” [1977: 41], while Sosin, speaking from the other 
side of the coin, writes, “[j]ust as Lucretius draws on elements of satire to express his phi-
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Moreover, the systematic use in DRN of the mode of satire, and the poem’s connection to 
earlier Roman satire (as we have seen in chapters 2–4) make reference to DRN in a pro-
grammatic way, or at least a positionally prominent way, not only possible but even rea-
sonable.16 
While I find Sosin’s argument persuasive, and probably right, I do not think that 
we need answer with certainty the ultimate source of or inspiration for Persius 1.1  If we 
attribute the line as it appears in Persius to Lucilius17—who did engage with philosophy 
in important ways—then Lucretius alludes to Lucilius’ verse at DRN 2.14, and Persius 
consequently invokes them both by quoting Lucilius and using the concomitant Lucretian 
intertexts as a part both of the thematic argument in poem 1 and of the broader “philoso-
phical inquiry” throughout his six poems.18  In other words, DRN invokes Lucilius within 
the overarching process of generic engagement with satire (see my discussion of the sa-
                                                                                                                                            
losophic position, so Persius makes philosophy part of his satiric agenda” [1999: 287].  
Powell’s “re-examination” of the poem sidesteps analysis of this textual problem alto-
gether [1992: 159]. 
16 Thus I would reject as too strongly worded Harvey’s assertion that “an allusion to the 
inventor of satire is, at this point in the poem, infinitely more appropriate than an echo of 
Lucretius” [1981: 14; underline added].  Yet, by the same token, I would not accept the 
supposed improbability of a dual reference (to Lucilius, as well as to Lucretius) in 
Sosin’s claim that “the reference at Persius 1.1 is clearly to Lucretius, and so a simulta-
neous second layer of reference to Lucilius is unlikely a priori” [1999: 284].  I find it al-
most equally plausible that Lucilius wrote the line as it appears in Persius 1.1. 
17 Fowler thinks that “the words [of Persius 1.1] are probably Lucilian” [2002: 67 ad 
DRN 2.14–19], citing Bramble [1974: 67 n. 1]. 
18 This kind of allusion, whereby the alluding text invokes not only its immediate source 
(as I am arguing that Persius 1.1 invokes DRN) but also its source’s source (as Persius 
invokes Lucilius), has been termed a “window reference” by Thomas [1986: 188–189] 
and a “double allusion” by McKeown [1987: 34–45].  For other instances of “window 
references” or double allusions in Latin poetry, see, e.g., Wheeler [1995: 99–100], Boyd 
[1992: 230–234; 2000: 67–68], O’Hara [2001: 383–384] Nappa [2002], and Smith [2005: 
206 n. 20]. 
 253 
tiric leaning of the passage in which DRN 2.14 appears at pp. 155–157, above) and Per-
sius invokes both Lucilius and Lucretius as satiric forebears, and acknowledges DRN’s 
own debt to Lucilius’ satire. 
If, on the other hand, we see the origin of Persius 1.1 in Lucretius’ poetry itself, I 
assert that Persius programmatically invokes DRN as a satiric as well as philosophic 
predecessor and thus still shows the importance of DRN’s role to the development of 
Roman satire—an importance evidenced earlier, I add, by the pervasive Epicurean ele-
ments and specifically Lucretian passages of Horace’s Sermones.  Additionally, I would 
suggest that DRN’s satirical elements and influence on the poetics of Roman satire make 
a Lucretian allusion more relevant to Persius’ project here than, say, a Stoic reference 
would be, despite the Stoic character of Persius’ satiric program on the whole.  By refer-
ring to Lucretius in his opening line, Persius shows the relevance of DRN, a philosophical 
poem that engages in important ways with satire, to his own poetic project, a book of sat-
ires that engage in important ways with philosophy. 
In light of the connection to DRN in Persius’ opening line, we may also consider 
another line in Persius’ satire, 3.66: discite et, o miseri, causas cognoscite rerum (“learn, 
wretches, and comprehend the explanations for things”).  Besides the speaker’s adoption 
(with discite) of the didactic stance familiar to us from chapter 3 (pp. 162–176, above), I 
see in this line another invocation of DRN (with causas cognoscite rerum).19  And we 
                                                
19 Note that DRN never in fact uses the phrase causae rerum; but Persius’ line is a pas-
tiche of Lucretian style, content, and vocabulary.  We may think also of Vergil Georgics 
2.490: felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas (“happy/lucky/successful is he who has 
been able to comprehend the explanations for things”).  There has been a long-running 
debate over whether this Vergilian line is in fact an allusion to DRN.  Miles argues that it 
is [1980: 154–155], and Dyson asserts that “[m]ost readers see a reference to Lucretius in 
 254 
may—though this point is admittedly tenuous—think from Lucretian allusion at Persius 
3.66 to the ur-allusion at Persius 1.1 to the source-text (DRN 2.14: o miseras hominum 
mentes! and so on), whereupon we could detect a vestige of DRN in the o miseri of Per-
sius 3.66, as well.  This instance of miseri, then, could connect with DRN’s repeated 
comic-satiric usage of miser.20 
 
 
Trouble at sea in DRN 2 and Juvenal poem 12 
In Juvenal poem 12, there is in my view another connection to DRN that, although 
not previously discussed at length, may be of substantial thematic importance.  This satire 
describes the troubles at sea, and subsequent safe homecoming, of the speaker’s friend 
and apparent sea-going merchant Catullus, whose return to dry land unscathed (though 
bereft of the luxury goods he was transporting) occasions an extended (and de rigeur sa-
tiric) assault on captatio, legacy-hunting.21  The shipwreck scene in Juvenal poem 12 
                                                                                                                                            
the line” [1997: 451, cf. 1994: 12–14], but Thomas [1988] argues against such a refer-
ence. 
Gale sees both DRN and Hesiodic poetry in the background of the line [2000: 11]; 
and a Vergilian reference not to only DRN but also to the philosophical poetry of Empe-
docles is detected by P. Hardie [1986: 39 n. 17; 1998: 29, 31], Putnam [1979: 147], A. 
Hardie [2002: 205], and Nelis [2004].  I agree with the assessment of Farrell [1993]—
“[t]he famous makarismos…is difficult not to take as an allusion to Lucretius—not nec-
essarily to any particular line in Lucretius, but to his project of writing philosophical po-
etry”—and I would apply his comments to Persius 1.1, as well. 
20 I discuss this usage of miser in chapter 2 (pp. 104–105 and n. 132, above).  For a con-
nection between Persius poem 5 and the proem to DRN book 3, see La Bua [1997]; Tar-
tari Chersoni [2003] points out metrical similarities between Persius and DRN.  
21 On the satiric topos of captatio, see Schmid [1951], Mansbach [1982], and Kay [1985: 
165–166], among others. 
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should, I will propose here, be read keeping in mind the scene of troubles at sea in the 
proem to DRN book 2. 
Scholarly attention to Juvenal poem 12—which has received much less study than 
many of the other, particularly the earlier, satires of Juvenal—has tended to cluster 
around the thematic questions of friendship and greed, around textual cruxes, and around 
the connections to “higher” poetic genres (epic, elegy, lyric, and tragedy); only Highet 
and Ramage touch on linkages with philosophy to any substantial extent.22  Ramage calls 
poem 12 “a fusion of forms from prose and poetry” [1978: 222], Smith points out the 
shipwreck scene’s connection to declamatory commonplaces [1989: 292], and Littlewood 
surveys the storm-at-sea topos in Roman poetry [2007: 397 and n. 31].23  The conven-
                                                
22 Issue of friendship: e.g., Helmbold [1956], Ramage [1978]; see, contra, Ronnick 
[1993a].  Greed: e.g., Adamietz [1983], Smith [1989], Larmour [2005], Gough [2008]; 
Ehlers sees the theme as the patron-client relationship, in particular what the appropriate 
role/behavior of a client is: “das angemessene und das unangemessene, das selbstlose und 
das eigennützige officium eines Klienten” [1996: 68].  Textual issues: Helmbold [1956], 
Kilpatrick [1971], LaFleur [1974], Jones [1982], Ronnick [1993b, 1995], Adkin [2004–
2005, 2008].  Connection to “higher” genres: Littlewood [2007], Gough [2008: ch. 3]; cf. 
Cairns [2007/1972: 20–23].  Philosophy: Highet [1949], Ramage [1978: 237].  Addition-
ally, Lindo [1974] notes that the later poems in the Juvenalian corpus can be compared 
with Horace’s Epistulae. 
Ronnick, proffering what I would describe as a minority viewpoint, calls Juvenal 
poem 12 “a poem about religio in the broadest sense” and says the “protagonist is clearly 
some sort of egomaniacal, unrequited lover” [1993a: 7 and 9, respectively].  It has be-
come almost a commonplace to quote—tendentiously, I note—Helmbold’s comment that 
“[t]he twelfth Satire is one of the strangest productions in Latin literature” [1956: 15], 
without contextualizing the quotation.  Helmbold is arguing for widespread textual cor-
ruption, as a result of which the poem is in his view poetically inadequate, even incom-
prehensible. 
23 The speaker himself advertises the intertextuality of his mise-en-scène at 12.23–24: “if 
ever a poetic storm arises” (si quando poetica surgit | tempestas).  In Romano’s words, 
“the satirist deliberately looks at reality through literature-coloured glasses and informs 
the reader that he is doing so” [1979: 175]; Larmour points out that “the satirist casts 
himself in the role of the presenter of a spectacle” with words like ecce at line 24 [2005: 
151]. 
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tional wisdom on the satire is that the speaker is cynical, that his purported friendship 
with Catullus is problematic or even undercut by Catullus’ profit-focused profession, and 
that the poem’s predominant feature is irony.24 
I would like to argue for our taking the shipwreck of Juvenal’s poem as in one 
sense a Lucretian “suaue mari magno” scene.25  The opening to DRN 2, as we have seen 
                                                                                                                                            
Littlewood adduces Statius Siluae 1.4 as a model for Juvenal poem 12 [2007: 
411–412].  Larmour [2005] compares Juvenal poem 12 to Catullus poem 63, discusses a 
reference to Valerius Flaccus Argonautica 292–312, and adduces the parallel of the 
roughly contemporaneous Nauigium of Lucian.  Colton [1972] sees the poem as indebted 
to Martial’s epigrams, while Smith contrasts it with Tacitus Annales 2.23 [1989: 292] and 
both Adamietz [1983] and Ehlers [1996: 61] liken it to parts of Horace’s Odes.  Ramage 
compares the poem’s overarching theme to Cicero De Amicitia and Seneca Epistulae 
Morales [1978: 223]. 
Haenicke [1877] understood the satire to be an example of how such a storm 
scene should not be written.  We can also look to the storm at Petronius Satyrica 115, 
with Conte [1996: 55–62], Connors [1998: 141–145], and Rimell [2002: 79–83].  On the 
shipwreck topos more broadly, see Huxley [1952]. 
24 Representative assessments are from Smith—“[t]he narrator cynically shrugs off his 
friend’s concern about his safety: if you are fool enough to risk a sea-voyage, this kind of 
thing is bound to happen” [1989: 291]—and from Littlewood: “[t]he satirist narrates the 
storm but with an irony that disassociates him from it.  The mock-heroic pretension of the 
narration can be read rather as a reflection of the life style of Catullus” [2007: 397]. 
Larmour attributes the cynicism to us, the readers: “[w]e can only assume that Ca-
tullus’ spectacular ‘renunciation’ is purely self-serving” [2005: 169].  Yes, sacrificing 
material goods to save one’s own life is inherently self-serving, but so is the avoidance in 
the first place of seafaring on account of the dangers it presents.  The course recom-
mended by DRN’s speaker can be seen as self-serving, too.  Konstan, however, under-
takes to defend the Lucretian speaker’s words against claims of malevolent Schaden-
freude, like Bailey’s description of the scene as “an almost cynical picture” [1947: 797], 
for example; nevertheless Fowler maintains that there is a “philosophical problem” in the 
conflict between the wise Epicurean’s ἀταραξία and the “mental disturbance at an-
other’s fate” implicit in the act or emotion of pity [2002: 40 ad DRN 2.3–4]. 
Thus I would suggest that the “self-serving” aspect of Catullus’ actions should not 
be taken to undercut the philosophic approval of his decisions.  Perhaps the spectacle and 
heroicness of Catullus’ casting his goods overboard can furthermore be attributed more to 
the satirist’s dramatization than to Catullus’ own motives—since, after all, it is the sati-
rist-speaker who is narrating Catullus’ story, not Catullus himself. 
25 To my knowledge, the only mention of the opening of DRN 2 in the scholarship on Ju-
venal poem 12 is by Larmour, who merely writes in passing, “Juvenal’s satirical contem-
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(pp. 90–91 and 155–157, above), has us with the speaker looking from the fortress of phi-
losophy down upon the shipwreck (nowadays we might say “train wreck”) of a life that 
most people lead: 
suaue, mari magno turbantibus aequora uentis, 
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; 
non quia uexari quemquamst iucunda uoluptas, 
sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suaue est. 
       (DRN 2.1–4) 
 
Sweet it is, when the winds are thrashing the flats on the great sea, 
to watch from land the great difficulties of another.  Not because 
there’s any mocking pleasure that someone’s in trouble, but be-
cause perceiving the kinds of problems you’re separated from is 
sweet.26 
 
This trouble at sea is a metaphor for ambition and, more pertinently for my considera-
tions here, wealth.27  Konstan, in fact, identifies the man in trouble at sea in DRN’s sec-
ond proem as an “audacious trader whose unnatural greed lures him to incur the perils of 
the sea” [2008/1973: 35, cf. 2001: 34–48]; the Horatian merchant whose ship is in trouble 
and who wishes he were a soldier instead (Serm. 1.1.6–7 “the merchant, when the south-
ern winds are buffeting his ship [says]: ‘being a soldier is better,’ ” mercator nauim iac-
tantibus Austris: | ‘militia est potior’) may both allude to DRN 2.1–4 and provide support 
for Konstan’s claim.  A few lines later, the Lucretian speaker makes clear that the trouble 
                                                                                                                                            
plation of the follies and vices of Roman males, through the particular example of Catul-
lus, is a transformation of the famous opening of Lucretius Book 2.1–4, with its detached, 
philosophical contemplation of the misfortunes of others” [2005: 145]. 
26 Konstan suggests translating line 4 as “but because it is sweet to discern the kind of 
evils to which you yourself are not susceptible” [2008/1973: 34]. 
27 Roy [forthcoming] also demonstrates that the Lucretian trouble at sea invokes the Od-
yssey, and argues that the Epicurean gaze upon the trouble at sea gestures metapoetically 
at the increased value of reading the Odyssey from the vantage point of the knowledge 
that DRN offers. 
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at sea is implicitly connected to the pursuit of money, when he says that people are strug-
gling (like sailors on a rough sea) “to surface to the level of the highest riches and to take 
possession of things.”28  The moralizing metaphor of life’s stormy sea, while not exclu-
sive or even original to DRN, is in fact a common scene within the poem itself (and in 
Graeco-Roman literature more generally).29 
Catullus’ troubles on the ocean blue (12.17–61) are significantly more protracted 
and technically detailed than those of his anonymous Lucretian predecessors.  The moral 
message of the first half of the poem, however, is basically the same as that of DRN 2.1–
19.  The Juvenal-ego even spells it out for us: “but who else, who in any part of the cos-
mos would really endeavor to offer up his head for silver and his safety for material 
goods?”30  Grasping for wealth is stressful, risky, and even life-endangering.  It is folly. 
If the shipwreck scene here in Juvenal can be seen as his own Lucretian “suaue 
mari magno” moment, the poem’s satiric speaker thus takes on the role of the philosophi-
cally serene observer.31  Indeed, the speaker does find the occasion “sweet” in the very 
first line (dulcior, in place of the Lucretian suaue), explicitly on account of his friend’s 
                                                
28 2.13: ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri.  I offer a slightly, but deliberately, 
tendentious rendering of the line, which is followed immediately by the o miseras homi-
num mentes interjection now familiar to us for its connection to Persius 1.1. 
29 We see vexatious waters in one form or another also at DRN 1.271–295, 2.552–559, 
3.802–805, 4.1097–1104, 5.222–223 (a child castaway), 5.1000–1006, 5.1226–1235. 
30 12.48–49: sed quis nunc alius, qua mundi parte quis audet | argento praeferre caput 
rebusque salutem?  Ronnick finds these lines “ironic” [1993a: 10]. 
31 Highet even sees this poem as evidence for the Juvenal-ego’s adopting an Epicurean 
subject position in his thematic focus on friendship in this poem and others late in the 
corpus: “[o]f all the three main sects, it was only Epicureanism which paid so much atten-
tion to friendship…only Epicureanism that ranked friendship, as Juvenal does, above the 
ties of the family” [1949: 268]. 
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survival and homecoming—but also, I believe, because he is an “earwitness” (so to 
speak) both to some of the ills from which he is safeguarded and to an excellent subject 
for satiric observation, inquiry, criticism, and moralizing.  The added benefit in the Juve-
nalian passage is that the reader, along with the speaker, can genuinely find the shipwreck 
scene “sweet” because the frame narrative assures that Catullus made it out of his 
seaborne magnus labor unscathed. 
Juvenal’s Catullus himself enhances the dialogue poem 12 has with DRN.  Schol-
ars writing on this satire have generally viewed with skepticism Catullus and his response 
to the sea-storm, and have consequently attributed a similar skepticism to the speaker’s 
perception of Catullus.32  While I would not say that such a perspective is incorrect, I do 
think that there is another way of looking at Catullus: he responded as he should have, 
not only given the exigencies of his situation but also considering the DRN-like scenario.  
In Lucretius’ poem, the seafarers are essentially passive, but in Juvenal’s, Catullus gets 
both action and speech: “ ‘pour overboard what’s mine,’ said Catullus, ‘—all of it.’ ”33  
Overboard go his luxury commodities, his basic goods (res utiles, 12.52), and even his 
                                                
32 So Ramage [1978: 229], Smith [1989: 296], Littlewood [2007: 402].  Cf. also Larmour: 
“[w]e might expect that Catullus’ escape from the storm would offer proof (testis) of his 
manliness, but in fact it demonstrates the opposite.”  Casting overboard the goods is “a 
display of virtus from all the wrong motivations and empty of all signification” [2005: 
149–150]. 
33 12.37: ‘fundite quae mea sunt’ dicebat ‘cuncta’ Catullus.  Smith sees cuncta as 
“comic” in its end position, and sees in quae mea sunt an allusion to Persius 5.113–114: 
“Persius, unlike Juvenal’s Catullus, scorns luxury items…as not being a ‘true part’ of the 
real human being” [1989: 293].  Adamietz views the line as determined and principled, 
forming a stark contrast with other greedy sailors who would put fortune before their own 
lives: “Sein Befehl…charakterisiert seine Entschlossenheit, er will restlos die Kost-
barkeiten aufgeben…alle anderen außer Catull würden dem Vermögen den Vorrang ge-
ben vor der Rettung des eigenen Lebens, noch im Untergang daran festhalten” [1983: 
240–241].  Ronnick calls Catullus’ casting things overboard “heroic” [1993: 10]. 
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ship’s mast.34  This response is exactly what the Lucretian ego would want Catullus to do 
in such a situation.  Better not to chase lucre across the waves.  But in adverse circum-
stances, focus on (bail out, we could say) what matters—the minimum needed to sustain 
your life—and forget (or bail on) the rest. 
Compare in DRN the passage shortly after book 2’s suaue mari magno opening, 
on how illness lingers just as long regardless of the kind of coverings you have, rich or 
poor: 
nec calidae citius decedunt corpore febres, 
textilibus si in picturis ostroque rubenti 
iacteris, quam si in plebeia ueste cubandum est. 
       (DRN 2.34–36) 
 
And hot fevers don’t go out of the body any faster if you’re 
wrapped up in painted fabrics and reddish-purple cloth than if 
you’ve got to lie down in a commoner’s cloak. 
 
Again, luxuries are not needed, only the minimum for life’s sustenance.  These lines fur-
thermore lead into a passage (2.37–53) that Konstan terms DRN’s “ironic satire on the 
notion that wealth or power can provide security against death” [2008/1973: 51]; and 
throughout this portion of the book’s proem, in Fowler’s words, “the useless riches are 
                                                
34 The divestment of goods is explicitly, and the severing of the mast (12.53–54) implic-
itly, compared to a beaver’s supposed self-castration to escape death at the hands of cas-
toreum-hunters (34–36): so Ramage [1978: 229 and n. 19], Smith [1989: 294], Little-
wood [2007: 404], Adkin [2008: 130], and Larmour, who calls it “the ideological ‘ground 
zero’ which ties together the poem’s complex interweaving of” themes and topoi [2005: 
141].  Ehlers, rejecting outright this interpretation of the beaver-simile, argues that it mis-
understands the fable and its function: “[e]s heißt die Fabel, das Gleichnis und seine 
Funktion mißzuverstehen, wenn hier jüngst von einer Art Selbstkastration des Catullus 
gesprochen wurde” [1996: 63].  In his reading, the beaver-simile is not a sign of greed-
caused effeminacy, but rather a wisdom growing from an un-stereotypical, un-satire-like 
wisdom: “[w]äre Catullus so habgierig, wie ein topischer Kaufmann der Satire zu sein 
hat, wäre er natürlich mit dem Schiff untergegangen, ohne auch nur den geringsten Teil 
seines Besitzes zu opfern” [1996: 64].  Littlewood calls Ehlers’ argument “perverse” 
[2007: 404 n. 49]. 
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sneeringly mocked” [2002: 99 ad 2.27].  The quest for riches overseas is in vain, DRN’s 
speaker tells us, because it needlessly endangers you and the riches themselves do you no 
good when you are in distress.  Juvenal poem 12 enacts this very lesson for the unfortu-
nate Catullus. 
Second-readers of this Juvenalian poem can furthermore contrast Juvenal 14.287–
304, a shipwreck scene where the response is greedy—the wrong answer.  I detect Lu-
cretian echoes there, too, at 14.303–304: tantis parta malis cura maiore metuque | se-
ruuantur (“things begotten at the expense of such misfortunes/ills are to be protected by 
means of greater anxiety and fear”).  Juvenal’s Catullus in poem 12 made a bad decision 
by going out on the open sea in the first place, but when he ran into problems, he acted 
promptly and wisely.  So DRN’s second proem, in my view, informs the moralistic plot 
of Juvenal poem 12’s first half.  There is no direct allusion to Lucretius in the satire, yet 
the conundrum it investigates and the roles of detached, placid observer (the Juvenal-ego) 
and beleaguered seafarer (Catullus) all combine to invoke DRN’s suaue mari magno—
and to extend it, to unpack its (Epicurean) implications.  Juvenal’s poem effectively fuses 
the philosophic and satiric impulses already intertwined in DRN’s satiric opening to book 
2. 
I cited earlier (p. 247, above) Keane’s assertion that “philosophical dis-
course…[is] a set of tools for which a satirist devises new uses” and so forth.35  Perhaps 
DRN “does” satire, and the satirists “do” philosophy in part because of the civic and 
moral concerns that they share, the subject of the second half of this chapter.  Keane’s 
point is, in a sense, the mirror image of what I have argued for DRN’s use of the mode of 
                                                
35 Again, Keane [2007: 29].  Cf. Taiwo [2009]. 
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satire in chapters 2–3.  Satire of this kind, that is to say, is a set of tools that DRN adapts 
for use in its own (new) context.  If we accept the second part of her point on Roman sat-
ire, therefore—that by adapting philosophy to their satiric context the satirists are em-
ploying a form of philosophical inquiry made native to the genre of satire—then, mutatis 
mutandis, we can say that DRN is engaging in a kind of satiric discourse that becomes a 
part of its own genre (or context).  This point is, in brief, my argument for the current 
chapter: that by engaging not only with the techniques of the Graeco-Roman mode of sat-
ire but also with the generic tropes of the body of Roman literature called satura, Lu-
cretius’ poem is importing satire into itself—DRN is doing and being a certain kind of 
satire. 
 
Lucretian elementa and satiric teaching 
Roman satirists after DRN reappropriate Lucretian imagery and the Lucretian 
speaker’s didactic pose for their own satiric ends.  This reappropriation—and the ways 
the satirists differ in their reception of DRN—is perhaps most clearly on display in the 
case of the alphabet.  The elementa, the “letters” of DRN, serve for the Lucretian speaker 
as illustrative metaphors for the atomic composition of matter.  To wit: 
quin etiam passim nostris in uersibus ipsis 
multa elementa uides multis communia uerbis, 
cum tamen inter se uersus ac uerba necessest 
confiteare et re et sonitu distare sonanti. 
tantum elementa queunt permutato ordine solo; 
at rerum quae sunt primordia, plura adhibere 
possunt unde queant uariae res quaeque creari. 
       (DRN 1.823–829) 
 
Moreover, you see all across my verses themselves many ele-
ments/letters shared by many words, although you must still admit 
that the verses and words are among themselves distinct both in 
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content and in sounding noise.  The elements/letters are capable of 
this much with a change to their order alone—but the elements that 
are the first-beginnings of matter can bring in more things from 
which all the various kinds of matter can be created. 
 
A fixed set of letters can make up the countless variety of words just like the fixed types 
of atoms can combine into the innumerable kinds of extant matter.36  Letters of the alpha-
bet model atomic constituents of matter; words model reality. 
The Horace-ego conjoins this Lucretian image with another, the simile of the 
honey on the cup (DRN 1.936–950 = 4.11–24): 
praeterea, ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens 
                                                
36 Compare also DRN 2.688–699 (note that 1.823–825 = 2.688–690 and 1.826 ≈ 2.691): 
quin etiam passim nostris in uersibus ipsis 
multa elementa uides multis communia uerbis, 
cum tamen inter se uersus ac uerba necesse est 
confiteare alia ex aliis constare elementis; 
non quo multa parum communis littera currat 
aut nulla inter se duo sint ex omnibus isdem, 
sed quia non uolgo paria omnibus omnia constant. 
sic aliis in rebus item, communia multa 
multarum rerum cum sint primordia, uerum 
dissimili tamen inter se consistere summa 
possunt; ut merito ex aliis constare feratur 
humanum genus et fruges arbustaque laeta. 
Moreover, you see all across my verses themselves many elements/letters 
shared by many words, although you must still admit that the verses and 
words are among themselves built each one from different [combinations 
of] letters—it’s not that a common letter doesn’t run through many 
[words], or that no two [words] are composed of all the same letters be-
tween themselves, but that generally not all [words] are built equal to all.  
So also likewise in other things, since many first-beginnings are common 
to many kinds of matter, but still they can come together in combinations 
varying among themselves.  As a result, it’s correctly reported that the 
human race and crops and fertile trees are made out of different [combina-
tions]. 
On the atoms-as-letters simile, see, e.g., Minadeo [1969], Dalzell [1987], Thury [1987] 
and Volk [2002a: 85–86, 100–105]. 
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percurram: quamquam ridentem dicere uerum 
quid uetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi 
doctores, elementa uelint ut discere prima: 
sed tamen amoto quaeramus seria ludo. 
       (Serm. 1.1.25–26) 
 
Moreover, not to rush through like someone laughing at witti-
cisms—although, what’s to prevent telling the truth while smiling?  
Like when sometimes wheedling/coaxing/charming teachers give 
cookies to boys, so that they’ll be willing to learn their ABCs [lit-
erally “their first elements”]: but, nevertheless, with play put away, 
let’s inquire into serious matters. 
 
The Horatian prima elementa invoke the Lucretian letters we have just seen—and, as 
well, the prima elementa may call to mind the Lucretian primordia (“first-beginnings”), 
principia (“first-principles”), and corpora prima (“first bodies”), three of DRN’s other 
terms for atoms in addition to elementa.  Likewise, the Horatian simile of teachers (doc-
tores) persuading boys to learn possibly uninteresting material alludes to the Lucretian 
“honeyed cup” simile of doctors (medentes) tricking boys into drinking definitely unpal-
atable medicine—and the allusion picks up not only on the literal image within the simile 
but also on the simile’s application in DRN, since it is a simile for the Lucretian speaker’s 
use of poetry to make the possibly uninteresting material of Epicurean physics palatable.  
Horace’s speaker here justifies, on grounds of didactic benefit, his own blend of satiric 
moral critique with good-natured comic mockery.  
Persius does not mention elementa specifically, but the chastising interlocutor (we 
might say “guest-satirist”) of Persius poem 3 does invoke the alphabet in order to make a 
moral-satiric point (“and the letter that has drawn apart its Samian branches has shown to 
you, too, its hill rising on the right edge,” et tibi quae Samios diduxit littera ramos | sur-
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gentem dextro monstrauit limite collem).37  And the Persius-ego similarly adverts to 
Lucilius with mention of the letter R, the “canine letter,” in the programmatic satire 
(canina | littera, 1.109–110).  The fate of the elementa in Juvenal’s later satire, where 
they are again explicitly mentioned (14.123: sunt quaedam uitiorum elementa, “there are 
certain basics/components of faults”), is grim: “[i]n Juvenal’s world, the prima elementa 
of children are vices.”38  Each satirist adopts the Lucretian image and repurposes it for his 
own satire. 
This example exhibits the satirists’ intertextual response to the satiric develop-
ments in DRN.  More broadly, I would see the satirists’ incorporation of Epicureanism to 
be in some ways a similar comment on and reference to DRN.  The connection between 
DRN or Epicureanism generally and Horace’s Sermones is quite complex, but I recall 
here the (often incompetent) Epicurean dialogue in Serm. 1.1–3,39 showcased as well in, 
e.g., Serm. 2.2, 2.7, and 2.8.40  Persius’ ego presents Epicureanism as risible, and also un-
successful in correcting his flaws: in Persius’ third satire, the lazy student (the ego) is de-
scribed as a leaking pot, a recurrent Lucretian image.41 
                                                
37 3.56–57.  The letter in question is the Greek upsilon, Υ or (as written in Persius’ sce-
nario) Ч, where adulthood offers a choice between the straight path of righteousness or 
the “hill” of vice.  Cf. Braund’s explanation [2004a: 79 n. 15 ad loc.]. 
38 Keane [2006: 135], with reference to Juvenal 14.208–209: “this [greed and vice] is 
what the hag-nannies teach our sons while they’re still toddlers, this is what all our 
daughters learn, before they learn their ΑΒΓs” (hoc monstrant uetulae pueris repentibus 
assae, | hoc discunt omnes ante alpha et beta puellae). 
39 Cf. Turpin [1998]. 
40 On 2.8, see Freudenburg [1995]. 
41 Persius 3.20–24, cf. Keane [2006: 163 n. 72] and my discussion in chapter 2 of the im-
agery of the uas in DRN (pp. 120–121 and n. 163, above). 
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Juvenal’s satire stages the wholesale failure of the didact, the grammaticus, as 
part of what Keane calls “an aggressive move to reinvent this genre” of satire [2006: 
128]—and this failure, too, I see as a response to DRN.42  If DRN is to be seen as a re-
sponse to the political, social, and intellectual crises of the late Republic,43 then the Juve-
nal-ego, from the vantage point of hindsight, calls the Lucretian persona’s response a 
failure.  “Juvenal’s professional teachers are unable to teach, while his immoral charac-
ters proceed to spread their knowledge easily.”44  In the world of Juvenalian satire, in the 
Sin City / Savage City that Juvenal portrays, DRN is ineffectual, its civic message is a 
failure.  And yet the Juvenal-ego’s own solution appears Epicurean.  In poem 12, at least, 
separation from civic life is the answer: limited sacrifice, renouncement of wealth, and 






                                                
42 The grammaticus figure appears at Juvenal 3.75–78, 6.434–456, and especially 7.215–
243. 
43 Or, if we accept the argument of Flower [2010], the transitional period between the fi-
nal legitimate form of the Republic and the beginning of the Augustan-era principate.  On 
Lucretius’ poem as such a response to crisis in the Roman state, see my discussion of 
civic discourse in DRN and Roman satire (pp. 271–286, below). 
44 Keane [2006: 133]. 
45 Cf. Fowler [2002: 28 ad DRN 2.1–13]: “[a] stormy sea is an obvious symbol for distur-
bance in…political life, suggesting not merely violent agitation but also to some extent 




Dining and consumption, food and feasting are of great generic importance to 
Roman satire, and to the post-classical satiric tradition that descends from Roman 
satura.46  Indeed, at the beginning of chapter 4 (pp. 199–200, above) we pondered the 
possible etymological connections between food and the term satura itself.  Citations of 
food in satire abound: Serm. 2.2, 2.4, 2.8; a peaceful dinner with Cornutus at Persius 
5.44; Petronius’ famous Dinner of Trimalchio scene; Juvenal poems 4, 5, 11.  At Persius 
2.42–43, the speaker states that lavish meals get in the way of prayers to the gods for 
good fortune; Juvenal poem 15 depicts the extreme in food (i.e., cannibalism) while the 
Juvenal-ego earlier asks tantine iniuria cenae?47 
The satiric topos of food holds links with Epicureanism and the satirists’ reception 
of DRN, as well.  Serm. 2.2’s Ofellus, who advocates for simple meals, sounds like Epi-
curus’ Letter to Menoecus, according to Hudson [1989: 75].  Freudenburg points out that 
the conclusion to the feast of Nasidienus (Serm. 2.8, the last poem in the last book of 
Sermones) echoes not only Serm. 1.4.116 and 2.4.45, but also DRN 1.25–26, 3.1070, and 
                                                
46 For Roman satire, see Gowers [1993a: ch. 3] and Hudson [1989, esp. 70]: “[f]or the 
satirists a useful criterion for judging a person’s moral quality was the amount of money 
and effort he devoted to thinking and talking about food and eating it.”  Cf. also Plaza 
[2006: 78–80, 93–101, 108–110, 119, 164, 186, 294–296, 340–341] and Muecke [2005: 
47]: “[t]he consumption and offering of food must be emphasized as one of satire’s en-
during themes, and a rich source of tropes and self-reflexive metaphors.”  On food in 
post-classical satire, see, e.g., Griffin [1994: 190–197]. 
47 5.9: “is the damage of a banquet worth so much?”  Note the allusion to Vergil Aeneid 
1.11: tantaene animis caelestibus irae? (“do such great wraths [or “does so much wrath”] 
exist in celestial spirits [i.e., in the minds of the gods]?”).  Adkin identifies recurrent Ver-
gilian parody in this satire [2004–2005: 286–290; 2008: 131–135]. 
 268 
5.1185.  Thus there is “a connection between Nasidienus’ gastronomic studies and Epicu-
rean natural science” [1995: 207 n. 1].  A technical-sounding Epicurean façade grants 
greater gravity to the dinner-host’s bloviation, while the Horatian ego’s linkage of the 
two could be seen as a debasement of the lofty precincts of Epicurean doctrine. 
DRN, in contrast to satire, is not nearly so stuffed with food-talk.  We get to see 
this victual principle in action earlier in the poem, when a pleasant picnic on a riverbank 
with a few friends is contrasted with the trappings of luxury (DRN 2.20–33, cf. pp. 150–
152, above).  And the motif comes up again in the Lucretian satiric “anthropology,” 
where early humans are satisfied with simple, easily gathered comestibles (5.937–952). 
The Lucretian speaker offers in book 4 what I consider a dispositive or conclusive take 
on food: 
nec refert quicquam quo uictu corpus alatur, 
dummodo quod capias concoctum didere possis 
artubus et stomachi ualidum seruare tenorem. 
       (DRN 4.630–632) 
 
And it doesn’t matter at all on what kind of sustenance the body is 
nourished, provided that the kind of thing you take is something 
you can digest and distribute through your limbs—and keep your 
stomach’s course strong. 
 
Take what is at hand, in other words, as long as it is nutritious enough.48  With one nota-
ble exception, these few moments essentially delimit the extent of DRN’s (dis)interest in 
food.49 
                                                
48 And as long as it will not make you sick to your stomach, as is common in Roman sat-
ire: the death of a man who could not digest the fancy peacock meat he devoured (Juve-
nal 1.135–146) is emblematic of the gastrointestinal disasters of the genre. 
49 Minor mentions of food or eating do crop up elsewhere.  Rouse & Smith identify 23 
such instances [1975: 595, s. v. “food”], but do not cite either the “picnic scene” of book 
2 or the early human diet in book 5. 
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The exception is itself another link to satire, namely the image of the conuiua that 
appears twice in DRN book 3:50 
cur non ut plenus uitae conuiua recedis 
aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem? 
       (DRN 3.938–939) 
 
Why don’t you be like the dinner-guest full of life and withdraw, 
and enjoy a carefree repose with a level head, you fool? 
 
sed quia semper aues quod abest, praesentia temnis, 
inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque uita, 
et nec opinanti mors ad caput adstitit ante 
quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum. 
       (DRN 3.957–960) 
 
But—because you always desire what you don’t have, you disdain 
what you do—your life has slipped by incomplete and unsatisfy-
ing, and death stands over your head, while you’re unawares, be-
fore you were able to draw away satisfied and full of things/the 
universe. 
 
A person afraid of death is like a dinner-guest (conuiua) who cannot get full, be satisfied, 
or leave the banquet happy.  In other words, such a person is like the gluttons of Roman 
satire.51  Horace alludes to and appropriates for his own program this conuiua at Serm. 
                                                                                                                                            
DRN on food has not received much scholarly study; Fowler considers the role of 
food and Epicurean pleasure theory in the Lucretian picnic scene [2002: 83–85 ad 2.20–
36], Shelton discusses the food supply as part of the “contract with animals” depicted in 
DRN book 5’s anthropology [1995: 116–118], and Gruber [2010] reads the honey in the 
Lucretian “honeyed cup” simile (1.936–942 ≈ 4.11–17) as a salutary food that refers to 
Plato Laws 2.659e–660a, a passage that compares poetry used to communicated healthy 
ideas with tasty food containing nourishment for the ill. 
50 Cf. my discussion of Natura Rerum, who gives voice to the image, at the end of chapter 
2 (pp. 133–139, above); cf. also the sympotic context of DRN 3.884–930 (with pp. 106–
108, above).  On the image of the conuiua in DRN, see, e.g., Stork [1970: 79 and n. 258], 
Wallach [1976: 64–65, 71], Nussbaum [2009/1994: 211], and Reinhardt [2002: 296–
297].  There is also a dinner-guest at Bion fr. 68, in the numbering of Kindstrand [1976]; 
cf. Harrison [2007c: 82]. 
51 And possibly also like the parasites of Greek and Roman comedy, on which character 
type see Gowers [1993a: 76–78], Damon [1997], and Tylawsky [2002]. 
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1.1.117–119 and Epist. 2.2.214–216.52  Concluding his first act of satiric versification, the 
Horatian speaker remarks that it is rare to find people who end their life contented like 
Lucretian dinner-guests: 
inde fit, ut raro, qui se uixisse beatum 
dicat et exacto contentus tempore uita 
cedat uti conuiua satur, reperire queamus. 
       (Serm. 1.1.117–119) 
 
And so it happens that we’re rarely able to find someone who says 
he’s lived happily/bountifully and who, pleased with the time he’s 
spent, withdraws from life just like a satisfied dinner-guest. 
 
Note the verbal echoes: uita, conuiua, satur in both authors, Lucretian recedis and 
discedere answered by Horatian cedat, Lucretian possis by Horatian queamus, Lucretian 
plenus…rerum by Horatian beatum, Lucretian elapsast…uita by Horatian ex-
acto…tempore, Lucretian aequo animo by Horatian contentus.  The μεμψιμοιρία of 
DRN’s first line—the criticism of one’s own lot in favor of another’s, the “grass is 
greener” topos—may have inspired the μεμψιμοιρία with which Serm. 1.1 opens, where 
each professional wishes to exchange his profession for another’s.53  The Horace-ego then 
pivots, however, and says “enough” for his own opening poem (iam satis est, 1.1.120; 
satis here reverberates with conuiua satur in the line previous).  In satire, we might ex-
pect to be stuffed.  The satirist of Serm. 1.1 has us just enough-ed.  He, like Lucretius’ 
Natura Rerum would want, knows when to let go. 
                                                
52 Freudenburg argues that the image of the conuiua is used in Serm. 1.1 to show that the 
poetry of Sermones is markedly unlike DRN, a six-book long epic [2001: 33–45].  Cf. 
also Glazewski [1971] and Munding [1996].  On the image in Epist. 2.2, see Dessen 
[1968: 81 and n. 19]. 
53 On the topos of μεμψιμοιρία, see, e.g., Fraenkel [1957: 92–94] and Horace Odes 
1.1.17 with Nisbet & Hubbard [1970: ad loc.].  On the programmatic intent of Serm. 1.1, 
see Dufallo [1999–2000]. 
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We can also attribute to this nexus of imagery in DRN elements of other satiric 
dinner scenes.  So, for example, the sympotic moment at Serm. 1.4.86–91, where we are 
shown a satirist making an ass of himself by telling the truth freely (as a liber) after 
drinking a bit too much wine (Liber, the Roman Dionysus).  Juvenal’s food-plagued 
poem 5 synthesizes both DRN’s conuiua and Serm. 1.4’s play on liber, I believe: 
tu tibi liber homo et regis conuiua uideris: 
captum te nidore suae putat ille culinae, 
nec male coniectat. 
       (Juvenal 5.161–163) 
 
You seem to yourself to be a free man and a dinner-guest of His 
Majesty—and he adjudges you to be enslaved by the splendor of 
his own kitchen…and he ain’t far off. 
 
Here the addressee’s status as dinner-guest is literal as well as metaphorical.  At Virro’s 
feast, “you” think you are almost an equal, an honored guest, but Virro (throughout poem 
5) proves otherwise by his treatment of you.  He is king (regis, line 161), you are en-
slaved to him (captum, 162).  Enslaved to your belly, as well, for you chase after the de-
lights of the kitchen no matter the cost or indignity.  Reading DRN 3.938–939 into this 
passage adds another level of metaphor: instead of contenting yourself (like a Lucretian 
conuiua satur) with what is nutritious and readily available, you are insatiable, clinging 





One of the enduring characteristics of the Roman genre of satire is its involve-
ment with Roman social and political life.  Examples from Horace, Persius, and Juvenal 
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abound.  Serm. 1.5 combines the lead-up to an event of great political magnitude (Mae-
cenas’ journey to Brundisium on Octavian’s behalf to meet with Antony) with a sample 
of everyday social life (ball-playing, pink-eye, lazy ferrymen, prostitutes, and so forth).  
Serm. 1.7 puts a court of law on center stage, while Juvenal poem 4 focuses on the court 
of the emperor instead.  These instances can be redoubled again and again, and they can 
likewise be matched with sweeping, even programmatic pronouncements on the state of 
the City of Rome: “Rome is in chaos” (turbida Roma, Persius 1.5), “Rome is waste-
ful/expensive” (prodiga Roma, Juvenal 7.138), “we inhabit a City for the most part 
propped up by a slight support” (nos Vrbem colimus tenui tibicine fultam | magna parte 
sui, Juvenal 3.193–194). 
In other words, as Muecke writes, satire’s “characteristic flavor was Roman” 
[2005: 34].  The City, if not explicitly mentioned, looms large in the backdrop to the po-
ems of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal—and of Lucretius, too, as we will see.  The 
satirist is both a poet and a social actor, someone who claims a stake in the health and 
standing of Roman society.  Henderson, writing on Serm. 1.9, speaks of the “excursions 
of the poet in the social domain” as an important feature of satire, figured in Serm. 1.9 by 
the Horace-ego’s pestered walk down the Sacra Via [1993: 80].  By treating topics like 
power relations between rich and poor, or government and the law, the poets of satire 
make such excursions a defining concern of the genre.54 
                                                
54 Satiric encounters with the law, for instance, comprise a recurrent, thorny topic: 
Horace’s Sermones feature a courtroom battle of wits (1.7) and a “fanboy” who deserts 
his legal duties to pursue his ambitions of access to Maecenas (1.9), while the fragmen-
tary Juvenal poem 16 sets up a lament about the preferential legal treatment afforded to 
soldiers.  See, e.g., Cloud [1989], Henderson [1993], Mazurek [1997], and Keane [2006: 
ch. 3]. 
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I consider more extensively here what Henderson terms the “civic discourse” of 
satire in Rome [again 1993: 69].  In my usage, civic discourse refers to the poetic treat-
ment of the topoi of Roman social and political life (the workings of government and the 
governing elite, but also the faults and foibles of daily mundane existence), as well as to 
the moralizing satiric critique of problems with the way Roman aristocracy and society 
functions.  Civic discourse, in essence, is made up of the poet’s excursions into the social 
domain.  In Graf’s account, “Roman satire appears as the literarization of fundamental 
social concerns and ways of behavior” [2005: 205].  The issues of the City, citizenship, 
and the Roman state, transfigured into poetry, make up a crucial part of what Roman sat-
ire does. 
Compare this identification of Roman satire as “literarization” of socio-political 
concerns with Rosen’s assertion that Graeco-Roman satiric verse (i.e., poetry employing 
the satiric mode) consists of poetic mimesis of everyday abuse and mockery [2007: 46].  
                                                                                                                                            
In DRN book 3, the Lucretian speaker avows that Natura Rerum (on whom see 
pp. 133–139, above) is waging a “just lawsuit” and a “true legal action” (3.950–951: 
iusta lis and uera causa), and she herself proclaims in legalistic language that “life is 
given to nobody as property-in-possession, but to everybody for usufruct” (uitaque man-
cipio nulli datur, omnibus usu, 3.971); lawyers appear in DRN’s next book, where they 
have dreams of court cases, in an example of how we dream of what we are habituated to 
do (4.966).  Fowler points out that DRN 3.48–54 includes phrases that “exactly pervert 
legal terminology” [1989: 136], but also that DRN’s account of the development of hu-
man government has a preference for (Roman-like) magistrates and laws over (un-
Roman) kings [143].  Cf. the problems with this passage’s conflicting trends of progress 
and decline (from a mythic/epic Golden Age) over the course of time, as discussed by, 
e.g., Cole [1967: 26–45], Furley [1978], Andreoni [1979], Manuwald [1980], Farrell 
[1994], and Campbell [2003]; and cf. also the Lucretian speaker’s problematic assertion 
that the Punic Wars, a relic of the past, are of no importance to contemporary Romans 
(despite the Wars’ influence on both late Republican citizen identity and late Republican 
geopolitical pre-eminence), with, among others, Kenney [1971: 193], Furley [1986: 76–
78], Mitsis [1988], Striker [1988], Nussbaum [2009/1994: 203 n. 1], and Lei [2007: 6–10, 
30].  On DRN and the law generally, see Schiesaro [2007b], and cf. Campbell [2002]. 
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Both categories handle in a stylized, poetic form some aspect of lived reality, often heav-
ily exaggerated, stereotyped, or distorted.  But what differentiates the Roman genre of 
satire from the wider tradition of Graeco-Roman satiric verse (of which the genre satura 
is an important part) is the genre’s basic, though not all-encompassing, focus on civic 
life.55  This focus is something that the post-Roman tradition of satire—both as mode and 
as genre—inherits from Roman satura.  I point, for the sake of example (they are plenti-
ful), to the political role of public mockery and literary libel in Stuart-era England, to the 
anti-Nazi satirical journal Ulenspiegel in American-occupied postwar Berlin, and to, per-
haps most obviously, political cartoons.56  And as Simpson points out, American legal 
precedent considers satire “a preeminent form of political debate.”57 
                                                
55 Aristophanic Old Comedy stands as an important, perhaps exceptional, pre-Roman ex-
ample of the use of satire in civic discourse: see, e.g., Sidwell [2009]. 
56 Stuart-era England: Fox [1994], Croft [1995], Bellany [2001], McRae [2004], Cressy 
[2010: 33–37].  Ulenspiegel: Goldstein [2009: 110–125].  For an analysis of satire in po-
litical cartoons during the 2000s-era American “War on Terror,” see Steuter & Wills 
[2008: 106–125]. 
57 Simpson [2003: 209].  The legal precedent to which Simpson refers is the 1987 deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in The Diver-
sity Action brought to the US District Court for the Western District of Virginia by the 
Reverend Jerry Falwell, Appellant, versus Larry C. Flynt, Hustler Magazine INC, Appel-
lee, popularly known as The People v. Larry Flint.  The Court of Appeals’ decision was 
subsequently upheld by the United States Supreme Court.  On the rhetoric of political 
satire, see Simpson [2003: 107–108].  See also Griffin [1994: ch. 6]. 
Politics are also an important topos of both satire and DRN.  Witness the assertion 
by Felgentreu et al. that apolitical satire is inconceivable: “[d]ie Satire als gänzlich un-
politisches Phänomen ist folglich schlechterdings nicht denkbar” [2009b: VIII].  In Ser-
mones, politics stay behind the scenes, or rather the Horace-ego stays out of the main-
stream of political life in the ciuitas.  By contrast, in Juvenal we see outright statements 
about how degraded the politics of his age have become, e.g., the satire-length indictment 
of Roman patronage in poem 9.  For politics in Horace’s satire, see further Gowers 
[2009] and Schmitzer [2009]; for Juvenal, Mülke [2009], Fögen [2009], and cf. also 
Krenkel [2001] on Lucilius and contemporary change in sociopolitical values, and like-
wise Olshauser [2001] and Schäfer [2001].  Scholarship on politics in (and surrounding) 
DRN is plentiful: see, among others, Farrington [1939], Fellin [1951], Clarke [1956], 
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Roman satire mimes, or models, Rome’s reality, and by doing so it can point out 
flaws and problems in Roman society.  So also for Lucretius’ poem, where moral and in-
tellectual weaknesses are repeatedly, intensely, and often satirically exposed.  In fact, in 
some of its most satiric passages, DRN adopts Roman satire’s civic discourse in its own 
kind of civic satire, as we will see.  From a certain perspective, additionally, the whole 
poem could be described as a “literarization” (to use Graf’s term) of a specific social 
concern, namely the fear of death and the concomitant driving passions of lust, greed, and 
ambition.  A literarization as well as a way to combat it: the Lucretian speaker offers not 
only concrete, positive steps towards a life free from anxiety but also a substantial 
monument of remarkable poetic value.  DRN is not merely an antidote to the taractic ex-
cesses of political ambition and social appetites.  It is also an indictment of those ex-
cesses, in a consciously literary context. 
Of greater importance for our considerations here, however, are the more properly 
civic concerns of DRN.  Lucretius’ poem begins with a prayer to Venus for peace “in a 
troubled time for the fatherland” (patriai tempore iniquo, 1.41) so that “Memmius” can 
focus on the poem without “being absent from the commonwealth amid such happen-
ings” (talibus in rebus communi desse saluti, 43); book 6 ends with a scene of civic decay 
and destruction, when Rome’s predecessor Athens falls prey to the plague.  From start to 
finish, and all along the way, DRN acknowledges and addresses society’s ills, and pro-
poses one overarching solution: Epicurean physics and ethics. 
                                                                                                                                            
Roller [1970], Packman [1975–1976], Pianezzola [1977], Grimal [1978], Kleve [1978], 
Schmid [1978], Monti [1981], Wiseman [1982], Cabisiu [1984–1985], Zetzel [1998], 
Hutchinson [2001], Gordon [2002], Lévy [2003: 55], Long [2003: 196], Schiesaro 
[2007a], Belliotti [2009: 102–103], Volk [2010], and Fish [2011]. 
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Minyard argues for a contrast in DRN between two “ways of dealing with the 
world, that of ciuitas and that of…Epicurus” [1985: 36].  In a period of civil discord and 
governmental crisis, he suggests, DRN describes the limitations of the traditional Roman 
state apparatus (ciuitas) and explores an alternative, the withdrawal from public life and 
politics.  Accordingly, the poem “is made to emerge from the aim of civil order as the 
non-civic remedy for the errors and evil inherent in that order as the seeds of its own de-
struction” [ibidem].  DRN in his reading is a rejection of ciuitas—an attribution of 
Rome’s social problems to participation in its civic affairs—and an embrace of self-
separation from the Roman ciuitas (Epicurus’ “live hidden,” λάθε βιώσας) as the only 
surefire way to solve the problems it causes. 
I do not wholly agree with Minyard’s interpretation, which has been poorly re-
ceived by some scholars (see p. 278 n. 60, below).  Though I am persuaded by his basic 
point of a contrast in DRN between ciuitas and λάθε βιώσας—and I find convincing his 
interpretation of the ends of books 3–6 as satires of life in the Roman ciuitas (cf. pp. 278–
286, below)—nonetheless Lucretius’ poem does not seem to me to present Roman civil 
order as inherently doomed to self-destruction.  Instead, I believe, DRN both criticizes the 
Roman civil order for its glaring flaws and yet still from time to time engages construc-
tively with Roman ciuitas.  The relationship between the Lucretian speaker and Mem-
mius, for example, plays out as a patron-client relationship, and the speaker portrays the 
extension of patronage as a good, as pleasurable (“the hoped-for pleasure of sweet [pa-
tron-client] friendship,” sperata uoluptas | suauis amicitiae, 1.140–141).58  To adapt one 
                                                
58 Friendship, and its formalized political equivalent (patronage), hold great influence on 
much of Roman poetry, as attested by the work of Treggiari [1977], White [1978, 2007], 
Gold [1982, 1987], Saller [1982], Bowditch [2001], and Stroup [2010], among others.  In 
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of DRN’s own medical analogies: the patient is ill, perhaps grievously so (and may re-
quire honey to mitigate the medicine’s bitterness), but not terminal.59 
DRN is, in this way, again interconnected with Roman satire.  As we will see be-
low, satire too undertakes often-biting critique of the society of which it is a part, and on 
occasion advocates varying degrees of separation from it, but ultimately does not consis-
tently reject the ciuitas altogether.  We can think, for instance, of how the Horatian ego 
refrains from truly participating in public life, even while he is enmeshed in a circle of 
friends who are involved in the very summit of Roman politics.  A good illustration of 
this point is Serm. 1.5, the journey with Maecenas and entourage to Brundisium for a 
meeting with Mark Antony, a poem that Freudenburg reads as the ego’s acknowledge-
ment of his circumscribed role in civic affairs, a role unlike that of his Lucilian predeces-
sor [2001: 51–58].  One of the characteristics of DRN that sets it apart from its Epicurean 
                                                                                                                                            
satire, as Muecke writes, “[t]he need for the satirist to negotiate a delicate course between 
friends and enemies, inclusion and exclusion, made itself one of satire’s themes” [2005: 
43].  Friendship, amicitia, was regularly a political term in Latin, and often specifically a 
reference to the patron-client relation: see Taylor [1949: 7–8], Hellegouarc’h [1963], 
Brunt [1965], Ross [1969: 80–95], Scullard [1973: 12], and Umbrico [2010: 64–67].  For 
friendship and patronage in Roman satire generally, see Rudd [1986: ch. 4] and Cuccioli 
[1990]; in Lucilius, Gärtner [2001] and Lefèvre [2001]; in Horace, McNeill [2001: ch. 1], 
and in Persius, Paladini [1936], Henderson [1991], and Reckford [2009: 108–118].  The 
satirist’s negotiation between inclusion and exclusion can be both literary—e.g., Serm. 
1.10.74–76, or Persius 1.13, with Cucchiarelli [2009: 10–13], arguing against Coffey 
[1976: 104, 273 n. 44] and van Rooy [1965: 149]—and social (Serm. 1.9, Juvenal 6.214–
225, for example). 
Epicureans like DRN’s speaker valued friendship highly (on which see Long & 
Sedley [1985: 137–138], Farrington [1954], and Campbell [2008], among others), and 
Epicurus is said to have embraced as members of his Garden both enslaved persons (ac-
cording to Diogenes Laertius 10.10) and immigrant metics, cf. Leiwo & Remes [1999].  
On DRN 1.140–145, a passage filled with keywords for Epicurean pleasure, where 
DRN’s talk of friendship/patronage invokes and advances Epicurean ethical principles, 
see Allen [1938]. 
59 Cf. Fowler [1989: 149]: DRN’s speaker “is concerned with the state of Rome, but the 
solution is a personal one: everyone should become an Epicurean.” 
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predecessors is its Roman-ness, its “characteristic flavor,” Roman (I quote Muecke 
[2005: 34] once more).  By taking on this Roman flavor, DRN also takes on Roman civic 
concerns, as previously Lucilius’ satire had, and as (in a much-transformed way) 
Horace’s Sermones will. 
 
The book-endings of DRN: satires on civic life 
The most extended passages of satire in Lucretius’ poem—and some of the most 
important passages in the poem altogether—can be found at the ends of DRN’s individual 
books.  The satiric elements of books 3 (fear of death), 4 (love and sex), and 5 (“anthro-
pology” and human society) have been treated in detail throughout the previous chapters, 
but I will argue here that books 2 and 6 also conclude with satire, and furthermore that 
these satiric tableaux form a sort of backbone or capstone to DRN’s civic discourse, 
shared with Roman satire.  Each book of Lucretius’ poem (besides the first) ends with 
what have been termed “satires on civic life” in Rome, each satire built on the scientific 
theories expounded in the book that it concludes.60  Book 3’s inveighing against the fear 
of death rests on the book’s plethora of proofs for the mortality of the anima, book 4’s 
screed about the danger of romantic attachment follows logically from the earlier expla-
nations of vision and the misjudgments that can be made based on the senses, book 5’s 
                                                
60 Minyard [1985: 53], who does not include book 2 under this rubric, and whose broader 
argument on the role of DRN in the intellectual and political environment of the late Re-
publican period has not been well received.  Nugent calls his argument “untenable,” for 
instance [1994: 188 n. 45], and Fowler calls it “extremely annoying” [1988: 215].  Yet 
both Nugent and Fowler direct their criticisms not at Minyard’s concept of civic satire in 
DRN but rather at his idiosyncratic and even in their view simplistic analysis of Rome’s 
intellectual climate.  My concerns here, with satire and civic discourse in DRN, are not 
incompatible with an acceptance of their critiques. 
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satiric play with human history treats the final stage of the Lucretian speaker’s examina-
tion of life’s development on earth, and the finale’s account of the Athenian plague ex-
emplifies book 6’s discussions on the nature and phenomenology of disease. 
The two long satiric passages at the ends of books 3 and 4 have elicited the most 
discussion by far of satire in the poem.  Hardie, for instance, calls the Lucretian ego “one 
of the great Roman satirists, in the diatribes against the fear of death and sexual infatua-
tion in Books 3 and 4.”61  Waltz remarks that book 3 is a treasure trove of satire, a “veri-
table mine de traits et de tableaux satiriques” [1949: 95].  Houghton calls the end of book 
4 “this satire on the vanity of human love” [1912: xxxvii] and says that book 5 “is, as we 
should expect to find, shot through with satire” [xxxviii].62  Smith, discussing satiric ele-
ments of book 6’s conclusion, states that “the depiction of the plague…climaxes in the 
death of a satiric foil to score a moral point,” and compares Serm. 2.3.217–264 as well as 
Persius 3.107–109 [2005c: 88].  Additionally, the plague scene of DRN book 6 is pre-
ceded by a clinical, rational explanation of the disease (ratio morborum, 6.1138) that en-
ables the competent reader to pick up on the subsequent satire.63 
Now, the suggestion that book 6’s plague of Athens should be considered “satire” 
may initially seem startling or unfounded.  Yet the scene does, I argue, include notable 
                                                
61 Hardie [2007: 125]; likewise Waltz [1949: 91–92], Dudley [1965b], Kenney [1971], 
Wallach [1976], Segal [1990], and Gale [2007: 68]. 
62 On book 4’s satire of love, see also Kleve [1969], Fitzgerald [1984], Brown [1987], 
Erler [2003], and Caston [2006].  For satiric components of book 5, Houghton [1912: 
xxxviii] cites as examples 5.39–56, 223–234, 828–836, 925–930, 999–1001, 1007–1010, 
and 1105–1457.  On 5.1430–1435 specifically, Murgia makes the qualification that the 
Lucretian ego “is being satirical in this section; he is not being sarcastic” [2000: 312 n. 
23]. 
63 Cf. Minyard [1985: 60], and my consideration of the idea that book 6 is a “final exam” 
for an Epicurean convert-reader (p. 189–190 and n. 97, above). 
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features of the mode of satire, as described in chapter 2.  As a whole, the Lucretian 
speaker’s discussion of the plague amounts to chastisement of incorrect beliefs and be-
haviors, because the scientific inquiry into the aetiology and epidemiology of the disease 
are in essence a frame for the depiction of the fears, anxieties, and extreme behavior that 
characterized the non-ataractic victims of the plague.  This castigation of foolish reac-
tions to the plague’s horrors itself constitutes a stance of moral superiority.  As with the 
“suaue mari magno” scenes of DRN book 2 and Juvenal poem 12, the ataractic speaker 
(with, presumably, ataractic readers alongside him) surveys the toils of an unenlightened 
life from a position of distance and of security: with the troubles at sea, a spatial distance, 
with the plague, the security of the passage of time, and in both scenarios, a philosophical 
reassurance that comes from intellectual aloofness and Epicurean withdrawal from mun-
dane concerns. 
There are also possible connections to earlier satiric moments within the poem.  
For instance, the description of the diseased who had body parts amputated in a vain at-
tempt to save their own lives may remind us of the speaker’s previous satiric descriptions 
of creatures missing limbs or people illogically harming themselves because of the fear of 
death:  
et grauiter partim metuentes limina leti 
uiuebant ferro priuati parte uirili, 
et manibus sine nonnulli pedibusque manebant 
in uita tamen, et perdebant lumina partim: 
usque adeo mortis metus his incesserat acer. 
       (DRN 6.1208–1212) 
 
And some of them, seriously fearing the doors of death, were to 
live on deprived of their genitalia, and many, though without hands 
and feet, lived on nonetheless, and some of them lost their eyes—
to such extents did the sharp fear of death assail them. 
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This passage from the plague is comparable to the deformed, limb-deprived beings 
spawned during the early stages of earth’s evolution in DRN’s satiric anthropology 
(5.837–844), and with the illogical suicides on account of the fear of death (3.79–84).64  
More importantly, the plague passage as a whole fits very neatly with the wider, and of-
ten satiric, civic discourse in DRN.  The plague-stricken Athens can be viewed as an ana-
logue for the troubled Roman ciuitas: the two cities are both, after all, the cultural and 
political capitals of empires powerful in their own time.  The ravages of physical disease 
in Periclean Athens run parallel to the unhealthy psychological ravages of ambition, ava-
rice, and all the rest in contemporary Rome—and the biting critique of Athenian citizen 
response to the contagion speaks to the difficulties the Roman citizenry faces in its own 
political-intellectual crisis. 
The end of DRN book 2 should also, I contend, be taken as a satire on civic life.  
As the book’s closing argument about the mortality and decay of the earth draws to a 
close, we are shown a pair of farmers who perceive a decline in the world’s greatness and 
fertility: 
iamque caput quassans grandis suspirat arator 
crebrius, incassum magnum cecidisse laborem, 
et cum tempora temporibus praesentia confert 
praeteritis, laudat fortunas saepe parentis. 
tristis item uetulae uitis sator atque <uietae>65 
temporis incusat momen saeclumque fatigat, 
et crepat antiquum genus ut pietate repletum 
perfacile angustis tolerarit finibus aeuom, 
cum minor esset agri multo modus ante uiritim; 
nec tenet omnia paulatim tabescere et ire 
                                                
64 See also my earlier discussion of all three passages (pp. 113–115 and nn. 146–147, 
above). 
65 I print uietae in angle brackets to follow not Rouse & Smith but rather Bailey [1947: 
982 ad loc.]. 
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ad scopulum, spatio aetatis defessa uetusto. 
       (DRN 2.1164–1174) 
 
And now the aged plowman shakes his head and sighs a bit more 
frequently about how his great toil has been wasted in vain, and 
when he compares with present times times past, he regularly 
praises his predecessors’ lot.  Likewise the gloomy cultivator of an 
elderly and shriveled vine criticizes the progress of time and carps 
on the age, and complains about how the old species, filled with 
dutifulness, would quite easily support life within narrow bounda-
ries, even though the man-by-man measure of land was much 
smaller back then—and yet he [the viticulturist] doesn’t get that 
everything decays bit by bit and goes to pieces, worn out by the 
ancient lapse of time. 
 
The Lucretian persona describes the viticulturist’s speech-acts with the same kinds of 
verbs he used to describe the later satiric speeches of Natura Rerum in book 3 (cf. pp. 
133–139, above): the vine-worker’s incusat and fatigat (2.1169) run parallel to Nature’s 
subsequent queratur, lamentetur, and inclamet,66 and his crepat (2.1170) is echoed by the 
increpet of Nature.67 
We have, here, I believe, two satirist-like figures, or perhaps proto-satirists, an-
ticipating the satiric speaker Natura Rerum in book 3.  Though these lines at the end of 
book 2 are not comic, they do otherwise fit in with one of the primary characteristics of a 
satiric speaker, the moralizing critique of contemporary faults; their agricultural failures 
could perhaps be taken as a claim of their abject status.  They are witnesses of the decay 
and imperfection of the modern world.  Again, as with the subsequent “civic satires” in 
DRN books 3–6, the satire at the end of the second book derives from and rounds off the 
                                                
66 Queratur: 3.953 (952 in the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975]); lamentetur: 950 
(953 in the numbering of Rouse & Smith); inclamet: 951 (954 in the numbering of Rouse 
& Smith). 
67 DRN 3.933; 3.951 (954 in the numbering of Rouse & Smith [1975]). 
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major philosophical argument that it follows, in this case the mortality and eventual de-
cay of all things, even the earth, that are made up of eternally indivisible atoms. 
The farmers’ complaint betrays an anxiety about their very livelihood, dependent 
upon the land, an anxiety ultimately in conflict with Epicurean ἀταραξία.  The decline in 
agricultural productivity stands in for the increasing problems of this troubled time for 
the Roman fatherland (patriai tempore iniquo, 1.41).  These problems have spread into 
another area of civic life, agricultural hinterlands, a realm that, though perhaps physically 
peripheral to the urban concerns of ciuitas, nevertheless plays an important part in the 
composition of the Roman state. 
These five satiric book-ends are, I say again, civic satires.68  They are, that is, em-
bedded in the cultural and social surroundings and assumptions of Republican Rome.  
First, the concerns over death and love and so forth that the Lucretian persona combats 
are in many ways all very Roman, from the funerary customs and the hell-on-earth that is 
political ambition to the question of the wife’s conception and the cosmetic cultus of the 
meretrix.69  Second, the passages offer a social critique, with mockery and blame as ap-
propriate, in an apparent attempt at improving (Roman, civic) social life.  Though Rome 
is not so explicitly present here in DRN as in the satires of Horace (e.g., Serm. 1.9) or Ju-
venal (e.g., poem 3), the City lies behind—and its citizens are the targets of—the satiric 
                                                
68 Cf. Gale [1994a: 228; emphasis added]: “[a]ll six books of the DRN (with the possible 
exception of book 5) end in darkness, with death and decay and human folly,” and see 
also Minadeo [1965] and Müller [1978]. 
69 Funerary customs: DRN 3.870–893.  Hell on earth: 3.978–1023.  Wives and concep-
tion: 4.1263–1267.  Cosmetic care of the body: e.g., 4.1185–1186.  These passages are, I 
add as a corollary, realistic/mimetic. 
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critique, just as in the Lucilian satire on which DRN draws and as in the satiric tradition 
that follows and in many instances draws on DRN in turn. 
These Lucretian civic satires furthermore take part in a symbiotic relationship 
with DRN’s broader philosophical program.  Their effect is to advance DRN’s Epicurean 
message, and the Epicurean teaching likewise informs the reader that the passages are in 
fact satiric.  “[T]he Epicurean narrative of nature is necessary for understanding the civic 
satire, and the civic satire lets the Epicurean natural narrative play a role in the contempo-
rary intellectual crisis at Rome.”70  Critics might find obscenity and be scandalized by it 
in the passage on love and sex in book 4, or take umbrage at Natura Rerum’s harsh words 
to the addressee in book 3, or be shocked and appalled by the poem’s plague-ridden con-
clusion.  But, I add, for the competent reader, the one who “gets” what the speaker is “up 
to,” who has comprehended not only the philosophic but also the satiric import of enjoy-
ment in soldiers’ and sailors’ misfortunes, these passages are satire.  The satires moreover 
link physics to ethics—Epicurean physics to the moral superiority of Epicurean ethics 
over at least some aspects of traditional Roman values—and thereby they make DRN 
relevant to Roman political and intellectual audiences.  These satires on civic life are vital 
for DRN’s success. 
We can thus see once more that satire is indispensible to DRN.  The poem is in-
deed intrinsically dependent on satire, both in extended passages of satiric invective and 
in smaller satiric points sprinkled throughout the work.  We can, for instance, link the 
civic satires with the poem’s other important satiric episodes.  For example, the suaue 
                                                
70 Minyard [1985: 61].  Cf. also Kenney [1971: 19]: “the satirical approach was sug-
gested—indeed dictated—by the work in hand, the attack on folly, error and supersti-
tion.” 
 285 
mari magno proem to book 2 (cf. pp. 155–157 and 233–237, above) is a passage that also 
exhibits a civic-minded approach, a passage that also places Epicurean templa serena 
above (geographically, morally, and intellectually) characteristically Roman endeavors 
like war, political competition (certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 2.11), and acquisi-
tion of wealth (ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri, 2.13).  And it is a passage 
picked up by a later satirist, Juvenal, for the theme of an entire poem (pp. 254–262, 
above). 
So also with the invective against the Presocratics in late book 1, familiar to us 
from chapters 2 and 3, where DRN’s speaker satirizes earlier philosophers on account of 
their intellectual flaws and failures.  By comprehending the error of these opposing 
worldviews, would-be Epicureans can better understand Epicurus’ own worldview, and 
thus learn how to eschew worldly concerns and achieve ἀταραξία.  The path to psycho-
logical serenity and ethical living, in other words, is through a proper understanding of 
the universe’s material composition and thence of the irrelevance to our lives of death, 
passion, the gods, and the sufferings of this mortal coil.  Problems in the social and the 
emotional can be corrected by intervention in the intellectual—and, therefore, intellectual 
polemic can amount to a moralistic civic satire. 
So DRN places, in five programmatically important positions, extended satiric 
passages intrinsically engaged in the kind of satiric civic discourse that Lucretius’ poem 
shares with the Roman genre of satura.  As Belliotti writes, “[b]oth Cicero and Lucretius, 
contemporaries living in a time of political crisis, concluded that philosophy could ex-
plain and remedy Rome’s social ills” [2009: 102].  And one significant means by which 
Lucretius’ poem puts its message of Epicurean philosophy into direct contact with Ro-
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man social and political problems is by ending every book in the poem (after the first) 
with civic-minded satiric sketches that invoke, critique, or reflect the institutions of Ro-
man culture and the apparatus of Roman ciuitas.  These passages not only tie a satiric 
bow around the scientific inquiries that precede them but also anchor the poem’s broader 
systematic use of the satiric mode, a satiric voice, and the generic tropes of Roman satire. 
 
 
Conclusion to chapter 5 
 
Lucretius’ DRN exploits several important topoi that it shares with Roman satire.  
These generic tropes include philosophy, food, and civic discourse.  Philosophy and sat-
ire form a two-way street, as the philosophical poem DRN picks up on satiric techniques 
and topics, while satire not only mocks philosophers and prominently adopts atomistic 
imagery but also engages more fundamentally with philosophical questions and concerns, 
in a satiric-philosophic inquiry that underlies much of Horace’s Sermones and Persius’ 
poems alike.  Persius 1.1 alludes to DRN 2.14 and thereby calls up DRN as both satiric 
and philosophic predecessor; Juvenal poem 12 contains an extended allusion, previously 
uncommented upon, to the proem to DRN book 2, and features a respectable Epicurean 
response by a character thrust into the second-party position of the suaue mari magno 
scene, the sailor in trouble at sea.  Satiric reception and reappropriation of Lucretian ele-
menta, and the satiric depiction of teaching, show the complications of didaxis in Augus-
tan and imperial Rome.  
 287 
The message about food—much more prominent in satire than in DRN—is, in 
both sets of poetry, to take what is enough, not to overload: e.g., DRN book 4, or the pic-
nic passage in early book 2, and the end of Serm. 1.1, where the image of the conuiua 
draws on and refigures an image from DRN book 3.  Juvenal poem 5’s belly-enslaved 
client synthesizes the two.  The City looms behind the poetry of Lucilius, Horace, Per-
sius, Juvenal, and DRN.  Lucretius’ poem and Roman satire share a civic discourse, 
touching on issues of citizenship, civic life, and the Roman state, the Roman ciuitas.  
This civic discourse is a literary exploration of sociopolitical concerns, and both DRN and 
satire not only identify problems but also offer solutions to them; in DRN, the solution is 
Epicurean natural and ethical philosophy. 
I suggest that the civic discourse of satire, and of the satiric tracts of Lucretius’ 
poem, comprise a kind of σπουδαιογέλοιον, a poetic melange of humorous and serious 
elements that communicate a moralizing message.71  This phenomenon is evident most 
prominently in the satires on civic life, derived from and complementary to the Epicurean 
physics of DRN, that conclude books 2–6 of the poem and programmatically anchor the 
poem’s engagement with Graeco-Roman satire, both as mode and as genre.  The combi-
                                                
71 The term σπουδαιογέλοιον is prefigured in Aristophanes—Frogs 391–392: πολλὰ 
μὲν γέλοιά μ’ εἰ|πεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα, “that I [may/should/do] say many funny 
things, but many serious things as well”—but was not in and of itself in use prior to 
Strabo (as Plaza [2006: 27–29 and esp. n. 65] argues).  Cf. also Plato Laws 816d–e: “for 
without funny things, it is not possible to learn the serious things, if a man is going to be 
sensible in some way,” ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα…μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ 
μέλλει τι φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι. 
On the concept of σπουδαιογέλοιον, see Fiske [1920: 209 n. 1], Giangrande 
[1972: 15–19], Ercolani [2002], and Zimmermann [2005], who discusses 
σπουδαιογέλοιον in Aristophanes as a tool for social health (“sozialhygienische Funk-
tion”).  I have made an argument similar to Zimmermann’s, for the use of religious ritual 
in the comedy of Menander and Plautus: Gellar-Goad [2008: 180–181]. 
 288 
nation of all these concerns is, I suggest, particularly Roman.  Consequently, we may see 
that DRN, an unusual innovation in the traditions of Epicurean philosophy and Roman 
poetry, joins Roman satire as “entirely ours,” entirely Roman, tota nostra.72 
 
DRN in the tradition of Roman satura 
Lucretius’ poem is not properly a member of the genre of Roman satire, but it ex-
erts, as we have seen, an important influence on later satire, and draws on earlier satire 
and satire’s generic tropes in important ways.  As Kenney has written, “Lucretius not 
only produced a profoundly original poem; he also laid the foundations of a tradition of 
satirical writing that has flourished down to modern times” [1971: 15].  Like satire, 
DRN’s characteristic flavor is Roman, despite the Lucretian ego’s espousal and exposi-
tion of Greek philosophy.  The speaker in fact presents his own work as a mixture of sub-
lime and difficult, of high and low—akin to satire, which can be thought of as a literary 
“potpourri,” as we saw in chapter 4 (pp. 199–200), above.  The satiric tropes, passages, 
themes, and techniques of DRN are integral to the poem.  The text depends on them. 
In chapter 4 we also saw that Lucretius’ poem adopts and adapts many aspects of 
Lucilian satire in its own satiric passages, and can thus in some respects be considered an 
heir to Lucilius’ satiric poetics and Lucilius’ poetic authority.  I suggest that we should 
see DRN as a detour on the generic path of Roman satire, a by-way on the main road that 
leads from Lucilius to Horace’s Sermones, Persius, and Juvenal.  Compared to Lucilius, 
the satiric attacks in DRN are significantly toned down, and dovetail with the sensibilities 
(and also subject matter) of much of Horatian satire.  Compared to Lucilius, the satiric 
                                                
72 From Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 10.1.93 (cited at p. 199 and n. 1, above). 
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attacks in DRN turn the gaze inward, in a more reflective way: the speech of Natura Re-
rum pushes readers to reevaluate their own perceptions of death, their own desires in life, 
and following the speech the Lucretian speaker puts words into the mouth of the reader, 
or at least of the fictive addressee.  Persius adopts DRN’s inward-turned gaze as a charac-
teristic of his own satire—satire that draws importantly on DRN and alludes to it in the 
programmatic first line of Persius’ first poem.  At the same time, as Kenney argues, Ju-
venal’s satire owes to the “Lucretian amalgamation of genres [viz., diatribe and didactic 
epos]…the foundation of a new school of satirical writing in the ‘high’ or ‘tragic’ vein” 
[1971: 19–20]. 
DRN offers a source for specific influences on later satire, as well.  We can think 
of the pervasive allusion to Lucretius’ poem in Sermones book 1, and “the importance of 
the DRN for Horace’s Satires” more generally.73  We can also think of the Lucretian allu-
sions and context in Persius 1.1 or Juvenal poem 12, as discussed above.  Scholars have 
identified other satiric references to DRN: Dudley, for example, argues that Juvenal 
6.460–473, on female cosmetics and cultus, imitates DRN 4.1185–1190, the unveiling of 
women’s behind-the-scenes life, their postscaenia uitae [1965b: 125–126], while Ken-
ney, commenting on DRN 3.1068–1069 (“so everyone runs away from himself, but sure 
enough, as it turns out, he can’t hardly escape from his own self, so he sticks to himself 
unwillingly/thanklessly and hates himself,” hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, 
ut fit, | effugere haud potis est, ingratis haeret et odit), points to the poem’s “position near 
the source of the Roman tradition of diatribe satire” [1971: 240–241].  The passage in 
                                                
73 Hardie, discussing Serm. 1.1.25–26 [2007: 125, and 126 for additional references]. 
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Masks and morality 
So, as we have seen, satire and DRN hold shared goals and affinities.  They both 
critique vice.  They both instruct, or claim to instruct, and use a didactic stance (whether 
a stance originating in the mode of satire or one originating in “formal” didactic, cf. p. 20, 
above).  And they both purport to offer moral utility, to indicate a path towards moral bet-
terment. 
I would like to emphasize the connections here between satire, Lucretius’ poem, 
and (Graeco-Roman) comedy more generally.75  Redfield writes that “comedy is life-
affirming” [2008: 13].  The comedies of Aristophanes and Menander, and to a certain ex-
                                                
74 De Caro calls Ovid Amores 1.10.17–30 “predicatorio” and “satirico-morale,” and finds 
a possible allusion to DRN 4.1197–1208 [2007: 58]; Smith states that Ars Amatoria has a 
basic goal of manipulating women’s behavior, a goal that “picks up on a theme from Lu-
cretius De rerum natura 4” [2005b: 11].  Cf. also the “anti-Lucretian didactics” of Shul-
man [1981: passim, esp. 242]: Ovid Ars Amatoria and Remedia Amoris “boldly burlesque 
the dispassionate nature of the Epicurean philosopher and stress the limitations of reason 
in human nature by ironically echoing the precepts of the De rerum natura.” 
75 The theater is a literary ancestor of Roman satire, the authors of which (particularly the 
Horace-ego) regularly affirm themselves as heirs to the tradition of Aristophanic Old 
Comedy.  On Lucilius and Aristophanes, see Zimmermann [2001]; on Lucilius and Ro-
man comedy, Auhagen [2001].  For satire, comedy, and theater more generally, see, 
among others, Graf [2005: 192], Keane [2006: ch. 1], and Cucchiarelli [2009].  In DRN 
theater serves as a metaphor or an illustration for the speaker’s moralizing discourse, as 
when the awnings or shade-curtains of theatrical spaces are mentioned in a discussion of 
the mechanisms of color (4.75–85) and of the generation of thunder’s sound (6.108–113).  
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tent also those of Plautus,76 enact the formation of a new or improved citizen society, 
through the resolution of familial crises, the creation of interfamilial ties through mar-
riage, and the promised production of citizen children, the vehicle for the continuance of 
the ciuitas.77  The comedies of Aristophanes and Menander, that is, affirm life.  Satire, 
too, which in both Horace and Persius claims as its predecessor Greek Old Comedy, is in 
essence life-affirming.  The people and bodies and social structures it depicts are regu-
larly grotesque, corrupt, decaying, and downright cruel, but the expressed aims of the 
satirist are as life-affirming as the expressed purposes of the stock plots of New Comedy. 
Epicureanism, too, is life-affirming: it is a philosophy whose basic raison d’être  
the question “what is the good life?,” and whose answer to that question is one that does 
not demand harsh asceticism or cynical rejection of social life or skepticism about intel-
lectual knowledge and value judgments.  Epicurean precepts encourage a self-initiated 
withdrawal from the harmful parts of life, without requiring total isolation from civic life.  
DRN, a poem of Epicurean philosophy that also draws substantially on comedy and sat-
ire, likewise affirms life.  From the foibles of lovers to the faults of the Presocratics, Lu-
cretius’ poem is intrinsically caught up in the ultimate shared trait of satire and its own 
Epicurean ideology: a comic affirmation of human life, both the good parts and the bad. 
A final observation: satire is about removing masks and lifting veils.  Lucilius’ sa-
tiric verse called out hypocrites and furtive criminals, Horace’s speaker reveals the truth 
with a laugh, Persius’ programmatic satire uncovers a truth so momentous (everyone in 
                                                
76 Terence, by contrast, dramatizes the social crises of the family that are encoded in the 
genre of New Comedy, and so I deliberately exclude him from my statement here.  See, 
e.g., James [1998] and Gellar-Goad [forthcoming]. 
77 Cf., e.g., Lape [2004]. 
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Rome has ass’ ears, 1.121) that the satirist must share it only with a hole in the ground, 
and Juvenal systematically unmasks the decadence and the injustice of Rome in his age.  
So, also, with DRN’s Epicurean philosophy, both physical and ethical.  The fictive nar-
ratee of Lucretius’ poem goes through a revelatory process, in which the truths about the 
nature of the universe, and concomitant truths about human behaviors and human society, 
are imparted.  And both DRN and satire have the goal of social/civic improvement, even 
though at times they go about it in much different ways. 
Near the beginning of the third book of DRN, the Lucretian ego writes that many 
people do not match their actions to their words: 
quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis 
conuenit aduersisque in rebus noscere qui sit; 
nam uerae uoces tum demum pectore ab imo 
eliciuntur et eripitur persona, manet res. 
       (DRN 3.55–58) 
 
And so it’s more appropriate to examine a man in uncertain dan-
gers and to recognize what kind of person he is in unfavorable cir-
cumstances, because that’s at last when his true voices are drawn 
out from the depths of his heart—and the mask is torn away, the 
thing remains. 
 
The mask—the persona (line 58)—is removed, the true thing, the res, the subject of 
DRN’s whole inquiry, remains in plain view.78  This unveiling or unmasking takes places 
in dubiis periclis (55) and aduersis in rebus (56), at times of peril, of adversity, like per-
haps when one is having trouble at sea (and Juvenal poem 12 does show us the true met-
tle of “Catullus,” removes his mask of luxury trader, and shows us instead, I argue, a man 
with well-rooted values and even potentially Epicurean sensibilities).  These lines from 
                                                
78 Navaud [2011: 207] discusses Montaigne’s adaptation of the theatrical metaphor in 
these lines. 
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early in DRN book 3 capture the essence of satire, and the essence of the satiric poetics in 
DRN.  Moreover, adopting a poetic persona in the way satire does, in the way DRN does, 
calls attention to the masks or personae that others wear.  Just as news satire outlets like 
the online newspaper The Onion or the American television program The Daily Show use 
their façades as media outlets to satirize and critique the news media itself—to unmask 
their own uncritical, sensationalist, at times hypocritical façades—so also do the speakers 
of Roman satire, and of DRN, adopt an exaggerated, self-undercutting, at times offensive 
persona, to draw attention to the masks and veils that the unseemly or unjust or un-








“[T]he two great symbols with which Lucretius begins and ends 
his poems are susceptible to many interpretations, which are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive.  I believe that this polyvalency 
is intentional, and that we should therefore admit any explanation 
which seems consistent with the text and with the poem as a whole.” 
Gale [1994a: 209] 
 
 “Stop organizing life around the people who don’t get the joke.” 
Maher [2011] 
 
plures post nostram memoriam 
nascentes cum Lucretio uidebuntur 
uelut coram de rerum natura disputare 
“Many men born beyond my time will seem 
to discuss/argue with Lucretius openly, 
as it were, about the Nature of Things.” 
Vitruvius 9 pr. 17 
 
 
This study has examined in systematic fashion how satire is important to Lu-
cretius’ De Rerum Natura and how DRN is important to satire.  The two traditions of 
classical satire—the mode of satire, a set of textual techniques that begin with archaic 
Greek poetry and extend into the modern world; and the Roman genre of satire, the 
satura of Ennius, Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal—not only influence the literary 
and rhetorical functions of Lucretius’ poem but also are themselves affected by Lucretian 
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intervention into the traditions.  Whereas a trend dominant in earlier Lucretian studies 
(yet still present in some contemporary scholarly voices) postulates a Lucretius disen-
gaged from his literary milieu who struggles unsuccessfully to contain rival literary and 
philosophical impulses within a single unified work, I see instead a poet in command of 
his tradition and in control of his own poetic output, a poet with mastery and self-mastery 
akin to that of Vergil or Ovid.  Towards this end, my work here has shown an author in 
command of a longstanding tradition of satiric poetry and a newer, fully Roman genre—
an author whose output influences the development of that genre in profound ways. 
In chapter 2 I drew a portrait of the satirist in the Graeco-Roman mode of satire.  
Satirists of all periods can be characterized by certain common traits, as scholarship on 
classical and modern literature shows: a personal voice or persona, the use of comic 
mockery, justified indignation that prompts criticism of some fault or flaw, a self-
contradictory pose of social or literary abjection that is paired with claims of the moral 
high ground, and the tendency to foment a collusive relationship between satirist and 
audience, who join in laughter at both the satiric target and the act of satiric mockery.  
The result of the collusive relationship is a divided audience: an in-group and an out-
group, readers of the satire who “get it” and readers who “don’t get it.”  Lucretius’ pri-
mary speaker frequently adopts the pose of a satirist, and with it each of these characteris-
tic traits.  A major target for the Lucretian satirist is the multitude of incorrect beliefs and 
behaviors from which people who do not adhere to Epicurean philosophy suffer.  Impor-
tant examples include the refutation of the Presocratics in DRN book 1 and the attack on 
the foibles of erotically impassioned lovers in book 4.  Through the speaker’s rough 
treatment of the poem’s nominal addressee—the doltish Memmius—the reader is pushed 
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into colluding with the speaker in his satiric mockery.  The speaker’s satire often supports 
his philosophical argumentation, particularly in the various instances of reductio ad ab-
surdum of a rival philosophical explanation or reasoning, but on occasion threatens to 
undercut the speaker’s own credibility as a fair-minded advocate of Epicurean doctrine.  
In book 3, the Lucretius depicts for us a personification of Natura Rerum herself—and 
she is a satirist.  Her satiric mockery of those who are afraid of death, and her own gran-
deur as the entirety of material existence, lends a sense of greater authority to the argu-
ments propounded by DRN’s main speaker.  Through her, he carries more weight and can 
argue more persuasively (and more satirically) against his targets. 
The components of the mode of satire are uniquely difficult to pin down, but in 
chapter 3 we focused on four main characteristics.  Satire on an essential level possesses 
an object (the target or problem that generates the satiric impulse), a formal antecedent (a 
model for the discourse or format of the satire), humor (particularly irony and parody), 
and ambiguity, an elusiveness that fosters the aforementioned division of the satiric read-
ership into “gets it” and “doesn’t get it” crowds.  DRN’s object in particular is religio, 
which is in some sense the source of the other problems and anxieties that the Lucretian 
ego combats.  Formal antecedents for DRN include the genre of Roman satura, the me-
dium of hexameter poetry, and what I have suggested is the “discourse” (rather than 
genre) of diatribe; DRN employs and exploits ambiguity on linguistic and philosophical 
levels, in a way that complicates a simple philosophical or literary reading of the poem.  
Satire as well generally tends to adopt a didactic pose, but one in which countervailing 
opinions or arguments are presented in a distorted way.  In other words: satire creates 
straw men.  These distortions reflect a basic tension in satire between didactic and comic 
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impulses and priorities.  In Lucretius’ poem, the Presocratic philosophers (especially 
Anaxagoras) are a perfect example of straw men, for the poem’s speaker distorts their 
philosophies to make seem more ridiculous and less credible than perhaps they should 
seem.  The tension between satire and didactic—which can be seen as analogous to ten-
sions between poetry and philosophy—is not so prominent in DRN, where the didactic 
pose comes before the satiric.  The Lucretian speaker maps the collusive satirist-audience 
relationship onto the preexisting didactic relation between teacher and student. 
Chapters 4 and 5 turned from the satiric mode to the actual Roman genre of satire.  
In chapter 4, I traced a number of possible Lucretian allusions to Ennius’ nearly nonex-
istent Saturae—perhaps most intriguingly, a connection between Lucretius’ personifica-
tion of Natura Rerum and the Ennian personification of Life in combat with Death.  
DRN’s allusions to the poetry of Lucilius, the founding father of Roman satire, are more 
numerous and more substantial, in line with the larger quantity of fragments surviving in 
the Lucilian corpus.  In both instances, DRN’s gestures to earlier satire not only flag his 
own work as satiric in its own right but also grant to the Lucretian ego a kind of poetic 
and social authority and efficacy.  
The fifth and final chapter considered the afterlife of Lucretian satire.  Each of the 
major satirists after the appearance of DRN—Horace (in Sermones), Persius, Juvenal—
makes a number of concrete and programmatically significant allusions to Lucretius, and 
each in his own way recasts DRN’s philosophic take on satire into a satiric take on phi-
losophy.  References to Lucretius’ poem in Sermones are many, and well-discussed in 
Horatian scholarship; I focused on how the Horace-ego appropriates and repurposes Lu-
cretian atoms/letters (elementa) for his own purposes, and is in turn followed by similar 
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satiric uses of the alphabet in Persius and Juvenal.  The very first line of Persius poem 1, I 
suggested, is a “window reference” to Lucilius through an allusion to DRN.  And Juvenal 
poem 12, I argued, enacts the Lucretian “suaue mari magno” scene upon the Juvenalian 
character Catullus, who, after getting himself into un-Epicurean troubles, nevertheless 
manages to react to them in an Epicurean way, by discarding all his luxury merchandise 
and even his trading ship’s mast in order to make it back to the safety of the shore.  We 
also looked at a shared “civic discourse” between satire and DRN, and explored the end-
ings of DRN books 2–6, endings that I believe are satires on Roman civic life (failed 
farming in book 2, politics and ambition in book 3, elegiac love in book 4, human social 
customs in book 5, and the breakdown of society in the face of plague in book 6). 
A thread that has appeared throughout this study concerns a satiric interpretation 
of the proem to Lucretius’ second book, wherein the speaker claims that it is pleasurable 
to see troubles at sea, or battles, or the struggles of ambitious politicians, from a safe po-
sition of philosophical high ground.  In chapter 2, we saw that this high ground is both 
intellectual and moral and shows the Lucretian ego modeling for the reader a satiric 
speaking position: like the audience of satire, the reader of DRN is invited to join the 
speaker in looking down with scorn upon the flawed and blameworthy victims of ambi-
tion and greed and the fear of death.  Furthermore, this passage (as I pointed out in chap-
ter 3) illustrates the safety and isolation offered by the satirist to his audience, safety that 
allows the audience to collude with the satirist in his mockery.  I also offered a metapo-
etic, metasatiric reading of the proem, whereby the act of looking down upon the foibles 
of un-Epicurean people stands in for the act of reading DRN, which itself displays just 
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such foibles—and, just as it is “pleasurable” (suaue, dulcius) to look down upon these 
people, it is pleasurable to read DRN. 
Chapter 4 discussed how the proem to DRN book 2, with its emphasis on the Epi-
curean ataractic pleasure of seeing from a position of carefree isolation, alludes to Lucil-
ius fr. H.41, the description of ambitious Romans hustling and bustling through the Fo-
rum day and night.1  This allusion draws out the moralizing overtones of Lucilius’ frag-
ment, allows the Lucretian speaker to discuss explicitly the implications of the rejection 
of political ambitions (where the Lucilius-ego seems to have left such implications un-
said), reinforces the civic message of DRN, and grants the authority of an aristocratic 
Roman citizen (i.e., Lucilius) to the Epicurean’s advocacy of seclusion from public life.  I 
proceeded in chapter 5 to discuss an allusion to Lucretius’ second proem in Juvenal poem 
12: when Juvenal’s “Catullus” is shipwrecked, the Juvenalian satirist and his audience 
take on the subject position of the proem to DRN book 2, with Epicureans looking down 
upon others’ struggles at sea, and Catullus himself responds to his dire straits by ditching 
the luxury cargo unnecessary for sustaining an Epicurean life.  Through this allusion, Ju-
venal poem 12 fuses more explicitly the satiric and philosophic content that is evident in 
the Lucretian proem. 
What is missing from this study?  Though I have considered in much detail 
DRN’s substantial and meaningful engagement both with the cross-temporal mode of sat-
ire and with the specific genre of Roman verse satire from Lucilius (and Ennius) through 
Juvenal—and thus given greater weight to statements such as Kenney’s claim that DRN 
                                                
1 H.41C = 1228–1234M = 1145–1151W = 1252–1258K.  For these abbreviations, see p. 
xii, above. 
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“laid the foundations of a tradition of satirical writing that has flourished down to modern 
times” [1971: 15]—I have not considered the possible influence of satiric prose and 
prosimetric sources on Lucretian satire.  Future extensions of my work here could also 
profitably examine the connections between DRN and the Menippean satire of Varro, as 
well as Greek antecedents (including Callimachus), both to Varro and to the “diatribe”-
like passages of Lucretius’ own poem.  Similarly, Lucretius’ contemporary Cicero is an 
author who engages in satiric invective and comic mockery (in his oratory, most notably 
in works like Pro Caelio, Pro Archia, and In Pisonem; and think also of his discussion of 
humor in De Oratore 2.217–290), in philosophical doxography (which occasionally in-
cludes the distortion of opposing or rival viewpoints), and in literary polemic.  For in-
stance, Cicero’s use of personification, as with the prosopopoieia of Appius Claudius 
Caecus (whom Cicero has inveigh against Clodius in Pro Caelio), may help augment our 
understanding of the Natura Rerum passage in Lucretius’ third book.  More complex 
modern theories of satire, such as the “reception analysis” method of Johnson et al. 
[2010], may also be useful heuristic devices for enriching my discussion of satire and 
DRN.2 
Furthermore, while I have considered specific allusions to DRN in Horace, Per-
sius, and Juvenal, and more general interactions between DRN’s satiric philosophy and 
the Roman satirists’ often-philosophical satire, there is more work to be done on the sa-
tiric reception of Lucretius’ poem.  There may be more Lucretian intertexts to be found in 
the later satirists, and likewise the inclusion of other satiric works (particularly Ovid’s 
                                                
2 One of the conclusions of Johnson et al., for instance, is “that viewers who ‘miss the 
joke’ may still ‘get the message’ ” [2010: 396], a conclusion that may have profound 
ramifications for my construct of the “get it” and “don’t get it” crowds. 
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Ars Amatoria) in these considerations can develop a more holistic picture of the role of 
DRN in the Roman satiric poetic tradition.  One potentially major avenue of inquiry along 
these lines is the connection between Lucretian satire and Vergil’s Georgics.  Kronenberg 
situates Georgics in the tradition of Menippean satires (including, in her estimation, 
Varro’s De Re Rustica and Xenophon’s Oeconomicus) and views Vergil’s poem as itself 
an instantiation of satire [2009: ch. 6].  While her study treats DRN essentially as what 
might be called a straight man, a more or less serious antecedent against which Georgics 
plays out its satire, my study’s discussion of satire in DRN may support and extend her 
observations.  Georgics’ engagement with Lucretius’ poem—which, like Georgics itself, 
a recent work of philosophical didactic poetry blended with satire3—may place Vergil’s 
work not only in the tradition of (previously prose) Menippean satire, but also in the po-
etic tradition of satire, through Lucretius to Lucilius and Ennius. 
 
 
Divided audiences in Catullus, Stephen Colbert, and DRN  
 
A recurrent theme in the pictures of satire and of Lucretius’ DRN that we have 
seen in this study is the matter of the divided audience, and I offer here in closing a 
glance at one way we might conceive of this divided audience in DRN.  Satirists divide 
their readers or listeners into (at least) two groups: those who “get it” and those who 
“don’t get it,” those who join the satirist in collusive laughter at the satirized target and 
                                                
3 And, as Gale points out, “[i]n writing the DRN, Lucretius was to all intents and purposes 
reviving a dead genre,” one that had fallen out of favor, notwithstanding the didactic-
style exercises of the Hellenistic poets Aratus and Nicander [1994a: 50]. 
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those who reject the satiric mockery, those who undertake the satirist’s poetic initiation 
and those who do not.  The reader of a satiric work must choose one of two (or more) 
paths to follow as a reader.  Often, the choice is unfair: to choose to side with the sati-
rized over the satirizing is to choose to be mocked, or to be associated with something or 
somebody blameworthy.  But the choice creates a divided audience, and can point atten-
tion to this very divide. 
Let us consider briefly two unusual instances of divided audiences.  First, take 
Catullus poem 56, given here in its entirety: 
o rem ridiculam, Cato, et iocosam, 
dignamque auribus et tuo cachinno! 
ride quidquid amas, Cato, Catullum: 
res et ridicula et nimis iocosa. 
“deprendi modo pupulum puellae 
trusantem; hunc ego, si placet Dionae, 
pro telo rigida mea cecidi.” 
 
Oh, Cato, what a hilarious and funny thing I’ve got for you, one 
worthy of your ears and your cackle!  Laugh, Cato, to the extent 
that you love Catullus—the thing I’ve got for you’s hilarious and 
just too funny: “I just now caught a schoolboy humping [his? my?] 
girlfriend…and, if it pleases Dione, I cut him down not with a 
weapon,4 but…with my boner!” 
 
What is funny about this poem?  The joke that the Catullus-ego promises is not particu-
larly hilarious, and appears to be a straightforward sexual one-liner (three-liner, rather).5  
But the poem is not merely the joke.  The poem is the three-line joke with four lines of 
                                                
4 The phrase “not with a weapon” renders the manuscript reading pro telo in the last line; 
if, with Housman [1931: 402] and others, we instead read protelo (a word attested at 
DRN 2.531 and 4.190), the last line would read: “I cut him down [put him in his place?] 
with my boner in a three-way row!”  See further Quinn [1970: 255], Thomson 
[1997/1978: 340 ad loc.]. 
5 Cf. Tanner [1972: 506–507]: “there seems nothing in the situation which could be de-
scribed as ridicula or iocosa.” 
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preface, a preface directed at a certain Cato.  This “Cato” may (or may not6) be Cato the 
Younger, a contemporary of Catullus who was considered an extreme exemplar of strict 
traditional Roman morals.  If so, I suggest, the poem is funny because it is a totally inap-
propriate joke for the addressee.  Cato the Younger, or at least his severe public persona, 
would very much not appreciate such scandalous humor.  The poem’s reader is given a 
choice between two audiences, between those who react merely to the joke—and find it 
either amusing or, with Cato, unsavory—and those who react to the larger circumstances 
presented in the poem, by joining with the Catullan speaker in laughing at not only the 
joke but also the fact that the speaker has (intentionally) addressed such a joke to such an 
incongruent recipient.7 
This interpretation of Catullus poem 56 can be compared profitably to the appear-
ance of satiric comedian Stephen Colbert at the 2006 White House Correspondents Din-
ner on invitation from the George W. Bush Administration and the White House Press 
Corps Association.  As we saw in chapter 2 (pp. 60–61, above), different viewers of Col-
bert’s television show The Colbert Report perceive the objects of Colbert’s satiric mock-
ery as either liberals or conservatives, depending on the viewers’ own political alle-
giances.  Liberals see Colbert’s hyperbolic right-wing persona as mockery of conserva-
tive blowhards, and conservatives see Colbert as a satiric double agent, mocking liberals 
                                                
6 Thomson points out that the Cato in the poem may be Valerius Cato, a poetic colleague 
of Catullus and a member of the Neoterics; and that Cato the Younger (according to the 
testimony of Plutarch Cato Minor 7) wrote iambics, which may make him a less unsuit-
able recipient than one might think [1997/1978: 339 ad loc.]. 
7 This point is derived from a discussion that I had about Catullus poem 56 with the stu-
dents in my Latin 204 course in the spring of 2011; I thank in particular Jeremy Gerlach 
for his contribution to the discussion.  Cf. also Clarke [2002: 171]: “Catullus write[s] the 
poem to offend Cato—and amuse his more worldly friends…Catullus’s address to the 
reader…[can] scandalize or amuse the viewer.” 
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while tricking them into believing that he is one himself.  When the Bush Administration 
invited Colbert to host the Correspondents Dinner in 2006, it did so with the belief that 
his humor was in fact pro-conservative, as pointed out by LaMarre et al. [2009: 228].  
Colbert proceeded to deliver the keynote address in character, with a viciously satiric 
“tribute” to the Bush Administration’s failures and flaws (in front of President George W. 
Bush himself), and scathing mockery of the press. 
Colbert’s performance was not well received in the room itself, as attested by 
Cohen [2006b] and many others, but was an immediate success online, with more than 
2.7 million views of the speech on YouTube within two days, according to the reporting 
of Cohen [2006a].  Though the Bush Administration officials and members of the press 
did not react warmly to Colbert’s speech, his regular television viewership—whom he 
calls the “Colbert Nation”—did.  And the Colbert Nation was Colbert’s true audience: his 
performance was not for the Correspondents Dinner attendees, but rather they formed 
part of his performance for a wider audience, who joined with him in the satiric mockery 
of the Bush Administration officials and media potentates in the room.  “Colbert wasn’t 
playing to the room…but to the wide audience of people who would later watch on the 
Internet. If anything, he was playing against the room—part of the frisson of his perform-
ance was the discomfort he generated in the audience.”8 
This situation closely mirrors Catullus poem 56.  In both instances, the satiric 
speaker delivers inappropriate jokes to a nominal audience that will not receive it well.  
The true audience derives humor both from the content and from the inappropriateness of 
the satirist’s delivery of such jokes to the immediate, nominal audience.  The Catullus-
                                                
8 Poniewozik [2006]. 
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ego makes a sex joke that will irritate Cato, and the readers laugh with the ego at Cato; 
the Colbert persona gives a speech that bothers members and supporters of the Bush Ad-
ministration, and the Colbert Nation laughs with the persona at them.  Cato, the Corre-
spondents Dinner attendees, and the news reporters who described Colbert’s performance 
as unsuccessful all fall into the “don’t get it” crowd, the object of collusive laughter for 
the satirist and the “get it” crowd. 
Lucretius’ poem, we have seen, exploits just such a divided audience.  Perhaps we 
can conceive of a “Lucretius Nation,” a readership or audience already familiar with the 
philosophical doctrines and rivals of Epicureanism who can appreciate the satiric distor-
tions of opposing viewpoints, a readership that sits with the Lucretian ego upon the se-
cluded heights of philosophy and satirically peers down with Epicurean pleasure at the 
uninitiated, the un-ataractic, and the unhappy.  Now, unlike Colbert’s speech, DRN did 
not have two million people participating in the second, real audience’s laughter at the 
mockery of the nominal, internal audience.  But as Henderson writes, “what you learn 
from your teachers depends on the lesson you read them as teaching” [1989: 112; empha-
sis preserved], and readers of DRN are faced with multiple readings, by which readers 
can join DRN’s speaker in his satiric mockery of incorrect beliefs and behaviors, or can 
fail, or can reject his philosophical message—and his satire—entirely, and end up the tar-
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APPENDIX 1 
CONCORDANCE OF LUCILIAN FRAGMENTS CITED IN CHAPTER 4 
 
C = Charpin [1978–1991/2002–2003] 
M = Marx [1904/1905] 
W = Warmington [1983] 
K = Krenkel [1970] 
 
 
The symbol — indicates that the given fragment is not included (or not included as a 




C M W K  C M W K 
1.1 1 1 1  9.20 379–380 391–392 369–370 
1.2 9 2 —  9.21 319 347 322 
1.3 2 3–4 5  13.11 448 475 447 
1.12 15–16 15–16 16–17  14.8 457–458 489–490 460–461 
2.13 71 60 61  14.9 459–460 493–494 462–463 
3.7 101 117 121  15.18 480–483 520–523 482–485 
5.14 203–205 208–210 205–207  15.19 484–489 524–529 490–495 
6.1 228–229 252–253 234–235  17.2 540–546 567–573 541–547 
6.7 238–239 275–276 243–244  19.7 566 593 562 
6.18 258–259 270–271 258–259  26.6 608 726 623 
8.2 305 333 304  26.7 650 675 607 
9.1 349–350 366–367 355–356  26.37 666 654 646 
9.4 351 368 344  26.42 623 704 676 
9.5 352–355 369–372 345–348  26.54 626 717 673 
9.6 356 373 350  26.58 625 707 624 
9.7 357 374 349  26.64 635–636 676–677 660–661 
9.8 358–361 384–387 360–363  26.65 638 678 662 
9.9 362–363 375–376 351–352  26.66 639 679 659 
9.10 364–366 377–379 353–355  27.3 693 770 707 
9.11 367–368 380–381 356–357  27.4 696 769 705 
9.12 369–370 382–383 358–359  27.42 701 777 742 
9.13 371 388 364  28.11 751 815 769 
9.14 372 388 365  28.12 752 816 770 
9.15 374 393 371  28.13 754 821 771 
9.16 375–376 394–395 372–373  28.14 755–756 822–823 772–773 
9.17 381 396 374  28.15 753 820 774 
9.18 382 388 366  29.1 806–807 962 919–920 
9.19 377–378 389–390 367–368  29.2 812 973 924 
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C M W K  C M W K 
29.3 875 879 844  30.19 1014 1084 1065 
29.4 876 880 842  30.20 1035 1075 1089 
29.5 877 881 843  30.21 1021 1087 — 
29.6 874 886 849  30.22 1015 1085 1090 
29.7 870–871 882–883 845–846  30.24 1095–1096 1000–1001 1014, 1016 
29.8 872–873 885 847–848  30.25 1037–1038 1088–1089 1093–1094 
29.9 810 964 856  30.27 1032 1068 1105 
29.10 890 892 872  30.28 1017 1078 1056 
29.11 888–889 887–888 852–853  30.29 1026 1077 1052 
29.12 894 889 854  30.30 1030 1069 1034 
29.13 891–893 893–895 868–870  30.32 1033 1070 1044 
29.14 808–809 963 855, —  30.72 1034 1071 1104 
29.15 803 969 918  H.1 1100 397 1110 
29.16 805 971 923  H.3 1294–1295 1257–1258 1310–1311 
29.17 804 972 921  H.4 1215–1217 398–400 1238–1240 
29.18 802 968 917  H.10 1227 1076 1251 
29.19 815 965 863  H.11 1168 418 1188 
29.20 813–814 966–967 925–926  H.23 1326–1338 1196–1208 1342–1354 
29.21 816 948 808  H.25 1340 1271 1356 
29.22 817 897 871  H.33 1197 1188 1219 
29.23 811 970 922  H.41 1228–1234 1145–1151 1252–1258 
29.24 879 901 861  H.73 1248 1183 1265 
29.25 882 904 859  H.85 1130 232 1146 
29.26 881 903 851  H.174 1099 — 1139 
29.27 884–885 906 864–865  H.175 1110 — 1121 
29.28 887 908 867  H.176 1112 — 1123 
29.29 886 907 866  H.177 1300 — 1316 
29.30 878 900 850  H.178 295 — 295 
29.31 818–819 890–891 857–858  H.179 477 — 471 
29.73 851–852 910–911 874–875  H.180 1127 — 1142 
30.1 1008 1061 1064  H.181 45 — 40 
30.9 1079 1008 1064  H.182 1137 — 1152 
30.10 1080–1081 1009–1010 1088, 1073  H.183 1143 — 1160 
30.13 1085 1013 1066  H.184 1156 — 1174 
30.17 1020 1083 1063  H.185 1184 — 1204 
30.18 1016 1086 1067  D.21 1364–1365 — 1383–1384 
 
APPENDIX 2 
ADDITIONAL MAJOR TOPOI OF ROMAN SATIRE AND DRN 
 
At the beginning of chapter 5 I made a praeteritio of several important satiric 
tropes that are present in some form as well in DRN (p. 246, above).  These tropes are 
verbal violence, city and country, animals, disease, sexuality/masculinity, anger, and the 
use of a persona.  In this appendix I touch briefly on each, with citations to relevant 
scholarship. 
Satire teems with verbal violence—language of attack.  Emblematic are Serm. 
1.7, the tale of the “regicide” of Rupilius Rex during legal proceedings by means of 
clever and incisive satiric attack, and the iurgia of Juvenal’s poems (e.g., 5.26, 6.268).  
See Henderson [1999b: 181, 197], Schlegel [2005], Keane [2006: ch. 2], and, on violence 
and rhetoric in Aristophanes’ Clouds, O’Regan [1992].  In DRN, we might think of the 
attack on the Presocratics, the vitriolic tirades in book 3 of Natura Rerum and the ad-
dressee (directed against himself), or the pervasive, collusive use of coercive argumenta-
tion throughout the poem—all discussed in chapter 2. 
The Greek term for the exercise of free speech, often in an abusive or invective 
context, is παρρησία, on which see Diogenes of Laertius 6.69 (quoting Diogenes of 
Sinope), Scarpat [1964], Foucault [2001/1985], Sluiter & Rosen [2004b: 4–8], and Carter 
[2004: 199–202].  Philodemus, the Epicurean philosopher contemporary with Lucretius, 
wrote a treatise on this topic, titled Περὶ Παρρησίας, on which see, among others, Kon-
stan et al. [1998] and Kemp [2010]; for παρρησία as a trait particularly associated with 
Cynic philosophers, see Branham [1996: 88] and Plaza [2006: 53–54], and for matters of 
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παρρησία in the first book of Horace’s Epistulae, see Feeney [2002: 182].  The Latin 
concept that corresponded to παρρησία was no less than libertas, and it was a marker of 
the Roman male’s independent citizen status: see Wirzsubski [1950], Hellegouarc’h 
[1963: 542–565], and Freudenberg [1997].  For courtroom oratory and abusive libertas, 
see Richlin [1992/1983: 96–104], Corbeill [1996], Geiger [2002], Habinek [2005: 182], 
and van der Bloom [2010].  The satirist Lucilius was particularly associated with libertas, 
not only by subsequent satirists but even by Cicero: see Epistulae ad Familiares 12.16.3, 
cf. Anderson [1963: 73], Beacham [1991: 158–160, 189–192], and Epistulae ad Atticum 
6.3.7 with Morgan [2003, 2007: 177–178, 311 n. 101].  On issues of libertas in Horace, 
see DuQuesnay [1984: 37], Freudenburg [2001: 242–248], Feeney [2002: 172], Schlegel 
[2005: 47, 159 n. 13], Toher [2005: 188 and n. 18], and Hooley [2007: 38–39]; for com-
parative perspectives on libertas in Roman satire and American rap music, see Rosen & 
Baines [2002], Braund [2004b: 410–413, 421, 427], and Sluiter [2005]. 
For the dichotomy between city and country in Roman satire, see Dessen [1968: 
22], Braund [1989b], and Harrison [2007b].  On the countryside, Epicureanism, and the 
reception of DRN in Horace’s Epistulae, see Ferri [1993: 81–131].  Important examples 
within the genre are Serm. 2.6 (city and country mouse), 2.7.28–29 (the grass is greener 
on the other side, whether living in the city or the country); Persius 1.70–75 (poets these 
days can’t depict the lush countryside, rus saturum), 6.12–17 (the satiric persona retreats 
to the countryside, where he is “safe from the commonfolk,” securus uolgi, 12); and Ju-
venal poems 3 (Umbricius’ retreat from the savage City to more rustic environs) and 11 
(with its simple country-style feast in the city).  In DRN, there is the “picnic passage” 
(2.20–33; see pp. 151–152, above), and likewise rustic early humankind 5.1392–1141 
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(note 5.1398: agrestis…musa).  Two additional examples: at 4.580–594, satyrs and 
nymphs are thought by country bumpkins to inhabit places with much echoing (and to 
explain said echoes), and by contrast a more urban life at 6.548–551 has wagons shaking 
houses. 
Animals are of symbolic importance both to Roman satire and to Lucretius’ 
poem, as for instance the fable of the city and country mouse at Serm. 2.6.79–117, or the 
poignant image of the mother cow searching for her calf at DRN 2.352–366.  On the liter-
ary usage of animals in DRN, see, e.g., Betensky [1972], Saylor [1972], Castner [1974], 
Mechley [1988], Gale [1991], Wiseman [1992], Shelton [1995, 1996], La Penna [1995: 
32–48], Campbell [2000, 2008], and Sharrock [2006].  For satire’s take on horses, see, 
among others, Powell [1992] and Freudenburg [2001: 59–61, 96–97], as well as, on 
“horse-feed” (farrago) and the “grain-pile” (aceruus), Freudenburg [2001: 248] and 
Rocca-Serra [2010: 129].  The snarling or biting dog is an iconic metasatiric evidence for 
the satirist, as at Persius 1.107–110, with Anderson [1958], Muecke [1985], and Knight 
[1990]. 
Disease is an important trope in Roman satire, a metaphor for the moral depravity 
of targets, for the poetry and persona of the satirist, for the irrational appetites of, say, the 
greedy person, and so forth.  At Serm. 2.3.27–30, for instance, social ills are figured 
physically.  See, among others, Dessen [1968: 43–44 n. 13, 47–48, 56], Bramble [1974: 
35–39], Barchiesi & Cucchiarelli [2005], and (on Latin satire, both classical and post-
classical) Kivistö [2009].  Bogel considers the metaphor in post-classical authors of satire 
as inoculation against disease [2001: 52–55, 120, 188, 244].  DRN, too, may use disease 
as a way of marking immoral or non-ataractic beliefs and behaviors: so, for instance, the 
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speaker reminds us that a fever is the same whether we have fancy or poor coverings 
(2.34–36).  Most prominent in DRN’s discourse on disease is the plague, which (as 
Commager [1957], Segal [1990], and others have argued) puts in focus the potential dif-
ficulty of maintaining Epicurean ἀταραξία amid the gravest of ills.  Larmour [2012] 
traces connections in Juvenal poem 2 between plague and unmasculine behavior among 
elite Roman males. 
Sexuality and masculinity are (like disease) each an enormous topic, both in DRN 
and in satire, and are topics where the poems have much in common, much not in com-
mon, and much that is part more broadly of Roman (and Greek) literary and cultural dis-
courses of gender and sexuality.  For satire, see, e.g., Serm. 1.2, 1.8; Persius 1.18, 20–21, 
and 87 (Rome and its literature are over-focused on reaching orgasm, literal and meta-
phorical), with Freudenburg [2001: 151–173]; and Juvenal poems 2, 6, and 9; with, e.g., 
Smith [1980], Rudd [1986: ch. 6], Henderson [1989], Richlin [1992/1983], and, on de-
pravity, Henderson [1999b: 174, 187], Walters [1998], and Gunderson [2005] (cp. Miller 
[1998] on grotesque bodies in Roman satire, and Haß [2001] and Krenkel [2001: 132–
133] on Lucilius and Roman values concerning gender and sexuality).  For DRN, the 
most important passage is that on love and sex (4.1030–1287); cf., among others, Brown 
[1987], Nugent [1994], Nussbaum [2009/1994], and Gordon [2002]. 
Anger, and with it exaggeration and extremes, are of fundamental importance to 
satire, especially to understanding Juvenal’s poetry.  Sample passages: Serm. 1.3.76 (the 
flaw of anger, uitium irae), 1.3.136 (a Stoic fool explodes with rage), 2.2.97–98 (financial 
mismanagement causes your family to hate you, and you to hate yourself); Persius 1.12 
(sum petulanti splene), 5.54–61 (extreme lifestyles are unfulfilling); Juvenal 1.79 (facit 
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indignatio uersum), and 6.647–649 (women’s anger, ira, pushes them off the deep end, 
like rocks in a landslide).  Keane points out that Juvenal poems 13 and 15 thematically 
deal with anger and connect to Seneca’s De Ira [2007: 30, 34–35, 37 n. 23].  Cf. further, 
e.g., Muecke [1985: 113-114, 117; 2005: 34], Braund [1988; 1989b], Ramage [1989], 
Rosen [2007: 54, 224–225, 230 n. 27], Roggen [2008: 564], and my discussion of indig-
natio as an essential part of the satirist’s characterization (pp. 43–44, above).  For anger 
and political satire in Aristophanes, see Allen [2003].  Although anger logically falls 
within the category of passionate emotions that can prevent Epicurean ἀταραξία, we 
have seen that there is a role for indignation in DRN (pp. 113–123, above), and Lucretius’ 
Epicurean contemporary Philodemus discussed the uses and problems of anger in his own 
tract On Anger, cf. Asmis [2011] and Tsouna [2011]. 
For the persona in satire, see, e.g., Dessen [1968: 93], Corn [1975], Henderson 
[1993: 69, 79, 86], Braund [1996], Powell [1999: 318 n. 8], Mayer [2003], and Keane 
[2006: 10, 32, 125–126; also 2010], as well as, more generally, Guérin [2009] and 
Navaud [2011].  An important part of the narratorial persona in satire is the autobio-
graphical presentation, the claim to speak simply and sincerely: cf. Dessen [1968: 7], and 
my discussion of such presentation by satiric speakers and DRN’s speaker in chapter 2. 
